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利用者:Ordinary Fool/sandbox

トンキン湾決議
アメリカ合衆国の国章
正式題名「東南アジアにおける国際的な平和と安全の維持を促進する」合同決議
通称東南アジア決議
制定議会アメリカ合衆国第88回議会（英語版）
施行日1964年8月10日
引用
一般法律Pub.L. 88–408
Stat.78 Stat. 384
立法経緯

トンキン湾決議または東南アジア決議（Pub.L. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384 1964年8月10日制定）はトンキン湾事件への対応としてアメリカ合衆国議会が1964年8月7日に可決した合同決議（英語版）であった。

議会による正式な宣戦布告なく東南アジアで従来型の（英語版）軍事力を用いる許可をアメリカ合衆国大統領リンドン・ジョンソンに与えたために歴史的に重要である。特に決議は「東南アジア集団防衛条約加盟国や条約議定国を」援助するために必要な全てことを行う権限を大統領に与えた。これには武力に関連することも含まれた。

上院ではウェイン・モース（英語版）議員（民主党・オレゴン州）とアーネスト・グリューニング議員（民主党・アラスカ州）が反対しただけであった。グリューニング議員は「権利がなく我々の戦争でなく見当違いに動員され絶えず拡大してきている戦争の戦闘にアメリカの若者を送る」ことに異議を申し立てた。ジョンソン政権は次にベトナム共和国でのアメリカ合衆国の軍事的関与の急拡大を開始しベトナム民主共和国とアメリカ合衆国の戦端を開く決議を頼りにした。

トンキン湾事件へ

[編集]

1956年3月に北ベトナム指導部は1956年12月に南部の暴動を復活させる暫定的な方法を承認した[1]:67。共産党主導の暴動は1957年4月にゴ・ディン・ジエム政権に対して始まった。北ベトナム共産党は1959年1月の会合で南での「人民戦争」を承認し[2]:119–120、7月28日に北ベトナム軍は南部の暴動を支援するにあたりホーチミン・ルートを維持し改良するためにラオス（英語版）に侵攻した[3]:26。1960年9月に北ベトナムの南部本部であるCOSVNは政府に対する南ベトナムでの南ベトナム解放民族戦線により組織された暴動を最大限にする命令を行い、人口の3分の1が暫く共産党が支配する地域に住んでいた[2]:106–107約4万の共産主義兵士が1961年から1963年に北ベトナムから南部に潜入した[4]:76。

1963年を通じてアメリカ合衆国のジョン・F・ケネディ大統領政権は南ベトナムのゴ・ディン・ジエム政権が南南ベトナム解放民族戦線を管理する北ベトナムに敗れることを憂慮していた。このような憂慮はゴ・ディン・ジエムが1963年11月のCIAが支援するクーデターで転覆され殺されると強まった。1963年12月19日にロバート・マクナマラはサイゴンを訪れ、次の2～3か月で状況が好転しなければ状況は「現況が良くて中立化か共産党が支配する国になる可能性がある」ために「非常に不安定」であるとリンドン・ジョンソン大統領に報告した[5]。マクナマラは更に南南ベトナム解放民族戦線が「人民の多数や広大な領域を支配し予想より戦略村を破壊したり占領している」ので戦争に勝ってきていると報告した[5]。南ベトナムの軍事政権が自称する革命司令会議についてマクナマラは軍事政権は将軍が戦争のための時間のない「基本的に政治に非常に夢中になっている」ことから「優柔不断で安定しない」ので「南ベトナムにはしっかりとした政権がない」と言いながら容赦なかった[5]。

マクナマラの報告への反応として統合幕僚部はアメリカ合衆国が「我々は後手に回っている」と言って北ベトナムに対する戦略爆撃戦術を求めながら空軍司令官カーチス・ルメイ将軍と共に戦争に介入するよう求めた[5]。ルメイより少ない粗野な言葉を使いながら統合幕僚議長マクスウェル・D・テイラー将軍はジョンソンへの報告で南ベトナムはアメリカ合衆国の「共産主義との世界的な対決」に「とても重要だ」と言い、南ベトナムが南南ベトナム解放民族戦線への敗北を認めることはアジアの全てが共産主義に敗れる可能性が十分あるアメリカの「永続性や決議、信用」に対するこのような一撃になると断言した[6]。テイラーも南ベトナムが南南ベトナム解放民族戦線に敗れるのを見ることはアメリカとラテンアメリカの両方も同様に共産主義に敗れるかも知れない両国の「我が国の印象」にとって非常に危険であると主張した[6]。南ベトナムが共産主義化すれば第三世界全体が共産主義に敗れると言いながらテイラーとの支柱を与えられてアメリカ合衆国が北ベトナム爆撃を開始する「益々大胆な」手法を採用すべきと言いながら抜本的な方法を主張した[6]。記者のスタンリー・カーノウ（英語版）はテイラーは南ベトナムが陥落する最初の「ドミノ」になれば第三世界全体が可能性として共産主義に敗れるというドミノ理論の「大袈裟な」考えを表明したと書いた[6]。

ジョンソンは大統領として多くの貧民の生活環境を改善する社会法令と共にアフリカ系アメリカ人のための公民権のような国内問題に取り組むつもりでいたが、南ベトナムを「失う」ことが当時のアメリカの政治家の経歴を終えるかも知れない恐怖の非難である「共産主義に甘い」という烙印を押される原因になることを非常に恐れた[6]。「ドミノ理論」の理由であるprimat der aussenpolitik（外交の卓越）というよりは[7]ジョンソンは南ベトナムが失われるならジョセフ・マッカーシー上院議員を全国的に有名にした1949年の「中国の喪失」を引き起こしたのと同様の右翼の反動を引き起こすことを恐れる理由であるprimat der innenpolitik（内政の卓越）の方に注力した[7][8]。新しいマッカーシー型の共和党政治家が現れ国内改革を頓挫させる恐れは南ベトナムが敗れる可能性を受け入れることを拒否するジョンソンの第一の理由であった[8]。南ベトナムを「負けさせない」ジョンソンの決意はベトナムから撤退する名誉ある方法をアメリカに提供するために冷戦で南ベトナムを中立国にすることに賛成するフランスのシャルル・ド・ゴール大統領により出された平和案を拒絶するまでになった[9]。ベトナムで戦争を戦うことを熱望しなかったが、ジョンソンは1963年のクリスマスイブのパーティーでテイラーなどの幕僚幹部に次のように言った。「私を選出しそして諸君は諸君の戦争ができる。」[6]南ベトナム政治の不安定な状態はARVN（ベトナム共和国軍）が戦争に焦点を当てることが不可能なことを示していた。ジョンソンは大統領執務室の会議で「このクーデターごとき」に飽き飽きとしていると述べ、それから間もなくグエン・カーン将軍が1964年1月30日にズオン・バン・ミン将軍を倒したように別のクーデターがサイゴンで起こった[10]。

アメリカ合衆国は長らくハノイを侵略行為で非難しながら南ベトナム政府を転覆しようとしているとして北ベトナム政府を公然と非難していたが、アメリカの支援で南ベトナムも北ベトナム政府を転覆しようとしていた[11]。1961年から中央情報局（CIA）は南ベトナムの志願兵の部隊を訓練し成功例は少ないまま反共ゲリラ戦を開始する目的で北ベトナムに潜入させていた[11]。例えば1963年に北ベトナムに潜入した80隊の内全員が捕らえられ、後にあるCIA情報員に次のように言わせた。「私は敵を虐殺することに気を止めていなかったが、我々は味方を虐殺していた。」[11]1964年1月にジョンソンは北ベトナムに対するコードネーム作戦34A号（英語版）という隠密の戦争の速度を上げ強化する計画を承認した[11]。ジョンソンは作戦34A号が良ければ北ベトナムの共産党政権を転覆し悪くても南ベトナムの戦争を終えるほどに北ベトナムを弱体化できる希望があった。作戦34A号の一環として1964年2月から南ベトナムの特殊部隊がアメリカの海軍作戦司令の下で北ベトナム沿岸を海上から急襲し始めた[12]。

カーン新政権は前のミン政権が戦争を戦ったように無益なものでしかないことを証明した。1964年2月にCIAの幹部ライマン・カークパトリック（英語版）は南ベトナムを訪れ、「任務が勝利に向かっていると常に言い形勢が我々に反するものと感じている人々でさえ米国人や軍事の数に衝撃を受けた」と報告した[13]。1964年前半までのアメリカのベトナム専門家の間の一般的な統一見解は南ベトナムが「次の数週間なり数か月に暴動の脅威を持ち堪える好機がある」「南ベトナム政府や軍隊の無益さに関する明白な証明がなくとも」ある官僚が書いた通りであった[14]。公然とジョンソン政権は依然としてアメリカの介入を排除したが、内密にジョンソンは革命司令会議の反目する将軍が単に幾つかの派閥に分裂しすぎ堕落しすぎ無能すぎて戦争に勝てないのでアメリカの軍事介入のみが今南ベトナムを救えると助言するマクナマラとテイラーの助言を聞きたい気持ちになった[15]。

軍召集

[編集]

アメリカの憲法の下で議会のみが宣戦布告する権限があると述べながら1964年2月に国務省政策企画本部長官ウォルト・ロストウはベトナムにアメリカ軍を関与させる計画に重大な憲法上の問題があると指摘した[16]。ジョンソンは中国との戦争の原因になる恐れから南ベトナムに北ベトナムを侵攻させるカーンの計画に反対することを明らかにしていて、アメリカ合衆国が北ベトナムを侵攻することに余り興味がなかった[17]。アメリカ合衆国に北ベトナムに宣戦布告させるために北ベトナムに侵攻させる計り知れない国内圧力につながることになる。ジョンソンは1950年に鴨緑江にアメリカ合衆国軍が接近したことがいかに朝鮮戦争に中国を介入させたかを記憶していて、北ベトナムへの侵攻が再び中国の介入につながることを恐れた。加えて1950年と違い1964年までに中国は核兵器を持っていた。この問題を解決するためにロストウはジョンソンに議会がジョンソンがベトナムで軍を使える権限を与える決議を議決することを提案した[18]。

ロストウは1964年3月1日のメモでアメリカ合衆国海軍がハイフォンを封鎖し北ベトナムの鉄道や工場、道路、訓練施設の爆撃を開始すべきとジョンソンに助言するアジア担当副長官ウィリアム・バンディ（英語版）により支持された[19]。バンディはアメリカ合衆国の関与を強めるための計画は議会からの宣戦布告を「普通は必要とする」と述べた[20]。バンディは目下のところジョンソンには依然としてベトナムでの「選択目標」しかないために宣戦布告の「率直な手段」に反対して助言したが、憲法の上の理由からベトナムでの計画された増大する関与を議会に支持させるには不十分になると述べた[20]。バンディはこの問題に対する「最良の答え」は1955年1月に中国の侵攻から台湾を守るのに「必要と考えるために」軍事力を使用する権限をアイゼンハワー大統領に与えた台湾決議（英語版）に賛成投票した際の上院議員としてのジョンソン自身の経験した事件であると主張した[20]。この時台湾海峡危機は依然として台湾の国民党政権により支配されている台湾海峡の7つの島を砲撃する中国共産党と共に激しく続き、多くの人がアイゼンハワーに台湾防衛で戦争開始の法的権限を与える議会の議決が危機を終えたと考えた。

ジョンソンが上院の多数党党首として支援し他の上院議員に賛成票を投じるよう影響力の全てを行使した1955年と違い現在の上院の多数党党首マイケル・マンスフィールドは南ベトナムを支援するのに米軍を使用することに懐疑的であった[21]。カトリックの「公正な戦争」の定義に合致する戦争を支援する意思しかない敬虔なカトリックマンスフィールドは嘗て議事堂では南ベトナムの最も熱烈な支持者であったが、1962年後半に南ベトナムを訪問すると政権はまさに打倒するために戦う南南ベトナム解放民族戦線のように専制的であると述べながら見てきたことにより非常にがっかりして帰国した[22]。マンスフィールドに加えてバンディは議会のみが宣戦布告する権限があるという意見を強硬に展開することで知られ議会の権限を弱めるとして台湾決議のような決議を深く嫌がる頑固で文句の多い人物であるウェイン・モース（英語版）上院議員から問題を予言された[21]。バンディは大統領に議会の「疑い深い友人」がアメリカ合衆国が「停戦し交渉する」ことについて「すさまじい圧力」を課す機会を東南アジアの戦争にアメリカの欧州同盟国に与えることを願う決議を延期させるかもしれないと警告した[21]。

マクナマラは1964年3月8日から4日間南ベトナムを訪問し、ワシントンに戻るに当たって1963年12月よりも悲観的でさえあった[23]。マクナマラはジョンソンに農村部の40％は現在南ベトナム解放民族戦線の「支配下か顕著な影響を受けている」ので前回12月の訪問から状況は「疑いなく悪化している」と報告した[24]。マクナマラは更にARVNの脱走率は「高く増加してきていて」、南ベトナム解放民族戦線は「精力的に新兵を募集し」、南ベトナム人民は「無気力と無関心に」打ち負かされ、「最大の弱点」はいかなる瞬間でも別のクーデターで転覆される可能性のあるカーン政権の「はっきりしない実行可能性」であると報告した[24]。マクナマラの報告に応えて国家安全保障会議は南ベトナムが「敗れる」なら南ベトナムでの共産主義の勝利はアメリカの同盟国はどこもアメリカの約束を信じないほどにアメリカの威信を傷付けると主張しながら南ベトナムへの軍事援助を増やすことを求めながら「行動備忘録」を発行しベトナムはアメリカの国際的な指導力の「テストケース」であると断言した[24]。南ベトナムが「敗れる」ならアメリカ合衆国が世界の大国であることを止めるというメロドラマのような主張と共にこの過酷な時期のベトナム戦争を表現することで「行動備忘録」は視覚的にアメリカの介入を保障した[24]。

当時モースはジョンソンのベトナム政策を批判する数人の内の一人であった。1964年4月の演説でモースはこの戦争を「マクナマラの戦争」と呼び、次のように主張した。「マクナマラ国防長官の下でアメリカ合衆国がベトナムでの違法で愚かな戦争を戦っているという私の主張に誰も答えていない。」[25]国際法を侵害していると攻撃しながらモースはジョンソンのベトナム政策への批判で歯に衣着せないままであった。1964年5月13日にバンディはモースと合意する最善の方法を討議する会合を呼び掛けた[25]。バンディの補佐官ジョナサン・ムーア（英語版）は国際法に基づいて戦争拡大を主張することになれば政権は「相当薄い氷」に乗る点でモースは正しいと助言した[25]。モースが法律面の主張で強硬であると感じられたためにムーアは政権が「一般的な（実践的で政治的な）理論的根拠に急速にギアを移動し」可能な限りモースを無視するよう要請した[26]。バンディは決議案はジョンソンに「マンスフィールド上院議員とエイケン上院議員が音頭を取る学派の十分な支援を」与え「モース上院議員と数人の仲間からの頑固な反対を自分達に押し付ける」と考えた[26]。

1964年5月27日にジョンソンはリチャード・ラッセル・ジュニアに知られずに記録するベトナムに関する討議のために大統領執務室に助言者ラッセルを招待した[27]。「中国との戦争は今までに見た酷い最悪の失敗」であり南ベトナムは「大して重要では」ないと言いながらラッセルはアメリカがベトナムに関わると中国との戦争になると予言した[27]。ジョンソンは専門家は中国は参戦しないと考えていると述べたが、専門家は1950年に同じことを言ったと意見を言った[28]。ジョンソンは殆どの世論調査によるとアメリカ人の63％がベトナムについて知らないか関心がなくこのことが1964年に今までにベトナムで戦って死んだアメリカの軍事顧問官35人の問題を生じさせていると述べた[28]。ラッセルはアメリカ人はベトナム死ぬ人よりもアトランタの自動車事故で死ぬ人の方が多いと述べ、更に多くのアメリカ人が死ねば大衆の意見は代わるかもしれないと警告した[28]。「ロッジは彼の地で野蛮人と交渉していると考えている。そして自分は皇帝でありただ何をすべきが告げるつもりでいるに過ぎない。私の中では彼の地でジエムに殺させたことは疑いがない」と言いながらアメリカの駐南ベトナム大使ヘンリー・カボット・ロッジ・ジュニアが傲慢すぎるとしてラッセルは解任した[28]。ジョンソンはゴ兄弟が「悲惨な失政」を殺すのを見ることをクーデターと呼び、ロッジのせいにした[29]。On 27 May 1964, Johnson invited his mentor, Senator  リチャード・ラッセル・ジュニア to the Oval Office for a discussion about Vietnam that, unknown to the latter, he recorded.[27] Russell predicted that American involvement in Vietnam would lead to a war with China, saying "it's the damned worst mess I ever saw" and South Vietnam was "not important a damned bit".[27] Johnson stated that his experts believed that China would not enter the war, but commented the experts had said the same thing in 1950.[28] Johnson noted that according to most polls 63% of Americans did not know or care about Vietnam; those who did were making an issue of the 35 American advisers killed fighting in Vietnam so far in 1964.[28] Russell noted that more Americans were killed in car accidents in Atlanta than had been killed in Vietnam but warned that public opinion could change if more Americans were killed.[28] Russell dismissed the American ambassador to South Vietnam, ヘンリー・カボット・ロッジ・ジュニア, as too arrogant, saying "He's thinks he's dealing with barbarian tribes out there. And he's the emperor and he's just going to tell them what to do. There's no doubt in my mind that he had ol'Diem killed out there".[28] Johnson called the coup that saw the Ngo brothers killed "a tragic mistake", which he blamed on Lodge.[29] Russell suggested making Lodge into the "fall guy" for the failures of South Vietnam and urged Johnson to send an expert who was "not scared to death of McNamara" to go to South Vietnam to recommend a withdrawal, saying preferably the expert should be a war hero from World War Two, suggesting オマール・ブラッドレー or en:Lucius D. Clay as possible candidates.[29] Johnson was intrigued by Russell's suggestion, but then changed the subject by calling Mansfield a "Milquetoast with no spine", saying contemptuously of Manfield's plans for an international conference to settle the Vietnam war: "Conferences aint' going to do a damn bit of good".[29] Russell warned Johnson against relying too much on McNamara, saying: "McNamara is the smartest fella any of us know. But he's got so much-he's opinionated as hell-and he's made up his mind".[30] Johnson expressed his confidence in McNamara, saying he was the most intelligent man he knew and said he was trying to buy time until the elections were over in November before deciding what to do.[30] However, he complained: "But those politicians got to raising hell, and Scripps-Howard writing these stories, and all the Senators, and Nixon, Rockefeller and Goldwater--let's move, let's go in the North".[30] After discussing the failure of the bombing campaign against North Korea in the Korean war, both men agreed that North Vietnam would not be defeated by strategic bombing.[30] Johnson concluded: "Well, they'd impeach a president that runs out, wouldn't they? Outside of Morse, everybody says you got to go in".[30]

By late May 1964, a rough draft of the resolution that was to become the Gulf of Tonkin resolution had been completed by Bundy which, if passed by Congress, would give Johnson the legal power to use force to defend any nation in Southeast Asia threatened by "Communist aggression or subversion".[21] By the beginning of June 1964, the final draft of the resolution had been completed and all that remained to do was to submit it to Congress.[31] The acting Attorney General, en:Nicholas Katzenbach, called resolution the "functional equivalent of a declaration of war".[31] The U.S Air Force had already selected 94 sites in North Vietnam to be bombed while the U.S. Navy had moved a carrier task force into the Gulf of Tonkin with the orders to be prepared for "reprisal bombings" of North Vietnam.[31] Initially, the plans called for the United States to respond to guerrilla attacks in South Vietnam with bombing raids over North Vietnam, and then Johnson would submit the resolution to Congress sometime in late June 1964.[32] At the time, Congress was preoccupied with the Civil Rights Act, which was intended to outlaw segregation, a bill that Johnson had supported and was met with fierce resistance from Southern senators and congressmen who did everything within their power to "kill the bill". Johnson wanted the Civil Rights Act passed before submitting the resolution to Congress.[21] On 15 June 1964, National Security Adviser en:McGeorge Bundy told the National Security Council that the president did not feel that Viet Cong attacks on the South Vietnamese government were a sufficient casus belli as Johnson wanted a North Vietnamese attack on American forces as his casus belli, arguing that Congress would be more likely to pass the resolution if it was in response to the latter rather than the former.[31] On 18 June 1964, the Canadian diplomat en:J. Blair Seaborn, who served as Canada's representative on the International Control Commission, arrived in Hanoi carrying a secret message from Johnson that North Vietnam would suffer the "greatest devastation" from American bombing if it continued on its present course.[33] Towards the end of June, Johnson asked Secretary of State en:Dean Rusk to provide a legal basis for the United States to fight in Vietnam, and he suggested the SEATO treaty would be sufficient.[34] In June 1964, the American ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, resigned in order to seek the Republican nomination for president. Johnson appointed Taylor as the new ambassador with orders to make the South Vietnamese fight.[35] Taylor's successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General Earle "Bus" Wheeler.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident

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→詳細は「Gulf of Tonkin incident」を参照

Soviet-North Vietnamese relations had become badly strained in the early 1960s as North Vietnam moved closer to China, the more militant and aggressive of the two warring Communist giants.[36] When Mao Zedong denounced Nikita Khrushchev for his "cowardice" for choosing a diplomatic compromise to settle the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 instead of a nuclear war against the United States as Mao preferred, North Vietnamese newspapers approvingly cited his remarks.[36] Likewise, when Khrushchev signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Mao again mocked him for his moderation, and was again approvingly quoted by North Vietnamese newspapers.[36] In a bid to recapture influence lost to China, the Soviet Union sold North Vietnam a radar system that was far more advanced than anything China could produce together with batteries of SAMs (surface-to-air missiles).[37] All through the spring and summer of 1964, Soviet workers were building and installing radar stations together with SAM batteries all over North Vietnam while training the North Vietnamese in their use.[37] As the U.S. Air Force and Navy were developing their plans at the same time to bomb North Vietnam, both the admirals and Air Force generals insisted that they needed more information about the radar network the Soviets were installing, most notably the frequencies the radar used in order to develop jamming mechanisms.[37] As a result, the U.S. Navy began to increase DESOTO patrols off the coast of North Vietnam.[37] The Navy's tactic was to have South Vietnamese commandos land to attack the North Vietnamese radar stations, forcing the operators to turn on the radars, which thereby allowed the Americans to learn what frequencies they used.[37] The South Vietnamese commandos were landed in light, Norwegian-built patrol boats made of aluminium and armed with machine guns and cannons known as the Swift boats.[37]

By July 1964, the rugged coastline of North Vietnam with its islands, bays, and estuaries was a war zone with South Vietnamese commandos constantly landing to raid while the North Vietnamese made vigorous efforts to stop the raids.[38] In support of the raids, an American destroyer, the USS Maddox was deployed to the Gulf of Tonkin with orders to collect electronic intelligence on the North Vietnamese radar system.[39] Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., the commander of the Pacific fleet ordered Captain John J. Herrick of the Maddox not to go any closer than 8 miles from the coast of North Vietnam and no more than 4 miles from any of the archipelagos off the coast.[39] The French had claimed control of only 3 miles of the waters off the coastline of Indochina, a claim that North Vietnam had inherited.[39] Subsequently, the North Vietnamese had extended their claim to control of waters 12 miles off their coastline, a claim the United States had declined to recognize.[39] On 30 July 1964, South Vietnamese commandos tried to attack the North Vietnamese radar station on the island of Hon Me, but were detected as they were coming in, leading the North Vietnamese to open fire, making any landing impossible.[40] The radar on Hon Me was turned on, and the Maddox stationed off the coast picked up the radar frequency being used.[40] North Vietnam made a formal protest about the raid to the International Control Commission consisting of delegations of diplomats from India, Canada and Poland that were supposed to enforce the Geneva Accords, accusing the United States of being behind the raid.[40]     

President Johnson as he signs the resolution on 10 August 1964

The Template:USS, a U.S. destroyer, was conducting a DESOTO patrol in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964, when it reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats from the 135th Torpedo Squadron,[41] which were attempting to close their range on Maddox for effective torpedo fire (1,000 yards was maximum effective range for the torpedoes)[42][43] Maddox fired over 280 5-inch shells[44] and the boats expended their 6 torpedoes (all misses) and some 14.5-mm machinegun fire. Breaking contact, the combatants commenced going their separate ways, when the three torpedo boats, T-333, T-336, and T-339 were then attacked by four USN F-8 Crusader jet fighter bombers from the aircraft carrier Template:USS.[45] The Crusaders reported no hits with their Zuni rockets, but damaged all three torpedo boats with 20-mm cannons.

Johnson was informed of the incident and -- in the first use of the "hotline" to Moscow installed after the Cuban Missile Crisis -- called Khrushchev in the Kremlin to say that the United States did not want war, but he hoped that the Soviets would use their influence to persuade North Vietnam to not attack American warships.[46] Though Johnson now had an "incident" at sea involving a North Vietnamese attack against American warships, he declined to use it as a reason to present a resolution to Congress. Johnson's fear was that the North Vietnamese could claim that the attempted raid on the radar station on Hon Me on July 30 gave them legitimate fears that the Maddox might have been moving in for a new attack.[47] Johnson wanted an "incident" where it was unambiguous that the North Vietnamese were the aggressors by attacking American warships in waters that the American regarded as international.

Out of the hope of provoking such an incident, Johnson ordered the Maddox to continue to cruise off the coast of North Vietnam, to be joined by another destroyer, USS Turner Joy, with orders "to attack any force that attacks them".[47] Both destroyers were ordered to sail 8 miles from North Vietnam in waters that Americans asserted were international waters, disregarding North Vietnam's claim to the 12-mile limit.[47] The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, ordered his staff to "pull together" the resolution Bundy had written in May–June, just in case Johnson decided to submit it to Congress.[47] On 3 August 1964, the South Vietnamese in their Swift boats raided Cape Vinhson and Cua Ron.[48] The cruise of the American destroyers was not directly connected to the raid, but Herrick knew from reading the summaries of decrypted North Vietnamese radio messages that the North Vietnamese believed that it was.[48] Herrick received orders to "show the gauntlet" and prove to the North Vietnamese that the Americans would sail off North Vietnam in waters that the Americans insisted were international waters.[48] 

Two days later on a very stormy night on 4 August 1964, Maddox and the destroyer Turner Joy both reported to be under attack again, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats; during this alleged engagement, Turner Joy fired approximately 220 3-inch & 5-inch shells at surface targets showing on the radar.[49][48] In response to the reported attack, aircraft from the Ticonderoga were launched, but the pilots reported no visual contact with any craft other than the two destroyers.[48] Hanoi subsequently insisted that it had not launched a second attack. Though Herrick had reported an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, he soon developed strong doubts about whatever an attack had actually occurred.[50] Herrick reported to Admiral Sharp that the "torpedo boats" were almost certainly radar blips due to the "freak weather effects" caused by the storm and that an "overeager" sonar operator aboard the Maddox had mistaken the effects of the storm for torpedoes.[50] Herrick's report concluded with the statement the "entire action leaves many doubts" as he noted that no sailor aboard his ship had seen a torpedo boat nor had heard any gunfire beyond the guns of the Turner Joy.[50] Likewise no sailor aboard the Turner Joy claimed to have seen any North Vietnamese craft and none of the pilots of the Crusader aircraft stated they had seen any torpedo boats.[50]

A later investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that Maddox had been on an electronic intelligence (DESOTO) mission. It also learned that the U.S. Naval Communication Center in the Philippine Islands, in reviewing the ships' messages, had questioned whether any second attack had actually occurred.[51] In 2005, an internal National Security Agency historical study was declassified; it concluded that Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese Navy on August 2 but that there may not have been any North Vietnamese Naval vessels present during the engagement of August 4. The report stated:

It is not simply that there is a different story as to what happened; it is that no attack happened that night. ... In truth, Hanoi's navy was engaged in nothing that night but the salvage of two of the boats damaged on August 2.[52]

In 1965, President Johnson commented privately: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there."[53]

Congress votes

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Early on the morning of 04 August 1964, Johnson told several congressmen at a meeting that North Vietnam had just attacked an American patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters and promised retaliation.[50] At the same time, Johnson also stated that he wanted Congress to vote for a resolution of support.[50] After the meeting, Johnson told one of his aides, Kenny O'Donnell, that he felt he was "being tested" by North Vietnam with both agreeing that how the president handled the crisis would affect the election.[50] O'Donnell recalled that Johnson's main fear was the incident might allow his Republican opponent in the election, Senator Barry Goldwater, a chance to gain in the polls.[50] O'Donnell added that Johnson felt that he "must not allow them [the Republicans] to accuse him of vacillating or being an indecisive leader".[50]

The equivocal nature of Captain Herrick's reports were a worrisome factor, and Johnson informed McNamara, the member of the cabinet that he trusted the most, to ensure that the naval report remove all of the ambiguous elements.[50] In turn, McNamara phoned Admiral Sharp to say the president was keen to launch a retaliatory raid, but could not move "unless we are dammed sure what happened".[50] Admiral Sharp in turn applied strong pressure on Herrick to "confirm absolutely" that his patrol had been just attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.[50] Admiral Sharp in a telephone call at 2:08 pm to the Air Force general David A. Burchinal stated he had no doubt that the second attack had occurred, and expressed his annoyance at Herrick for his doubts.[54] Just forty minutes later, Herrick sent a message on the radio saying "Certain that the original ambush was bona fide".[54] 

At the same time that Sharp was pressuring Herrick, Johnson had summoned McNamara to the White House to point out to him the best places to bomb in North Vietnam.[55] The British ambassador, Lord Harlech, and the West German ambassador, Karl Heinrich Knappstein, were summoned to the State Department to be told that the United States would be launching a major bombing raid on North Vietnam very soon.[55] A press release from the Defense Department accused North Vietnam of a "second deliberate attack" on American warships in international waters.[55] At a meeting of the National Security Council, Rusk pressed for a bombing raid, saying the second alleged attack was more serious of the two incidents and that it indicated that North Vietnam wanted war with the United States.[54] The CIA director John A. McCone in response stated that his agency believed that North Vietnam did not want war with America, saying that North Vietnam was acting "out of pride" and anger over the violation of its sovereignty with American warships sailing through its waters and South Vietnamese commandos attacking its shore.[54] However, McCone accused North Vietnam of "upping the ante" and stated he supported the idea of bombing raids.[54] Carl Rowan of the U.S. Information Agency and the lone black man at the meeting said his agency would have to justify any bombing raid and to rebut charges that the United States had fabricated the incidents, leading McNamara to say that there was no doubt that both incidents had occurred.[54] McNamara wanted another DeSoto patrol off North Vietnam, but Undersecretary of State George Ball made an impassioned speech, saying: "Mr. President, I urge you not to make that decision. Suppose one of the destroyers is sunk with several hundred men aboard. Inevitably, there'll be a Congressional investigation. What would your defense be?...Just think what Congress and the world press would do with that! They would say that Johnson had thrown away lives just to have an excuse to bomb the North. Mr. President you couldn't live with that."[54] In response, Johnson told McNamara: "We won't go ahead with it, Bob. Let's put it on the shelf".[54]

The National Security Agency (NSA) had broken North Vietnam's codes, and McNamara emphasized to Johnson that certain decrypts conveyed that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had been damaged by American destroyers, thus proving that the second incident happened.[56] However, several intelligence analyses at the time accused McNamara of having either misinterpreted, either intentionally or by mistake, decrypts referring to the first incident of August 2 and presenting them as referring to the second alleged incident of August 4.[57] Ray S. Cline, the deputy director of the CIA later stated: "I felt from the start that the second incident had been questionable, but I simply wasn't sure. However, after a number of days collating and examining the reports relating to the second incident, I concluded that they were either unsound or that they dealt with the first incident".[58] Cline was told to keep his doubts to himself.

Johnson invited 18 senators and congressmen led by Mansfield to the White House to inform them he had ordered a bombing raid on North Vietnam and asked for their support for a resolution.[59] Johnson began the meeting with a warning: "It is dangerous to have the leaders come here. The reporters see they are coming and they go back and report all over the Hill. Some of our boys are floating in the water. The facts we would like to present to you are to be held in the closest confidence and are to be kept in this room until announced".[60] Congressman Charles A. Halleck denied leaking the meeting, saying "I did not tell a damn person".[60] The atmosphere of the meeting with Johnson saying that the American warplanes were on their way to bomb North Vietnam made it difficult for those present to oppose the president, out of the fear of appearing unpatriotic.[60] Most of the congressional leaders were supportive, through Mansfield still had doubts, saying he preferred the matter be referred to the United Nations.[60] Rusk assured Mansfield that he would have liked to take the matter up at the UN, but the possibility of a Soviet veto at the UN left the president no choice.[60] Johnson told Mansfield the UN was not an option and that: "I have told you what I want from you".[61] Senator George Aiken told the president about the proposed resolution: "By the time you send it up, there won't be anything for us to do, but support you".[62] Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper argued that there was no point in inquiring if the second incident had occurred or not, saying it was imperative that the United States must strike North Vietnam at once to show strength.[60] Rusk told the congressional leaders: "We are trying to get across two points-one, leave your neighbor alone and, two, if you don't we will have to get busy".[60] About the fact that Radio Hanoi had admitted to the first incident, but denied the second, Rusk used the radio broadcasts to argue for the malevolence and dishonesty of North Vietnam, saying: "They have not talked about what did happen, but what did not happen".[60]  After the meeting, Johnson summoned his National Security Adviser, McGeorge "Mac" Bundy, to tell him: "You know that resolution your brother's been talking about for the past few months? Well, now's the time to get it through Congress."[63] When Bundy replied "Mr. President, that seems too fast for me", Johnson growled "I didn't ask you that question. I want you to do it."[63] 

Within hours, President Johnson ordered the launching of retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) on the bases of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats and announced, in a television address to the American public that same evening, that U.S. naval forces had been attacked. Johnson in his television address announced: "Repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak tonight".[55] Johnson requested approval of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia", stating that the resolution should express support "for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces", but repeated previous assurances that "the United States ... seeks no wider war". As the nation entered the final three months of political campaigning for the 1964 elections (in which Johnson was standing for election), the president contended that the resolution would help "hostile nations ... understand" that the United States was unified in its determination "to continue to protect its national interests".[64] The media reaction to the raid was highly favorable with The New York Times declaring in an editorial that those doubted if Johnson could handle pressure "were saying that they now had a commander-in-chief who was better under pressure than they had ever seen him".[62] A rare dissenting voice was the veteran left-wing journalist I.F. Stone who argued that the raid was illegal stating the League of Nations Covenant, the Kellog-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter had banned reprisals in peacetime.[63] Stone wrote in an editorial: "Hackworth's Digest, the State Department's huge Talmud of international law, quotes an old War Department manual, Rules of Land Warfare, as authoritative on the subject. This says reprisals are never to be taken 'merely for revenge', but only as an unavoidable last resort 'to enforce the rules of civilized warfare'. And they should not exceed the degree of violence committed by the enemy".[63] Stone argued that no damage had been done to either destroyer, but contrast the American bombing raid had destroyed a naval base and an oil storage facility in North Vietnam.[63]

On 5 August 1964, Johnson submitted the resolution to Congress, which if passed would give him the legal power to "take all necessary measures" and "prevent further aggression" as well as allowing him to decide when "peace and security" in Southeast Asia were attained.[58] Johnson commented the resolution was "like grandma's nightshirt-it covered everything".[58] Despite his public claims of "aggression", Johnson in private believed that the second incident had not taken place, saying at a meeting in the Oval Office in his Texas twang: "Hell, those dumb stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish".[58] The president's two chosen instruments for passing the resolution were the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Senator J. William Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[58] McNamara had the image of the "whiz kid", a man of almost superhuman intelligence and ability whose computer-generated graphs and spreadsheets showed the best way to "scientifically" solve any problem.[58] McNamara, whose statements always seemed to be backed up by the Pentagon's computers had the ability to "dazzle" Congress and whatever he requested of Congress tended to be approved.[58] Fulbright, through too much an individualist and an intellectual to fit into the Senate's "Club", was widely respected as the Senate's resident foreign policy expert and as a defender of Congress's prerogatives.[65] If Fulbright backed the resolution, Johnson knew that he would probably carry over the doubters and waverers, of which there were several.[65] Johnson knew that the conservative Republicans together with the conservative Southern Democrats would vote for the resolution, but he did not want to be dependent upon their support for his foreign policy as his domestic policies were anathema to them.[65] From Johnson's viewpoint, having liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans vote for the resolution would free his hands to carry out the domestic reforms he wanted to have Congress pass after the election.[65]  

On 5 August 1964, Fulbright arrived at the White House to meet Johnson, where the president asked his old friend to use all his influence to get the resolution passed.[66] Johnson insisted quite vehemently to Fulbright that the alleged attack on the destroyers had taken place and it was only later that Fulbright became skeptical about whether the alleged attack had really taken place.[66] Furthermore, Johnson insisted the resolution, which was a "functional equivalent to a declaration of war" was not intended to be used for going to war in Vietnam.[66] In the 1964 election, the Republicans had nominated Goldwater as their candidate, who ran on a platform accusing Johnson of being "soft on Communism" and by contrast promised a "total victory" over Communism. Johnson argued to Fulbright that the resolution was an election year stunt that would prove to the voters that he was really "tough on Communism" and thus dent the appeal of Goldwater by denying him of his main avenue of attack.[66] Besides for the primat der innenpolitik reason Johnson gave for the resolution, he also gave a primat der aussenpolitik reason, arguing that such a resolution would intimidate North Vietnam into ceasing to try to overthrow the government of South Vietnam, and as such Congress passing a resolution would make American involvement in Vietnam less likely rather than more likely.[66] Fulbright's longstanding friendship with Johnson made it difficult for him to go against the president, who cunningly exploited Fulbright's vulnerability, namely his desire to have greater influence over foreign policy.[66] Johnson gave Fulbright the impression that he would be one of his unofficial advisers on foreign policy and that he was very interested in turning his ideas into policies, provided that he voted for the resolution, which was a test of their friendship.[66] Johnson also hinted that he was thinking about sacking Rusk if he won the 1964 election and would consider nominating Fulbright to be the next Secretary of State.[66] Fulbright had much contempt for whoever happened to be Secretary of State, always believing that he understood foreign policy better than any of them, and had a particular contempt for Rusk, so the offer to be Secretary of State was tempting for him.[67] Fulbright also felt a strong rapport with his fellow Southerner Johnson, the first Southern president since Wilson.[67]  Finally, for Fulbright in 1964 it was inconceivable that Johnson would lie to him and he believed the resolution "was not going to be used for anything other than the Tonkin Gulf incident itself" as Johnson had told him.[66] Johnson told Fulbright he wanted the resolution passed by the widest possible margin to show North Vietnam that Congress was united behind the administration.[65] Despite all of Johnson's efforts, there was little danger of the resolution not being passed. A public opinion poll at the time showed that 85% of Americans felt that Congress should pass the resolution.[58]    

On 6 August 1964, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara testified before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. He stated that Maddox had been "carrying out a routine mission of the type we carry out all over the world at all times" and denied that it had been in any way involved in South Vietnamese patrol boat raids on the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu on the nights of July 30 and July 31.[51] In his testimony, McNamara accused North Vietnam of "aggression" and of an "unprovoked attack" on the destroyers.[68] Senator Wayne Morse had been tipped off by a source inside the Pentagon about Operation 34A, and asked McNamara about there was any connection between the activities of the Maddox and Operation 34A, leading to a blunt denial.[68] In response to Morse's question, McNamara answered dismissively: "Our navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any...I say this flatly. This is a fact".[68] The administration did not, however, disclose that the island raids, although separate from the mission of Maddox, had been part of a program of clandestine attacks on North Vietnamese installations called Operation Plan 34A. These operations were carried out by U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos under the control of a special operations unit of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam called the Studies and Operations Group.[69]

Despite McNamara's statement, Morse appeared before an almost empty Senate later on 6 August 1964 to say: "The place to settle the controversy is not on the battlefield but around the conference table".[68] Morse was supported only by Senator Ernest Gruening who stated in a speech "all Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy".[68] Senator Richard Russell Jr., who previously had doubts about Vietnam and whose long-standing friendship with Johnson had just been severely tested by the latter's support for the Civil Rights Act, supported the resolution, saying: "Our national honor is at stake. We cannot and will not shrink from defending it".[68] On 6 August 1964, Fulbright gave a speech on the Senate floor calling for the resolution to be passed as he accused North Vietnam of "aggression" and praised Johnson for his "great restraint...in response to the provocation of a small power".[70] He also declared his support for the Johnson administration's "noble" Vietnam policy, which he called a policy of seeking "...to establish viable, independent states in Indochina and elsewhere which will be free and secure from the combination of Communist China and Communist North Vietnam".[70] Fulbright concluded that this policy could be accomplished via diplomatic means and echoing Johnson's thesis, argued that it was necessary to pass the resolution as a way to intimidate North Vietnam who would presumably change their policies towards South Vietnam once Congress passed the resolution.[70] Fulbright called the resolution a mechanism "calculated to prevent the spread of war".[65]

At a crucial meeting of several senators, Fulbright was able to persuade them to support the resolution.[65] Several Senators such as Allen J. Ellender, Jacob Javits, John Sherman Cooper, Daniel Brewster, George McGovern and Gaylord Nelson were very reluctant to vote for a resolution that would be a "blank cheque" for a war in southeast Asia, and at the meeting Fulbright called to discuss the issue, he argued that passing a resolution would make fighting a war less likely, claiming the whole purpose of the resolution was only intimidation.[70] Nelson wanted to add an amendment forbidding Johnson from sending troops to fight in Vietnam unless Congress gave its approval first, saying he did not like the open-ended nature of the resolution.[65][71] Fulbright dissuaded him, saying he had the president's word that "the last thing we want to do is become involved in a land war in Asia".[65] Fulbright argued to Nelson the resolution was "harmless" while saying that the real purpose of the resolution was "to pull the rug out from under Goldwater", going on to ask Nelson who did he prefer to win the election, Johnson or Goldwater?[71] From the viewpoint of Nelson, a liberal Democrat known for his support of environmentalism, Johnson was a far more preferable president than Goldwater, the leader of the right-wing of the Republican Party.

After less than nine hours of committee consideration and floor debate, Congress voted, on 10 August 1964, on a joint resolution authorizing the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom" (H.J. RES 1145 1964). The unanimous affirmative vote in the House of Representatives was 416–0. (However, Republican Congressman Eugene Siler of Kentucky, who was not present but opposed the measure, was "paired" with another member who favored the resolution—i.e., his opposition was not counted, but the vote in favor was one less than it would have been.) The Senate conferred its approval by a vote of 88–2. Some members expressed misgivings about the measure, but in the end, Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska cast the only nay votes.[72] At the time, Senator Morse warned that "I believe this resolution to be a historic mistake."[73] Morse also predicted that those who voted for the resolution "will live to regret it".[65] Much to Johnson's satisfaction, Senator Goldwater voted for the resolution as appropriate, which allowed the president to present himself as just as "tough on Communism" as his opponent.[67]   

After the resolution was passed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John W. McCormack called Johnson to congratulate him.[74] The call was recorded and Johnson spent much time denouncing Morse as mentally unstable and untrustworthy while he called Gruening an ingrate, saying "He's just no good. I've spent millions on him up in Alaska".[74] Rostow was ebullient and stated: "The second attack probably hadn't happened, but it was the chance to do what we should have been doing all along".[74]

As a policy instrument

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The passage of the resolution alarmed several American allies who preferred that the United States not fight in Vietnam such as Canada. J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian diplomat who served as Canada's representative to the International Control Commission engaged in secret "shuttle diplomacy" carrying messages back and forth from Hanoi to Washington in an attempt to stop the escalation of the war.[65] On 13 August 1964, Seaborn arrived in Hanoi to meet the North Vietnamese Premier, Phạm Văn Đồng.[65] Seaborn told Đồng that based on his recent meetings with Johnson that he was seriously using the powers he just gained from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to go to war, but also stated that Johnson was willing to offer "economic and other benefits" if only North Vietnam ceased trying to overthrow the government of South Vietnam.[65] Seaborn further stated that Johnson had told him that North Vietnam would "suffer the consequences" if it continued on its "present course".[75] Đồng rejected the offer, saying he would rather see the war engulf "the whole of Southeast Asia" than to abandon the vision of one Communist Vietnam.[75]

Though Johnson now had the power to wage war in Vietnam, he proved reluctant to use it, instead hoping that Ambassador Taylor could somehow pressure the South Vietnamese to fight better.[76] On 11 August 1964, William Bundy wrote a memo on the "next course of action", under which predicated that unless South Vietnamese "morale and momentum" could be improved, the regime of General Khanh would collapse.[77] Bundy recommended a programme of gradually increasing escalation to achieve "maximum results for minimal risks".[77] Bundy argued for August, the United States should do nothing to "take onus off the Communist side for escalation".[78] Starting in September, the memo advocated more DESOTO patrols, 34A raids, and for the United States to start bombing the part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail running through neutral Laos.[78] In January 1965, Bundy stated the "next move upward" would begin with a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam.[78] Taylor objected to Bundy's plan, stating if the U.S started bombing North Vietnam, it would trigger a North Vietnamese response that the South Vietnamese would not be able to handle on their own.[78] Taylor, who had become increasingly disillusioned with South Vietnam as Khanh drove him to exasperation with his stupidity wrote: "We should not get involved militarily with North Vietnam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Vietnam is insecure and Khanh's army is tied down everywhere by the Vietcong insurgency".[78] General Wheeler and the rest of Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected Taylor's advice and advocated an immediate strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam.[79] On 7 September 1964, Johnson called a meeting at the White House attended by McNamara, Rusk, Wheeler, the Bundy brothers and Taylor to discuss what to do.[80] Taylor conceded that there "only the emergence of an exceptional leader could improve the situation and there is no George Washington in sight".[81] The meeting concluded that the U.S. would react "as appropriate" against "any" attacks against American forces.[81] A war game conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1963 code-named Sigma I found that the U.S. would have to commit half-million troops to have a chance of victory in Vietnam; its sequel code-named Sigma II in September 1964 reached the same conclusion and found that despite the claims of General LeMay that a strategical bombing campaign would not be decisive, instead stating that the war would only be won on the ground.[81]  

On 1 November 1964, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the American air field at the Bien Hoa Air Base, killing 5 American servicemen and destroying 6 B-57 bombers.[82] Wheeler recommended an immediate bombing campaign against North Vietnam, but Johnson demurred, instead creating a "working group" to consider scenarios for American intervention.[83] The conclusion of the "working group" chaired by William Bundy when presented in late November resorted to the bureaucratic device of the "Goldilocks's Principle" by presenting Johnson with two extreme options of either invading North Vietnam or abandoning South Vietnam; in between the two extremes was the third option of gradual escalation, which Bundy knew that Johnson would choose.[84] On 1 December 1964, McNamara, Rusk and "Mac" Bundy presented Johnson again with the "Goldilock's Principle" by giving him three options, knowing he would choose the third as invading North Vietnam and abandoning South Vietnam were too extreme for him.[85] Johnson agreed to their advice to launch Operation Barrel Roll to bomb the Lao section of the Ho Chi Minh trail and for more 34A raids.[85] On Christmas Eve 1964, the Viet Cong bombed the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, killing two Americans.[86] Despite almost unanimous advice to bomb North Vietnam, Johnson refused, saying in a cable to Taylor "The final responsibility is mine and the stakes are very high indeed".[87] Johnson added: "I have never felt that this war will be won from the air, and it seems to me that what is much needed and would be more effective is a larger and stronger use of Rangers and Special Forces and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on scene..I know that it might involve the acceptance of larger Americans sacrifices but I myself am ready to substantially increase the Americans in Vietnam if it is necessary to provide this kind of fighting force against the Vietcong".[87]

As Johnson continued to procrastinate, he repeatedly received advice from McNamara, the Bundy brothers, Rusk, and Wheeler that now was the time to use his powers under the resolution.[88] A memo co-written by "Mac" Bundy and McNamara in January 1965 stated "our present policy can lead only to a disastrous defeat" with the alternative being either "salvage what little can be saved" by withdrawing or to commit American forces to war.[89] By contrast, Taylor advised Johnson against committing American troops, stating that having the Americans "carry the ball" would only encourage South Vietnam's feuding generals to engage in even more in-fighting at the expense of the war effort, thus creating a vicious circle where the Americans would do all the fighting while the ARVN did nothing, leading to a situation where more and more Americans would be needed.[90] After a Viet Cong attack on the American air base at Pleiku in February 1965, Johnson called a meeting at the White House attended by his national security team plus Mansfield and McCormack to announce that "I've had enough of this" and that he had decided on a bombing campaign.[91] Only Mansfield and the Vice President Hubert Humphrey opposed the plans to bomb North Vietnam.[91]

Johnson ordered Operation Flaming Dart on 7 February 1965, a bombing raid on a North Vietnamese Army base, which marked the beginning of a series of increasing intense bombing raids.[91] The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who was strongly opposed to the United States fighting a war in Asia which would distract American attention from Europe, wrote to Johnson proposing a summit in Washington, where he intended to press Johnson to not use his powers under the resolution to fight war in Vietnam.[92] Johnson phoned Wilson to say the proposed summit was superfluous, maintaining he could not see "what was to be gained by flapping around the Atlantic with our coattails out", and instead urged Wilson to send British troops to fight in Vietnam.[92] On 22 February 1965, the commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, stated that he had no confidence in the ability of the ARVN to protect the American air base at Danang and asked for two Marine battalions to protect it, a request that Johnson approved.[93] On 2 March 1965, Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder, the strategic bombing offensive against North Vietnam that had long been urged upon him.[93] On 8 March 1965, two battalions of Marines landed at Danang to fulfill Westmoreland's request for troops to protect the air base.[94]

Fulbright who developed doubts by this point advised Johnson that a "massive ground and air war in Southeast Asia" would be a "disaster", but Johnson now had the legal power to wage war as he saw fit and disregarded his warning not send any more troops.[95] The Joint Chiefs of Staff led by Wheeler now recommended further troops to Vietnam and on 1 April 1965 Johnson agreed to send 2 more Marine battalions plus 28, 000 logistic troops.[96] At the same time, Johnson approved Westmoreland's request for "offensive defense" by allowing the Marines to patrol the countryside instead of just guarding the air base, committing the U.S. to a ground war.[97] Taylor wrote that Johnson having "crossed the Rubicon" with Rolling Thunder "was now off to Rome on the double".[98] On 20 April 1965, Johnson approved a plan to send 40, 000 U.S Army troops to South Vietnam by June.[98] In June, Westmoreland reported "The South Vietnamese armed forces cannot stand up to this pressure without substantial U.S. combat troops on the ground" and stated that he needed 180, 000 men immediately, a request that was granted in July.[99] In a telephone call to McNamara that unknown to the latter was being recorded, Johnson said "We know ourselves that when we asked for this Tonkin Gulf resolution, we had no intention of committing this many ground troops", leading McNamara to say "right".[100] Johnson concluded: "And we're doin' so now and we know it's goin' be bad, and the question: do we just want to do it out on a limb by ourselves?"[100] On 28 July 1965, Johnson gave a TV speech saying: "I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. And we will meet his needs. We cannot be defeated by force of arms. We will stand in Vietnam".[101]

In February 1966, Morse introduced a motion to repeal the resolution, which he argued was unconstitutional and had been used in ways that Johnson had promised that it would not be.[102] Through Morse's motion had no chance of passing with Senate Majority Leader Mansfield fatalistically saying "we are in too deep now", he was able to extend the debate for two weeks.[102] Morse who was described as a "skilled parliamentarian" was able to use various procedural methods to keep the debate going despite Mansfield's efforts, and several senators spoke in favor of the motion.[102] Russell complained about the "very great grant of power" that the resolution had granted Johnson.[102] Ultimately, most senators followed Johnson's argument that America was at war and it was the patriotic duty of Congress to support the president, no matter what, and only five senators voted for Morse's motion.[102]

Repeal

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Template:U.S. Congressional opposition to war By 1967, the rationale for what had become a costly U.S. involvement In the Vietnam War was receiving close scrutiny. With opposition to the war mounting, a movement to repeal the resolution—which war critics decried as having given the Johnson administration a "blank check"—began to gather steam.

An investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that Maddox had been on an electronic intelligence collection mission off the North Vietnamese coast.[103] It also learned that the U.S. Naval Communication Center in the Philippine Islands, in reviewing ships' messages, had questioned whether any second attack had actually occurred.[51]

The administration of President Richard Nixon, which took office in January 1969, initially opposed repeal, warning of "consequences for Southeast Asia [that] go beyond the war in Vietnam". In 1970 the administration began to shift its stance. It asserted that its conduct of operations in Southeast Asia was based not on the resolution but was a constitutional exercise of the president's authority, as commander in chief of U.S. military forces, to take necessary steps to protect American troops as they were gradually withdrawn[104] (the U.S. had begun withdrawing its forces from Vietnam in 1969 under a policy known as "Vietnamization").

Mounting public opinion against the war eventually led to the repeal of the resolution, which was attached to the Foreign Military Sales Act that Nixon signed in January 1971.[105] Seeking to restore limits on presidential authority to engage U.S. forces without a formal declaration of war, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, over Nixon's veto. The War Powers Resolution, which is still in effect, sets forth certain requirements for the president to consult with Congress in regard to decisions that engage U.S. forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities.

Reconsideration

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"[O]nce-classified documents and tapes released in the past several years, combined with previously uncovered facts, make clear that high government officials distorted facts and deceived the American public about events that led to full U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War", according to Paterson (2008).

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Olson, James S.; Roberts, Randy (2008). Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam 1945–1995 (5th ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4051-8222-5 
  2. ^ a b Hastings, Max (2018). Vietnam an epic tragedy, 1945–1975. Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-240567-8 
  3. ^ Morrocco, John (1985). Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. Volume 14 of Vietnam Experience. Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 9780939526147. https://books.google.com/books?id=dEhuAAAAMAAJ 2020年5月26日閲覧。 
  4. ^ Ang, Cheng Guan (2002). The Vietnam War from the Other Side. RoutledgeCurzon. ISBN 978-0-7007-1615-9 
  5. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 325.
  6. ^ a b c d e f Karnow 1983, p. 326.
  7. ^ a b Beck, Peter J. (2012-08-01). “The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern Britain, ed. William Mulligan and Brendan Simms”. The English Historical Review 127 (527): 1008–1009. doi:10.1093/ehr/ces164. ISSN 0013-8266. https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ces164. 
  8. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 330.
  9. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 337.
  10. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 334-335.
  11. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 363.
  12. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 363-364.
  13. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 340.
  14. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 340-341.
  15. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 341.
  16. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 357-358.
  17. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 343.
  18. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 358.
  19. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 344.
  20. ^ a b c Karnow 1983, p. 360.
  21. ^ a b c d e Karnow 1983, p. 361.
  22. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 217-219 & 268.
  23. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 341-342.
  24. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 342.
  25. ^ a b c Ceplair 2012, p. 22.
  26. ^ a b Ceplair 2012, p. 23.
  27. ^ a b c d Langguth 2000, p. 283.
  28. ^ a b c d e f g h Langguth 2000, p. 284.
  29. ^ a b c d Langguth 2000, p. 285.
  30. ^ a b c d e Langguth 2000, p. 286.
  31. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 362.
  32. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 361-362.
  33. ^ Hunt 1993, p. 15.
  34. ^ Langguth 2000, p. 296.
  35. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 345.
  36. ^ a b c Karnow 1983, p. 328.
  37. ^ a b c d e f Karnow 1983, p. 365.
  38. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 365-366.
  39. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 366.
  40. ^ a b c Karnow 1983, p. 367.
  41. ^ Moise 1996, pp. 50, 78.
  42. ^ Moise 1996, p. 71.
  43. ^ Hanyok 2000.
  44. ^ Moise 1996, p. 78.
  45. ^ Moise 1996, p. 82.
  46. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 368-369.
  47. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 369.
  48. ^ a b c d e Karnow 1983, p. 370.
  49. ^ Moise 1996, p. 158.
  50. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Karnow 1983, p. 371.
  51. ^ a b c NYT 1968.
  52. ^ Hanyok 2000, p. 3.
  53. ^ KQED 2006.
  54. ^ a b c d e f g h Langguth 2000, p. 302.
  55. ^ a b c d Karnow 1983, p. 372.
  56. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 373.
  57. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 373-374.
  58. ^ a b c d e f g h Karnow 1983, p. 374.
  59. ^ Langguth 2000, p. 302-303.
  60. ^ a b c d e f g h Langguth 2000, p. 303.
  61. ^ Langguth 2000, p. 319.
  62. ^ a b Langguth 2000, p. 304.
  63. ^ a b c d e Langguth 2000, p. 305.
  64. ^ President's Message to Congress 1964.
  65. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Karnow 1983, p. 376.
  66. ^ a b c d e f g h i Berman 1988, p. 25.
  67. ^ a b c Langguth 2000, p. 306.
  68. ^ a b c d e f Karnow 1983, p. 375.
  69. ^ Andradé & Conboy 1999.
  70. ^ a b c d Berman 1988, p. 26.
  71. ^ a b Berman 1988, p. 27.
  72. ^ Kenworthy 1964.
  73. ^ Tonkin Gulf debate 1964.
  74. ^ a b c Langguth 2000, p. 307.
  75. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 377.
  76. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 377-378.
  77. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 396-397.
  78. ^ a b c d e Karnow 1983, p. 397.
  79. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 397-398.
  80. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 398.
  81. ^ a b c Karnow 1983, p. 399.
  82. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 402.
  83. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 402-403.
  84. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 404.
  85. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 406.
  86. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 408.
  87. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 409.
  88. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 409-411.
  89. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 411.
  90. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 410.
  91. ^ a b c Karnow 1983, p. 413.
  92. ^ a b Langguth 2000, p. 342.
  93. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 415.
  94. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 412.
  95. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 418.
  96. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 417.
  97. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 417-418.
  98. ^ a b Karnow 1983, p. 420.
  99. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 422-426.
  100. ^ a b Langguth 2000, p. 374.
  101. ^ Karnow 1983, p. 426.
  102. ^ a b c d e Karnow 1983, p. 491.
  103. ^ Finney 1968.
  104. ^ NYT 1970.
  105. ^ NYT 1971.

References

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