User:Sovietblobfish/Second French War of Religion (1567-1568)

(summarise background of peace)

Dutch revolt

The king was aware that various French Protestants wished to support the Geuzen (beggar - the name of the anti-Habsburg party in the Spanish Netherlands) across the frontier. To this end they engaged in raids, with suspected support from England. On 6 June 1566, Charles ordered that the baron de Colombières be arrested for his role in the raids.

The Spanish regent of the Netherlands, Margaret of Parma sent a letter of complaint concerning the actions of the comte de Montgommery, who she charged with having raised 500 arquebusiers in Normandy and raising armed ships to the end of making a landing in Zeeland. She further complained about the prince de Porcien, who she asserted was conducting reconnaissance on the Franco-Spanish northern border.

It became apparent to the French crown that the situation in the Spanish Netherlands was heading towards confrontation in the summer of 1566. Back in March 1566, king Charles had written to his ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux. He noted that some time ago he had become aware of discontent in the Spanish Netherlands, and that now it seemed to be reaching a crescendo. In April, a delegation of disgruntled Dutch nobles came to the regent Margaret to present a petition, and were treated dismissively. With the heating up situation in the Netherlands in mind, Catherine had hoped to inspect the border fortifications with Charles in July 1566. This was hotly protested by the Spanish ambassador Álava, who saw in such an effort the dark hand of the admiral de Coligny and prince de Condé who were attempting to drive the French Protestants to arms in favour of the Dutch Protestants. Catherine hoped to discourage French Protestants from supporting their coreligionists in the Spanish Netherlands. Similarly, the French crown feared that the troubles in the Netherlands might infect the province of Picardy. Charles therefore wrote to the governor of Péronne to maintain a firm hand in the preservation of the royal edicts, to dissaude those who might look to induce a conflagration.

The situation was nevertheless advantageous for Catherine and the French. They looked to translate the circumstances into more balanced or even French advantaged, relations between the two kingdoms. It was initially imagined that Philip would look to the French for support in handling the matter in the Netherlands, thereby putting the decision for the severity of action in French hands. Though this would not come to pass, the crisis still afforded benefit to Catherine. She noted that in the present circumstances, executing the promises she had made at the Bayonne conference (that she certainly remained committed to) was quite unfeasable. Further, she rebuked challenges to religious toleration, comparing the situation in France to that Philip faced with his Protestants in the Netherlands.

Charles asked, on 27 September 1566, to be appraised of the information in Matignon's possession concerning the actions of the baron de Colombières with all possible haste.

French prospective action

Around August, according to the Spanish ambassador in France Álava, the prince de Condé and admiral de Coligny were already in league with the count palatine of Zweibrücken, with whom they were seeking to match contributions of troops for the Protestant cause in the Netherlands. Álava understood Condé to be stockpiling foodstuffs, and that saddlers were at work in Paris. The seigneur de Monluc, who was in ontact with the Spanish, informed them that the admiral de Coligny was planning to surprise a Spanish army as it made passage through the Franche-Comté.

In November, the admiral de Coligny and prince de Condé met with delegates representing the Protestant Imperial princes: the duke of Württemberg, the count palatine of Zweibrücken, and the elector Palatine of the Rhine. These delegates had travelled to France in an official capacity, seeking to secure payments of the debts owed to them by the French crown from their mercenary service in prior years. The Spanish ambassador became aware, a further offer had been made during the meeting, to put 5,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry at the disposal of the French for the conquest of Flanders. The French king would march into Valenciennes in this plan. This plan could be the king's for the price of 200,000 écus. The constable de Montmorency was on board with this proposal, as were his Protestant nephews. Charles himself opposed it, wishing to maintain good relations with his brother-in-law the king of Spain. Catherine feared the might of Spanish power, and was also conscious of the fiscal straits the kingdom was in after the first civil war. She therefore opposed military adventure in the Netherlands. Catherine also imagined that in gratitude for Charles' failure to endorse the martial proposal, Philip would drop his opposition to an Imperial bride for Charles. Despite the fairly open opposition of Condé and the Châtillon to the Franco-Spanish alliance and advocacy for an intervention in the Netherlands, Álava was unable to see in their public speeches religious motivation for this enterprise. Further, the Protestant denunciation of Philip was moderate in comparison with their invectives against domestic opponents like the cardinal de Lorraine, who they put in the central role.

With troubles enflaming the Spanish Netherlands, the duchess of Parma ordered the city of Valenciennes to receive a garrison under the command of a certain lord of Saint-Aldegonde. On 20 October the city refused to take their garrison. Therefore Saint-Aldegonde came to besiege the city in December. It came to pass that rumours developed of several hundred French subjects having made the trip to Valenciennes. This became known to Charles. He expressed scepticism at how this could have come to pass, given the prohibitions he had imposed and the vigilance of his border governors. He nevertheless felt it important to determine the veracity of the rumour, and if it turned out to be true, detain those French subjects in the city and deliver to them exemplary punishment. Charles was sure that the matter would have reached the Spanish sovereign's ears, and therefore advised the baron de Fourquevaux to keep his ear to the ground and respond to the rumour where the ambassador encountered it as advised by him. In a letter of 1 March, to his ambassador in Spain, Charles hotly refuted the word that the French were supporting the rebellion of Valenciennes, which was then under Spanish siege. The city capitulated on 24 March 1567.

The French crown offered to provide military support to the Spanish for the suppression of the Flemish revolt during 1566. Philip considered this offer in keeping with what was proper, given the military aid he had previously provided the French against their own rebels.

The Spanish ambassador, Francés de Álava ultimately felt that the French could not undertake any enterprise against the Netherlands due to their poor fiscal position. He voiced this to Philip in several letters, including one of October 1566. This was despite Coligny's desire on this point, which Álava outlined in a letter of 25 October as being for the annexation of the Netherlands, with German support. Indeed the Protestants at least were mobilising to this effect in his estimation.

Spanish action

The Spanish sovereign initially took a hands off approach to the developing challenge to his authority in the Netherlands, leaving it to his ambassador, Álava and the governor of the province, his half-sister Margaret. He was consumed by anti-Ottoman action in the Mediterranean. As time wore on, the opposition to his rule in the Netherlands became increasingly radical and popular. Towns on the French border, and in the north slipped out of the control of the Spanish government for several months.

In August 1566, a revolt erupted against Philip II in the Spanish Netherlands which saw a wave of iconoclastic Protestant action as churches were sacked. This revolt was led by the nobility. The discontent of the Dutch nobility with the Spanish sovereign had been a subject of French diplomatic correspondence as far back as 1559. The Spanish king, Philip II, entrusted the duke of Alba with crushing the revolt in the Netherlands and terrorising the Protestants. Alba enjoyed a reputation for violence among the Protestants. To this end the Spanish general was to march along the French border with an army brought up from Milan. For a time, the possibility of Philip himself making his way up to Brussels was considered. This was entirely disagreeable to Catherine, and she asked the French ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux, to keep his ear to the ground to try and determine the veracity of this plan. Fourquevaux was exposed to a variety of contradictory rumours, and even with the help of the Spanish queen, Élisabeth, sister of the French king, was unable to make sense of it. With Philip's prospective action ambiguous, Catherine was keen to be assured that her daughter Élisabeth would not be left behind in Spain by Philip during a trip to the Netherlands. Philip assured her that Élisabeth would accompany him. If Élisabeth did remain in Spain, it was the great French hope that she would enjoy the regency of the kingdom. The French desire for this had the effect of alienating Philip from the possibility. Philip had little actual interest in making for Flanders, being feverish and his wife only recently coming off a difficult pregnancy. The possibility of it allowed for the cause of disquiet in France, and as a gauge of Catherine. On 11 September, the governor of Provence, the comte de Tende was advised by Charles that if Philip appeared on the coast of Provence or attempted to enter Marseille, he was to prohibit his entry. If Philip insisted, it would not be possible, given the relations between the two countries to stop his visit. In such an eventuality he should give 'dexterous orders' to ensure the tranquility of Marseille. The crown felt that the arrival of Philip might very well ignite a Catholic uprising in Provence. The comte de Tende was not to snub Philip though. He was to honour him, but not go to see him himeslf, rather Tende should send an 'honest gentleman' to succor Philip with fruits and wines and other things he might desire. In September, Charles wrote to the duc de Nemours, to discuss the possibility of Philip making close passage near to Lyon in a journey north. Nemours was to advise his lieutenants (Birague and Schomberg) on how to best protect Lyon in the event it came under threat. After the iconoclastic fury, the possibility of Philip's trip seemed increasing assured, and Fourquevaux was confident in it by October 1566. There were several paths an army could take to reach the Netherlands from Spain, there was the sea route, which risked being preyed upon by French corsairs and reliant on the good favour of the English, the route directly through France which relied on agreement of passage with the kingdom, and the old Spanish road, which landed in Genoa or Nice, passed through the duchy of Savoy, and then traced the eastern border of France through territories under Spanish influence (Lorraine and the Franche-Comté). Meeting with the French king and his mother in October, Álava assured them Philip would make the trip in person, but stated nothing definite about Élisabeth besides noting it as a possibility. In November 1566, Alba requested of Charles the right to lead his army through France itself in a modified version of the Spanish road route. He explained to Fourquevaux that Spanish recruits would head to Luxembourg, Naples, Sardinia and Sicily to replace the veterans stationed there. Several thousand troops would be pulled from Milan, and reiters raised in the Holy Roman Empire. The army would trace the French frontier through Savoy, the Franche-Comté and Lorraine. However, as it was winter, it would be impractical to cross the Alps. Therefore, Alba proposed that the troops arrive in Marseille or Toulon, then chart the path of the Rhône so that they might reach Franche-Comté. While they passed through French territory, they would be fed by the French. Fourquevaux responded to Alba that this would induce a Protestant uprising. Alba dismissed the notion, arguing the strength of the Spanish force present would mean such recourse would not be considered by the Protestants. This did not sooth Fourquevaux, who wrote to Charles IX in concern that this whole eventuality might in fact be cover for a different purpose. As early as December 1566, Margaret had succeeded in restoring order in the Netherlands, nevertheless the ingredients for religious war still lay there, and Alba's march was still to go ahead. As things calmed in the Netherlands, Charles congratulated himself in January on his influence dampening the rebellion in the Spanish sovereign's lands. With the Spanish having received a bloody nose in the Netherlands, a show of force was necessary to quiet those who gazed with hungry eyes on a weakened royal authority. Therefore, Philip announced that he would be travelling to the Netherlands personally, but that before his arrival he would be proceeded by an army under the command of the duke of Alba. In discussions with the baron de Fourquevaux sometime before 9 December, the duke of Alba argued that the alliance between France and Spain meant that that each of them owed the other support in times of difficulty. Alba presented the possibility of a new meeting between the sovereigns. Fourquevaux retorted that there had always been, and would always be, a friendly attitude given such as required by the alliance of the two kingdoms. Éboli was more dexterous on matters of Franco-Spanish friendship, and throughout the first half of 1567, he regularly discussed the possibility of a meeting between Catherine and Philip. In his opinion such meetings should become second nature for the two kingdoms, taking place every year. Rumour swirled in the Spanish court during December that the Flemish rebels were preparing to receive the support of 3,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, something Fourquevaux had to hotly refute. Charles gave orders to the governor of Péronne, d'Humières, in December warning him against allowing Dutch subjects of the Spanish sovereign from selling their Picard lands without royal permission. D'Humières was advised that he would be held responsible for these acts if they continued. In the same month, d'Humières was advised that in the present circumstances where the security of the border towns hanged in the balance, his residency in his government was expected by the crown. Charles boasted on 31 January 1567 that a few days previous he had issued prohibitions on the receiving of any foreigners into France. In the king's opinion, this illustrated the value of the French in the Franco-Spanish relationship. While Catherine had enjoyed a window free of Spanish reproach, this terminated at the opening of 1567, when accusations began to be levelled, that despite French prohibitions on Flemish refugees being allowed to remain in France, their presence was in fact implicitly tolerated. The French tolerance of Flemish refugees was held up in opposition to the Spanish attitude during the French troubles of 1562-1563. In these troubles, had a Frenchman escaped across the border into Spanish territory, the ambassador affirmed they would have been hanged. The spokesman of Álava's who made this charge, travelled to Spain in February 1567 to repeat the accusation to Philip. In a February letter to the baron de Fourquevaux, Charles smugly noted that the Spanish now found themselves in the situation the French had in 1562, and if they fared better in battle than the French had during the first civil war they could consider themselves very fortunate. With such a formidable force close to the kingdom, the French king Charles IX, sought the council of the prince de Condé and the young duc de Guise. Coligny and his brother d'Andelot had returned to court in March, and looked to see 6,000 Swiss mercenaries and 10,000 French infantry raised as guard against the passage of the duke of Alba. According to Castelnau, Coligny warned Charles and Catherine that it was the ambition of the Spanish crown to see France ruined. Per the recommendation of the Protestants, Charles would arrange for the hiring of 6,000 Swiss soldiers (undertaken in December 1566), and 10,000 French infantry in case things turned south. The captain of these 6,000 Swiss was a certain colonel Pfyffer. Philip was immediately informed of the raising of these soldiers, with the reasoning given for their employ being that they were to protect the city of Lyon. There was a particular fear that the Emperor might take advantage of a recent truce he had concluded, to descend upon the Three Bishoprics (Metz, Toul and Verdun) and seize them. Crété argues the Protestant leadership were favourable to the hiring of soldiers in the hopes they might be used to support their coreligionists in the Netherlands. The old constable de Montmorency supported his Protestant nephews drive to raise troops and fortify the border, as he enjoyed warm relations with the Dutch and German princes. Indeed, he had recently met with his Dutch relative, the baron of Montigny, who was the brother of the count of Horn one of the leaders of the Dutch troubles. The two men enjoyed a private four hour interview on 1 June 1566. Champion reports that among those present at Écouen to meet with Montigny was the Constable, his family, the admiral de Coligny, the queen of Navarre, and several other leading Protestant nobles. Montigny had then travelled on to the Spanish court, with the blessing of the young prince de Béarn (future king Henry IV). He had also entertained the ambassadors of the German princes of Hesse, Württemberg, and Cleves. In August, Charles would thank the constable de Montmorency for sending a gentleman to him to appraise him of developments in Flanders. Nevertheless, the constable de Montmorency did not favour a Spanish war, much to the disappointment of the Protestant leadership. Catherine likewise opposed those in the French court who advocated a break with Spain or a more provocative attitude towards the rebellion in the Netherlands. She hoped through this anti-Flemish rebel position she might be able to prevent Philip and his army making the trip to the Netherlands. She also hoped to see the playing field of relations evened between Charles and Philip. In March 1567, the comte de La Rochefoucauld visited Chantilly in search of Montmorency's support for an aggressive policy. Montmorency categorically refused to support a war with Spain. In addition to the raising of the Swiss were another 10,000 French soldiers, as per the recommendation of Coligny and d'Andelot. Philip II was appraised by Catherine of the hiring of the soldiers the crown had undertaken. Contrary to the intended purpose of the raising of the Swiss, their recruitment, in conjunction with Alba's march, confirmed some Protestants' suspicions that back at the Bayonne meeting in 1565, a plot had been formulated tending towards their liquidation. Catherine also saw to the supplementing of the fortifications in Picardy, on the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands. By contrast, when the Spanish ambassador Álava learned of the hiring of these soldiers, he enjoyed a bitter meeting with Catherine on 3 July, during which the ambassador fumed that France had no need of the soldiers they had just hired. Catherine tasked the baron de Fourquevaux with justifying their employ to the Spanish court. Charles informed Alba of his refusal to allow the Spanish passage through French lands, on the grounds the safety of his soldiers in lands filled with Protestants could not be guaranteed. Catherine did not wish to alienate her son-in-law, the king of Spain though, and the French would therefore supply the French army as it made its move northwards outside of French territory. In addition to this, Flemish refugees would not be permitted to settle in France, and the king's subjects would be prohibited from proffering armed aid to their co-religionists in the Netherlands. The Protestants baulked at the thought of the crown feeding the Spanish army. The duke of Savoy and duc de Lorraine were more amiable to the Spanish, and allowed Alba passage through their lands. Though he had afforded passage to the Spanish army, this did not mean the duc de Lorraine was blind to the dangers of the proximity of so many foreign troops. Along with the Swiss he assumed arms in case the Spanish decided to descend upon him.(order the flow of events in this mess of a section)

Condé arrived at the French court during this crisis, at the instruction of the crown.

To some disquiet, he took the initiative in royal council on 10 July by making a promise to raise 5,000 cavalry within a few days. The authority under which he would raise and command troops was questionable. On the one hand these might be raised for the good of the kingdom, on the other, for his own personal advancement. Though some found this proposal agreeable, others on the royal council were unsettled.

At the prompting of the royal council, Anjou confronted Condé in the gallery of the château. With him for this menace laden meeting were archers from the royal guard and several 'great lords'. The contemporary historian Brantôme was a witness to the confrontation. The duc d'Anjou noted that while Condé may not have respect for Charles or Catherine he might perhaps show it to him, the king's lieutenant-général. He chided the prince for suggesting it was his right to raise horsemen on his own initiative. The prince asserted to Condé that this was a matter so close to royal power that it was beyond even the constable to do such a thing, the initiative for such an act being in Anjou's hands. Anjou called on Condé to return to his company of men-at-arms and cause no further trouble. As Anjou addressed the prince, in words that Brantôme was too distant to make out, he is to have played with his sword, and toyed with his dagger. Some other historians, such as Garrisson, Labourdette, Jouanna and Carpi record this meeting differently, suggesting the dispute was over Condé's interest in the title of lieutenant-general should war break out. Condé argued that the title belonged to the premier prince du sang, and given the prince de Béarn's young age, it should be his to hold on an interim basis. Anjou is to have rebuffed Condé arguing such a title would rightly belong in his hands. The Spanish ambassador was greatly impressed by Anjou's approach, lauding him as a leader of the Catholic party. In Pernot's estimation, in transcribing Anjou's speech to the Spanish king, Álava likely embellished the confrontation.

Condé protested that no service other than that given towards the king was in his mind by such a proposal. He spoke softly in response to the hot words that Anjou had delivered against him. Brântome sees the duc d'Anjou as possessing a particular hatred of Condé. Jouanna emphasises the gravity of this affront that the duc d'Anjou had delivered to Condé. Chevallier notes that Condé was 37, had a glowing military career and enjoyed popularity with the soldiery. Anjou by contrast was only 16 years old. Humiliated by his treatment at the hands of the king's brother, and, according to the historian Crété, fearful for his life, the day that followed, 11 July, he requested leave of the court and departed. Having left court, he made for the château de Vallery, a property of his. Labourdette describes this confrontation with Anjou as a key cause of Condé's decision to enter rebellion against the crown.

That same day, the court arrived at the château d'Écouen, a residence belonging to Montmorency. Álava made an appearance here, to demanded the adoption of the resolutions of the council of Trent. He was now channelling the aggressive diplomatic posturing of his predecessor, Chantonnay. His diplomatic offensive paralleled the military offensive Spain was undertaking against the rebellion in the Spanish Netherlands simultaneously. Charles and Catherine rebuffed the Spanish ambassador on this, noting that they abided by the terms of the Tridentine decrees as concerned suspect bishops, but reserved the right in their own house to follow their own customs. While Catherine represented a defiant attitude towards Álava, the duc de Montmorency employed a softer touch, giving the ambassador a tour of his château.

According to an English diplomatic report, the fortresses on the Picard frontier were fortified, as were those on the border with Luxembourg. Fortification work also began at Verdun. Soldiers were dispatched to the Lyonnais and the maréchal de Vielleville made for the Lorraine strongpoint of Metz. Cloulas reports that in addition to reinforcements in the Three Bishoprics, were the provision of soldiers to the remaining French Piedmontese possessions as well as the Picard border. Haan affirms that the garrisons of Saluzzo in Piedmont were bolstered. Further, a possession of the cardinal de Lorraine, the town of Rambervillers was fortified. The French crown already had several thousand Swiss soldiers in its employ, that were under the command of the duc d'Aumale in Champagne. Catherine ordered that these troops be put on alert.

Up to the point that Alba left for his journey to the Spanish Netherlands, Fourquevaux imagined the voyage to the Netherlands might be a dissimulation. He rather believed Alba's army might be destined for Algiers. His conviction in this matter was a result of the fact that the situation had calmed in the Netherlands, and thus such a military show there was not necessary. Alba made his departure, with his army of 16,000 soldiers (hardened veterans that concerned even the Catholic duchies), from Cartagena on 10 May 1567. As his ships passed the Provençal supports, no customary salvos were given. On the other hand, his troops did not receive the supplies they had been promised after having landed on the continent. He passed through Savoy, Franche-Comté and Lorraine on route to Brussels. On route, his passage took him past Geneva. The Protestant city had put itself under heavy arms. Condé had proposed offering a Dauphinois garrison to the republic, but they did not feel the reinforcements were required. In June, Philip announced that his travel to the Netherlands, with some of the armies cavalry, would be taken by the sea route. The French response to this news was far more amenable than it had been to Alba's march. Montmorency declared that if Philip stopped at a French port, the keys of the city would be provided to him, and he would be treated as were he the lord of the place. Both Catherine and Montmorency saw this as an obligation for the treatment of an allied sovereign. Álava was sceptical of the sincerity of the offer. As Alba made his way passed Burgundy, Charles wrote to the lieutenant-general of the province, the seigneur de Tavannes advising him on the precautions to take while Alba was near, and commending him on the order in which he maintained the province. To the king's confusion he had been informed that German landsknechts were descending to link up with Alba's army. The Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II advised that any soldiers who wished to in Germany may go to join with the army of the Spanish king, but that none may join an army other than his. This puzzled the sovereign, who noted in a June letter to Fourquevaux that he could see no use for further augmenting of the Spanish army when the duchess of Parma had already restored peace in the Netherlands. While he passed through the Franche-Comté in July, the Spanish ambassador Álava suggested to Catherine that his force could be used to strengthen Catholicism and the French crown. Catherine categorically rejected this proposition for Spanish military intervention in France. That same month, Alba reached Luxembourg. In August, the prospect of Philip's trip by sea again surfaced in rumours. On 1 August, Charles advised the lieutenant-general of Normandy, the seigneur de Matignon to provide all the support that might be required in this eventuality, and if Philip himself showed up in any of the ports that he be afforded every courtesy befitting an allied monarch. Finally, on 22 August, Alba entered the Spanish Netherlands. Concurrently, it was in August, as Alba concluded his journey, that the Swiss mercenaries that had been hired for his passage entered France. Though he had passed, Catherine maintained the soldiers that had been raised for the period during which he marched by the border. The Protestants hoped to see the raised troops employed towards supporting their coreligionists in the Netherlands against the Spanish. Catherine's policy thus left them unsatisfied. It also generated confusion and concern as to why the Swiss remained in the crowns employ now that Alba had passed. On 8 September, in the Netherlands, Alba engineered two high profile arrests, that of the count of Horn and the count of Egmont. The arrest of these loyal nobles, provoked the resignation from the governorship of Margaret, a role that would be filled by the duke of Alba. This was a project of his own initiative, and created a strong impression in Paris according to the Spanish ambassador Álava. Montmorency supposedly exclaimed in outrage that the Spanish intended to execute his two cousins. Alba devoted himself to domestic repression in the Spanish Netherlands, no longer offering a threat to the French border.

The Protestants, seeing the fate of their compatriots in the Netherlands, feared a similar eventuality was in wait for them in France. Alba would cross the border and exterminate them in conjunction with the Swiss the crown had maintained employ of. Constant describes the Protestant fears as 'largely false'.

Both Protestant and Catholic nobles were keen to lend their support to the revolt in the Netherlands, so as to spite Philip II.

In Paris, the Spanish ambassador exhorted Catherine to follow the Spanish example in dealing with the Protestants of France, and chastised her for her policy of toleration. Charles was more sympathetic to these exhortations, being of the opinion he must instil obedience in the Protestants.

Final months of peace

At some point in the Spring of 1567, Catherine held a secret meeting with the Protestant leader Theodore de Beza. With fears of both a Protestant and a Catholic uprising haunting the crown, Catherine hoped to invite both the Châtillon/Condé party and the Lorraine-Guise to court for further reconciliation efforts between them. The Lorraine-Guise only appeared with great reluctance. Coligny refused to come to court, and when Condé responded to the summons he quickly experienced an affront and departed again. Haan argues these reconciliation efforts by Catherine actually poisoned relations further.

Montmorency, who had retired from court in anger over not being granted the monetary spoils of confiscations made by the crown, was summoned to return by Catherine in March 1567. She hoped that he might serve as a counterweight to the hawkish prince de Condé. The constable refused the summons on the grounds of 'illness'. On 20 April, orders were sent out for all the members of the court to assemble at Fontainebleau. Montmorency stayed obstinate in his refusal. Catherine offered Montmorency 30,000 livres for his travel expenses, and his eldest son, the maréchal de Montmorency, endeavoured to see his father come to court. Montmorency resisted, instead sending the seigneur de Lanssac in his place.

Soon after making this decision, he abandoned his resolve, and made his way to join with the court.

On 1 May 1567, concerned that the gendarmerie was understrength, Charles ordered that all captains of the compagnies (companies) to hold a review on 1 June, while being in attendance themselves. The king hoped this would ensure the compagnies were best able to serve him.

In May 1567, Condé's first son by his second wife was baptised. Charles refused to attend the baptism, little interested in making a showing at a Protestant ceremony, sending in his stead the admiral de Coligny.

The Spanish ambassador Álava, reported back to his king during May and June that there was great hostility to be found between Charles and his brother the duc d'Anjou. According to his reports, Anjou avoided playing tennis with the king, meanwhile Charles raged at his mother's relative favour towards his younger brother.

On 29 May, Charles attended a procession of the blessed sacrament alongside Catherine.

During the summer, the king and his mother spent time in Compiègne, seeing to the state of the border defences with Flanders.

Coligny again departed court around this time, appraised of a plot tending to his disadvantage. He had however been granted the Spanish cipher by a secretary of the Spanish ambassador.

In June, the seigneur d'Andelot came to Paris, to undertake recruitment for his bands.

Having got into a fracas with the maréchal de Cossé, who refused to respect his authority as colonel-general of the French infantry, Andelot bitterly departed from court, retiring to his lands in Brittany.

The Spanish ambassador Álava, in July wrote to king Philip. He opined that surely Charles was now old enough to wage a war against heresy. When he enjoyed an interview with Catherine he made an impassioned case for her and her son to strike against Protestantism.

The Protestant leadership made the decision during July 1567 (Daussy suspects Coligny in particular took the lead), to establish a more rigorous military structure they could mobilise should the need arise. The kingdom was cut into sixteen provinces, each of which would play host to two councils of good men that would oversee the Protestant ability to raise money (1,000 crowns a year) and soldiers in the event of war (in addition to appointing the leadership, maintaining list of men who could fight for the church). The information these councils collated on the fighting strength could then be conveyed up the ladder to the provincial military leader, and then the Protestant aristocratic leadership at large. Thus, the leadership could know what resources they had at their disposal should the need arise. One of these councils featured a deputy of each baillage and sénéchaussée and would meet once a month, while the other, a more permanent council, comprised six councillors drawn from the provincial courts, as well as members of the former council.

Daussy suspects that the quick descent into civil war after this regulation of July, precluded its total implementation. He nevertheless sees in the rapid Protestant mobilisation in parts of the country, evidence that at least partial implementation might have been undertaken. He further argues evidence of its success can be found in the somewhat closer collaboration between the central Protestant leadership and their provincial counterparts during the second war of religion.

Towards the end of July, the cardinal de Lorraine returned to the French court. Around this time, he was of the belief that religious affairs in the kingdom might be settled if only Catherine and Philip were able to meet for a few hours. His nephew, the young duc de Guise had just had a marriage arranged with the Protestant widow of the prince de Porcien, Catherine de Clèves. Around this time, the Swiss mercenaries that the French had hired entered the kingdom.

A dual marriage transpired in August for the sons of the constable de Montmorency. In attendance were the Savoie-Nemours and the Lorraine-Guise. The seigneur de Méru was married to the eldest daughter of the maréchal de Cossé (the seigneur de Gonnor had recently acquired the baton of the maréchal upon the death of the seigneur de Bourdillon). Concurrently, Montmorency's fourth eldest daughter, Marie, married the comte de Candalle.

Coligny and Condé campaigned for the dismissal of the Swiss mercenaries. The crown was not yet ready to undertake this, Charles keen to see the 'fine soldiers' and thus Catherine had written to the constable de Montmorency on 21 August to have them brought to the capital so Charles could inspect them, and get his money's worth from their employment. Charles could not understand why the Protestant leadership would feel threatened by the employ of the Swiss. Seeing the Swiss approach Paris, the Protestant leadership demanded an explanation from Montmorency. According to the Protestant contemporary historian Agrippa d'Aubigné, writing decades later, he responded bluntly "Que voudraiz vous qu'on fist de ces Suisses bien payés si on ne les employait" (What would you have us do with these well paid Swiss but use them?). The fear and suspicions of the Protestants were mutual, the king having been appraised the Protestant leadership were secretly reaching out to their assemblies to put themselves in a state of readiness. Charles thus sent the seigneur de Thoré, a son of the Constable, to Châtillon. Coligny provided to Thoré a memorandum in which he denied having told a single man to take arms, noted that he did not control all the Protestants in France, and explained the distrust of the Protestants towards the king's Swiss, whose raising could have no other purpose than one tending towards their disadvantage due to the friendship between Philip and Charles.

Around this time, both the seigneur de Soubise and the prince de Porcien, two leaders of the Protestant cause, died. Soubise had faded after a long illness. Porcien meanwhile, was young and healthy, and therefore contemporary suspicions fell on him being the victim of a poisoning.

Surprise of Meaux

Several meetings were held among the Protestant aristocratic leadership, all of whom attended with the exception of Soubise and Porcien. These meetings transpired at Vallery, a property belonging to the prince de Condé, and Châtillon-sur-Loing, a property of the admiral de Coligny. In the first two meetings, the admiral de Coligny took on the position of the cool head, who advised against confrontation, while most of the others were in favour of assuming arms. Condé was part of the war camp, he argued that the Spanish queen was pregnant, and the birth of a child was going to strengthen the bonds between the French and Spanish crowns and that Catherine and the cardinal de Lorraine were soon to imitate the example of the duke of Alba in the Netherlands by arresting both him and Coligny. Coligny was for a while able to succeed in convincing the gathered nobles of the dangers of rebellion as he counselled patience. While the Protestants were meeting at Châtillon-Coligny, they had with them a host of 1,200 to 1,500 horsemen. Catherine was aware of this great host having met there, but put little weight in it.

Then, according to Crété, Coligny is to have learned of a plot by which he and Condé were seized, with the one killed and the other thrown in prison. The Swiss would fan out between Paris, Orléans and Poitiers and then the edict of Amboise would be annulled. The English ambassador Norris reported that, under pressure from Lorraine, the edict was to be revoked, the Tridentine decrees imposed and Protestantism outlawed on pain of death.

Condé summoned the Protestant leaders to Vallery at the start of September. The time for patience had passed. D'Andelot made a passionate speech for rebellion. According to the contemporary La Noue, he argued that to do nothing was to wait for their own executions, that the foreign enemy was already on the march, seeking to avenge the injury of the battle of Dreux and defensive Protestatn actions, and that 3,000 Protestant's had been killed since the coming of peace without any satisfaction being given as justice by the crown. They would capture some important towns (Lyon, Toulouse and Troyes), destroy the Swiss, and drive from the French court the cardinal de Lorraine. Once in such a strong position, they could extract religious toleration. Coligny endorsed this proposal. Constant arges that it was at Vallery that the plan to kidnap Charles and Catherine was agreed upon. In essence, the coup-de-main of capturing the royal family was a repeat of what the Catholic grandees had accomplished in 1562 at the outset of the first French War of Religion.

It was agreed that they would follow Condé's suggested location of Rozay-en-Brie for an armed meeting which would transpire at the end of September. Orders went out to gather here but individually, not arriving as a great host. These were distributed through the Protestant church system in France. The Protestant soldiers, primarily from the West and East of the kingdom, made the journey by day and night in small groups, avoiding the main roads. As the nobles made their way to Rozay, they stayed in the châteaux and in provisioned barns. This did not attract attention as nobles of status were accustomed to travelling with armed retinues in this period. Rozay was seized by the Protestants on 24 September.

The contemporary Protestant, La Noue, ascribed four key objectives for the Protestant leadership by the resumption of war: to secure strategic towns, to form a coherent army, to massacre the Swiss mercenaries in the crowns employ and to drive the cardinal de Lorraine from the French court. Once the king was freed of the influence of the Lorraine-Guise family, Charles could then mete out punishment to the arrested Guise. Jouanna characterises this plot as a re-run of the 1560 Conspiracy of Amboise, the main difference being, only one of the two enemies of the Amboise conspirators was still standing, the cardinal de Lorraine. Miquel argues Coligny intended the capture of the king to be quite different to that attempted at Amboise in 1560, undertaken professionally, and with the Estates General quickly called after the capture. Constant explains the motivation of the coup as to remove the young Charles from the reach and influence of his nefarious mother Catherine, and the cardinal de Lorraine. Jouanna, in considering the motivation of Condé and the other Protestant leaders to enter revolt argues that we cannot solely look to religious drivers. Political considerations played a role in the high noble decision making. She contrasts this with the wider Protestant movement which she argues assumed arms in the hope of destroying the Catholic church and seizing the cities of the kingdom for their worship.

The chancellor l'Hôpital attempted to salvage the peace at this eleventh hour. He urged Charles to make concessions to the Protestants.

As early as 4 September, Catherine wrote to the maréchal de Cossé to investigate the veracity of rumours of a gathering of between 1,200 and 1,500 horsemen around Montargis and Châtillon. She nevertheless asserted she did not believe these rumours. Wanegffelen summarises her disposition as being one that could not conceive of another Protestant uprising.

At some point, spies were dispatched to Châtillon by Catherine. Arriving in Coligny's domain, they saw the admiral dressed in peasants clothes, attention focused on preparations for the upcoming harvest. This was a disarming display to report back. Decrue states that it was one of the sons of the constable de Montmorency, the seigneur de Thoré, who came to meet with Coligny, and saw this episode.

On 10 September, Catherine declared herself to be satisfied by the maréchal de Cossé's investigation and was assured that Cossé would maintain a key eye over his governate of Anjou to be assured such troubles would not emerge. Indeed, her concerns lay primarily with the Catholics as likely disruptors of the peace, and on 11 September she wrote to Paris to caution the city against the committment of any outrages.

Catherine wrote to her ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux on 18 September. In this communique she noted that there had been baseless rumour of a Protestant enterprise. If the thought was on their minds, with the news from Flanders reaching them, it did not develop beyond that.

Word reached the court, which was staying at the château de Montceaux-lès-Meaux, in the form of the seigneur de Mauvissière, who had just returned from Spanish Flanders where he had been sent to offer the king's compliments to the duchess of Parma and the duke of Alba. He stated that he had become aware of a Protestant plan to seize the king and the greater royal family, which had been confided to him by several Protestant travelling companions with whom he had made the return journey from the Netherlands. By this time, 400 Protestant horsemen had already arrived in the area. He first confided these reports in a private interview with Catherine and the king where he was little believed. They then bid him address the same story to the constable de Montmorency, the duc de Nemours, the duc de Guise and the chancellor. The constable de Montmorency derided the weakness of the Protestants, noting that was an amassing of Protestant force underway, he would be aware of it. The chancellor de L'Hôpital chided the messenger for spreading rumours that risked the standing of the kingdom's peace. For L'Hôpital such false fearmongering was a capital offence.

This complacency was ruptured with the arrival of a second messenger, a certain Titus de Castelnau, brother of the seigneur de Mauvissière. He had been on a reconnaissance mission. This new messenger reported that Condé, Coligny, Andelot, and the seigneur de Mouy were at the head of several thousand men near Montceaux, the nearest of which were already at nearby Lagny, only two leagues away.

The royal family quickly made for the nearby city of Meaux, where they could shelter behind the walls until the arrival of the 6,000 Swiss mercenaries encamped at Château-Thierry. While in the city, on 27 September, Charles issued a circular explaining the 'scandalous coup' that, if reports were to be believed, threatened not only his life, but that of his mother and brothers. These circular letters were accompanied by a more personal one from Catherine, in which she expressed the bafflement she and Charles felt at the situation and urged the provincial governors to maintain their currently stable situations. Any enterprises tending towards the frustration of this peaceable situation were to be countered by the governors.

On 28 September, Charles appraised the duc de Nevers of the fact that his subjects had risen up against him. The king, conscious of the great damage to royal authority that had been caused by the seizure of cities during the first war of religion urged Nevers to do his utmost to preserve the principal places of his government. Catherine made a plea to 'her cousin', the new duc de Nevers. He was counselled to make his way quickly to unite with the court, and bring with him as many men as he could.

While holding council in Meaux, the chancellor de L'Hôpital proposed that they find out the reason that the Protestants had assumed arms. This is to have occasioned an outburst from Catherine who angrily accused L'Hôpital's moderate policy of being the cause. The maréchal de Montmorency, eldest son of the duc de Montmorency was entrusted with going out to negotiate with the Protestant leaders. He reported back to his father that the Protestant nobles were determined. Crété characterises his negotiations as a stalling tactic to bridge the time until the Swiss might arrive. Getting wind of the approach of the Swiss, the Protestant leadership cut the talks short.

The chancellor L'Hôpital and the constable de Montmorency were little inclined to see the court withdraw to Paris. By contrast the Lorraine-Guise at court, and the duc de Nemours counselled a retreat to the capital. Catherine was torn on how to proceed. By withdrawing to Paris, the faction of nobles with the court would be elevated into the royal faction. By this means, the kingdom would again be in a civil war. A misunderstanding is then supposed to have followed in a conversation between the captain of the Swiss Pfyffer and Catherine. Pfyffer assured Catherine that the 6,000 Swiss could well protect the court for the retreat back to Paris, misunderstanding her reasoning for being hesitant to follow that course. Catherine in turn interpreted Pfyffer's reassurance as a protection for the court from becoming a pawn of the 'Catholic faction', thereby ensuring she still enjoyed the autonomy necessary to pursue a policy of pacification. Thus it was resolved on to depart for Paris.

While the king wanted to proffer battle, the constable de Montmorency organised the flight of the court. Departing from Meaux at 02:00 in the morning on 28 September, the court began its flight. The Swiss thus escorted the court first to Lagny and then back to Paris, surrounding the royal party with a wall of pikes as they marched, their number acting as the vanguard and the rearguard as the court made its progress. The Protestant La Noue, who could little disguise how impressed he was by the Swiss, characterised their formation of pikes as being akin to a forest.

The cardinal de Lorraine, for his part, took flight by means of a Turkish horse. This brought him to his destination.

As this force marched, it was harried by the cavalry of Condé and Coligny who were attempting to seize the king. Condé had approached the Swiss, stating that he desired to speak with the king, they responded by lowering their pikes. Condé then charged, but penetration into the royal hedgehog of pikes was not possible. The Protestant cavalry, numbering perhaps five or six hundred under Condé and Coligny's command looked to disrupt the royal progress. The fierce resolve of the Swiss kept the Protestant horsemen at bay, and they made little impression against the phalanxes. According to the later writings of the (at that time) twelve-year-old vicomte de Turenne, the king himself took a sword and endeavoured to involve himself in the combat with the Protestants by putting himself at the head of the Swiss. Montmorency had to reprimand the king for risking his life in such a way. From Paris, the duc d'Aumale and the maréchal de Vielleville came out with forces of their own to join with the royal party. Therefore, despite these cavalry assaults, the court was able to make it into Paris, arriving in the city around by around 04:00 that same morning. In the latter stages of the flight to the capital, once the threat of the Protestant cavalry had subsided, Charles and Catherine proceeded by carriage. The carriage was surrounded by those gentlemen loyal to the crown. This was not without risk, as had the rebel Protestant's realised the changing travel methods of the royal family, they would have needed only a few hundred horsemen to seize their quicker moving adversary. The constable de Montmorency stayed back with the body of the Swiss to hold off the Protestants.

As a result of the coup attempt, Catherine's heart hardened against the prince de Condé. She considered him to be a traitor, and became more favourable to war. She also rebuked the chancellor L'Hôpital, ascribing the crown's failed policy to him. The king too was embittered by the experience of the coup and his subsequent flight. He exploded in rage that never again would he be subject to such a cause of panic, and that he would punish those responsible even if he had to seek the perpetrators out in their houses. It would remain in the memory of both figures. Labourdette suggests that, in 1572, it made him credulous to the idea that there was a new Protestant plot to seize his person, and thus played a role in the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre.

The objective cities of the surprise of Meaux for the Protestant rebels: Troyes, Toulouse and Lyon were not captured. The conspiracy also failed to drive the cardinal de Lorraine from the French court.

Having reached the capital, Catherine described the Protestant enterprise, in her correspondence with the baron de Fourquevaux, as an 'infamous enterprise'. In Charles' letter to Fourquevaux of 28 September, the king noted how it could not be said that this conspiracy (which threatened the lives of the members of the royal family) was a response to religious persecution of Protestantism. Therefore the rebellion could not be disguised under the 'cloak of religion'. Similarly in a postscript of a letter of 29 September written to the duke of Savoy, she characterised it as the 'greatest wickedness in the world'. She also vented her frustration at how her hard efforts to pacify the realm were being unravelled.

On 8 October, Catherine, through Charles, wrote to the baron de Gordes, lieutenant-general of the province of Dauphiné. She urged him to stop any of those that might be on their way to support the Protestant cause. Where he identified that they were stubborn in their resolve to do so, he was to slaughter them.

Charles wrote to the duke of Savoy that it had been necessary for the Swiss to protect him from the Protestant attacks. He noted that the Protestants had seized cities, attempted to seize and kill him, but that god had not allowed this to transpire. These shocking acts were despite the fact that the 'Protestants had not been obstructed in their enjoyment of the pacification edict', therefore the excuse of defence of religion rang hollow to the king. Thus, there was nothing religious about suppressing this rebellion.

Pope Pius IV, wrote to the Papal nunzio in France, cardinal della Torre, in October that he should counsel the queen mother that those who had advised her to dismiss the advice of the cardinal de Lorraine had led her poorly.

Treatises

The most eloquent Protestant pamphlets were compiled together in a collection by a certain printer of Orléans titled Les Requestes, protestations, remonstrances et advertissemens, faits par Monseigneur le Prince de Condé et autres de sa suite, où l'on peut aisément cognoistre les causes et moyens des troubles et guerres présentes. Other pamphlet's come down to us individually. Jouanna speculates that, as in 1562, the jurist François Hotman may have played a role in the Protestant discourse.

In the published discourse justifying the steps they'd taken, Condé and his supporters positioned themselves not as representatives of the Protestant faith, but the broader interest of the kingdom. In his protestation, entitled Requeste présentée au Roy, par Monseigneur le Prince de Condé accompagné d'un grand nombre de Seigneurs, gentilshommes et autres qui font profession de la Religion réformée en ce Royaume, Condé stated that his desire was to see the King convoke the Estates, and bring to pass relief for Charles' subjects. They did not seek to impose a Protestant supremacy, indeed, Condé forbade his supporters from molesting others on the grounds of divergent religious beliefs.

In a follow up document titled Advertissement sur la Protestation de Monseigneur le Prince de Condé that built on Condé's, those who disapproved of Condé's protestation for not having made any mention of Protestantism were chided. It was Condé, and indeed the broader nobilities, duty to defend all the king's subjects irrespective of religion. The princes du sang and entire nobility could not revolt in favour of a specific part of the population, but only its whole. The chancellor L'Hôpital, archbishop of Vienne and Philippe de Commines were quoted from. With the king's advisors resisting the ordinary process by which an Estates General might be called, force was required. It was not the king who was the target of these attacks, but rather the enemies of the monarchy that surrounded him. Champion of the cause of the Estates were a prince du sang and all the 'good nobility'.

It was the duty of Condé, as a prince du sang, and the broader nobility, to protect the public good against those who would exploit the King to cause the crown injury. Thus they demanded the calling of an Estates.

The Protestant nobility saw value in religious toleration. The crown was implored not to sequester the provision of office and award away from Protestant nobles but grant this royal favour without consideration for religion. They protested that as a result of their exclusion from dignities, the dignities were being awarded to unworthy men. In a broader sense they argued Charles was debasing nobility to common status and raising commoners to nobility.

This thread was picked up on in the work Response de Monseigneur le prince de Condé et autres seigneurs de sa compagnie sur certaines propositions à eux faites par Monsieur le Chancelier. Offices and honours were being granted to men of low birth by virtue of their proximity to the King, and if those people happened to be nobles, they were nobles who had not seen military service. Such a state of affairs was insulting to the King's dignity.

Still other texts specified the 'unworthy men'. The sons of merchants, parlementaires, and notaries.

The unbearable levels of taxation were deplored, with note given to the extractive Italian salt farm collectors, wine duties and bribes required for justice. This was despite the fact the average yearly taxation during these years, was lower than that at the end of Henri II's reign.

In the pamphlet Mémoires des occasions de la guerre, appelée Le Bien Public, rapportés à l'état de la guerre présente the current conflict was analogised with that of the War of the Public Weal in 1465. The author set out the situation in 1465, a kingdom in which justice failed, taxes were improper, and the state was in disorder. The author noted that Louis XI was raising those of low birth, and demeaning those of great birth. Boltanski argues that this attack could be seen as an attack against the duc de Nevers, whose position in the French nobility owed so much to royal favour. These societal ills mandated the calling of an Estates to resolve. The prince de Condé was thus justified in taking up arms, as those who had opposed Louis XI's government had been, to see the bringing about of an Estates General, as no other recourse had been left open to him. Unlike the cabal of advisers that surrounded the king, an Estates would offer a far more representative cross-section of the kingdom, and would be much better suited to propose solutions to France's judicial, religious and economic troubles. Religious persecution was simply one tendril of a general royal tyranny.

This was the first time in a century that the ambition to curtail the monarchs power through an intermediary body like the Estates had been forwarded. Indeed, Chevallier finds parallels with the League of the Public Weal, as had the contemporary pamphleteer.

Pernot argues that the rebel Protestant attempts to ensconce themselves in a broader political program had the effect of further disgusting Charles IX, who believed in a more absolute monarchy. The rank and file Protestants were also dismayed that a right to freedom for worship for all was not a feature of their leader's rhetorical battle.

In the pamphlet titled Requeste et remonstrance du peuple adressante au Roy, the problem of the repression of Protestantism and the 'usurpation of the state' were argued to derive from a singular cause. Other pamphlets also championed a similar theme. The continual modification, and revocation of royal edicts made the French crown appear fickle and indecisive in foreign eyes. The reason for the instability of policy was to be found in the 'foreign advisers' of the king: those of Lorraine (the Guise), and those of Italy (like Birague). By the usurpation of the royal council by such unworthy figures, French princes and great seigneurs who should be present to advise the king were frozen out. Their names blackened, they could no longer access the king for fear of their own safety. The proposal first put forward by the conspirators of Amboise was picked up in Requeste et remonstrance, that rather than cloistering himself with a handful of councillors, the king surround himself with men selected by the Estates General. Irrespective of his age, the king must always be advised well.

The secretary of state L'Aubespine came in for particular attack as the stand-in for the recent birth of the ministerial system in France.

This is not to say all Protestant pamphlets downplayed the religious element of the war. In the work titled Le chrestien postulat de monseigneur le prince de Condé, the demand for total freedom of religion was front and centre. Charles was implored to permit Protestant worship irrespective of station and place, and publically. Jouanna sees the influence of the admiral de Coligny in this work, but argues that it is fundamentally the exception in the 'war of words' of pamphlets of the war.

The usage of lettres de cachet, which were private, rather than lettres patentes which were public, also came in for critique. Through these means, it was argued, the crown sought to disguise their ill intentions.

The relative paucity of focus on religious matters, was useful fuels for the opponents of the rebels. They were able to argue that it demonstrated that religion was just a 'pretext' for their rebellion, which had the true goal of defying and denigrating the dignity of the crown.

Negotiations

Though she had distanced herself from the policy of the chancellor L'Hôpital, he was nevertheless one of the men tasked (alongside Morvillier, the bishop of Orléans and the maréchal de Vielleville with getting Condé and the rebel Protestants to lay down their arms in return for amnesty by Catherine on 3 October. This was refused by the the Protestant leadership, with Condé responding in writing to the offer of L'Hôpital to demand universal freedom of worship throughout France regardless of station or location. He demanded the convening of an Estates General, the lowering of taxes and the purging of the kingdoms Italian advisors and other foreigners (including those of Lorraine-Guise and Savoie-Nemours), who burdened the people with unjust taxes. The Italians were 'even guilty of imposing fiscal burdens on the nobles, who were unaccustomed to such things. This last point was a direct attack against Catherine and her Italian advisors. According to Sutherland, this attack was aimed squarly at the duc de Nevers, the baron de Retz, and the duc de Nemours. Cloulas grants that it was true that she utilised Italian financiers to support the lavish court in return for allowing them to reimburse themselves from tax revenues. Catherine would be among those removed from power. He also sought to see the maréchal de Montmorency established as Grand Master (an office currently occupied by the Lorraine duc de Guise). The discussions initially concerned themselves with banalities. The constable de Montmorency refused to entertain negotiations on this basis, arguing that edicts were the business of the king, and not his subjects. He further stated that the edict of Amboise, which brought the first war to a close with a degree of toleration was always intended to be provisional, and the king could not brook two religions in his kingdom. Decrue reports that the Constable got into an argument with the cardinal de Châtillon, and also that upon meeting his nephews he refused to dismount his horse. The historian Cloulas characterises Condé's demands as "arrogant". L'Hôpital wished to continue negotiations, but this earned him a rebuke from Catherine, who now placed responsibility for the religious policy of the last years, and thus the present situation, in his hands.

On 7 October, in a revival of an ancient ceremony, several ornately dressed heralds appeared in the Protestant camp. They twice summoned the prince de Condé, admiral de Coligny, the seigneur d'Andelot and the other Protestant leaders to surrender themselves with three days, or be declared guilty of rebellion. The herald had instructions to express to the cardinal de Châtillon his uncles regret that he had secured advancement for his nephew. Though caught off guard by this unusual ceremony, the Protestant leaders remained committed to their course. While certain moderations were inspired by this display, the leadership believing they might have overstepped the mark in their involvement in matters of taxation and government, they nevertheless demanded the surrender of Calais, Le Havre and Metz as surety, the disarming of the crown and dismissal of foreign troops in the royal service (i.e. the Swiss).

After this, the constable de Montmorency was sent out to the Protestant camp. He upbraided Condé, noting that Charles would be betraying Christianity to establish two religions in his kingdom. He argued that if the king restored the edict of Amboise it would be at his discretion to modify and revoke it as he pleased. He remained open to negotiations however, Wanegffelen suspects this was a product of him acting on the orders of Catherine. Nevertheless, on 8 October, his nephew Coligny essentially prohibited further negotiations. Military confrontation became inevitable.

Siege of Paris

Writing to the governors of the kingdom on 5 October, Charles reinforced the earlier royal directives issued at the end of September. They were to maintain their provinces in passive obedience to the crown, with his subjects demonstrating their loyalty and affection to the crown. Where they identified those inclined to support the Protestant rebellion they were to if necessary slaughter them to a man. This brutal repression was aimed at those Protestants who used religion as a 'pretext' for rebellion, rather than the religion at large.

Though safe from the Protestants in the fervently Catholic Paris, the king was now trapped in his capital, which was encircled by the Protestants. No longer able to seize the king, the Protestants resolved to starve the city out, thereby forcing the royalists inside to give a battle, which, having been won by the Protestants would win the war for them. The Protestants established a camp first at Claye-Soullis and then at Saint-Denis on 2 October from where they put the capital to siege, hoping to starve the place out. Their numbers were not sufficient for such an approach. A large number of places around Paris fell to the Protestants: Saint-Denis, Lagny, Charenton, Porche, Fontaine, Buzenval, Argenteuil, Saint-Ouen, Aubervilliers, Dreux, Montereau, Étampes and Dourdan. A large garrison was installed at Montereau. Their soldiers fanned out into the countryside, torching the mills between the Porte du Temple and the Porte Saint-Honoré, stripping churches of their wealth, and impeding the passage of food convoys into the capital. At Montereau the Seine was impeded, at Charenton the Marne blocked, cutting off supplies to the capital. The winning of Étampes cost the capital its granary. Lagny commanded an important bridge upon the road to the capital.

Condé stationed his forces jointly at Saint-Denis and at Le Bourget.

Inside the capital, Charles permitted the people to arm, they descended upon the Protestants in their midst, killing them.

Catherine wrote optimistically to the duc de Nevers on the royalist position in the capital. She argued that their position was strong, with many good people coming to reinforce their party in the capital. She also urgently summoned the seigneur de Tavannes to make for the capital immediately with all the forces at his disposal, so that he might serve the crown. In addition to his own compagnie he was to bring with him that of the duc d'Aumale, the comte de Charny, the comte de Vaudémont, the comte de Roussillon, the count of Bene and the duke of Savoy. She assured Tavannes his passage to Paris would be trivial, as all the rebel Protestants were concentrated in the confines around the city. In his absence from Burgundy, the seigneur de Vennoux would hold the fort in the province as lieutenant-general. Tavannes received two communications from the capital around this time, one on 28 September, the next following the day after, both advising him to make haste to the capital.

Tavannes was also to bring up to Paris a new levy of 4,000 Swiss that the French crown had undertaken.

On 15 October, the king wrote to the duc de Nevers. He was to unify the forces he was bringing to the capital (the five old infantry companies that were stationed in the French Piedmontese fortresses) with the new 4,000 Swiss the crown was raising. These five old companies were a mixture of arquebusiers (who accounted for around 63% of the force) and mostly armoured pikemen (29% of the force). To hold the forts in his absence, legionnaires could be raised from Piedmont or other companies moved in. Nevers was advised that a representative of his had already arrived at the French court bringing word of the energies Nevers was devoting to the raising of foot soldiers. He was assured that the army was well served for foot soldiers, and he should not tax himself overly in this pursuit.

The next day, the duc de Nevers was instructed to recapture for the crown places in Dauphiné that had fallen to the Protestants on his route north. Three days further, on 19 October, Nevers was urged to see to the restoration of royal control over Vienne in Dauphiné and Mâcon in Burgundy, both of which had entered Protestant hands. To assist him in this, he could look to the force under Birague in Lyon. Given the paucity of royal funds, it was hoped that Nevers would be able to accomplish this with only 1,200 livres brought with a certain Molé would suffice, with the rest accomplished on credit.

The duc de Nevers had still not arrived in Paris by 7 November. The king, impatient for his arrival, ordered that he, and his soldiers, not devote themselves any further to anything other than making their way to the capital with all haste. It was stressed that it would be in Paris that the climactic showdown transpired, and therefore this was where it was important for all royal commanders to be. The king noted that the Swiss Nevers was bringing were presently without a commander of the their own, Charles advised Nevers to pick a worthy Frenchman for the position while they were on route to the capital. Charles suggested the seigneur de Nançay for the role.

The duc de Nevers oversaw the recapture of Vienne for the royal cause at some point during November. This received congratulations from the king in a letter of 23 November. The monarch advised that he also see to reconquest of Autun and Mâcon. He hoped that the capture of these places would not delay Nevers too long though, as he hoped to see him link up with the royal army under the duc d'Anjou. He hoped that it would be possible for Nevers to take these places on route.

On the 28th of September, Charles wrote to the governor of Péronne, d'Humières to inform him that the seigneur de Strozzi. would be bringing the gendarme companies under d'Humières authority out of Picardy to provide support to the king in Paris. With four gendarme companies having been summoned to the capital from Picardy, Charles was concerned for the defence of this sensitive border province that stood next to the source of the rebels potential for greatest aid, the Dutch Geuzen. As such, Charles wrote to d'Humières on 5 October to advise him to raise four companies of the Picard legion, which would be stationed in Péronne. With Spanish help having been called for by the French crown, d'Humières was instructed to receive the forces of the duke of Alba on 11 October.

A week late, on 18 October, d'Humières was advised that Condé was attempting to draw some artillery companies from the province, over which he was the governor. D'Humières was to intercept the artillery, and prevent its transport to the Île de France. In a letter of 24 October, the governor of Péronne was congratulated for his efforts to preserve order in the areas under his authority, through the disarmament of suspected individuals.

As Burgundy, Champagne and Anjou were largely quiet of disturbances, these places could have their soldiery summoned to the capital with relatively little risk.

Reinforcements

Making their way to join with the besieging Protestants were the comte de Montgommery who brought with him a small force, the seigneur de La Rochefoucauld coming up from Poitou and the comte de Gramont who brought Gascon soldiers with him.

The constable de Montmorency also received reinforcements. He soon enjoyed an army of around 15,000 to 16,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with further volunteers. The Parisian volunteers were given the insignia of a white cross. Aid could be anticipated to arrive from the duke of Alba also sometime soon. Cloulas puts the royal cavalry at 8,000.

Charles ordered the mobilisation of the old bands, under Filippo di Piero Strozzi, in addition to all other available men of war. Strozzi's band came forth from Picardy. Meanwhile, Montmorency ordered the seigneur de Brissac to bring reinforcements from Lyon.

The constable de Montmorency came in for criticism for allowing his significantly numerically inferior besiegers to have the capital in their vice. He struck out on 4 November, capturing Argenteuil. This was followed the day after with the occupation of La Chapelle.

Several advantageous blows were delivered for the royalist cause. On 6 November, the commander Strozzi destroyed a pontoon bridge the Protestants had built upstream on the Seine to block the river. The following day, the duc de Nemours seized Buzenval back from the Protestants. Despite the increasing assertiveness of the royalists, on 8 November, Condé resolved to send away the seigneur d'Andelot to capture Poissy, and the comte de Montgommery to take Pontoise. The comte de La Rochefoucauld was also dispatched, in sum leaving the main Protestant army with less than half of its cavalry. His army was left deficient in numbers. Worse, the constable de Montmorency was appraised of this, and on 9 November departed from the capital to give battle. The Constable had been dogged by rumours that he was refusing to give battle due to the fact his nephews were among the besieging army.

Saint-Denis

Around the year 1566, the royal army could boast for its cavalry a roster of 3,160 lances. A lance was a unit of 5 to 7 men that each man-at-arms or homme d'armes possessed. It contained a mixture of horse bound and foot bound soldies. Thus, 3,160 lances worked out at 7,900 gendarmes (the noble heavy cavalry). Recruitment problems were created by the religious schism, with some of the gendarmerie favouring Protestantism. Therefore the crown looked to transform archers that formed part of the lance, into men-at-arms. Despite this theoretical size, at the battle of Saint-Denis, only 3,000 cavalry would be brought to bear by the crown.

With the Protestant line weak (numbering around 1,200 to 1,500 cavalry and a similar number of arquebusiers according to Crété), the constable de Montmorency effected a sortie through the porte Saint-Denis with his cavalry and artillery, the aged Constable watching as the soldiers passed through before dawn. The Protestants were aware of this, and the leadership debated how to proceed. Some counselled abandoning Aubervilliers and Saint-Ouen and retreating to Saint-Denis where they could reunite with the seigneur d'Andelot. Coligny favoured harassing the enemy without affording battle. Condé favoured battle. The only compromise Coligny was able to achieve was to delay the giving of battle to the afternoon so that if necessary the army might withdraw under cover of darkness.

Both Charles IX and his brother Anjou had been desirous to join the army, so that they might fight the besiegers. Catherine and her advisors succeeded in recalling them back to the Louvre. She was uninterested in offering the possibility to the Protestants of achieving what they had failed to achieve at Meaux unnecessarily. A meeting between Álava and the French royal family (including Catherine, Charles, the duc d'Anjou and the duc d'Alençon) transpired at the court on the day of the battle. Catherine was in a state of great apprehension concerning the confrontation. This confused Álava who noted that only two days previous, Catherine had been filled with confidence as to the destruction of the rebellion. He further noted that they had only given battle because the Protestants had insisted upon it. Recalibrating to the mood of the room, he noted that were it still possible, he would pray Charles call back the army from the confrontation. Seeing Álava's anxiety, Catherine reassured him, that battle had been resolved upon after word had come of the Protestants sending away much of their forces, and with this information in hand Álava approved of the matter. In his letter to Philip II, he explained to his sovereign that the French had kept him in the dark for some time. Charles then inquired of Álava as to word of the duke of Alba's reinforcements, and, protesting that he had none, he was advised to urge Alba to hurry so that the Protestant German reinforcements might be intercepted. Anjou and Charles would watch the coming battle from one of the Louvre towers, and Álava was taken up to see the march of the army into the field. The Protestant force had divided their cavalry into three corps, the right under the command of Coligny at Saint-Ouen, the left under the seigneur de Genlis at Aubervilliers and the centre under Condé's command. Coligny's flanks were watched over by the arquebusiers who were on foot. The Protestants had no cannons or pikemen. Montmorency enjoyed a 6:1 numbers advantage, and deployed on both sides of the causeway that led from Paris to Saint-Denis. Mariéjol puts the royal army at around 18,000 infantry and 3,000 gendarmes, while the Protestants had between 1,000 and 1,200 arquebusiers, and 1,400 to 1,500 cavalry armed not with lances but poles to which iron tips had been attached. Le Roux puts the Protestant numbers a little higher, at 3,500 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. The constable de Montmorency's force had 6,000 Swiss under the command of Pfyffer, 10,000 French infantry under the command of Strozzi and the seigneur de Brissac, the cream of the French gendarmerie and good artillery. Decrue rates the skill of Strozzi, Pfyffer and Brissac highly. The plan of the Constable was to seize the two anchor points of the Protestant army simultaneously (Saint-Ouen and Aubervilliers), before advancing on Saint-Denis. On the Constable's left, facing Saint-Ouen, was the cavalry of the duc de Nemours, the seigneur de Thoré and the duc de Longueville, as well as a legion of the Parisian volunteers. Montmorency himself was in the royal centre with the gendarmerie and the Swiss. To his right the royal artillery, and then the royal right under the maréchal de Cossé. Cossé had the cavalry companies of the duc d'Aumale and seigneur de Damville, the infantry of Strozzi and Brissac. Battle was joined between the royalists and Protestants at 15:00 on 10 November at Saint-Denis, close to Paris. Montmorency hoped to separate the Protestants from Saint-Denis, and looked to attack the Protestant left. He was hasty, and even before observing the effect of his artillery barrage, or waiting for his infantry to deploy, he ordered Aumale and Genlis' cavalry forward against the seigneur de Genlis' corps. The seigneur de Biron and maréchal de Cossé were ordered to charge with their cavalry, but their advance was broken by a ditch filled with Protestant arquebusiers. Despite being outnumbered, the Protestants attacked. Coligny's cavalry crashed through the light cavalry opposite them and penetrated into the Parisian bourgeois volunteers. As the Parisians withdrew in disarray they caused confusion among the Swiss. Condé's gendarmes drove into those of the constable de Montmorency. In the ferocity of the attack, the constable was unhorsed and isolated from his men, and was approached by a certain Robert Stuart. By this time, Montmorency was already wounded to a great degree, having received four sword blows and a strike on the head from a mace. Stuart called on Montmorency to surrender to him, to which Montmorency rejoindered by striking Stuart in the face with the hilt of his sword, knocking out three teeth. Concurrent to this defiant act, Montmorency was shot in the kidney with a pistol and fell to the ground. He was rescued from the field by his sons Thoré and Damville. His eldest son, the maréchal de Montmorency restored control over the royal army. He pursued the admiral de Coligny while his younger brother the seigneur de Damville chased Condé's squadron. During the chaos, Condé's horse was shot out from under him. Taking advantage of the rainy conditions to enjoy a withdrawal without pursuit, the Protestants fell back to Saint-Denis under the cover of darkness. The field, and the victory, were left in the hands of the royalists. Garrisson argues by contrast that the battle had no real victor. Le Roux describes the Protestant retreat from the battle as 'catastrophic'.

In total, around a thousand were killed at the battle of Saint-Denis. Of these, a majority were Protestants.

Among those who got their first taste of battle at Saint-Denis was the royal bastard Henri, the chevalier d'Angoulême, then only sixteen-years-old.

Victory went to the royalists, primarily by virtue of remaining in control of the battlefield. Charles delivered word of the royal victory to the Spanish ambassador Álava, who offered his congratulations. Álava then went to visit the bedside of the dying constable de Montmorency. Montmorency's bedside was surrounded by his wife and sons, though he was unable to recognise them. The Spanish king prepared a letter for his wife, Élisabeth, to send in the wake of the battle. This letter urged Charles and Catherine forward, to continue to punish the heretical rebels.

The constable died two days later of his injuries. He was granted an elaborate funeral by Catherine at Notre-Dame-de-Paris. Participating in the funeral procession were many of Montmorency's prominent son-in-laws, the king's brother the duc d'Alençon, the cardinal de Bourbon, the duc de Longueville, and various prelates and knights of the royal order. Catherine and the king watched from a scaffold. An effigy was made for the occasion that even modelled his facial wounds. His heart was then buried in the Celestine convent alongside that of king Henri II with whom he had been so close. The Spanish ambassador Álava, who had held deep suspicions of Montmorency's religious inclinations, celebrated his death in a letter to Philip as a 'true miracle from god'. For her part, Catherine wrote to Philip that she was thankful no other great noble other than the Constable had died during the battle. Despite this proclamation, Montmorency was not the only prominent death of the battle. The Protestant's lost the vidame d'Amiens, the comte de Sault and the comte de Suze. The future maréchal de France, the seigneur de Sansac was among the few prominent royalist wounded.

With the death of the constable de Montmorency, the position of Constable of France fell vacant. It would not be filled again until 1593. The importance of the charge required a noble of complete loyalty, in addition to military prowess. Charles asserted no one was required to fill the position. Catherine disagreed.

It was inappropriate for Charles himself to take on leadership of the army with Montmorency's death for several reasons. In the neo-platonic conception of the monarchy which was in fashion at the time, the king was the soother of troubles. Further, if he were to himself fight rebels, it would be to dignify them with an undeserved importance. Thus, it would be the job of the duc d'Anjou to deal with Condé's army.

This did not mean Charles did not wish to involve himself actively in military affairs. He announced to the duc de Nevers on 15 November his desire to make for Champagne so that he might come face to face with the reiters that Condé had recruited. His council succeeded, with some difficulty, in dissuading him from taking this course.

The role the king had in mind for the cardinal de Lorraine in the civil war was of great displeasure to the latter figure. He wrote to Charles on 14 November that as the king clearly did not think him a worthy figure, that he allow him to retire to his estates while a younger man take over his place.

It was decided in council on 14 November to elevate the duc d'Anjou as lieutenant-general of the kingdom. Charles signed the letters patent but backdated them to 12 November so that there would be no interregnum in the holding of supreme military command. In the absence of a Constable, this role made him the sole leader of the royal army (as Pernot puts it, the 'commander in chief'). As Anjou was heir presumptive to the French crown, he could be assured to devote himself solely to the interests of the crown. Beyond this, royal power was also delegated to the lieutenant-général in any place in which Charles himself could not act. The charge had not been occupied since the death of the duc de Guise, François in 1563. Catherine thought this a prudent course given the jealous nature of the leading families of the kingdom that hungered for the office of Constable. Indeed, the new duc de Montmorency (formerly the comte de Dammartin) angled to have himself made the second in command to the new lieutenant-general, thereby acting as a continuator to the office of Constable that his father had held. As the most senior of the maréchaux, having been appointed in 1559, logic dictated that in the absence of royal command of the army or that of a Constable control of the military would have defaulted to him. Hoping to force the queen's hand on this front, he and his brothers, along with other princes, threatened to depart court. Injurious to his prospects to achieve this command were the fact he was a first cousin of the Châtillon brothers, and was seen as being soft on Protestantism. Charles had first considered the late duc de Guise's brother, the duc d'Aumale, for the position of deputy to his brother, the duc d'Anjou. This had been stringently opposed by the four Montmorency brothers who threatened to defy Aumale's authority if he was put in such a position and therefore the king had dropped the idea. Aumale then retired to Champagne in disgust. The duc de Montpensier, duc de Nemours, duc de Longueville and duc d'Aumale looked to see the seigneur de Sansac receive the charge of Anjou's deputy. The maréchaux baulked at this proposal, threatening to depart, much as the Montmorency had done.

To assist the duc d'Anjou in his new military career three military advisors were chosen: the duc de Nemours (who had recently married Anne d'Este and thus affixed himself to the Lorraine family), the duc de Montpensier (a countweight to the Lorraine aligned Nemours but also a virulent Catholic), and the maréchal de Cossé (a moderate Catholic also chosen to ensure the Montmorency did not feel left out in the cold). Cossé (formerly known by his title as the seigneur de Gonnor) was a recent elevation to the Marshalate. These three men got on poorly with one another, and were not good strategists. Anjou, still young, lacked the gravitas to settle the disputes between his honour sensitive advisers. Nemours was discontented that he did not have sole command of the army. As a result, Charles would have to write to him on 17 January 1568 to sooth him, and make it clear to him that it was the king's intention that his brother enjoyed command of the army, but that he would be advised by princes (like Nemours) and seigneurs.

As the role of lieutenant-general made him not just the commander of the military but also the alter-ego of the king, Anjou also enjoyed a council of his own. In this council were the duc de Montpensier, Montpensier's son the prince dauphin d'Auvergne, the duc de Nemours, the duc de Longueville, the seigneur de Méru (one of the late constable de Montmorency's sons), the duc d'Anjou's governor Carnavalet, one of the captains of the Scottish guard de Losses, and his future favourite the seigneur de Villequier. The king was involved in the composition of Anjou's war council. He advised his brother on 1 March 1568 to see the comte de Radan, who Charles rated as a worthy figure, included in his council.

In the contemporary writer Brantôme's opinion, Catherine afforded her son the maréchal de Cossé as an advisor because he would oppose following a firm course against the Protestants.

From his appointment until the end of the conflict, Anjou would write 125 letters, of which around a quarter were for the attentions of the court.

Anjou appeared before the parlement of Paris on 17 November, where he took an oath. The next day he wrote to the duc de Nevers, appraising him of his new command, and noting he would do his utmost to satisfy the king. The maréchal de Matignon received a letter with the same message.

Writing to the Pope on 22 November, the duc d'Anjou noted that he had to take the occasion of the sending of Charles sending a certain Annibal Rouchelay to the Pontiff to write him. He assured the Pope that no other prince would be devoted to the preservation of the Catholic religion as he. He informed the Pope of his new charge, and that he was regretful for the military opportunities that had been squandered since his appointment as lieutenant-general (something he had told Annibal to discuss with Pius V). He argued he was inexperienced and subject to the advice of those around him.

Royalist aid

At first, Charles imagined that he might be able to restore control over the situation without turning to Spain for military support. He noted to Fourquevaux that Álava had approached him on 27 September with offers of support, for which Fourquevaux was to thank Philip, but decline, as the French king commanded enough strength to suppress the rebellion on his own. It quickly became apparent that support from the French provinces would be slow in arriving, and this forced a re-evaluation of the Spanish offer.

No sooner had she arrived in Paris, than Catherine began sending out foreign diplomatic feelers to the Catholic powers. The Spanish ambassador Álava, Margaret of Parma and the duke of Alba all made promises of military aid. Philip endorsed these outreach efforts, and indicated he was willing to provide support with both his troops and his own person as required. Margaret of Parma promised to dispatch 1,600 cavalry from the Spanish Netherlands, this offer was accepted by the French crown. Charles recorded his acceptance of this aid to Fourquevaux in a letter of 10 October. Alongside the 1,600 heavy cavalry were a further 400 light cavalry. These reinforcements would be under the command of the count of Arenberg. Writing to both the comte de Chaulnes and d'Humières on 13 October, Charles instructed them to receive the Spanish as friends. They were to ensure the Spanish were feasted, and lacked for nothing while they were in Picardy. Charles entrusted his bastard half-brother, the chevalier d'Angoulême with welcoming the Spanish soldiers of the count of Arenberg. This role was granted to Henri over the hesitation of the queen mother Catherine. The expeditionary force preceded Arenberg into France, arriving on 13 November. Arenberg himself crossed the frontier on 25 November, from the Spanish Netherlands. Welcoming Arenberg represented a significant responsibility for the bastard Henri, due to the missions diplomatic as well as military dimensions. The cavalry that Arenberg lead would remain in France until April 1568, in sum the duration of the war. Pay was provided for these soldiers by the Spanish for a period of three months.

These would be the only soldiers provided by the Spanish during the second war of religion. Nevertheless, Alba assured Charles that if his situation besieged in the capital became a dire one, he would head into France at the head of an army. He also offered a further 5,000 infantry. This offer was viewed sceptically and suspiciously by the French court, and ultimately Catherine refused the suggestion.

Though she didn't want such a sizable contingent of Spanish infantry entering the country, this did not mean Catherine did not see military value in Alba. She hoped rather, that the duke might hire reiters in the hope of intimidating the elector Palatine into backing down from his support of the Protestants. From October to December, she also wanted to see the cream of the Spanish mounted arquebusier force enter France. Angry at Alba's reticence, she threatened to make peace with the Protestants with him to blame for the affair if the French did not receive this force before the German mercenaries of the Protestant's showed up. Alba stayed resolute in his refusal.

In addition to aid in soldiers, Alba also offered aid in information, appraising the French of troops levied in the Holy Roman Empire, such as he was aware of them. Such intelligence liaisons would link the Spanish Netherlands, France and Spain well through this period.

During November, Catherine assured Álava that the crown would not make peace with the Protestants before appraising Philip. Delighted, Philip urged Álava to remind Catherine of this statement of hers whenever possible. Álava dutifully complied with this instruction.

A new levy of 4,000 Swiss was undertaken by the crown. The French ambassador in Switzerland, Bellièvre was to see this force to Chalon, from where it could be brought to join the main royal army by the lieutenant-general of Burgundy, the seigneur de Tavannes. In contrast with Italian mercenaries, Swiss mercenaries were primarily infantry who used pikes rather than arquebusiers. Such a weapon preference favoured large scale manoeveurs over individual actions. Arquebuses were more expensive, lacked accuracy over long ranges, and took about a minute to reload. Their advantage came in mobility and autonomy.

She leant on the duke of Savoy to provide the aid he had promised, looked to her cousin, the duke of Florence to provide between 100,000 and 200,000 écus. Similar requests for money went to the Pope for up to 300,000 écus. Pope Pius assented to the raising of this fund through the employment of half an annate (the annual income of clerical land in France). Delighted at the thought of a war on Protestantism, he further proffered 25,000 écus and offered 6,000 soldiers. The new duc de Nevers was asked to raise several thousand soldiers from Piedmont.

The Pope similarly offered support to the royalist Catholic cause in terms of soldiers. He became little inclined to proffer financial support, lest it be devoted to another end than the fight against heresy. He further demanded Catherine dismissing the chancellor de L'Hôpital and the maréchal de Montmorency, while funnelling money to the cardinal de Lorraine.

Catherine reassured the Pope on 20 November, that there was too much at stake for the kingdom, her honour and her salvation to contemplate offering satisfaction to the Protestants.

In correspondence with the duke of Florence of 8 October 1567, Catherine proposed that the duke dispatch to France his third son, Pietro to France so that he might be granted an advantageous match with the heiress Marie de Clèves, who was then under the auspices of the Protestant queen of Navarre. Through this marriage, the property of the Clèves heiress could be maintained in Catholic hands, rather than falling to the Protestant party. She analogised the advantages she would afford Pietor favourably to the benevolence the French crown had shown another Italian, Louis de Gonzague, who had married Marie's elder sister Henriette and become a French ducal peer. For a man of her blood, as Pietro was, Catherine invited the Florentine to imagine how much more favour still she might show. Pietro offered the possibility of the acquisition of a new loyalist to the crown at a sensitive moment of civil war when the political base of the crown was narrowed.

Just as the Protestant rebels would look to secure German mercenaries, so too did the royalists. The bishop of Rennes, former French ambassador to the Holy Roman Emperor, was entrusted with raising a levy of reiters, and dissauding support for the Protestant cause among German princes. The bishop saw favourable prospects with the duke of Saxony, but found himself stuck in the French city of Verdun around 21 October.

Reiters were a fairly recent type of pistol wielding form of cavalry from Germany, that the Protestant soldier La Noue argued was superior to the French gendarmerie. These soldiers were mounted on common horses, with blackened armour so that the production process might be made quicker. Such mercenaries fought infantry in small squadrons, being careful not to become engaged. Each reiter carried several pistols, which they reloaded while on the move.

From Heidelberg on 1 November, the bishop of Rennes reported that he had enjoyed favourable discussions with the duke of Saxe-Weimar who was willing to devote 2,400 reiters to the royalist cause as soon as possible. The only prospective problem would be in the provision of money, as the bishop was not sure whether Saxe-Weimar would be willing to advance the money until the French could provide it. He therefore looked to see 50,000 livres provided, which would be need to be sent to the governor of Metz, maréchal de Vielleville. He hoped that there would be no cause for dispute with the duke of Saxony, who could be a great friend of the French, over the raising of these troops, despite the dispute between Saxony and the colonel of the French reiters.

The bishop of Rennes warned Charles against using the service of captains who were persona non grata with the Holy Roman Emperor and the duke of Saxony. He noted in a despatch of 19 November that the duke of Württemberg had learned that the French were utilising a certain captain Mandesloh. Mandesloh had been in the service of the rival claimant to Saxony, John Frederick during the Gotha War. By using the service of Mandesloh, Charles risked alienating the Elector of Saxony from favouring him, even driving him into the rebel Protestant camp. The bishop explained that he understand why Charles had taken this course, as the duke of Saxe-Weimar was slow in raising his levies. Nevertheless he urged against it.

By letter of 9 December, Charles expressed confusion at the rumour that he had taken Mandesloh into his employ. The bishop of Rennes was to assure the Elector of Saxony that Mandesloh was not in French service. The king was not lacking in prospective captains, and had no need to turn to such men, chief among whom the duke of Saxe-Weimar.

By this same letter, the bishop of Rennes was instructed to go and meet with the duke of Saxe-Weimar to oversee the prospective raising of the reiters. Saxe-Weimar had written to the bishop in confusion as to why he had not yet received the order to raise them from king Charles. This induced fear in Rennes that Charles might have backed out of the hiring of these forces. Arriving in Weimar, the bishop of Rennes would find word from the king, who emphasised the importance of the Saxe-Weimar mercenaries being ready simultaneously with the Protestant mercenaries of the Elector Palatine. The bishop of Rennes wrote frustratedly back to Charles on 15 December that if the king had dispatched another figure to Weimar while he was consumed with other business, this might have indeed been possible. He protested that it was not possible to be in two places simultaneously. He implored Charles to ratify the treaty he had undertaken with the duke of Saxe-Weimar with all possible haste, noting that he was a prisoner of the duke until its signing.

Concerning the attitude of the Emperor, the bishop of Rennes was fundamentally pessimistic. He noted that Maximilian had done his best to dissaude the duke of Alba from proferring support to the royalist cause in France. Further, he was given to understand the Emperor had informed the son of the Elector Palatine, John Casimir that his invasion of France in support of the Protestants was his own business, and not one that aroused the ire of Maximilian. Charles put little stock in the outlook of the bishop of Rennes concerning Maximilian. In the king's opinion, Maximilian remained an ally, and he tasked the comte de Fiesque with explaining to Maximilian that the French struggle against their rebels was one common to all princes.

Fearful of royalist negotiations with the Protestants. On 20 January, Philip II dispatched a courier to offer Catherine one million gold pieces if she would spurn such negotiations.

The Pope, who had learned that the (excommunicated) cardinal de Châtillon had come to the capital, demanded that he be handed over to the Papacy for punishment.

German Aid

Well aware that alone they could not well resist the royal army without foreign soldiers and funds, Protestant representatives were sent into the Holy Roman Empire at the outbreak of the conflict. The Protestant rebel leaders hoped to implement a more coherent and organised foreign policy than they had during the first French War of Religion, where a vast number of representatives (twenty-seven in total) were sent out in an incoherent fashion. Daussy sees by 1567 an evolution in the rebel Protestant diplomatic approach to a more efficient and lean outreach. The baron de Lux, who the French crown had sent into the Holy Roman Empire to frustrate the Protestants, argued that at first the Protestant outreach justified their rebellion against the French crown on the grounds of tyranny and the public good, but that these justifications were disagreeable to the German princes. Seeing little success in this, the Protestants had switched to justifying their rebellion on religious grounds, and enjoyed more success in this manner.

The French Protestants were Reformed, as such, they found little sympathy for their cause with the Evangelical Protestant princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Hesse and Württemberg.

By 1567, the Protestant leadership enjoyed long running relations with various allies. A far smaller number of representatives were sent out than had been during the first war. The agents who were sent out functioned as de facto ambassadors.

The French crown worked hard to characterise the Protestant leadership as rebels, in the hope of dissuading foreign actors from entertaining supporting them. Where the Protestant ambassadors were welcomed, it was in a circumspect fashion, lacking in grandeur.

The bishop of Rennes noted that while only the Elector Palatine supported the Protestant rebellion, many other princes who maintained more circumspect attitudes believed that the Protestants had rebelled due to the fact that toleration was about to be terminated with their faith to be persecuted. Rennes argued that this false rumour could be best disabused if the king himself wrote to the various princes of the Empire to clarify matters.

The Swiss were particularly sensitive to the charge that they might be supporting rebels, and thus support from this quarter very evaporated for the Protestants after the first civil war.

The Protestants secured the military aid of the Elector Palatine, who entrusted his son, John Casimir with providing military support. Renaudeau sees the involvement of the Palatine for the Protestant cause as more a cynical business venture, than anything driven by religious solidarity. Casimir would bring to bear 8,000 reiters, and 3,000 landsknechts. The composition of the landsknecht mercenaries was around two-thirds pikemen and one-third arquebusiers.

The crown worked to conduct a diplomatic counter offensive in the Empire, and to this end sent various representatives to gauge the plans of the various German princes, and dissaude them from providing support if possible. This operation was handled sloppily, with many inexperienced representatives being sent out in a scattered approach.

For example, the seigneur de Lignerolles was dispatched to the court of the Elector Palatine, with whom he attained an audience. Despite the proximity in relations between the French Protestants and the Elector Palatine, Lignerolles took the electors assurances of good friendship at face value. By contrast, when the bishop of Rennes met with the Elector Palatine, he walked away with the sense his time was being wasted, and that the Elector, and his son, were both resolved to support the rebel Protestant cause.

In a similar case of mixed messaging resulting from multiple representatives, in December, the bishop of Rennes felt it necessary to clear up a confusion that had emerged over the figure of a certain Pierre Le Clair, a captain who had hired German mercenaries for the crown during the first civil war. Charles had informed him that Pierre Le Clair was not to be trusted, as letters had shown he was in league with the Protestant rebels. Nevertheless, the maréchal de Vielleville, governor of Metz, had not been appraised of this fact, and was writing letters in favour of the man to the German princes. Resultingly, the bishop of Rennes had to write to Vielleville on the matter on 15 December.

Lignerolles found the duke of Württemberg full throated in his friendship of the French sovereign. Despite this, Lignerolles committed a faux pas, presenting a letter from the duke of Alba to Württemberg, something the bishop of Rennes would later identify as having been inappropriate. As a result of this, Württemberg took on a harsh tone with Lignerolles. The bishop of Rennes identified the problem here as being the sending out of many diplomatic representatives to accomplish the same objective without being in contact with one another. It would always be the case that one representative would find it prudent to remain silent on a matter another thought it wise to mention, and this diversity of approaches would instill distrust among those they intended to negotiate with. Württemberg would conduct his own discussions with Württemberg with the assistance of the Protestant baron de Lux. The bishop of Rennes poured great compliments on the Protestant baron de Lux, informing Charles that while he might be viewed with scepticism by Protestant princes like Württemberg, the presence of their co-religionist Lux was able to slick the wheels of the talks. In his 19 November despatch to Charles, the bishop of Rennes was positive about his talks with the duke of Württemberg. The duke had informed him that all in German had distaste for the actions of the Elector Palatine. Württemberg appraised the bishop that the Protestant mercenaries were ready to go on a tighter timetable than the one Rennes had initially provided to Charles. He warned that John Casimir had brought the margrave of Baden-Baden and a brother of the Landgrave of Hesse to his side. In addition to the 6,000 reiters, the bishop of Rennes was informed several companies of landsknechts were also being raised. The duke informed the bishop that he was under a misapprehension concerning a group of reiters that had already entered Lorraine. These were not, as he had thought, royalist reiters under the command of a certain Bassompierre but rather reiters in the service of those hostile to the French crown.

Württemberg was not all supportive words for the French king though. The bishop of Rennes reported that the duke was unsure whether Charles would guarantee freedom of conscience to the Protestants. The bishop of Rennes had assured him that not only was the king committed to freedom of conscience, but also freedom of worship under certain restrictions. The war was a matter of Charles defending himself against intractible Protestants who had resisted attempts to negotiate with unreasonable demands beyond the freedom of worship. Württemberg requested that this assurance was also provided to him from writing in the king's own hand. If this assurance were given then Württemberg, Saxony and Hesse would work to see France pacified including by cutting off support to them.

The duke also expressed his apprehension about the possibility of the Tridentine decrees being received in France. The bishop of Rennes reassured him that the Catholics of France were opposed to their adoption, and that their application would only apply to French Catholics, not French Protestants.

To the embarrasment of the bishop of Rennes, Württemberg also offered to act as a mediator between Charles and the rebel Protestants so that a good peace could be forged. The bishop of Rennes demured on this proposal, arguing the best way to bring about peace was to cut off the German support to the Protestants. Württemberg was eventually convinced, and he offered to do what he could to stop the German mercenaries coming to the Protestant camp, but noted that this would not be easy. Württemberg, the landgrave of Hesse and the duke of Saxony would meet at Schmalkalden so that they might discuss French affairs, and how best to stop the civil war in the French kingdom spreading like an infection to engulf all of Europe. Württemberg noted that, had the duke John Casimir's preparations for his entry into France been less advanced, they might have been able to call him back from the enterprise at such a meeting. In the circumstances though, he would surely have already crossed the Rhine by then. The bishop of Rennes was similarly pessimistic, believing it was too late to stop the army of John Casimir. He was more hopeful that further recruitment could be contained though.

Charles got back to the bishop of Rennes by despatch of 9 December. He expressed regret over the situation with the seigneur de Lignerolles that Rennes had elaborated on to him. He noted that Lignerolles had exceeded the bounds of his mission, which was to rendezvous with the duke of Alba in Flanders and then head on with any instructions Alba provided into Germany. The king expressed his disappointment in the attitude of the the Elector Palatine, as he was a figure that had received friendship from France in the past. As for the invasion of the Elector's son, Charles noted that all they would bring back to Germany with them would be regret. As for the assurances Württemberg required, Charles outlined that he had never dreamed of ending the regime of religious tolerance he oversaw, and that the rebellion had nothing to do with matters of religion but was rather an assault on one's sovereign under a pretext. To support the bishop of Rennes, Charles included some articles he had offered the rebels a few days prior as proof of his good attitude on the matter of religion. The bishop of Rennes was to convince the German princes of this. Württemberg's offer to act as an intermediary between Charles and his subjects was politely noted, but firmly rejected. Charles noted it was not proper for another prince to have a role in the relations between him and his subjects.

In his meeting with the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II, Lignerolles reported to Charles that he could be well satisfied by the assurances he had been given by the Emperor. Maximilian would be as responsive to the French request to prohibit German aid to the Protestants as he had been with king Philip's similar request concerning the Spanish Netherlands. Further, Maximilian assured Lignerolles that the French crown had nothing to fear in the duke of Saxony, the marquis of Brandenburg or the landgraves of Hesse (the title having being partitioned into four in early 1567).

The Protestant but royalist baron de Lux, enjoyed meetings with the duke of Saxony and the margrave of Hesse. On his return, which he intended to conduct as quickly as possible, he was informed that all the border places and passages between France and Lorraine were held by men of the prince de Condé. Despite this danger, Lux was resolved to continue his passage into France. It was only when he received word from the bishop of Rennes, who had arrived in Heidelberg, that he was of more use to the French king in Germany, that he resolved to stay in the Empire. In his letter back to the French court of 28 October, he noted that the duke of Saxony, and the duke of Saxe-Weimar were well disposed towards Charles. The latter had even explained to the baron that he was eager to put himself in French service at the first opportunity. Nevertheless, the news was not all so good, he had learned of the commission the prince de Condé had issued in the Empire, which was for '6,000 horse'.

The comte de Fiesque warned Catherine on 6 December that mustering was under way in the lands of the Elector Palatine per word he had received from Maximilian.

In January, the bishop of Rennes attended the Imperial diet, which was held at Fulda. Maximilian worked to dissaude the Protestant Imperial princes from supporting the French Protestant cause in this diet. Despite the favour the Emperor, the duke of Saxony, and margrave of Hesse-Kassel showed for the pacification of France, the overall news was not encouraging. These figures wanted to act as intermediaries between Charles and the rebels to bring about peace in France but were unsure whether their services would be welcomed. The bishop of Rennes stated that it was not right for them to mediate between a king and his subjects. Rather Charles desired that they work to recalling the German mercenaries that had gone to support the Protestant rebels, and endeavour to see no new levies join with the rebels from the Empire. This included levies like that the bishop of Rennes believed (upon information from the duke of Württemberg]] was being undertaken by the queen of England, Elizabeth, in Holstein. The French ambassador reported to Charles that there was great scandal at the diet that Charles had taken captain Mandesloh into his employ. This was to the disquiet of the Emperor, who expressed his disapproval to the bishop. Learning of the bishop of Rennes involvement in the diet by the intercepting of a Protestant pack of letters, Anjou voiced his approval of the choice on 17 February.

In the wake of Fulda, the Emperor announced to Charles that he would mediate with the rebels. The comte de Fiesque framed it sympathetically, highlighting that the Emperor had made an identical offer to Philip II over his troubles in the Netherlands. In both cases, there had been fear of the troubles spreading into Germany. The baron de Lux urged Catherine to seize on the opportunity of Imperial arbitration. In this letter of 24 February he warned that Maximilian had issued a prohibition on any German mercenaries going to enter France irrespective of whether they were in the pay of the king of France or the rebels. This was not ideal for the royalists as their mercenaries had not all entered the kingdom.

On the subject of the Fulda proposal, the baron de Lux wrote to Charles on 15 March. The Imperial mediation would not produce a peace that was dishonourable to Charles' authority or dignity. Lux had been informed by the landgrave of Hesse that the only condition insisted upon by the Imperials would be that freedom of religion was guaranteed in a settlement, just as it had been in the Empire in 1555. It would be stressed to Condé and those of his party that they owed obedience to Charles, and with freedom of religion guaranteed to them they must disarm. As to the Protestant's other demands, concerning who Charles kept council wit or distributed honours to, this was none of their business. The baron de Lux had enquired of them whether they would press the matter of French possession of the Three Bishoprics and been informed that while it could be an article, they would not push it too much. Indeed, if the Saxon Elector, as part of a peace seeking legation, brought the matter up, they would intervene against the proposal.

Another French representative working in the Empire was the naturalised German, Schomberg. In a despatch of 27 February to Catherine he reported on the evolving attitude of the Elector of Saxony. He noted that in a general sense there was much sympathy for the Protestant cause as the opinion in the country was that Charles intended to re-impose unitary Catholicism upon France, crushing freedom of religion. As a result, many had tried to convince the Elector of Saxony against the French king, and were trying to impede military support reaching Charles. Schomberg credited himself with having succeeded in convincing the Elector of Saxony that Charles was no enemy of Protestant worship in his kingdom, and that he had illustrated this by the terms Charles had provided to Téligny to give to the prince de Condé. With this about face accomplished, the Elector had embraced the royalist cause, and wished to do everything for its favour. Schomberg was also able to report that he had rehabilitated Mandesloh in the eyes of the Elector of Saxony. So complete was this rehabilitation that the Elector would also represent in Mandesloh's favour with the Emperor and other princes of the Empire. In further good news, the mercenary levy that the crown had raised was now ready, waiting only for the word from Charles to take to their horses. If the crown did not take their employ, Schomberg warned that they would go into the employ of the duke of Holstein who was a pensionary of Elizabeth I of England.

Charles was keen to assure himself that the English crown would not support the rebel Protestants. His ambassador in England, the seigneur de La Forest, had written to assure him no support from Elizabeth to the rebels would be forthcoming. This was not sufficient for Charles though, and he tapped his ambassador in the Spanish Netherlands, the seigneur de Durescu to get the duke of Alba to write to Elizabeth requesting her maintain her neutrality. Alba was to emphasise that Philip would not approve of supporting rebels against their lord.

The aid promised to the rebel Protestants by England did not materialise. The lack of financial subsidies from England left the Protestant army in dire fiscal straits by early 1568.

With the Protestants to receive 4,000 German reiters from the Empire, the young duc de Guise stationed himself in Champagne, in the hopes of preventing their entry into the kingdom of France.

In addition to their aid from inside the Empire, further boon came to the Protestant cause by the Protestant armies of Rouergue, Dauphiné and Quercy.

There was concern in the royal camp about the 5,000 reiters that the duke of Saxony was meant to be providing for the king's cause. On route, the duke had made a stop at the territory of his father-in-law, the Count Palatine of the Rhine. It was feared that the duke's father-in-law might have convinced him either to cease his progress, or even worse join with the Count Palatine's son John Casimir and throw his lot in with the Protestants. Charles wrote to his brother, who was leading the royal army in the field, with this fearful news on 1 February.

In addition to the duke of Saxony's reiters, the royal army also looked to receive a force led by Bassompierre and the Count Rhinegrave who had won over the margrave of Baden-Baden to the royalist cause in January 1568. Indeed, the duc d'Anjou had reported on their defection from John Casimir's army on 13 January, advising Charles to bring the margrave of Baden-Baden into French royal service, while reporting that the Rhinegrave and Bassompierre were coming already to provide him support. On the same day he advised Catherine of the letters he had received from Baden-Baden and Vielleville on the former's defection, as well as appraising her of the movements of the duke of Saxony's force. The king hoped that the arrival of these forces with Anjou would bolster him sufficiently until the duke of Saxony turned up.

On 16 January, Anjou wrote to Catherine again on the subject of the German mercenaries. He noted that he had received, and was forwarding, communiques from the maréchal de Vielleville, and the duke of Saxony. He had been informed that the duke of Zweibrücken and the count of Nassau were vexed by the damages done to their lands by John Casimir's reiters, and were seeking revenge. Anjou noted that he had written to the duke of Lorraine, who he felt was even more impacted by the passage of the reiters, to urge him to act similarly. Anjou also counselled the maréchal de Vielleville to do his all to keep these various aggrieved princes in this state of mind so as to trouble John Casimir most severely. In a related request, Anjou sought to ensure that the payment required for the duke of Saxony's men was sent forward. He noted that he had commanded Pasquier to move no further forward than Verdun until such time as the payment arrived.

Two days later, Anjou made a request of the seigneur de Puygaillard to send forward the reiters of Bassompierre without waiting for those of the count Rhinegrave.

On 28 January, Anjou alerted Charles to the fact he had told the maréchal de Vielleville he was free to undertake negotiations with the margrave of Baden-Baden.

Unsure what to believe, the duc d'Anjou wrote to Pasquier on 30 January to find out whether there was merit to what the duc d'Aumale had told him, that Saxony and the Rhinegrave's forces had crossed the Rhine and united on the far bank.

Come 3 February, Anjou would write directly to the duke of Saxony. He expressed his appreciation for the sincere friendship of the duke for France. He noted that they were eagerly awaiting the arrival of the duke's troops, and that he desired their arrival with all possible haste so that the rampant pillage and destruction of the Protestant army that was marauding through the kingdom could be brought to an end.

To facilitate the arrival of the forces of the Rhinegrave, Anjou wrote to the seigneur d'Espaulx on 4 February to receive them at Mouzon, and bring them to Troyes.

While writing to the duc de Nemours on 12 February, Anjou appraised the latter that he had received word from Charles and the maréchal de Vielleville that the duke of Saxony was closing in on Metz, and would be able to link up with the royal army in between twelve and fifteen days.

In correspondence with the seigneur de Pasquier on 15 February, Anjou gave orders for the guard of the money intended for the duke of Saxony until such time as Saxony arrived in Château-Thierry.

Anjou was again chasing the location of the seigneur de Bassompierre on 21 February, eager for his support. He did this both by directly writing to Bassompierre and through writing to Puygaillard. The duke of Saxony also came in for chasing, with Pasquier urged to hurry him along.

On 23 February, Charles reported to his ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux, that 3,000 of the duke of Saxony's reiters had made the crossing over the river Meuse three days previous.

Close to the wars end, on 6 March, the duc d'Anjou wrote to the seigneur de Mauvissière to deplore the fact that poor conditions on the road had delayed the progress of the duke of Saxony's soldiers.

Anjou complained, on 11 March, to Pasquier of the pretexts for delay of the arrival of Saxony, the Rhinegrave and the Margrave of Baden-Baden. He asked that Pasquier do what he could to resolve their excuses.

The royalists also received German aid, with 8,000 reiters arriving while the army was sheltering in the capital in early 1568 that had been provided by the duke of Saxony. They also received Italians from Savoy.

Move east

Having abandoned the field of Saint-Denis, the Protestants took refuge first in Montereau. They encamped here until the night of 13-14 November at which they began to move out, destroying a village near Paris as they departed as a show of strength. From here they anticipated the arrival of Protestant forces from Guyenne, Poitou and the German mercenaries of the Elector Palatine. While the army cooled its heels in Montereau, the reinforcements brought by the comte de La Rochefoucauld united with what was left of the Protestant army.

On 14 November, Charles wrote to his Spanish ambassador Fourquevaux about his expectations for how the Protestants would proceed. He believed they would make into Champagne to link up with the German mercenaries they had recruited. He was optimistic though, on the information of the bishop of Rennes, that it would take several months before this mercenary force was ready to join with the Protestant rebels.

The duc d'Aumale was entrusted with heading into Lorraine by the crown. This was to the end of a dual purpose. Firstly he would unite with the 3,000 German soldiers under the duke of Saxony and the marquis of Baden, and secondly he would block the entry of the Protestant's German mercenaries into the kingdom.

At Châlons, on 21 November, the forces of the maréchal de Cossé skirmished with Condé's soldiers. Cossé did not deploy his cavalry, thereby allowing the Protestants to escape.

While Anjou was still in the capital, the Spanish ambassador Álava came to visit him. Álava offered the complements of king Philip. The young prince expressed his joy to the ambassador that his first taste of war would be to fight the enemies of god and the King.

On 24 November, the duc d'Anjou departed from Paris. He inaugurated his new office as lieutenant-général when he reviewed the Flemish cavalry sent to the kingdom by the duke of Alba. This force was composed of 1,200 lances.

In November 1567, Álava described the peace of Amboise, that had brought the first French War of Religion to a close, as a 'hellish peace'. The tour of the kingdom, undertaken from 1564 to 1566, had also been a mistake in Álava's estimation. He felt that it had empowered the Protestants.

The royal army advanced to Corbeil. Their commander, the duc d'Anjou, was besieged by letters from his mother, advising him to discuss peace proposals that the king had received from the Protestants. Though Anjou was in favour of negotiations, the march eastwards continued. From his base at Corbeil, correspondence from the king dated 25 November assured him reinforcements were being raised to supplement his army.

As he moved towards Montargis, a place belonging to Renée, daughter of king Louis XII, the duc d'Anjou wrote to his cousin on 27 November from Melun. He requested that 200,000 loaves of bread be made ready for his army to arrive. In an undated letter, written at some point in November, Anjou wrote to Renée that the Protestants had resolved to seize Montargis, which they could use to cause much grief, and therefore he implored he her to look favourably on royal troops arriving in the city.

On 28 November, new word came from king Charles to the duc d'Anjou. The king advised his brother to have the two companies of foot soldiers of the seigneur de Puyguillard, as well as the companies of de Cristo and du Bicq all placed under the authority of the count of Martinengo (who commanded the Papal forces afforded to the crown). This would expand Martinengo's authority to covering six companies in total.

By 29 November, Anjou had reached Fontainebleau. From here he wrote his mother that the sieur de La Gastine had arrived in the army camp, and that he had overseen La Gastine's memorandum (which contained the Protestant demands for peace) being read before the various princes and captains. He summarised the opinion of the assembled for Catherine as being that the terms, by which those seigneurs who enjoyed high justice in their lands might be able to practice the Protestant faith, should be accepted, due to the great ruin the kingdom was being drawn into by the civil war. This would be on the condition that Catholics were at liberty in these places, and that tithes continued to be paid to the Catholic church. He noted that, at La Gastine's prompting, the other terms the Protestants had raised had not been debated, due to the opinion that the Protestants would defer to Catherine's judgement on all other points. The duc de Nemours and duc de Longueville were happy to be the ones to go and sign the peace with the Protestants. They would follow the lead of Catherine in this matter.

Anjou also alerted Catherine to the fact he intended to arrive in the city of Nemours with his army the following day. It would thus be from Nemours that he wrote to Nevers on 30 November. Still in Nemours on 2 December, he warned Renée that soldiers under the command of the baron de Terride would shortly be arriving in Montargis. He hoped she would greet them kindly, and furnish them with the aforementioned foodstuff.

At some point in December, Charles requested of the local judiciary of the kingdom that they inventory the nobles both loyalist and rebellious who had returned to their provinces after the battle of Saint-Denis. These men were to be chastisted as to the harm their behaviour caused.

On 3 December, Anjou was instructed by the court to continue military operations. Having remained in Nemours, while Terride had gone forward, the duc d'Anjou wrote back on 3 December, that they had received the sieur de La Mauvissière who had appraised the assembled grandees on the articles of peace. He assured his mother and brother that his army would march on 4 December, something that would have begun sooner had provisions not been in such a poor way. The sieur de La Gastine, who would serve as the bearer of this letter, would appraise the crown on Anjou's feelings concerning the articles of peace. The following day, he was able to reassure Renée that his soldiers would stop in the suburbs of Montargis, but that they would still expect resupply.

Sometime before 5 December Anjou's army successfully relieved the city of Sens from its siege, and saw to the preservation of Provins and Sézenne. Charles wrote to the duc de Nevers on the matter (as well as those of Layant and Failly) on 7 December, noting that the enemy had 'lost many men there'

Around 6 December, Charles was optimistic concerning the military situation. He wrote to his ambassador in Spain, Fourquevaux, on that day, speculating that the German mercenaries the Protestants had hired would arrive too late to support them.

While Anjou's army was camped at Nemours, the mother-in-law of the prince de Condé, the marquise de Rothelin visited the royal camp. She brought with her the king's proposal for peace, the restoration of the terms of the edict of Amboise. She succeeded in extracting a three day truce from the commander, which Anjou confirmed with her by letter of 6 December from Nemours. During the course of the three day truce, troops would not cross the Yonne river. Catherine meanwhile dispatched the seigneur de Lanssac to the royal army, to gauge her son's intentions with the army.

Anjou was forced to apologise to Renée on 8 December, that it was not possible for him to prevent the passage of Gascon soldiers through her city of Montargis.

With the military situation rapidly evolving, Charles struggled to to coordinate his generals. Writing to Nevers on 8 December, the king's mood of optimism had faded. He had been informed the German mercenaries were making straight for Champagne. Nevers was thus ordered to make against them as quickly as possible, rather than heading for Montargis.

Joblin imagines that after the experience of having the royal army move through her territory, Renée asked that the move not be repeated. They cite the pledge of Anjou on 9 February to send no more soldiers through the area as evidence. In a similar fashion, on 22 December, the king had to write to the dowager duchesse to request that she permit the lieutenant-general of Marseille, a certain captain Moulhon, to travel through Montargis with his company on his return to Marseille. In addition to affording him passage, she was to provide an escort.

The duke of Alba counselled Catherine to have the chancellor L'Hôpital dismissed from his post. Catherine assured the Spanish ambassador that she would dismiss her chancellor in time, but now was not the appropriate moment.(when)

Despite the best efforts of the duc d'Aumale, cardinal de Lorraine and seigneur de Tavannes, they struggled to impede the progress of the German Protestant mercenaries.(when)

Before his departure from Nemours, on 12 December, Anjou wrote to the duc de Nevers. He informed the duc that he was heading off the next day in pursuit of the Protestants (who he understood to be attempting to link up with their German mercenary reiters). Nevers was to unify his army with that of the seigneur de Tavannes and duc d'Aumale, and then join with Anjou's army. As a united force, they could block the passage of the reiters.

On 13 December, Anjou broke camp from Nemours. He was advised by the king to make to link up with the duc d'Aumale without waiting for the arrival of reinforcements, as the highest priority was preventing the junction of the Protestant army and their German reiters.

The royal army reached Montereau on 14 December, from where Anjou again wrote to the duc de Nevers, advising him that if he could not link with Anjou's army presently, to make instead for Châlons or Troyes. The next day the royal army made for Provins. The Protestant army was near, located at Epernay, where it was still spinning its wheels on 17 December.

The orders to Nevers on 14 December focused on the need for him to go and support the forces of the duc d'Aumale and duc de Guise near Toul in Lorraine, where they would block the entry of the German reiters from entering the kingdom. Nevers protested of the confusion in the orders he was being given, to which the king responded on 16 December by noting that in war, the situation could change hour to hour, and orders must change with the changing circumstances. Charles reiterated that by linking up with d'Aumale, Nevers would be doing him the utmost service.

The king again wrote to Nevers on 17 December. He expressed his need for his various generals in the field (including his brother) to communicate well with one another so that they would not be caught facing the enemy alone. He avoided giving specific directions, knowing that Nevers' actions would be contingent on the word he got from Anjou and Aumale.

The day that followed, Anjou wrote to Nevers from Sézanne ordering him to come link with the royal army at Châlons.

The king wrote to Anjou, advising him on the money he had sent across for the payment of the royal soldiery. Charles cautioned against waste, noting that he should make sure the Gascons of Monluc and the bands of the seigneur de Sainctorens did not receive double payment.

Anjou had arrived in Châlons by 21 December. From here he advised the seigneur de Matignon to pay off the arquebusiers of the baron de Larchant, which had arrived in Rouen, and then dismiss them.

That same day, 21 December, the maréchal de Cossé captured the château de Sarry near Châlons. Seeing themselves at risk of being surrounded by the royalists, Condé and Coligny resolved for the army to take flight in the night. Upon hearing of the Protestant bolting, Anjou ordered the duc d'Aumale and duc de Nevers to rally to him.

The young duc de Guise was overflowing with enthusiasm at the prospect of going after Coligny and preventing his juncture with the German Protestant mercenaries. However, he was bamboozled by a feigned attack against Sens. Seeing, what he believed to be an attack on the city, Guise hurried into the place, hoping to replicate his father's stand at the defence of Metz in 1552. With Guise thus out of the way, Coligny was free to head up the Seine to Bray.(when)

Towards the end of December, the royal army was to be found in Châlons, very close on the heels of the Protestant army. On 23 December, Anjou left Châlons and arrived in Saint-Julien-de-Courtiroles. As he made his departure from Châlons he ordered the duc de Nevers to make for Ligny. From Saint-Julien-de-Courtiroles, Anjou wrote to the duc de Nemours, asking him to appraise him of the status of the enemy. He also asked that Nemours execute his plan of attack, of which Anjou was highly complementary. It was important Nemours informed him of this so that he might alert the forces of the count of Arenberg as well as the battle of the army (the main body).

Sometime around this point, a certain Guy de Saint-Gelais, son of the seigneur de Lanssac, was captured by the Protestants. This fact was grieved over by the king, who resolved to see him swapped in a prisoner exchange as soon as possible. Having arrived at Vitry-le-François on 23 December, Anjou wrote to Condé, offering safe conduct for a hundred horsemen under the command of a certain Robert de Combault to travel from Bar-le-Duc to Paris, and requesting the release of Guy de Saint-Gelais.

From Vavray-le-Grand on 25 December, the duc d'Anjou wrote to the duc de Nevers. He urged the latter to link up with him eight leagues out from Vitry-le-François. This was followed by another letter the following day, in which Nevers was urged to send forth 500 cavalrymen to scatter the enemy that had gathered at Nogent and Pont-sur-Seine.

Come 27 December, while still stationed at Vavray-le-Grand, Anjou ordered the duc de Nevers to go with his troops to Chavagnes, where he might unite with the the royal army. This was to be instead of going to the abbey of Viron.

From here, the royal armies vanguard was only a league away from the rebel Protestant army. Anjou wished to pursue battle, but after taking council, consensus could not be reached on the matter (according to Brantôme, Catherine had instructed the maréchal de Cossé to oppose giving battle for fear of a royal loss). Nemours was hungry for battle, and raged on the matter, but Cossé would not provide his cavalry for an attack. The Protestant army succeeded in slipping away at Notre-Dame de l'Épine.(see below cn notice for the problem) Catholic anger rose against the maréchal de Cossé after this episode, decrying him as a traitor. The seigneur de Carnavalet, a member of Anjou's council, was similarly derided as being in league with Condé. The duc d'Anjou took Christmas in Vitry-le-François where the royal army was joined by the duc de Nevers, who brought with him Swiss and Italian reinforcements numbering around 13,000. On route to join with Anjou, Nevers' army had captured Mâcon.

Anjou conducted a review of the new troops that Nevers had brought up to the army, with a salvo being fired in his honour, and the troops also undertaking a small skirmish for the occasion.

In a despatch of 25 December, the Spanish ambassador Álava related to Philip a meeting he had enjoyed with the queen mother Catherine. Catherine undertook discussions with Álava in the Tuileries Garden during which she explained away the current military situation by arguing that the duc d'Anjou was but a child and that the leaders of the army did not wish to proffer battle but were rather taken with negotiating with the enemy. Álava rebuffed this reasoning, arguing that Catherine was to blame for surrounding her son with incompetent men. In his estimation, Cossé was an irrelevancy who she could dismiss if she saw fit, Nemours was too distracted by his love life, and Montpensier was an idiot. He urged her to recall them, and replace them with a man of war like the seigneur de Tavannes. Catherine assured him she would order the duc de Nemours to proffer battle with 4,000 to 5,000 cavalry, and that if he would not give battle she would grant the task to the seigneur de Martigues. She noted that the duc de Nevers, a wise man, would remain with the young prince. Despite these various assurances, Álava remained sceptical of Anjou's army. Álava's extreme attitude, going so far as to threaten the continuity of the Franco-Spanish alliance, brought him in for rebuke from Catherine, who protested that he had now slipped into the mould of his predecessor Chantonnay. Though Philip and Alba concurred with Álava's opinions, they did not appreciate the manner in which he imparted them to Catherine. The queen mother should be treated with respect and tact. Álava should have found a way to impart these views without inspiring conflict with Catherine.

The duc d'Anjou dispatched the comte de Brissac with conducting a reconnoitre of Châlons, which proved bountiful. The several Protestant captains who Brissac crossed swords with were defeated. Much of the Protestant soldiery was either captured or killed.

Anjou himself and the main army went to support Nemours and Martigues in their skirmishes, however no battle followed from this engagement. Exhortations from the king to hurry continued, and in a letter of 29 December he reitered the importance of preventing the juncture of the Protestants with their mercenaries.

Word reached Charles that Martigues had caught the rearguard of the rebel Protestant army and engaged it, but that Anjou had not acted decisively, allowing the Protestant rebels to slip away.

The king, frustrated at this news, vented his frustrations to his brother in a letter of 2 or 4 January. He chastised Anjou for having failed to provide the support to the duc d'Aumale that was required, noting that had reinforcements been provided in the way he suggested, the situation would have developed more favourably for the royalist cause. Rather than immediately proffer support after receiving word from Aumale, Anjou had dispatched the seigneur de Mauvissière to the commander. This was a waste of time in Charles' opinion when decisive action was needed.(above four paragraphs all relate to a single episode, streamline it into a coherent single narrative)

On 2 January, Anjou had returned to Vitry-le-François, and issued orders to several subordinate commanders (the maréchal de Cossé, the duc de Nemours and the seigneur de Matignon to link up with him.

That same day, he updated Charles on the status of his army. He explained the maintenance of 2,000 Swiss under his command to this point. These Swiss had left to join with the king on the morning of 2 January under the command of the duc de Thouars along with the companies of the seigneur de Sanssac and de Caillac. The duc de Nemours and maréchal de Cossé were to scout the villages around Saint-Dizier. He advised the king that the soldiers of the governor of Montreuil were not completely paid.

The following day, Anjou wrote to his brother again. He explained that he and his captains had examined the routes the enemy, who was to be found at Pont-à-Mousson might follow. They intended to take a wait and see approach, awaiting the Protestant departure before engaging in pursuit, though he intended to get the opinions of the seigneur de Tavannes and duc d'Aumale on this point. He also requested receipt of 1,200 horse. Writing to his mother Catherine, he expressed a desire to countermand the order of the previous day by which the companies the duc de Thouars and Sanssac departed the army, in addition to having already countermanded the departure of the Swiss, so that he might come down in force against the enemy. The sieur de La Roche-Posay would explain the need for the duke of Alba to provide the additional 1,200 horse, which could be peeled off from soldiers Alba held in Luxembourg so they could join with those of the count of Arenberg in the French royal army.

By 4 January, Anjou had received the two letters the king had written. He explained how he had these letters read out to the various grandees and captains of the royal army, with their deliverer (the seigneur des Roches) providing supplementary details as appropriate. They affirmed the existing plan to await the Protestant departure from Pont-à-Mousson before striking out. Such a wait and see approach, he assured Charles, was endorsed by the duc d'Aumale, seigneur de Tavannes and duc de Guise. Nemours and Cossé, who had reconnaîtred Saint-Dizier had not found a suitable place for the army to lodge.

Having faced protest from the city of Châlons about the requisition of grain, Anjou assured the city on 4 January that going forward grain would not be requisitioned from the city. However, it would still be necessary for the city to provide a boat of wheat and another of oats to make for Paris. He made sure to ensure that it would only be one boat of each that was taken.

In correspondence with his mother on 5 January, Anjou forwarded for her attentions several correspondences he had received relating to the hiring of German mercenaries, as well as a letter from the maréchal de Vielleville. He argued that an arrangement with the mercenary Mandesloh was more favourable than that made with the count of Rockendorf, whose terms he had received.

Catherine, visited the army in January 1568, and as had been advised by Álava, installed the seigneur de Tavannes with the army. Though as the leader of the vanguard, rather than a replacement for Anjou's current military leadership. A further opportunity from her visit to the front was to be found in meeting with the cardinal de Châtillon.(when)

After his meeting with his mother, Anjou and the army departed from Vitry on 8 January to make towards Troyes. Around this time, the army was at its peak strength, numbering 72,000 men. Of these, the duc de Nevers was the provider of 26 companies of foot (around 2,800 men) and along with the duc d'Aumale 34 companies of cavalry (3,060 men). If the troops in royal garrisons are included, Charles had raised around 100,000 men.

The Protestant army made its passage across the Meuse at Saint-Mihiel, and then the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson.(when) The German mercenaries, under the command of John Casimir, numbering some 6,500 reiters, and 3,000 landsknechts could not be impeded in their march across Lorraine, and on 11 January they effected juncture with the Protestant army near Pont-à-Mousson. Before his captains would agree to fight for the rebel Protestants, they wanted to receive their first months pay up front. They demanded to receive 250,000 livres from Condé and Coligny. The Protestant commanders, and pastors, set to work trying to scrounge together this sum from their men. The more wealthy members donated their gold plate, chains and other valuables. In total they succeeded in putting together 80,000 livres. This satisfied the mercenary commanders. The duc d'Anjou reported on this development to the French court in two letters of 10 January, one to Charles the other to Catherine. He noted that the Protestant leadership had raised a loan among their own soldiers to pay the mercenaries. That d'Andelot and Coligny had feasted the captains of the reiters at Seuzey. With them they brought a vast quantity of bread (20,000 loaves), and twenty muids of wine.

The Protestant force now numbered around 20,000 men, and could think of turning around to take the fight back into France. In the royal camp it was not known where this reinvigorated army would strike. The duc d'Anjou moved to protect Troyes, from where he might impede the Protestant march into Burgundy. He would headquarter himself in Troyes from 12 January to 5 February. Writing to the duc de Nevers on 12 January, the day of his arrival in Troyes, Anjou explained that he had ordered those companies that were in Troyes, those of the duke of Savoy, and the five of the comte de Brissac to come to join with the duc de Nevers. By means of providing these troops to Nevers, the latter would be able to face the enemy with confidence, and not shy away from such an encounter. As for Anjou, he was unsure as to whether he should make for Auxerre, and would liaise with his advisers. The duc de Nevers meanwhile went to defend Auxerre through establishing himself at Châtillon-sur-Seine. Anjou was appraised around this time, by the maréchal de Vielleville who was established in Metz, that his own German mercenaries, those of the duke of Saxony, had crossed the Rhine on their way into France on 16 January. The duc d'Anjou entrusted a certain Pasquier with greeting these mercenaries and bringing them to unite with the royal army.

Not all Anjou's communique's related to sensitive military matters. In his correspondence of 13 January with the king, he sought to secure exemption from monetary contributions to the fortification of cities for his servants, as well as a similar exemption for his brother and sister. In addition to this request, he looked to see a certain captain de La Berthe appointed as gentilhomme de la chambre du roi (a ceremonial position in the kings household).

Discussing the Protestant's movements with Catherine on 13 January, Anjou dismissed the idea they intended to march up into Picardy. Rather he argued they intended to make for Auxerre and Orléans. This was the location the Gascons were converging on also.

The next day, Anjou made a request through his mother for four cannons to be shipped from Paris to Auxerre to aid in the defence of the city, along with 2,000 cannonballs and powder. He would follow up on this request on 15 January, providing further details on the process by which the cannons would come to Auxerre. The process would be overseen by the seigneur de La Bourdaisière.

With the royal army at risk of being compromised by desertions after a rumour that peace had been made, Charles wrote on 14 January to assure his brother that payment had been prepared for the entire royal gendarmerie, and would arrive on 1 February. Concurrently to this, the king wrote happily that favourable military developments against the Protestants were to be found elsewhere in the kingdom, specifically against the baron d'Acier in Provence.

From Troyes, Anjou informed the inhabitants of Châlons on 16 January of his intent to head out to confront the enemy. Resultingly he would like for them to keep 100 mulds of flour on standby.

A skirmish having taken place between the royalists and Provençal rebels, Anjou entrusted the seigneur du Crocq with relating it to Catherine on 18 January, and noted that he concurred with his council that those soldiers that had participated in the battle be given garrison duty in the Loire, in addition to his armies light cavalry, for which he lacked the ability to provide payment.

Anjou expressed his enthusiasm, on 23 January, for the royal order to sequester the property of Protestants. He noted that the Protestant's extracted forced levies from towns and abbeys by threatening to burn them down, and that he would send his chancellor, the comte de Cheverny to request of the king that regardless of the consequences Charles should order his subjects to refuse this Protestant blackmail. The same day, he requested in a separate communique that Charles send a captain to command Montargis, which was at risk, he also cancelled his prior request of cannons for Auxerre, at which he no longer planned to halt. For the purpose of the defence of Montargis, he thought it might be wise to ask Renée to depart from her city for a while. The situation in relation to Auxerre had evolved due to the advance of the enemy, and the delay in receipt of the reiters. To support his chancellor travelling to the court, he also asked Catherine to lend her voice to his plan to stop the people of France yielding to Protestant blackmail.

A little while before 24 January, the duc d'Anjou looked to resolve a conflict among his officers. Dispute had arisen between the seigneur de Méru a moderate Catholic open to accommodation with Protestantism and the vicomte de Martigues a zealous Catholic. In this quarrel, Martigues had slapped the seigneur de Méru, and the soldiers of the two men were ready to come to blows. Anjou felt this episode was of great damage to the morale of the army. This affair was reported upon by the Spanish ambassador Álava, who knew it would please his king. He noted that with the two men had been in Anjou's presence when a dispute emerged during which Martigues put his hand on his dagger. For the next four days, this poisonous dispute continued to defy attempts at reconciliation. On 24 January, Anjou wrote to Charles on the matter, he noted that he hoped for the arbitration of the baron de Damville and maréchal de Montmorency on the matter, as well as the king's opinion. He would seek update on the arbitration of this quarrel from the maréchal de Montmorency on 3 February.

Over the objections of the Spanish ambassador and the hawkishly pro-war Parisians, Catherine continued to push for negotiations.

Writing to the cardinal de Lorraine on 27 January, Anjou ordered the seigneur de La Vieuville to make his departure from Rethel for Mézières. He signed off on the dismissal of the cardinal's soldiers, and concurred with Lorraine on the need to garrison Château-Porcien.

On 28 January, Anjou requested of his mother Catherine that trials involving officers in his army be suspended until the end of the troubles, the same privilege they enjoyed in foreign wars. He also renewed his request for cannons, six this time. This request was made to Charles in parallel. To Charles, he provided documents that had been found on the Protestants. He appraised Charles that Nevers had informed him of his intention to strike at the Protestants near Chaumont.

Anjou counselled the seigneur de Fervacques on 30 January to assure himself of the safety from Protestant attack of his château de Grancey before he came to link up with the royal army in Troyes. Having received update from the duc de Nevers, he expressed his confidence in the judgement of the duc as to the wisdom of garrisoning Montbard. The prince complained of the pillaging undertaken by the Italian units of the army.

At the end of January, Charles communicated to his brother the duc d'Anjou that rather than referring matters of payment back to the court, that he resolve himself on the proper distribution of money provided to him by the crown. The king was keen that the expenses of the army be curtailed. He noted that he had previously instructed Anjou to conduct a review of his soldiery, to ensure payment was not being granted to non-existent soldiers. The seigneur de Carnavalet was entrusted by the king with reviewing the armies finances, alongside the maréchal de Cossé (who was formerly the surintendant des finances).

As Condé's army marched towards Orléans, the cavalry cornets fanned out around Montargis, the Gâtinais and up to the walls of Paris itself. Montargis in particular was felt to be an important place that Condé's army must not be allowed to capture. Charles therefore urged his brother to secure permission from Renée to make passage through the city, and then station men there. Renée was little inclined to depart from the city, so Charles noted on 1 February that it was likely she would not be comfortable there, surrounded by so many men of war. He advised that she withdraw to Vincennes, Fontainebleau, or another place of her choosing.

The commander of the royal army found it necessary to scold the city of Joigny on 2 February for their refusal to accept a garrison of five companies of foot and one company of mounted arquebusiers. He warned the place that if they continued to obstinately refuse this royal order they would be subject to exemplary punishment as rebels. They were to immediately accomodate them upon receipt of his letter, as well as affording them provisions.

With the trésorier de l'extroardinaire des guerres Antoine Fayet due to bring 5,000 livres for the royal army, Anjou advised the comte de Brissac to facilitate his arrival in Troyes on 4 February.

Anjou advised Renée, the duchess of Ferrara, on 4 February, that he had sent a captain Bonavie to reinforce Montargis, with eight companies of foot. She was to accomodate this force. The following day he informed her he had dispatched the seigneur de Thoré to take charge in Montargis.

Not only did Renée refuse to withdraw from Montargis, but she further refused the royal soldiers entry into the city. It had first been the seigneur de Thoré who was entrusted with leading the royal soldiers into the city, but little desiring to anger Renée he refused the charge. It was instead given to the seigneur de Losses and seigneur de Chavigny. Aware his aunt might refuse these men entry, Charles cautioned Anjou to provide for them well so they were not trapped between the walls of Montargis and the Protestant army.

Avoiding the royal army in Troyes, Condé moved south into Burgundy, and crossed the Seine in a place in which it was frozen around Châtillon. Travelling to Auxerre they put the country to ransom. With the Protestants carving a path of destruction, Anjou resolved to fall back from Troyes and shadow the Protestants. By 7 February he had left the city and was to be found in Saint-Mesmin. Condé then made west for the Loire. Here he was reinforced by the southern vicomtes (viscounts) de Montclar and de Bruniquel who brought soldiers up from Quercy, Périgord and the Rouergue. His army now numbered around 30,000 men. Linked with these forces, he could set his sights on the city of Chartres. He crossed the Loire around La Charité, entering the Beauce where Blois was seized.(timeline here)

Chartres campaign

On 6 February, the Protestants captured Blois. The city had been besieged by a Protestant army of 5,000 foot soldiers, 400 cavalry, and four cannon. The capture of Blois was overseen by the seigneur de Mauvans, who had come up from the south-west previously. Having secured the cities capitulation, Mauvans did not keep to the agreement he had made with the inhabitants, justifying himself that the Catholics never did so with the Protestants. Prior to seizing Blois they had captured Beaugency. Blois had been defended by the seigneur de Richelieu with 800 men in his garrison. With the fall of Blois, Condé resolved on putting Chartres to siege. Anjou had dispatched a certain La Rivière with arquebusiers to relieve Blois, however, the king observed in a letter of 14 February, that now the city had fallen, these soldiers served no purpose going to Blois and should rather be moved on to aid in the defence of Amboise or Tours.

The chevalier de Monluc advised Renée on 6 February that he had orders from the duc d'Anjou to enter Montargis with his 10 companies.

From Saint-Mesmin on 7 February, Anjou advised the duc de Nevers that if Renée would not accept the passage of the chevalier de Monluc's force through her city, that the bands should lodge at Nemours.

Having moved on to Pont-sur-Seine that same day, Anjou again wrote Nevers. He advised Nevers to tarry a few days around Sens, so that he might guard Joigny and Villeneuve-le-Roi. In a more specific request, he asked Nevers to allocate 100 horsemen to accompany a silver convoy from Sens to Nogent, where he [Anjou] anticipated arriving imminently.

Anjou would reach Nogent on 7 February, and write to Nevers for a third time that day. He wrote with regret that three companies had been subject to a defeat, requested Nevers send forward La Valette with his companies of light horse to Joigny and Villeneuve-le-Roi and noted thata he intended to tarry at Nogent for a couple of days.

Nevers was again the subject of Anjou's correspondence on 9 February, in a contradictory letter in which Nevers was urged to maintain himself where he was to defend Joigny and Villeneuve-le-Roi, but also to come join with Anjou at Nogent. In a new correspondence of the same day, this latter command was affirmed, with Nevers urged to see to the garrisoning of the city of Nevers and La Charité and then come to join Anjou with the rest of his army.

That same day, Anjou capitulated to Renée, assuring her that as she desired, royal troops would not in fact be sent into Montargis.

From Nogent-sur-Seine on 10 February, Anjou liaised with the duc de Nemours. The latter was to keep Anjou in the loop as to the progress of the Protestant army, and assault Coligny's force as possible.

Of the understanding that the Protestant army was making for Orléans, Anjou appraised his mother on 11 February that he had dispatched his Swiss soldiers and artillery to the city. He was gathering the rest of his forces at Montereau to determine their future direction.

On 11 February, Nemours informed Anjou that he had captured the places of Autricourt and Villier l'Espaux from the Protestants. Those captured in the places were sent forward to Anjou.

Thanks were given by Anjou to the duc de Nemours on 12 February, while the prince resided in Provins, for updates Nemours had provided on the movement of the Protestant army. Having arrived at Nangis by 13 February, Anjou was able to express his satisfaction to Nemours at the capture of Autricourt and Villier l'Espaux. He noted that he had done what he could to extract information about the enemy from those captured by Nemours.

(major cleanup of this whole section required) The historian Wood puts the number of soldiers at the French crown's disposal at 100,000 by January 1568. 60,000 of these being concentrated in Champagne.

The royal army followed in the wake of the Protestant one, moving through devastated country which had been pillaged. It slowly haemorrhaged to desertions. The army withdrew to the south of Paris, arriving at Nogent-sur-Seine. Anjou made for Villeneuve-Saint-Georges to liaise with his mother. This afforded the freedom to the combined French Protestant and German mercenary army to lay siege to Chartres. This city was a source of grain for the capital. In addition to this it housed a great cathedral, the destruction of which could be an ideological victory.(when)

Tours fell to the Protestant rebels.(when)

Having sent the seigneurs de Montpezat and de Prie to Étampes to assess the viability of holding the place, Anjou noted in his letter of 13 February to the duc de Nemours that he had assessed holding the place as both difficult and of little value based on their reports. As a result, he resolved to send only the captain de Bieq and his company, as well as a further four companies of mounted arquebusiers, who if disoldged from Étampes could retreat along the river. He counselled Nemours to send these four companies to de Bieq in Montereau. He noted that he was also sending a letter to the inhabitants of Étampes to received de Bieq and the companies. In a similar fashion, Nemours was to provide 2 companies of mounted arquebusiers for the defence of Dourdan, that could retreat towards Chevreuse as required by their circumstances.

As the royal army got increasingly close to Paris, the possibility of men slipping away from the army grew. Charles counselled his brother on 13 February to afford as little leave as he could to the nobles, conducting the army with a strict hand. He advised Anjou renew the ban général. Anjou afforded full powers in Montereau to the seigneur de Charrieu, and assured him he was seeing to the sending of powder to the place. On the same day, 13 February, he wrote to the seigneur de La Bourdaisière to see the power brought to Montereau.

The day that followed, 14 February, Anjou wrote to the baron de Damville to inform him they were now on the way to Melun. The duc d'Anjou would indeed arrive in Melun for 15 February, and took the occasion to write Damville again. He noted that the two men were now only two days apart from one another, and that combat was but a single days march away. Anjou informed the baron that he would be making his departure from Melun tomorrow. Before his departure, he ordered the comte de Brissac to come and reunite with his regiment. On the matter of garrisons, Anjou wrote to Nemours about the exemplary punishment (death) to be meted out to two or three of the ringleaders of the refusal of the town of Moret to host a garrison.

Anjou anticipated the arrival of the German mercenaries of the duke of Saxony, as well as those of the marquis of Baden, who Anjou had been informed by the maréchal de Vielleville, had abandoned his allegiance to John Casimir.{{cn)){merge with another paragraph)

The seigneur de Lignières was deputised by Anjou to take command of the defence of Chartres on 16 February.

Updating the king on 17 February, Anjou recorded how the sieur de Riocourt (governor of Chaumont) had intercepted a pack of letters, which Anjou was now forwarding on to the king. Two of them were written by the prince of Orange. They discussed the negotiations undertaken by the bishop of Rennes, as well as news from England, Flanders and the Levant. Also in the pack was a letter the Count Palatine had written to Charles, who excused the money he had given to the prince de Condé on the grounds it was not intended to provide aid to him, but simply to preserve the Protestant faith. Anjou left it up to the king to form his thoughts on the Count Palatine's questionable actions. Several ciphered letters were also among the intercepted materials, that he advised Charles to see to the cracking of.

On 18 February, Anjou was at Corbeil with the seigneur de Tavannes, the duc d'Aumale and the seigneur de Martigues. From here, he could see the lights of the Protestant camp fires in the distance. He wrote congratulations to Renée on this day that she had not permitted the Protestants to enter her city of Montargis. He quickly resolved to return to Paris, entering the city on 19 February. There, he hurried to the Louvre where he was embraced by the king. The duc d'Anjou would establish the royal camp at Chartreux, just outside the walls of Paris.

From Chartreux on 20 February, Anjou awarded command of the place of Poissy to a certain captain de La Tour.

On the subsequent day, he wrote a flurry of letters to Bassompierre, Pasquier, and Puygaillard to ascertain the location of, and hurry along, the German mercenaries of Bassompierre and the duke of Saxony.

Also on 21 February, the prince dauphin d'Auvergne was ordered to garrison Châteaudun and Bonneval pending a Protestant siege of Chartres.

Among those commanders with Anjou for the Chartres campaign was the seigneur de La Valette, who held command of a compagnie d'ordonnance of 30 lances. In total Anjou boasted 26 such compagnies in his army. In contrast wtih the years previous, the compagnies d'ordonnance had been mobilised by the crown on a more intense basis.

Coligny billeted his cavalry in the villages that surrounded Chartres, and endeavoured to limit pillage by the provision of bakers.

For the pay of their reiters, 100,000 écus was required. Condé had only 2,000 écus and thus everyone was encouraged to contribute, with the two leaders setting an example by the devotion of their silver plate to the sum. By the time the campaign for funds had been concluded, 90,000 livres worth of gold and silver had been raised.

With the payment of soldiers proving to be difficult, Condé withdrew to Orléans with his Gascon soldiers, no longer able to pose a threat to Paris.

The duc d'Anjou dispatched the seigneur de La Valette with eighteen cornets of cavalry. This force was bested by that of the admiral de Coligny, but without many casualties.

Writing to the maréchal de Matignon on 1 March from his camp at Les Chartreux, Anjou advised he see to the protection of lower Normandy. In particular the towns of Verneuil, Lisieux and Pont-Audemer.

The next day, Anjou wrote to the city of Dreux, to inform them that he had appointed a certain Saint-Rémy to command in the city. They would need to accmodate infantry inside the centre of Dreux, while mounted arquebusiers were housed in the suburbs. These troops were only passing through, and Dreux would not be expected to victual them. La Bourdaisière would provide gunpowder for the city.

Writing to the comte de Tende on 3 March, Anjou urged him to do what he could to prevent the forces of the baron d'Assier from linking up with the main Protestant army. As necessary he was to seek the assistance of the baron de Gordes, comte de Suze, baron des Adrets, seigneur d'Urfé, Saint-Herem, Saint-Chamond and Montaré to this end.

Anjou entrusted, on 4 March, the duc d'Aumale to have charge of the royal army in his absence, and informed the army of this on that day. By 6 March he was in Paris, before returning to Les Chartreux on 7 March.

The seigneur de La Valette requested of Anjou the use of 2,000 to 3,000 horse to make for Montfort. Anjou communicated his assent to this to La Valette on 8 March and alerted him to the fact he had asked the duc d'Aumale to satisfy the request. He would indeed write to the duc d'Aumale the same day to see that order executed. In addition to this he had dispatched the seigneur de Bassompierre to Aumale and planned to also dispatch the seigneur de Saint-Amand so that they might see what they could do in relation to Chartres and Pontgouin. The seigneur de La Meilleraye was to be peeled off to see to the defence of Vernon.

On 11 March, the duc d'Anjou wrote to the seigneur de Monluc disapprovingly. He noted that various Gascon captains had deserted the royal army, taking two months pay with them that had been intended for the men. This included the chevalier de Monluc (the seigneur de Monluc's son). He asked that, when these men had travelled back to Gascony, that they be arrested and subject to exemplary punishment.

For the relief of the people of Cravant, Anjou ordered, on 12 March, that the seigneur de La Ferté and his company depart the place. They were to join with the seigneur de Barbezieux.

Back in Paris, Anjou offered his congratulations to the seigneur de Matignon on his success in returning peace to areas of lower Normandy that had been troubled by Protestant activity. Further laudits for his efforts to recapture Carentan alongside the company of the seigneur de Vassé.

It would be from Paris that the final flurry of Anjou's letters of the war were delivered. On 16 March he inquired of the seigneur de Saint-Léger as to the progress of the enemy. On the same day he wrote to the seigneur d'Espaulx to disband the company of a certain captain Hue which was no longer required for the defence of Châlons. The next day he alerted the seigneur de Fervacques that the duc d'Aumale would send him reinforcements so that he might bring the money in his possession to the army. Aumale was sent a similar letter requesting he provide the troops to Fervacques to serve as the escort. A few days later, 19 March, Anjou wrote again to Aumale, this time on the matter of Normandy. He was to remove his cavalry from the Pays de Caux so that Rouen would not want for supplies.

Initial strike

At the moment of the surprise of Meaux, it was reported that the Protestants were making attempts on the cities of Montereau, Lagny, Péronne, and Melun. Orléans, Auxerre, Soissons and Nîmes were also seized.

Fighting between Protestants and Catholics took place in Orléans, Soissons, Lyon, Abbeville and Troyes.

(summarise provincial action)

Move to peace

Various difficulties necessitated a push for peace. Money was running low, famine loomed, and disease ran rampant. This paucity of money was as true for Condé and the rebels as it was for the crown. The Spanish ambassador, Álava, was dismissive about the idea that want of money was the driver towards peace.

No sooner had the battle of Saint-Denis transpired, than Téligny, and then a certain Gastines, were dispatched to Paris to begin negotiations with the crown on 13 November. Téligny was to impart that the Protestants would only lay down their arms if persecution of Protestantism ceased, and the edict of pacification was fully observed. Charles refused to negotiate on these terms, noting that if they wished to demonstrate their loyalty, they would disarm. The Protestant proposals were forwarded by Charles IX to Anjou's camp for discussion. Anjou received them while he was in Nemours. Both Anjou and his council were of the opinion that, given the present circumstances of the kingdom, the Protestant demands should be acceded to. The lieutenant-general gave his reply to the court on 29 November. In this opinion he argued that they should consent to the requests for those who enjoyed the rights of high justice in their land to enjoy Protestant worship among their households and those who gather with them.

Catherine was keen to restore the primacy of civic authority over military, and thus was interested in peace also. Catherine's first proposal was to offer freedom of religion for those who enjoyed the rights of high justice for their families and 50 others. With the crown's openness to offers thus demonstrated, Condé expanded his demands, requesting the rights for Protestant worship to take place in Paris and Lyon.

Condé entrusted the cardinal de Châtillon with furthering the negotiations to attain some clarity on points. It was agreed there would be a truce while Téligny made his way to the court, but the duc d'Anjou violated this truce. Negotiations continued with Téligny serving as the messenger between the court and the rebel camp.

The Protestant nobles (like their Catholic counterparts) were eager to fight, and had to be soothed by Condé and Coligny from their passions.

While Catherine's prime ambition was peace, her son, the king, held a more rigid position. He would only offer a pardon to the Protestant rebels if their demands did not exceed those enunciated in the 1563 edict of Amboise. On the matter of Protestant worship in Lyon he rejected the proposition. He explained to his brother Anjou in a letter of 4 December that not only was Lyon a border city, but the people of the place would also reject Protestant worship there. Charles was also adverse to the Protestants having a place in the judiciary or financial administration.

In a letter to the French ambassador to Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux, written on 6 December, Charles explained his munificence. Even though the Protestant rebels had gone as far as to attack his own person, he preferred to receive them with kindness, if only they were prepared to be good subjects of the crown once more.

During January, Catherine met with the cardinal de Châtillon at Châlons, where the royal army was headquartered. The two negotiated at length. Catherine and the cardinal de Châtillon then proceeded back towards Paris.

Châtillon took up residence at the château de Vincennes alongside Téligny and the comte de La Rochefoucauld on 15 January. Catherine brought them over to discuss peace at the Louvre during the night. Charles refused to grant them an audience. Nevertheless, the parties talked for three hours. After three days at Vincennes without further talks, on 17 January, Châtillon was met by the seigneur de Lanssac and the bishop of Orléans who stated they were there to continue negotiations. This was to the Cardinal's surprise, as he had hoped to negotiate directly with the king. This discussion did not further the negotiations.

To the anger of Châtillon, on 18 January, Lanssac and the bishop of Orléans were replaced by the first and second présidents of the Paris parlement (de Thou and Baillet). He found the turnover in negotiators vexing. Two days more negotiations continued with no progress.

Finally, Catherine summoned the cardinal de Châtillon to the convent of Minimes.

Châtillon demanded that any pacification edict be permanent, as opposed to provisional. That the Protestant mercenaries be paid off by the crown, and that it be acknowledged in the registers of the parlement that the Protestant uprising had not been a rebellion but rather a necessary act. While Catherine might have been inclined to accept this, her son was not. In contrast to this, the starting point for the king was that the Protestants unilaterally disarm. He further demanded that the Protestant leaders come to him to explain the act they had undertaken against him at Meaux. With the Protestant position unacceptable to the crown, that evening the seigneur de Lanssac and bishop of Orléans went to the château de Vincennes to inform the cardinal. They explained the king could not consent to the edict being irrevocable, or to pay off the Protestant mercenaries. The cardinal de Châtillon asked to take his leave, feeling further talks were pointless in the current impass, and this was granted.

A rumour spread through the royal army around mid-January, that peace had been reached between the rebel Protestants and the crown. Keen to avoid this rumour leading to desertions, king Charles wrote to express his confusion at the news, urging the duc d'Anjou to ensure this false report did not continue to spread.

Sournia believed Condé to be in a position of great strength, with Chartres soon to fall to him, and after that Paris at his mercy. He thus attributes his drive towards peace as a sign of his poor negotiation abilities.

From his new base at Orléans, Condé made a plea to Charles and Catherine on 22 February to bring the disastrous war to an end.

On 25 February, negotiations resumed at Longjumeau between the cardinal de Châtillon and maréchal de Montmorency. Condé was prepared to compromise. Coligny was less inclined to, desiring security to prevent Catherine revenging herself on them for the surprise of Meaux. On 4 March, Charles consented to the re-establishment of the edict of Amboise as well as the royal payment of the Protestant mercenaries.

Charles fumed to his negotiators on 4 March that Condé had put Chartres to siege while the royal army was under a truce. In his letter to the bishop of Limoges he requested his representative impart the king's displeasure to the cardinal de Châtillon and those around him, so that they might put a halt to the siege of Chartres.

On 11 March, a truce was established between the rebel Protestants and the crown.

Longjumeau

The war was brought to a close by the peace of Longjumeau, signed by the maréchal de Montmorency for the crown on 22 March and then Condé and Coligny on 23 March 1568. Its terms offered essentially a repeat of those of the edict of Amboise from five years previous. Notably however, Provence found itself included in the terms of the peace as regarded the toleration of Protestantism. A general amnesty was afforded to the Protestant rebels. The crown even agreed to pay off the German mercenaries that the Protestants had hired. Both sides were to disengage their forces from one another and disarm immediately. Condé was amnestied for having undertaken unofficial embassies with foreign realms, as well as his minting of money, fortification of towns and manufacture of artillery. No places of surety were granted to the Protestants, who would have to rely on the good faith of the crown.

This peace was the first to describe the Protestants as being of 'the so called reformed religion' (in French "La Religion prétendue réformée"). In prior times they had been referred to as 'the religion they say is reformed'. Le Roux characterises this stylistic change as one that was more insulting towards Protestantism, and notes that it would become the standard royal characterisation of Protestantism going forward.

As it had been with Amboise, Protestantism was prohibited in the city, prévôté (provostship) and vicomté (viscounty) of Paris.

Even though they had accepted the peace, the French crown no longer had faith in the policy of toleration that had been advocated by the chancellor L'Hôpital.

On 25 March, the peace was registered by the parlement of Paris.

The king expressed his pleasure at the peace to his negotiators on 27 March, writing to the duc de Montmorency.

Less than a week later, on 31 March, Charles received a delegation of Protestants at the Carthusian convent who had come to offer their submission.

Charles now owed the reiters the Protestants had raised in the Empire around 1,000,000 livres. He would have to indicate also that the Count Palatine's son had been transferred into royal service. If paid, they promised to leave the kingdom within fifteen days. During March, Charles attempted to raise this sum from Paris. To achieve this, he imposed a contribution upon them amounting to 1,400,000 livres. The advances he received by this means allowed for the removal from the kingdom of Condé's reiters, the royal mercenaries from Saxony, the soldiers of the duke of Savoy, and those of the count of Arenberg. Charles also looked to the city of Caen, which boasted a large amount of royal money. A loan was also to be imposed on the baillage of Caen. Even before Longjumeau was signed, he had looked to see the money transferred from this place, and these efforts continued after peace was declared. The seigneur de Matignon was to ensure the money's escort from Caen to Rouen, and then from Rouen to Paris it would be the job of the seigneur de Carrouges or duc d'Aumale.

The French government attempted the same type of argument that they had in previous years, that once the Protestant reiters had departed the kingdom, the peace would be voided, and Protestants attacked. The Spanish little believed this. Even the French ambassador Fourquevaux, could not disguise his disbelief from Philip. The Spanish king urged Álava to hold the French to the promise nevertheless.

The reiters were to make their departure through the province of Burgundy. Companies of gendarmes were sent to the province to watch over their departure. In a letter to the seigneur de Tavannes, it was advised that the gendarmes were to ensure the speedy and orderly withdrawal of the reiters. To ensure the gendarmes obeyed Tavannes, the king advertised that he had written to them also.

The regular components of the royal army would not disband. Neither would the Swiss forces of 6,000 men the crown had raised. This gave the king great leverage over the prince de Condé and the Protestants, who had disarmed. The non-Swiss mercenaries would be slowly divested by the crown however. Further, new companies that had been established during the civil war were to be disbanded by the crown, and garrisons reduced to their pre-war size.

The duc d'Anjou maintained his position as lieutenant-general of the kingdom despite the coming of peace.

The soldiery would indeed continue to cause mayhem and destruction against the French people. Hoping to ameliorate this, the king ordered, on 31 March, the redistribution of the compagnies d'ordonnance around the kingdom in such a way that they would be lodged in convenient places, where they did not burden the people.

On this subject, Anjou wrote to the seigneur de Matignon on 31 March. He noted that the companies of the seigneur de Fervacques, Châteauvillain, Matignon (i.e. his own), de Neufbourg and du Brueil had been put at his disosal for distribution across Normandy to ensure the defence of the province. He inquired of the duc de Nemours and seigneur d'Humières to know how they had distributed the soldiers allocated to them by the king for their respective governments.

With the vicomte d'Auchy entrusted with command of the gendarmerie, Anjou advised him on 2 April to do what he could to spare the poor people, and stalk Condé's withdrawing forces.

Writing again to the seigneur d'Humières on 6 April, the duc d'Anjou apologised that it would be necessary to disband the garrison of Péronne for reasons of cost. The only companies that would be maintained in the area were those of the comte de Brissac and comte de Strozzi.

On 8 April, the duc d'Anjou wrote again to Matignon to ensure that he did his best to stop some disbanded troops from descending into brigandage in his province. Alongside his brother, the king also wrote to Matignon on the same theme, urging him to ensure the roads were cleared of soldiers, and the people able to go about their business without fear of being robbed. He advised Matignon approach the scaling down of the companies with tact, so that the disbanded troops did not engage in worse acts than they had while raised. In addition to the local threat, Charles was also conscious of the international threat, as he was of the understanding arquebusiers were assembling in Normandy with the intention of making an intervention in the Netherlands. He therefore advised Matignon of this by a communique of 8 May.

The Catholics rejected the peace negotiated at Longjumeau, judging it as a victory for the Protestants. The peace aroused the disgust of the Spanish crown. Though disgusted, Philip gave the appearance to Fourquevaux of being largely unbothered by the news. His attitude contrasted with the rage of his ambassador Álava during the war. He would not sent an envoy to protest the peace, and rather left such a step to Álava to undertake. Álava would follow through with the protest, but utilising greater restraint than he had previously. A matter of concern for the French king was assuring the Spanish that the paid off German mercenaries would not make their way into the Spanish Netherlands in support of the Dutch opposition. Therefore the king sent an emissary to Spain to explain that he had provided a route the reiters were to follow in writing, a copy of which was provided to the emissary to present to Philip.

The seigneur de Monluc, and his fellow southern commander Gaches, ignored the peace of Longjumeau. The latter described the peace as a cunning ruse by Catherine that had fooled the gullible Condé. Monluc meanwhile claimed he was monitoring the actions of the queen of Navarre closely, lest she try anything.

The vicomte de Joyeuse attempted to enforce the disarmament mandated by the peace of Longjumeau. The effectiveness of this was hampered by his simultaneous contradictory policy in which he prepared men and arms for action in case of an outbreak of hostilities.

The butler of the prince de Condé, a certain sieur de Rapin, was executed in Toulouse after a brief trial on 13 April 1568. He had been delegated by the prince de Condé to see to the disarmament of the Protestant held places around Toulouse. However, he had been arrested in Grenade after which he was promptly transferred to Toulouse due to his outstanding conviction from the first civil war for his involvement in the attempted Protestant coup in Toulouse.

In response to Rapin's execution, Protestants of Montauban and Grenade conducted pillaging around their cities. The city of Castres refused to allow the baron d'Ambres, royal governor of the city, within their walls.

Protestant towns of Languedoc refused to disarm given the hostility shown their commissioner. This allowed the parlement of Toulouse an excuse to refuse to register the edict of Longjumeau until, having received four royal summons to do so, they obeyed on 5 June 1568.

Rouen also bore witness to anti-Protestant attacks and pillage when word arrived of the peace. Meanwhile in Blois, Protestants sacked churches.

In Amiens, religious violence followed the peace. After a Protestant roofer acted in a 'provocative manner' during easter time, the Catholics of the parish of Saint-Rémy descended on the Protestants of the area, killing between 150 and 160 of them.

The conclusion of the war in France did not bring peace to Avignon or the Comtat Venaissin. The leader of the Protestant defence of Mornas, a certain Roland Robert, was taken to Avignon and strangled then burned. The affording of a strangulation prior to the burning was due to his abjuration from Protestantism. A painter from Avignon suffered the same fate.

The Papal government moved to proceed with the confiscation of Protestant property. Even if this property would have been inherited by a Catholic family member, the Pope advised that this inheritance should not go forward. In the Pope's view, an example had to be made to caution others against turning to heresy. Instead, the assets would be devoted to the restoration of churches and public places destroyed by the Protestants, with the left over money being put to public expenses. The cardinal de Bourbon ordered that the Jesuits receive 1,200 livres from confiscated Protestant property.

The Protestant minister of Courthézon was seized by the Catholics, and died at the stake. Catholics assumed control of the consulate of Courthézon, with the Protestants banished from the territory.

The principality of Orange was assigned a Catholic governor by Charles, and had to submit to this.

The Protestants felt little hurry in the returning of towns they had seized during the war to royal control.

La Rochelle received a royal governor as part of the peace, the baron de Jarnac however, the Protestant population would afford him no power. Jarnac was not allowed to bring his soldiers within the walls. Similar stories played out in Montauban, Nîmes, Montpellier, Castres, Albi and Sancerre.

In general terms, Pernot argues the peace was disregarded by both Protestants and Catholics in places in which they enjoyed relative strength. Murder and leagues proliferated despite the prohibitions of the peace. Condé claimed that 4,000 were murdered in total.

Condé won himself few Protestant friends by the terms of the peace. He was accused of being too credulous in his willingness to trust the word of the king. Spurning him, Protestants turned towards the queen of Navarre. The contemporary memoirist La Noue argues that while Condé was credulous enough to believe in the peace, Coligny did not. The Venetian ambassador opined on 31 March that the peace had only been concluded so that both sides might 'catch their breath'.

Sources

• Babelon, Jean-Pierre (2009). Henri IV. Fayard.
• Biloghi, Dominique (1998). "Le Monde au Temps des Guerres de Religion". In Jouanna, Arlette; Boucher, Jacqueline; Biloghi, Dominique; Le Thiec, Guy (eds.). Histoire et Dictionnaire des Guerres de Religion.
• Boltanski, Ariane (2006). Les ducs de Nevers et l'État royal: genèse d'un compromis (ca 1550 - ca 1600). Librairie Droz.
• Boucher, Jacqueline (2023). "Le Cardinal de Lorraine, Premier Ministre de Fait ou d'Ambition (1559 – 1574)". In Bellenger, Yvonne (ed.). Le Mécénat et l'Influence des Guises. Classiques Garnier.
• Carpi, Olivia (2005). Une République Imaginaire: Amiens pendant les Troubles de Religion (1559-1597). Belin.
• Carpi, Olivia (2012). Les Guerres de Religion (1559-1598): Un Conflit Franco-Français. Ellipses.
• Champion, Pierre (1938). Paris sous les Derniers Valois - Paris au Temps des Guerres de Religion:Fin du Règne de Henri II, Régence de Catherine de Médicis, Charles IX. Calmann-Lévy.
• Champion, Pierre (1939). Charles IX: La France et le Controle de l'Espagne (Tome 1). Grasset.
• Champion, Pierre (1941). La Jeunesse de Henri III (1551 – 1571). Grasset.
• Chevallier, Pierre (1985). Henri III: Roi Shakespearien. Fayard.
• Cloulas, Ivan (1979). Catherine de Médicis. Fayard.
• Cocula, Anne-Marie (1992). "Brantôme ou La Mauvaise Réputation du Duc d'Anjou, Futur Henri III". In Sauzet, Robert (ed.). Henri III et son Temps. Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin.
• Constant, Jean-Marie (1984). Les Guise. Hachette.
• Constant, Jean-Marie (1996). La Ligue. Fayard.
• Crété, Liliane (1985). Coligny. Fayard.
• Daussy, Hugues (2022). "D'une Diplomatie Rebelle à une Diplomatie Royale: Les Balbutiements de la Politique Internationale Huguenote pendant les Premières Guerres Civiles". In Gellard, Matthieu; Micallef, Fabrice (eds.). Diplomaties Rebelles: Huguenots, Malcontents et Ligueurs sur la Scène Internationale (1562–1629). Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
• Daussy, Hugues (2023a). "La Strategie Européenne du Parti Huguenot". In Le Roux, Nicolas (ed.). Les Guerres de Religion: Une Histoire de l'Europe au XVIe Siècle. Passés Composés.
• Daussy, Hugues (2023b). "Le Parti Huguenot". Les Guerres de Religion 1559-1610: La Haine des Clans. In Fine Éditions d'art.
• Daussy, Hugues (2024). "L'Organisation Militaire du Parti Huguenot (1562-1598)". In Charere, Philippe; Daussy, Hugues (eds.). La France Huguenote: Histoire Institutionnelle d'une Minorité Religieuse (XVIe-XVIIIe Siècle). Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
• Decrue, Francis (1889). Anne, Duc de Montmorency: Connétable et Pair de France sous les Rois Henri II, François II et Charles IX. E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie.
• François, Michel (1959). Lettres de Henri III, Roi de France: Tome I (1557 - Août 1574). Société de l'Histoire de France.
• Garrisson, Janine (1991). Guerre Civile et Compromis 1559-1598. Éditions du Seuil.
• Haan, Bertrand (2011). L'Amitié Entre Princes: Une Alliance Franco-Espagnole au Temps des Guerres de Religion (1560-1570). Presses Universitaires de France.
• Joblin, Alain (2023). Henri III: Un Roi de Tragédie. Ellipses.
• Jouanna, Arlette (1989). Le Devoir de révolte: La noblesse française et la gestation de l'Etat moderne 1559-1661. Fayard.
• Jouanna, Arlette (1998). "Le Temps des Guerres de Religion en France (1559-1598)". In Jouanna, Arlette; Boucher, Jacqueline; Biloghi, Dominique; Le Thiec, Guy (eds.). Histoire et Dictionnaire des Guerres de Religion.
• Labourdette, Jean François (2013). Charles IX et la Puissance Espagnole: Diplomatie et Guerres Civiles (1563–1574). Honoré Champion.
• Labourdette, Jean François (2018). Charles IX, un Roi dans la Tourmente des Guerres Civiles (1560 – 1574). Honoré Champion.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2000). La Faveur du Roi: Mignons et Courtisans au Temps des Derniers Valois. Champ Vallon.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2013). Le Roi, La Cour, L'État de La Renaissance À L'Absolutisme. Champ Vallon.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2022). 1559-1629 Les Guerres de Religion. Gallimard.
• Le Roux, Nicolas (2023). "Les Protestants, le Roi et la Ligue: Les Guerres de Religion dans la France du Nord". In Le Roux, Nicolas (ed.). Les Guerres de Religion: Une Histoire de l'Europe au XVIe Siècle. Passés Composés.
• Lhoumeau, Charles Sauzé de (1940). Un Fils Naturel de François Ier: Louis de Saint-Gelais, baron de la Mothe-Saint-Héray. Société Française d'Imprimerie et de Librairie.
• Marchand, Romain (2020). Henri de La Tour (1555 – 1623): Affirmation Politique, Service du Roi et Révolte. Classiques Garnier.
• Mariéjol, Jean H. (1983). La Réforme, la Ligue, l'Édit de Nantes. Tallandier.
• Micallef, Fabrice (2018). Le Bâtard Royal: Henri d'Angoulême dans l'Ombre des Valois (1551 – 1586). Droz.
• Miquel, Pierre (1980). Les Guerres de Religion. Fayard.
• Pernot, Michel (1987). Les Guerres de Religion en France 1559-1598. Sedes.
• Pernot, Michel (2013). Henri III: Le Roi Décrié. Éditions de Fallois.
• Ribera, Jean-Michel (2018). Diplomatie et Espionnage: Les Ambassadeurs du Roi de France auprès de Philippe II - Du Traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (1589). Classiques Garnier.
• Renaudeau, Olivier (2023). "Armement et Tactique en Temps de Guerre Civile". Les Guerres de Religion 1559-1610: La Haine des Clans. In Fine Éditions d'art.
• Solnon, Jean-François (2001). Henri III: un désir de majesté. Librarie Académique Perrin.
• Souriac, Pierre-Jean (2008). Une Guerre Civile: Affrontements Religieux et Militaires dans Le Midi Toulousain (1562-1596). Champ Vallon.
• Sournia, Jean-Charles (1981). Blaise de Monluc: Soldat et Écrivain (1500-1577). Fayard.
• Venard, Marc (1993). Réforme Protestante, Réforme Catholique dans la Province d'Avignon - XVIe Siècle -. Cerf.
• Venard, Marc (2023). "Le Cardinal de Lorraine dans l'Église de France (1564 – 1574)". In Bellenger, Yvonne (ed.). Le Mécénat et l'Influence des Guises. Classiques Garnier.
• Vray, Nicole (1997). La Guerre des Religions dans la France de l'Ouest: Poitou-Aunis-Saintonge 1534-1610. Geste Éditions.
• Wanegffelen, Thierry (2005). Catherine de Médicis: Le Pouvoir au Fémenin. Payot & Rivages.