User:Sovietblobfish/Foreign policy 1563-1567

Foreign policy

Having resolved to recapture Le Havre from the English, the French informed the Spanish king Philip II before taking the step. The news of this development was a frustrating one to the Spanish, whose desire to see the English back in possession of Calais was held openly. The Spanish would succeed in adjusting their view on the matter subsequently.

Upon the French recapture, which transpired on 28 July 1563, the French ambassador in Spain noted that even if the Spanish may have regreted the development, they made a good show of welcoming the news. The loss of Le Havre was a blow to the English crown. Among the English queen Elizabeth's advisors, there was little appetite for announcing the development to her.

The peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 had ended the long period of conflict between France and Spain and made the two states into allies. This friendship between the two powers was not an equal one, France lacking the strength to really oppose Spain. The outbreak of the civil wars in 1562 had ensured this imbalance. Therefore, the ambassadors the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice and the baron de Fourquevaux had to maintain at least the image of accord between the two states. This was despite the fact that it was apparent to the men that the accord between the states was not sustainable.

The baron de Fourquevaux chafed at what he perceived to be Spanish arrogance and insolence. He wrote to Charles IX on this assessment in August 1566. Fourquevaux also found the administration of Spain to be very lethargic in its administration.

A legacy concern of the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis was the matter of French prisoners being kept in Spanish galleys. This had been an issue of concern during the ambassadorship of the bishop of Limoges, and under his successor the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, the French would continue to advocate for their release. The Spanish were reluctant, little keen to lose this captive labour force that powered their Mediterranean fleet. Despite securing an approval for their release from Philip, the actual release of many of the captives did not materialise. Charles wrote to Saint-Sulpice on the matter in July 1563, and in November 1564, demanding that he secure the captives release.(prove the link to cateau-cambrésis) After a Frenchman was condemned to the galleys by the Spanish inquisition, this generated a protest from Charles who argued that the inquisition had no jursidiction over a French subject. The harassment of French merchants by the inquisition, which saw many of them as being Protestants, aroused Charles' ire. Charles noted that Saint-Sulpice should seek to acquire from Philip a commitment that French Protestant merchants should be treated no worse than the English and German Protestants, who were able to conduct their trade without such harrying. The threat that Charles would retaliate against Spanish merchants was presented as the alternative.

Captive Frenchman would also be a present concern during the residence of the baron de Fourquevaux. In December 1566, Philip alerted the ambassador to the arrest and handing over to the inquisition of five Frenchmen. Philip explained he was not accustomed to interfering in the actions of the inquisition. After the arrest of a further seventy Frenchmen in Barcelona in February 1567, with the unfortunate men being sent to the galleys, the baron de Fourquevaux complained to the duke of Alba. Alba demurred, noting that French Protestants were only arrested in Spain if they committed scandalous acts. The galleys that ferried Alba for his journey to the Spanish Netherlands in 1567 had crews that included captive Frenchmen. Charles wrote to queen Élisabeth on the matter. He also wrote to the Genoese, in the hopes they might return them from Alba's service. Alba retorted that the French only released the Spaniards they held in return for ransoms. In an audience on the subject of French captives with Philip II some time around July 1567, Fourquevaux noted that by the terms of Cateau-Cambrésis, they should have been released. He followed this up with a memorandum in August to Philip on the matter. 1567 would come and go without satisfaction. It would not be until November 1568, that he indicated in his despatches that releases had begun.

During the armed peace between 1563 and 1567, tensions and conflict would emerge between the French and Spanish crowns in the Netherlands, in Corsica, in the Papacy and in the New World. Though many years ago, problems also lingered from the peace settlement of Cateau-Cambrésis as related to the exchange of prisoners during the ambassadorships of both the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice and baron de Fourquevaux. In Haan's opinion, though there were flashes of tension between 1563 and 1566, the period represented a cooler one diplomatically than the years that had preceded it.

With the coming of peace in France in the signing of the peace of Amboise, the seigneur d'Oysel was dispatched as an extraordinary ambassador to Spain to justify the policy. The signing of the peace was necessary given the circumstances in the kingdom, and Catholicism would be maintained. It was to be made clear to Philip, that no criticism of the terms would be brooked. They were being communicated to him for his information, so that friendly relations might be maintained between princes. Oysel also had a more ambitious goal, to convince Philip of the merit of convening a true General Council of the Church, in contrast with the Council of Trent, that would include those of the Protestant faith. At the very least, to move the Council of Trent into Germany. Oysel was able to report that Philip appeared satisfied with the peace, and thus his mission had been a success.

In the opinion of the duke of Alba, in discussion with the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, the terms were rigorously imposed only upon the Catholics, while the Protestants were allowed to run amuck.

Though they had hotly protested the presence of Protestants at the French court initially, the firm resistance of the French crown to these attacks caused a re-evaluation in Spain about how intensely they were coming on to the matter. The arrival of the (Protestant) cardinal de Châtillon at the French court was not objected to by Philip. Rather he turned to his ambassador in France, Chantonnay, for advice on the matter. This more measured approach did not mean an end to the Spanish support for the Catholic party in France.

Chantonnay

Chantonnay had, in prior times, enjoyed strong relations with the duc de Montmorency, however in the post-war period, Montmorency distanced himself from his Spanish associations, and treated Chantonnay poorly. The Spanish ambassador found he no longer enjoyed any influence over the French grandee as the latter moved to bolster the grandeur of his house (including his Protestant nephews).

Chantonnay behaved provocatively. He saw in the French capital an ally in opposition to the peace of Amboise, he leant his support to the municipal authorities in their fight with Catherine and the constable de Montmorency over being disarmed. Haan suggests he may similarly have hitched his horse to the delegations of parlementaires who came to the court to protest the edict. Chantonnay wrote to Philip in April 1563 of his hope to see the duc d'Aumale step up to the plate to lead the Catholic party in France. He was to spend the rest of the year disappointed by their relative timidity.

Charles IX and his mother Catherine requested the French ambassador, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, reach out to the Spanish royal favourite the prince of Éboli. The French ambassador was, through Éboli, to lodge complaint about the actions of Chantonnay. Éboli was the favoured point of contact in Spain for Saint-Sulpice, who believed him to be a 'lover of peace' and the good friendship between Spain and France. From the end of 1563 onwards, Éboli constantly demonstrated his attitude of friendship. At this time, the duke of Alba had retired to his estates, he nevertheless continued to exert some influence on Spanish policy.

The civic authorities of Paris betrayed Chantonnay in mid-November 1563, revealing to Catherine the advice he had given them. Keen to demonstrate the new balance of power that had come with peace, Montmorency ordered Chantonnay immediately cease these actions. Catherine exploded against Chantonnay in an audience with the ambassador on 25 November. She charged him with having written to the Spanish court that she was a Protestant. She also indicated that Chantonnay had fanned the flames a few months previously by accusing her of preparing an invasion of the duchy of Savoy after the duke of the territory had a brush with death. Then there was the matter of his efforts to impede the disarmament of Paris. In sum, he was seeking to sow discord in France and exceeded his position as ambassador. From here on until his dismissal, Chantonnay enjoyed no influence in the French court.

Philip did not enjoy the excoriating his ambassador was receiving at the hands of the French court, but nevertheless consented in December to recall Chantonnay, who would be replaced with a certain Álava. The prince of Éboli, had been on the same side of this matter as he also worked to see the dismissal of Chantonnay from the ambassadorship. Chantonnay had reported to Philip that France was an atheistic nation whose tolerance of Protestantism would bring ruin to the monarchy and jeopardise the Spanish Netherlands. He had continually issued blunt reprimands that compromised the Spanish position in France. Saint-Sulpice gave advanced warning to the French court about the new ambassador, alerting Catherine that Álava was cut from the same cloth as the duke of Alba in November 1563 and then again in January 1564. Philip however saw with the introduction of Álava the beginning of a new approach, advising his representative to utilise a soft approach rather than threats in his instructions written on 11 January. His prime goal as ambassador was to maintain good and friendly relations between the monarchies. The new ambassador, Álava, arrived at the French court on 12 February while it was in Fontainebleau before its departure on the Grand Tour. Great celebrations were held to honour his arrival. Catherine ensured that the new ambassador could see the young king Charles and the duc d'Orléans participating in a tournament from the window during his audience with her. Though Álava would spend the next several years as Philip's representative in France, it would not technically be until notice given in a letter of 16 April 1567 that Álava received the appointment as ordinary ambassador, as opposed to an extraordinary representative. He would go on to be Philip's longest serving ambassador to France, serving for eight years in the role.

Haan argues that the change in diplomatic style from the Spanish, embodied by the instructions given to Álava was not solely to sooth French sensibilities, but also a recognition of the French Protestant support for the rebellious lords in the Spanish Netherlands, who had just triumphed over Granvelle. Thus, it was prudent to direct less heat at the French leadership.

As time wore on, Álava would become just as despised by the French as Chantonnay had been. Both the French crown and their ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux greatly resented him.

The new policy of gentleness appeared to quickly bear fruit. As the French court prepared to depart on the grand tour of the kingdom in early 1564, the Protestant leadership, most notably represented by the admiral de Coligny, made their departure from the French court. Thus a major Spanish grievance was in part resolved. As the tour progressed, various evidence of the courts committment to upholding Catholicism would be given. In a period of happy relations, Catherine affirmed in early 1564, that her friendship with her son-in-law Philip would continue until her death.

Catherine spoke of Philip as alternatively her son and her brother. Philip for his part addressed Catherine as his mother or sister. The Spanish king would go as far as to say that he hoped to be the most esteemed of Catherine's children in his affection for her. He also put her on equal footing with his biological mother, Isabella of Portugal on occasion. In an example of this approach, the prince of Éboli would declare in September 1567, that Philip thought of Catherine with such affection as had she carried him in her womb.

While his secretary was well convinced by Catherine's efforts, Álava himself maintained a deal more scepticism. Toleration of Protestatism in France was not being renounced, and the leaders of the Protestant party continued to be accommodated by the queen mother. Álava wanted to see a Catholic reconquest of France, not an equitable application of the terms of the edict of Amboise.

As his predecessor had once done, Álava hoped to win the constable de Montmorency for his party. He found however, that the constable was steadfast in following Catherine's policy.

Around the summer of 1564, a servant of the Spanish ambassador stole the key to the cipher he used for his diplomatic correspondence, and passed it off to the seigneur de Piennes. The seigneur de Piennes was close to Catherine, and Álava thus saw the shadowy hand of the queen mother behind the theft of his cipher key. Haan states that his organisation of the theft was probably undertaken on Catherine's instruction. In discontent, Álava departed the French court as an act of protest. Philip protested robustly to the affair. He was satisfied however to see the servant who had stolen the cipher subjected to exemplary punishment, and Álava's temporary refusal to negotiate with Catherine. He did not wish to push the matter further into a diplomatic crisis.

With the termination of the several crises that temporarily beset Franco-Spanish relations during the summer of 1564 (including the matter of the cipher and Corsica), a modus vivendi was re-established between the two countries. To reach this understanding, the Spanish had been compelled to re-evaluate their attitude towards the French domestic situation, and the French had been forced to curtail their European ambitions.

Philip was, during this time, distracted by both domestic affairs, and the fight with the Ottomans. It was therefore only in August 1564 that Álava was afforded more precise instructions on how to proceed with the French. He was to regularly remind Catherine to exercise caution, and to encourage her onwards lest she be seen as weak or negligent. Philip would continue to remain somewhat distant from his ambassador, who sometimes went months without letters from his sovereign. The ambassador was thus greatly frustrated that, with troubles having erupted in Corsica, he received no instructions on how to handle the matter. He wrote bitterly on the matter back to Spain on several occasions.

In audiences with Catherine therefore, Álava deplored the ambiguous religious policy the queen mother was employing. Philip encouraged his ambassador to keep up this approach in his October correspondence. He did not allow his criticisms of the French religious policy to become more severe or frequent over time however, even as the court moved from areas of Catholic strength (Burgundy and Champagne) to ones of Protestant strength (the Dauphiné, Languedoc, Provence). He limited himself to general reproaches, not getting into the specifics of religious policy. Catherine, and her ambassador the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice continued to defend the merits of the grand tour in the face of these critiques. Any abrogation of the edict of Amboise would result in the Protestant's taking up arms, a new civil war.

Though he largely maintained this temperament as the French court progressed through the south, a notable exception to this came in mid-March 1565. Here, when upon learning of an edict which confirmed religious tolerance, he flew into a rage.

Álava viewed the city of Paris as a Protestant one, as it was governed by the maréchal de Montmorency.

The position of ambassador put Álava in an intermediary position between the two courts. It was thus possible for him to present himself as a servant of the French monarchy. On occasion, Catherine sought his opinion on matters, approaching him as were he an advisor.

After it was resolved in Spain to militarily intervene in the Netherlands, Álava increased the temperature of his interventions against Catherine. By his aggressive posturing he emulated his predecessor's approach to dealing with Catherine. His increasingly frequent interventions concerning French religious policy paralleled the march of Alba's army north to the Spanish Netherlands.

In January 1567, Álava's intervention with the French crown concerning the piratical actions of Protestant corsairs from La Rochelle outraged king Charles. In a letter to Fourquevaux of 26 January, Charles described how Álava had, in a fit of anger, rounded upon his mother. In the king's opinion, the Spanish ambassador had gone over the line in his fiery words. Charles was concerned of what 'outrageous' things Álava might report back to Philip in his correspondence, and advised Fourquevaux should he encounter such talk in Spain to reply as the king had done. In March 1567, he defended himself against Álava's attacks concerning the corsairs in a letter to Fourquevaux in which he enumerated the counter measures he had undertaken against the corsairs. He elaborated though that to go beyond this and try to put restrictions on French trade on the seas was an overreach from the Spanish.

Charles saw the architect of this more combatative Spanish diplomacy to be Álava's secretary Aguilon. He noted that Aguilon had undertaken a secret trip to Flanders and that upon his return, he had inflamed the Spanish ambassador against Catherine and Charles.

Extraordinary ambassadorial missions

This diplomatic mission would be followed by another one in December undertaken by the chevalier (knight) de Batresse to elaborate on the pacification being undertaken in France.

The seigneur de Lanssac undertook a diplomatic mission to Spain in February 1564. On 5 February he arrived in Barcelona after a difficult journey, in the company of the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice. He provided to king Philip, letters from the King and Queen Mother, and assured the Spanish monarch of French friendship. On 9 February, he enjoyed his audience with Philip II. Philip assured him of his own good will, and also that the French should put no stock in the English boast that Philip was going to support them. Philip noted he desired nothing more than to see the Franco-English quarrel resolved peaceably. Philip promised satisfaction on a range of grievances raised by Lanssac: import duties on goods entering Flanders, and the building of a fort near Gravelines among other matters. In relation to the French distaste for the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay, Philip was able to inform Lanssac that Chantonnay had in fact already been recalled. He is also supposed to have assured the French extraordinary ambassador that he opposed the Pope's recent move to dispossess the Protestant queen of Navarre of her lands.^α Concerning the possibility of a vacancy in the Pontificate, Lanssac was assured the Spanish would not oppose the candidacy of the cardinal of Ferrara. Having left his audience with Philip, the prince of Éboli assured him that other petitions he had brought on various matters relating to Corsica and Flanders would be subject to benevolent consideration. Lanssac took his leave of the king on 14 February, bearing letters to Catherine and Charles given to him by the monarch. He wrote ahead to the French court, appraising them of the happy outcome of his mission. He then went to Madrid, where he stayed for 5 days, so that he might meet with the queen of Spain, Élisabeth. While with Élisabeth he appraised her of developments in the French court, and then made his way back into France, arriving in Bordeaux by 10 March.

In the summer of 1564, the seigneur de Verderonne was sent to Spain to ask after the health of Philip, who was recovering from an illness.

Returning from his involvement in the Spanish capture of the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera (a tidal island on the Moroccan coast), in August 1564, the seigneur de Brantôme visited Spain. His mission in the country was to act as a spy for Charles IX. In addition to investigations of the Spanish army and navy, he was tasked with regularly visiting the queen, Élisabeth, to report on her health, and encourage her to support Catherine's marital plans.

Verderonne was again in Spain around May-June 1567, to offer French congratulations to Philip for his triumph in Flanders.

Southern border trouble

French hackles were raised concerning the Basque border of the kingdom of France with Spain. Charles would write to his Spanish ambassador Fourquevaux several times on the matter of the border river Bidassoa on behalf of the towns of Uruggne and Hendaye. In August 1567, he charged that the Spanish of Hondarribia were trying to claim the river for themselves. This included the seizure of a French boat laden with wine and other goods. The river was rightly held in common by those on both sides of the border, and thus Fourquevaux must represent this with Philip so that he might restore justice to the situation.

Élisabeth

Catherine had great ambitions for the influence that her daughter Élisabeth, the queen of Spain, might wield towards French interests. She was to keep Philip enraptured with the French alliance, and assume an active political role of her own. Édouard argues that in this, Catherine misjudged the limits of the role Élisabeth had the capacity to play in Spanish politics. In regards to Élisabeth's relations with her mother, Brantôme characterises the daughters' relationship with her mother as one of fearful respect. Élisabeth was to never have opened a letter from her mother without trembling at the possibility she might have disappointed her. The emotional manipulation went both ways however. Élisabeth would put her pen to letters in favour of the Spanish religious position as related to French politics.

The French ambassador, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, and the queen of Spain, Élisabeth enjoyed warm relations, and in his embassy to Spain, Ribera writes that it could be seen that the two worked as a diplomatic pair. Indeed, in October 1564, Saint-Sulpice wrote to Catherine that Élisabeth had great influence over her husband and she worked dexterously to maintain the Franco-Spanish relationship. Saint-Sulpice's successor as ambassador, the baron de Fourquevaux also looked to Élisabeth to further the French diplomatic agenda, as indeed he had been instructed to do before his departure for Spain in his brief. She could appraise the ambassadors of Philip's mood, as well as that of the larger Spanish court. When Philip was absent, she could serve as an intermediary. It was typical that before any audience the ambassadors held with Philip, they would first meet with Élisabeth, and broach the matters they intended to discuss with her husband. In addition to the support Élisabeth provided the ambassadors, they assisted her in managing her relations with her husband Philip and mother Catherine. For example, she took advise from Fourquevaux on occasion on what to write to Catherine. Catherine would urge her daughter to conceal her poor health from her husband, out of fear that it could be an origin point for the distancing of relations between the couple. Ribera describes Catherine's hope that her daughter could shape her husband's foreign policy in favour of the French as an 'illusion'.

Fourquevaux identified the aftermath of the interview at Bayonne as a turning point in Élisabeth's willingness and ability to act as agent of French influence in Spain. The ambassador alleged that she was quicker to intervene with Philip in support of Catherine. She also expressed interest in being appraised of French developments so that she might know when affairs were developing in Spain that might be to Charles' interest. Come 1568, the Spanish ambassador in France was complaining about Élisabeth's behaviour.

Don Carlos

The Spanish king, Philip, also had a son, don Carlos. Relations between Philip and don Carlos were very poor. The baron de Foruquevaux reported on this fact back to Catherine. By contrast, don Carlos enjoyed a great friendship with the queen Élisabeth. In 1563, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice and Élisabeth made an effort to engineer a match between don Carlos and the widowed queen of France, Mary, Queen of Scots. In August 1567, Fourquevaux noted that don Carlos was a troubled soul. The troubles between don Carlos and Philip reached a head in early 1568, when Philip had his son put under house arrest, with no weapons to be kept near him. He would continue to discuss the imprisonment of the prince until the latter's death in the summer of 1568.

Éboli and Alba

Of the Spanish king's two favourites, the prince of Éboli, and the duke of Alba, there was a great preference in France for the former. In a letter of 18 August 1564, Catherine bemoaned that Éboli was to make a trip to Flanders. She wished for Élisabeth to convince Philip to maintain Éboli in Spain. Rather, she would prefer the duke of Alba be sent off to the Spanish Netherlands. The ambassador himself mouthed off concerning the duke of Alba to the prince of Éboli in January 1565. He charged the duke with a penchant for interfering in French domestic affairs.

Pregnancy

Catherine was greatly desirous that her daughter, Élisabeth, would produce an heir for the Spanish king. She was therefore very interested in the possibility of her daughter's pregnancy. In February 1564, Catherine wrote various pieces of advice to Élisabeth including advising her to wake and bed early in the hopes that this might better enable pregnancy. In May, Saint-Sulpice wrote to the governor of Narbonne, a certain baron de Fourquevaux (who would serve as ambassador to Spain in a years time) on Élisabeth's pleasure that her husband had returned from Monzón, and the ambassador's hope to see a son born to the couple in nine months. On 4 June 1564, a certain mademoiselle de Ribérac informed Claude de Gontaut, wife of the French ambassador in Spain, of Ėlisabeth's stomach aches and vomiting. When word of this sign of pregnancy reached the French court, it was greeted with much pleasure. Charles IX wrote to the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice to express his satisfaction with the news on 18 August 1564, while Catherine informed the ambassador of her intention to send French midwives to her daughter. The pregnancy went poorly, and Élisabeth was several times on the verge of death. Blood letting was undertaken multiple times. In the end the pregnancy ended in a double miscarriage around three months into its progress at some point during August. Several days after the miscarriage, Élisabeth suffered seizures that left her in a state of delirium. After several weeks in this precarious state, Élisabeth returned to good health. Saint-Sulpice gave the vicomte d'Orthe the urgent mission of informing Catherine that her daughter was out of medical danger around the end of August. Processions were organised in Madrid in favour of her recovery. By 3 September, Saint-Sulpice was able to write to Catherine that her daughter's health was good. He emphasised that there was much celebration across the peninsula at her recovery, and that while she had been suffering many acts of piety and devotion had been undertaken. Catherine likewise ordered processions to take place in Avignon (where the court was at this time) and in the capital. Philip was greatly impacted by his wife's health troubles. The king consented to the presence of two experienced women from France for any future pregnancies his wife had. Catherine was relieved to know that the trouble had passed for her daughter, but was keen to ensure that no further blood letting was performed on Élisabeth and wrote on this subject to Saint-Sulpice.

Scarcely had Élisabeth recovered from this near-death pregnancy experience than new rumours of a pregnancy (from a prophecy of Nostradamus) caused the seigneur de Méru to be sent to Spain in late November to investigate their veracity. His mission was also to thank Philip for the care he had shown Élisabeth during her recent illness. The baron de Fourquevaux, who had replaced the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice as the French ambassador to Spain, reported on the introduction to Élisabeth of a 'conception trick' that Catherine had recommended her daughter adopt on 21 November 1564. He noted that this had been opposed by Juan Manrique de Lara until it received the approval of Spanish doctors. These French pressures on the young Élisabeth (who was then only eighteen) caused her difficulty.(wrong? fourquevaux was not ambassador in November 1564)

Come January 1566, Élisabeth was confirmed to be pregnant. Fourquevaux wrote that he had offered her a French midwife, but that she had assured him she had a very competent Spanish midwife, and that a foreign midwife would be a cause of problems. The ambassador also reported that Philip was falling deeper in love with Élisabeth, and that the pregnancy had made her 'more beautiful'. The ex-ambassador Saint-Sulpice wrote to Élisabeth to congratulate her in February 1566. The French court dispatched the seigneur de Villeroy to Spain to offer congratulations to Élisabeth and Philip.

According to Spanish custom, Élisabeth wrote up her will before giving birth. Fourquevaux followed her to 'La Casa del Bosque de Segovia' where she was due to give birth. He reported to Catherine that childbirth was anticipated for the middle of the month. A steady diet of news trickled to France concerning the final weeks of the pregnancy. In the final days before Élisabeth gave birth, both Philip and the duke of Alba opined that they hoped it was a daughter rather than a son. Ribera argues this was because they did not wish to see a grandson of Catherine ascend the Spanish throne. On 12 August, Élisabeth gave birth to a daughter, Isabella Clara Eugenia. Fourquevaux was then able to update Catherine on 18 August that Élisabeth was somewhat unwell after the birth of her daughter. The ambassador had a very low opinion of her Spanish doctors, describing them as 'big beasts' who scorned all advice Catherine offered for her daughter due to their arrogance. Her health would deteriorate again to the point that Fourquevaux was informing Charles IX that his sister had come to the verge of death. During these difficult days, the ambassador reported that Philip was attentively at his wife's side showing the greatest affections. He noted that Philip would comfort and embolden her courage, and visit frequently throughout the night and day. The baptism of Isabella transpired on 25 August, which was the feast day of saint Louis, patron saint of the French monarchs.

The seigneur de Saint-Sulpice was sent as the extraordinary French ambassador to Spain to offer the congratulations on the birth of Isabella. He reported back to Catherine on 25 September that Élisabeth had been pleased to see him, and they had enjoyed a pleasant interview. He also noted that Philip was attentive to his responsibilities as a husband and a father. His mission concluded in October 1566.

Come February 1567, Fourquevaux was again able to report to the French court on Élisabeth's pregnancy, he noted that Philip suspected the child would be a girl. As with Élisabeth's first pregnancy, regular updates were sent from Fourquevaux to Catherine as it progressed. In discussions with the prince of Éboli around June 1567, the Spanish grandee confided in Fourquevaux that any son Élisabeth had would surely inherit the kingdom, due to the reproductive defects of Philip's only son don Carlos. Éboli looked positively on this prospect as one that might bind the two kingdoms togeher. Come 6 October, Élisabeth gave birth to her second daughter, Catalina Micaela. The name Catalina was chosen as a tribute to the child's grandmother, Catherine. Fourquevaux was distraught that she had not given birth to a son. Philip wrote to Catherine on the matter that his wife was in a good way, but would perhaps be even better if she had given birth to a boy. He noted that this might derive from Catherine's desire for a grandson, and urged her to express the same enthusiasm for another granddaughter as she would a granddson, to spare her daughter any grief. Concerning the two daughters that Élisabeth had borne, Fourquevaux noted to Catherine that the alliance with Spain was more than ratified by their birth. With word of Catalina's birth, in October Charles instructed the governor of Péronne to fire off all the cannons of the border town (with the Spanish Netherlands) so the French pleasure could be clearly understood by the neighbouring Spanish. Around the end of the year, a certain La Prêtre was sent to the Spanish court to offer the French congratulations on the birth.

Only two months after this birth, Élisabeth was pregnant again. Her health was in increasingly dire straits, and over the course of the pregnancy Fourquevaux was regularly reporting back to France on her illnesses and deteriorating condition. On 3 October 1568, Élisabeth died of a miscarriage.

In a secret letter written in May 1564, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice alerted Catherine to Spanish troop movements to have her guard up and prepare for any eventualities. That same month he wrote to the governor of Narbonne, the baron de Fourquevaux, to advice him that such a policy of military preparedness was the best way to maintain peace between princes.

Papal precedence

Traditionally, French diplomatic representatives had enjoyed the place of second precedence in the Papal court, behind only the Imperial ambassador. This was now challenged by the Spanish representatives, who sought to assume the place of second precedence over France. The Spanish claim to overcome France was based on their colonial holdings, which, it was argued, elevated Philip to the dignity of an Emperor (Emperor of the Indies). During the reign of Francis II, the French had opposed similar Spanish moves in the Imperial caught to grant precedence to the Spanish over the French.

This matter reared its head at the council of Trent. In an episode on 29 June 1563, the Spanish ambassador to the council, the count of Luna attempted to put himeslf on equal footing with the French representatives during a ceremony. In response, the French representatives left the cathedral, and threatened to depart Trent. In the hopes of maintaining the peace, the French put the blame for this affair on pope Pius IV, arguing he wanted to undermine Trent by turning its discussions into a battle of precedence. In a conversation between Saint-Sulpice and Philip II at Monzón in January 1564, the two men concurred that the Papacy had previously been seeking to induce discord in such a way that was to the institutions discredit. In their opinion Pius IV should be given space to pick up the pieces.

Though Pius IV assured the French that they would maintain their precedence over the Spanish, he would, through a certain abbot Nicquet, advise them to absent themselves from the Urbi et Orbi (a Pontifical blessing) given on holy Thursday (30 March). The request for the French absence was justified on the grounds that there would be no place at the blessing for ambassadors. This was not true, the Imperial ambassador would confirm to the French representative, that all the other ambassadors were present for these blessings. The new French representative, the seigneur d'Oisel, saw Pius' shrinking from support for French precedence as resulting from venomous letters they had received from the Spanish court. Oisel further refused to comply with his absenting from the blessing. Subsequently Oisel and the cardinal de La Bourdaisière were summoned before Pius. Oisel, under threat of excommunication, was ordered not to attend the Easter blessing. The Pope assured him that his precedence would be granted to him some time after Easter. Oisel fell to his knees and begged the Pope not to force such a humiliaton on him. Both he, and the cardinal de La Bourdaisière would ultimately remain unmoved by the Pope's intervention.

Rather than comply with the Pope's request, Oisel appeared before the Pope on 1 April to request he be permitted to take his leave and return to France. He opined that was not possible for him to continue to reside in Rome without compromising Charles' honour. Pius, while regretful of the situation, accepted Oisel's withdrawal. This hard line approach to the matter of precedence bore fruit, and, fearful of a break with France, Pius relented on Pentecost (21 May), with Oisel noting that this had come after a day of intrigues in which the cardinal de La Bourdaisière had needed to be firm. The French precedence would be visible at the feast of the Trinity (28 May). Thus French precedence over the Spanish at the Papal court was affirmed. Oisel gave credit to the Papal nephew, cardinal Altemps as an ally of the French in this business. He noted that Altemps had supported the French even at personal cost, risking his Spanish pension. Oisel argued he should be rewarded by the French king. In addition to the services of Altemps, Oisel saw value in those of the cardinal's brother, de:Jakob Hannibal I. von Hohenems due to their power in Germany. In the same letter of 31 May, Oisel conveyed to Charles information of a private audience he had held with Pius. In this audience, Pius had despaired for the Spanish domination of the Italian peninsula. He noted that by affirming French precedence he now risked being subject to attack. Oisel opined that if the Papacy was indeed attacked by Spain over the matter of precedence, that the French sovereign should come to his protection. The matter of the Papal affirmation of French precedence would indeed be a source of tension between France and Spain. Though a matter of great seriousness, moreso than the contemporary diplomatic crisis in Corsica in the opinion of Haan, the Spanish avoided making an official declaration on the matter. As the Spanish had declared no official position on the affair, the French ambassador in Spain, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice found he had no need to justify it.

In the instructions given to Oisel's successor, the comte de Tournon in July 1566, the ambassador was encouraged to jealously guard French precedence in the Papacy over Spain. To this end he must ensure his presence at all assemblies and ceremonies where diplomats would be present. He was to be on the lookout for Spanish plots and schemes to frustrate French precedence. If his precedence was threatened, he was to follow the example of Oisel, and take his leave from the Papal court.

Italian patronage

Hoping to break through the status quo of Spanish domination in Italy, Charles looked to find friends in the peninsula. The king had dynastic ties with the Este family which he hoped to utilise, as well as the Medici through his mother. Difficulty was to be found in fostering these relationships due the rivalry among the Italian princes.

Oisel wrote with concern about the departure of the Papal nuncio to France, cardinal Santacroce. He observed that Charles had not afforded him anything upon his departure. He held up the example of the Holy Roman Emperor, who had granted the cardinal Delfino a 'large bishopric'. This was important, as Santacroce's bishopric was a French one, and Charles should foster the devotion of his cardinals. Ultimately, Santacroce would receive his gratification through receipt of the archbishopric of Arles, which was taken from the cardinal of Ferrara for this purpose. Ferrara was wealthy enough that he could take the hit.

In terms of broader patronage, for want of money, French pensions to various cardinals were often in arrears. Likewise, Oisel had to advocate for Mario Sforza di Santa Fiore, who had been in French service since the reign of Henri II. Without a pension, and unpaid for his role as gentilhomme de la chambre du roi, Santa Fiore was considering moving into Venetian service. It was important to maintain him, as he was well liked, and one of the few captains in the peninsula. Similarly, Oisel advised that the king must do well by the Rucellai banking family, whose loyalty to France was as great as that of a Frenchman in his estimation. Another target of Oisel's advocacy, this time to Catherine, was a certain Leonardo della Rovere, who he stated had performed good services in support of the French crown.

As concerned the replacement of cardinal Santacroce as Papal Nuncio to France, Catherine had little enthusiasm for the bishop of Terracina who had been sent to replace him in October 1565. In her estimation, the bishop was of insufficient quality for such a high office. This was to the surprise of the Pope, who insisted this figure be accepted. Oisel argued that Pius should look to a more qualified individual to replace Terracina. In Oisel's estimation, Terracina was little respected by the Italians, and his choice as Nuncio made it appear as though the Pope placed little importance in his relationship with France. To this charge, Pius retorted that one of Oisel's predecessors as ambassador to the Papacy, (the seigneur du Mortier) had been a Protestant, but that nevertheless, Pius had tolerated him. Oisel bristled at the accusation of heresy against one of his predecessors. In a letter of November 1565 to the queen mother, the ambassador opined that if Catherine remained firm in her opposition to Terracina, Pius would relent and select another candidate for the position. With the death of Pius IV, it would be on his successor Pius V, who had ascended to the pontificate on 7 January 1566 to replace him. Until such time as the replacement, the bishop of Ceneda could arrive, Pius V asked in February 1566 that Catherine receive Terracina, for the honour of the Papacy. Terracina would be relieved of his charge in April 1566.

During the pontificate of Pius IV, the French had been accustomed to a degree of flexibility from the Papacy. Under his successor Pius V, elected on 7 January 1566, a more rigid pontificate would present itself to the French crown. Pius was quick to register with the French his opposition to the edict of Amboise. Pius' advice to Charles was to work towards its erosion so that Catholicism might be restored. In addition to this, he expressed his disapproval at word he had received that Protestants who had fled from Savoy had found refuge in Lyon, and those from Piedmont had found refuge in French Saluzzo. The Birague bothers, who respectively governed these two places were implicated by the Pope as heretics. Oisel disputed these accusations, arguing that the governor of the Lyonnais, the président de Birague had in fact expelled a Protestant minister, Viret from Lyon. He thus felt it was dubious that Birague would have accepted a troop of Protestant refugees into Lyon, as he was a man of good character and faith. Charles would not have installed him in such a charge if his Catholicity was in doubt, therefore he urged the Pope to put little stock in these rumours. The Pope rejoindered that he was indeed satisfied that Birague was a good man, but that it was not possible to be too firm in such a matter, where the possibility of reducing the number of enemies of the faith was concerned. As for Saluzzo, this place was governed by the seigneur de Ottobiano (another member of the Birague family). Oisel argued that he had governed with Catholic wisdom. It was admitted that a fleeing Protestant could take refuge without the cognisance of the places governor. Given the times in which they lived, it was sufficient for such refugees to know they did not enjoy support of ministers rather than to actively persecute them.

Not long to his pontificate, in February 1566, the new Pope urged the French to link up with other Christian princes in a crusade against the Ottoman Empire. Oisel responded to this proposal in careful and general terms. Oisel urged him to do good by king Charles to best draw him towards this holy resolution. Upon taking his leave of the Pope, Oisel noted that Pius V was crying, and that his admonitions were 'tender'.

The Pope also cautioned Charles against allowing the accumulation of many benefices in a single pair of hands. If such pluralism was tolerated, the benefice holder could not properly tend to all their flocks. In the instructions given to the new Papal Nuncio, several policies were prescribed for the bishop of Ceneda, these were learned of by Oisel through the cardinal de Ferrara and the cardinal Santecroce and he subsequently informed Charles by letter of 1 April 1566. The new Nuncio was to ensure Charles always remained true to the Catholic faith. To see to the publication of the Tridentine decrees in France. To ensure that appointments for bishoprics and abbeys were given to those whose Catholic faith could not be doubted. Most importantly, to strip the cardinal de Châtillon of his dignity as cardinal, as the Pope had already done so.

Corsica

In the summer of 1564, a certain Sampiero Corso (who had once been in the service of the French king Henri II) began a revolt against Genoese rule of the island of Corsica. He landed in Corsica on 12 June in a boat provided by the French king Charles, and incited a general rebellion. The official French position was that Corso had been unjustly treated by the Genoese, having his property confiscated, and was well within his rights to resist a tyrannical regime that the Genoese were imposing on his island. Genoese excesses in Corsica made an uprising an inevitability. It was clear to the Spanish king Philip that this uprising had more than just French sympathy. Covert support was being provided to his endeavour.

With the covert backing of France, Corso worked to stir up revolt in Corsica against the Genoese. This was an assault not only on the Genoese, but also their allies, Spain. Philip reacted strongly against the Corsican rebellion. He wanted from France a declaration of their neutrality in the matter. This desire took the form of a summons. The prince of Éboli opined that while the affair of Álava's stolen cipher could become water under the bridge, this was a more serious matter. Nevertheless he assured that the friendship between the kingdoms would not be destroyed over a 'pirate' like Corso. Saint-Sulpice at first downplayed the seriousness of the situation, but come 31 July he admitted in a despatch back to the French court that the Spanish king should be given satisfaction on this matter. Catherine assented to this, and around the end of August, assured the Spanish sovereign through Saint-Sulpice, that French subjects were forbidden to support Corso under pain of death. Álava's spies in the Provençal ports could pull up no information to the contrary of Catherine's declaration, and he declared himself satisfied of French innocence. Philip and Alba were similarly satisfied by the speed of the French assurances. Philip consented to inform Saint-Sulpice of the destinations of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean. Previously, Saint-Sulpice had demanded to know the destination of the Spanish fleet, but had received no answer. Haan argues that in addition to concern about the French attitude to Corsica, there had been hesitancy to disclosed this information to an ally of the Ottomans. The ships had first dropped off 500 infantry in Corsica at the start of July, before heading to the Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera (a tidal island off the Moroccan coast) which was recaptured form the Barbary pirates in September. The fleet then headed back to Corsica, though it was left ambiguous whether the island would be taken for Spain.

Spanish power was affirmed by the passing of the French coast by a Spanish fleet twice during this crisis.

The war in Corsica would continue several more years, with the French providing covert support to Corso.

In early 1566, Álava became aware that nine galleys were being armed in Marseille. He interpreted this as an effort in favour of Sampiero Corso orchestrated by the brother of the king the duc d'Anjou. He imagined Anjou intended to establish himself as the king of Corsica.

Álava raised this matter with Catherine in an audience on 14 March. She laughed at the idea that Anjou would be made the king of Corsica. Catherine described the idea of the relationship between Anjou and Corso as hearsay, and the 'support' her son was to be providing to the Corsican patriot was laughable. Catherine's assurances did little to divorce Álava from his anxieties of a French plot in Corsica. Philip inquired of Álava to probe further on the matter.

Alba would be far more frank about the objectives of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean in 1566 than the Spanish had initially been in 1564. He informed the French that they would either pursue the defence of Malta, La Goulette or the king of Spain's own territories. By the means of this frankness, Alba hoped to communicate a lack of aggressive intentions of Spain against France.

War of letters

Álava believed the French secretaries of state had a penchant for opening his diplomatic letters, and even deciphering them. In 1566, Catherine was caught holding an open Spanish despatch. Such incidents happened around once a year.

That same year, Fourquevaux became embittered that he was not informed of the departure of Spanish couriers, as he had been promised, thereby impeding the speed his despatches were able to return to France. In revenge, he requested in 23 August that Charles put every possible barrier in front of Álava for the sending of his despatches back to Spain.

On 19 July 1565, shortly after the conclusion of the Bayonne interview, Charles informed his Spanish ambassador, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice, of the name of his replacement, the baron de Fourquevaux.

The failure of the French to adopt an anti-Protestant policy in the year following the Bayonne conference greatly embittered Álava and Philip. This was compounded by the return of the Protestant grandees to the French court. With a degree of discretion, Álava had even tried to sabotague the reconciliation of the Catholic Lorraine-Guise and Protestant Châtillon feud.

Saint-Sulpice's successor was advised to conduct as much business as possible through Éboli, rather than the duke of Alba. Fourquevaux would find the latter figure a skilful dissimulator, and forged a strong relationship with the prince of Éboli. The rivalry between the two Spanish grandees ceased to concern the French ambassadors from 1567 onwards, as the duke of Alba received appointment as the governor of the Spanish Netherlands.

At the departure from his diplomatic posting in Spain, in October 1565, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice made an impassioned plea for the maintenance of friendly relations between France and Spain, and implored the Spanish ministers to work earnestly towards this objective.

The French attempted to size up the fiscal capabilities of the Spanish to wage war. It was felt around 1567, that Philip lacked the ability to wage war in the present financial circumstances he found himself in. Fourquevaux felt reassured by the amount the Spanish crown had spent without making any inroads into their debts.

Offers of military support between France and Spain were not a one way street. When Alba informed the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice of rebellious heretics troubling the Netherlands, the French ambassador offered French support in their suppression. He justified this off the cuff offer to Charles on the grounds that Philip had recently provided similar support to France (i.e. during the first French War of Religion). Charles signed off on his ambassador's advance, and urged Saint-Sulpice to repeat the offer, as it was only proper of an ally to do so.

In 1564, the French would proffer a minor amount of naval aid to the Spanish.

German mercenaries

In the hopes of frustrating any future possibility for Protestant hiring of German mercenaries, the baron de Lux and the seigneur de Rambouillet were entrusted with convincing the Imperial princes against proffering their services as mercenaries. This mission transpired in April 1564, after the constable de Montmorency had been informed that some sort the renewal of conflict in France, and had secretly hired captains for this purpose. The envoys were to stress Charles' continued adherence to the policy of friendship his father and grandfather had borne the German princes. If the moment was fortuitous, Charles hoped to meet with the duke of Württemberg, archbishop of Trier and the Count Palatine during his passage through Lorraine, so that he might honour these grandees. They were to communicate to the duke of Saxony Charles' regret concerning the war between Denmark and Sweden, and to inform him the French ambassador to Denmark, Dançay was looking to mediate this quarrel. Finally, they would communicate the recent treaty negotiated with England.

Venetian alliance

Since 1513, the French had enjoyed the strongest of their relationships in the Italian peninsula with the republic of Venice. The only concern for Venice, was that in the event they were subject to an Ottoman attack, they could not count on the French for support. The minority of Charles IX was a concern to the Venetians. The Spanish were working hard among the Catholic princes of Italy to discredit the French, arguing they were in league with the Protestants. The edicts of pacification that Charles had issued were presented sinisterly. The Spanish succeeded in winning the friendship of the Venetians, to the vexation of the French.

In the reports of the Venetian ambassadors to France of 1564, authored by Marc-Antoino Barbaroa, the kingdom of France was depicted as having decidedly fallen in status. Justice was confused, the people of the kingdom fractious and rebellious, and the nobility consumed by passions. Protestant heresy was at the root of France's decline in his estimation. Barbaro would be replaced as ambassador by Giovanni Correro in 1566, and he would write up his views on the state of France a little while later in 1569. He saw Catherine as being politically boxed in for fear of displeasing the Protestants. For the Venetian ambassadors the solution was simple, execute 5 or 6 of the leading great Protestant nobles.

Ottoman aliance

During the reigns of Francis I and Henri II, France had enjoyed a friendship with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman navy had supported the French as their own navy. Upon the accession of Charles IX, French diplomats responsible for the Levant urged for a renewal of the friendship between the 'Most Christian King' and the Sultan. The Spanish king Philip gave the appearance of being scandalised by the French relationship with the Ottomans. In an age of Habsburg domination, friendship with the Ottomans was a valuable counterweight for the French crown. The Ottomans had been unnerved by the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which appeared to offer the spectre of a Franco-Spanish alliance. Nevertheless, the French continued to place great stock in their relationship with the Ottomans. Abandoning the relationship with the Ottomans would allow the Genoese and Spanish to walk into the void, turning the force that had once been an asset for France into a cause of injury. It would also be a damage to French trade. Yet, as noted by the French agent in Constantinople in December 1563, for the last four years, the French had failed to provide an ambassador for their relations with the Ottoman Empire.

In the Spring of 1563, the Spanish held town of Oran was put under siege by the regency of Algiers, an Ottoman subject. In the opinion of the Spanish ambassador to France, Chantonnay, French arms, powder and supplies daily crossed the Mediterranean to support the besiegers.

Resultingly, many French ships, docked in Catalonia, were seized. This was done on the grounds that they might be undertaking trade with Barbary pirates.

With the Ottoman Empire undertaking a siege of Malta during 1565, determined to stamp out the refuge of the Knights Hospitaller, various French nobles rallied to the defence of the island. This enterprise was led by the seigneur de Brissac, son of the late maréchal de Brissac and Filippo di Piero Strozzi, son of the late maréchal de Strozzi. In total this force comprised around 300 nobles, and 800 soldiers. By the time this force arrived in Malta, the siege had already been lifted. Great state led efforts had been made by various Christian princes (including the Spanish crown and the Florentines) in favour of the besieged. The official French position opposed the expeditionary force of their subjects. They were denied recognition by the crown. The French position was an embarrasing one, the Grand Master of the Hospitaller knights, as well as many of his knights, being French subjects. Nevertheless, the military aid provided to Malta, in addition to fiscal aid towards the Knights Hospitaller, aroused the discontent of the Ottoman Empire. Around the end of 1565, Catherine took firm efforts to appease the Sultan. The expedition of Brissac and Strozzi was condemned, and its participants banished. This banishment was more for appearances, and had the actual goal of securing their return.

The following year, 1566, the young duc de Guise and other young nobles, including Gaspard de Schomberg looked to fight the Ottomans in Hungary. The French crown attempted unsuccessfully to frustrate their mission through declaring them to be rebels. Efforts were also made, through the French Venetian and Papal ambassadors, to hinder their passage. The men would fight in Hungary regardless.

With the threat of a new siege of Malta in 1566, those in favour of military action in its defence let it be known that king Charles approved of the mission. This is at least, what they had informed the duke of Alcalá, Spanish viceroy of Naples, while they were in Messina.

In the same period, Coligny undertook negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. Crété believes this might have been towards the end of a commercial treaty or maritime alliance. To the end of these discussions, Coligny dispatched his protégé, Téligny and another Protestant noble to Constantinople in the Autumn of 1566. They were unable to meet with the Sultan Suleiman as he had recently departed from the capital for Szeged, where he would die. The nature of Coligny's mission was a mystery even to Charles IX. He inquired of Téligny and his compatriot in April 1567 whether they had gone to acquire the Sultan's support for the French Protestant cause, whether there was a plot tending to the disadvantage of the king of Spain with the Protestants of Flanders, and finally if he was cognisant of secret Protestant war preparations. Coligny denied both the first and second points raised by the king, and to the third noted that he understood no one to be arming, but if someone was arming to the detriment of the Protestants, they would respond in kind.

On the excuse that the French intended to use them to support the 'Moors', the Portuguese seized two French vessels.

The French were considered to be the instigators of aggressive Ottoman actions both in the Mediterranean and in Hungary. For example, in May 1567, Philip purported to have information that Charles had requested an Ottoman fleet action during the summer.

Saxon quarrel

The Imperial electoral title of Saxony had been contested since 1560 between [[Augustus, Elector of Saxony|the duke of Saxony], and the duke of Saxe-Gotha, his cousin. Hoping to put an end to the matter, in 1566, the duke of Saxony came to besiege Gotha, the place of his rival. Saxony was concerned that the French king might support his rival, as during the first French War of Religion Charles had recruited mercenaries from Saxe-Gotha's lands. On 25 February 1566, Saxony's ambassador, a certain Hubert Languet was sent to Charles to counsel him against supporting Saxe-Gotha. The latter was currently under the Imperial ban, and Charles was careful not to offer support to him. Despite this positive result, rumour spread in the winter of 1566 that Charles would support Saxe-Gotha. The German princes therefore sent two nobles to Charles to determine the veracity of this rumour. They arrived while the king was at Montceaux, and were received by the constable de Montmorency. Through Languet, Saxony also sought to get a confirmation of neutrality from Charles. This was provided on 3 February 1567. Charles was not best pleased by the proximate relations between the duke of Saxony and the Emperor, but nevertheless assured him no help for Saxe-Gotha would be forthcoming from France. Saxony entered Gotha on 13 April, and his rival was jailed.

Imperial relations

Justifying the edict of Amboise to the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II in April 1563, through her ambassador the bishop of Rennes, Catherine argued that the French crown's goal by the peace was not to introduce diversity of religion into France, but rather to more achieve religious reunification by less destructive means than civil war. At this time, it was still possible to imagine the ongoing council of Trent might bring about such a triumph.

In a great contrast with the attitude of his Spanish cousin, Maximilian II presented a sympathetic face to the idea of religious tolerance in France. Indeed, this was how he had approached the religious question in his own territories. He informed the French ambassador to the Imperial court, the comte de Fiesque of his respect for the queen mother Catherine, and the way in which she had chosen to govern France. Through her efforts, he opined to Fiesque, she had assured peace and stability in the kingdom. However, there was one blot on this relationship. Maximilian charged the French representative to the Ottoman Empire with driving that state to arms against him. The comte de Fiesque hotly denied that such rumours were true, blaming the talk on malignant actors. TIn a letter of 1 Novembre 1567 to Catherine, Fiesque observed that the Emperor had alleged to him that the French ambassador in Constantinople was trying to sink peace efforts between the Ottomans and the Empire, and if they could not do so, to become party to the peace. Fiesque had denied that the French had any desire to make themselves party to a peace process that did not involve them.

The Emperor was also frustrated at rumours that he was to join a Catholic alliance alongside the French and Spanish kings, and the Pope. A book had been published alleging that the three Protestant Imperial electors were to be dispossesed and replaced by Maximilian's brothers. With outrage against this work in Germany, Maximilian was forced to denounce this work as a scurrilous fiction. He therefore had little appetite for the concept. Catherine had championed a similar proposal at the Bayonne conference.

The comte de Fiesque worked to reassure him on the merits of an alliance between Spain, France and the Empire, as well as downplay any French malfeasance relating to the Ottoman Empire. He appraised Charles of the developments of this conversation in December 1567. It was only through such a Catholic league could heresy be combatted, and peace assured. In relation to French policy regarding the Ottomans, Fiesque noted that he had informed Maximilian that he had been informed by Charles concerning the commission given to the French man in Constantinople. No part of the commission related to the injury of the Imperial cause. As for why the French had ambassadors with the Ottomans, this was a policy Charles wished to maintain continuity on from his predecessors, and it could be used to rescue Christians that had fallen into Ottoman captivity.

Clearing the mercenaries

It had been agreed that those German mercenaries hired during the first French War of Religion (specifically those of the son of the Elector Palatine) would be paid off by the French crown. Come 1567, these troops were still stationed in Burgundy. In April, John Casimir, outlined new demands. He increased his monetary request beyond that which had initially been settled with him at Orléans. Exasperated, Charles requested of his lieutenant-general for the province of Burgundy, that he make the mercenaries leave the kingdom. If the mercenaries would not listen to reason, then by military pressure. He suggested that he raise a military force, and closely shadow the Germans in such a way as they would be compelled to depart from the kingdom.

The opprobrium of the Spanish was raised when Condé and Coligny undertook an inspection of the border defences with the Spanish realm. Their actions were interpreted as being the impetus to a plot against 'god and King' alongside the maréchal de Montmorency.

Switzerland

Only ten days after the signing of the edict of Amboise that brought the first French War of Religion to a close, Charles sent two representatives (Bellièvre and the abbé d'Orbais) to the Swiss Leagues so that they might negotiate the renewal of the Swiss alliance with France, the deadline for which was near approaching. Through this alliance, in both times of civil and foreign war, the French crown could count on the raising of infantry regiments. This was an alliance that had last been established by king Henri II. Charles, though conscious the renewal of the alliance would require some expenditure, was inclined to be miserly in the matter, and advised Orbais/Bellièvre to spend only on those liable to yield effective results for the relationship.

In the final months of 1564, the admiral de Coligny worked towards the renewal of the French crown's alliance with the Swiss. Charles IX was keen to see the Protestant cantons joined into the treaty with France, but this was opposed by Heinrich Bullinger who adhered to the policy of Huldrych Zwingli that rejected Swiss mercenary service. Bullinger's objection was on the grounds that the cantons would be obliged to proffer their support regardless of the morality of the French king's cause, if the call came for soldiers. An embassy, comprising the bishop of Limoges and maréchal de Vieilleville was entrusted with travelling to Geneva where they were to join with de Beza, and the French ambassador to the Cantons, Bellièvre, so that they might head to the Protestant cantons. Beza assured them he would undertake interventions with Bullinger. Zurich, Bern, Schaffhausen and Basel hoped to see a clause inserted into the treaty with the French king by which he promised to strictly abide by the terms he had agreed in the edict of Amboise. Limoges, and Vielleville were little keen to adopt this clause. In the diet of Baden, which transpired in August, it would be the old 1549 treaty which was presented for the cantons. Vielleville and L'Aubespine toured Bern, Zurich and Schaffhausen hoping to overcome their opposition. As they travelled, the ambassadors were besieged with requests for the payment of pensions and other debts owed to the Swiss by the French crown, including those for military service in the prior civil war. At Fribourg, in October, Vielleville and L'Aubespine announced firmly that they would not support the addition of this new clause into the treaty. Their efforts were supported by the admiral de Coligny, who wrote to Bern on 31 October, urging them to trust in the kings word, and not require the insertion of the clause. He noted that if they expressed the sentiments of the clause verbally to the king this could be just as effective as it being a component of the treaty. D'Andelot wrote to Bern and Zurich on the same matter. Coligny again reached out to the resistant cantons on 9 November. On the admiral's initiative, the Protestant pastor of Orléans reached out to Bullinger beseeching him to make accord with the French king. Despite this multiplicity of efforts, Bern and Zurich refused to enter into the treaty. Decrue credits the alliance treaty they were able to establish to the Swiss colonel of Lucerne, a certain Pfyffer.

Around May 1566, Álava charged the Protestant prince de Porcien and duc de Bouillon with keeping tabs on the developing situation in the Spanish Netherlands, and appraising the duke of Cleves.

In June 1566, Charles wrote to his ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux, on a host of Spanish grievances that had been raised. He challenged the idea that the comte de Montgommery with 600 men had planned a raid against Antwerp from Normandy. Charles argued that such an enterprise would require ships, and all the ports were under watch. Another Spanish complaint voiced by Margaret of Parma concerned a certain Chavigny, allegedly a bastard son of the late king of Navarre, causing mischief in Antwerp. Charles noted that he desired the arrest of this man. A similar complaint about those entering Flanders to cause disorder was responded to with a request that these men be identified so that Charles might punish them. Finally, there was the matter of the actions of the prince de Porcien, who was supposedly causing havoc in Flanders. Charles refuted this allegation, arguing that Porcien was in fact hunting on his estates. Porcien continued to engage in provocative actions however, and was therefore summoned to appear before the French court in November 1566.

In August 1566, a scandal developed over the robbing of the mail of the duke of Alba in France. Catherine wrote to the Spanish ambassador on 22 August to assure him that the seigneur de Lanssac had been put on the case to get to the bottom of the affair. He was to head to the post office at which the correspondence had been robbed, so that he might get to the bottom of the incident and punish those who were responsible with rigour.

Denmark

The Danish king, Frederick II had requested the provision of around six 'good vessels' that would travel into the conflict zone, and without militarily participating, provide a suitable intimidation to bring the Swedish sovereign to the table. France had been unable to fulfill this request when it was made due to the war with England. Dançay apologised to Frederick, that it was not for lack of desire to do so that the French denied him support.

In 1564, Charles, eager to reassert French diplomatic prestige, sought for his ambassador in Denmark, the seigneur de Dançay to act as a reconciliatory force in the conflict between Sweden and Denmark. There was fear that the conflict between the two kingdoms might spread into the Holy Roman Empire and ignite a broader war. While Charles wanted Dançay to avoid taking a side, the relationship with the Danish king was the more important one to France. Denmark could provide naval support for France against the English, and also possessed relationships with the Protestant German princes that were useful to the French. In addition to apologising for the French inability to engage in gunboat diplomacy in the present circumstances, Dançay was to work to protect French commercial interests to trade as it pleased in the Baltic sea. This was to defy the objections of the Swedish king, Erik XIV, who had forbidden French ships from trading with Russia on the grounds that they could get the goods they desired from Reval (modern day Tallinn). The negotiations between the two sovereigns that Dançay was to conduct would take place in Sweden in Charles' estimation.

Dançay returned to Denmark in July 1565, and set about working on the problem. He looked to solve the problem of the war directly by establishing lines of contact between the two sovereigns. His approach seemed to be working, and the two parties appeared to be in agreement by September 1566. They were due to meet one another at Falkenberg in that same November. Charles congratulated his ambassador for his diplomatic success, but this was a little hasty. The negotiations at Falkenberg were a failure. Charles was aware of French captains who were offering their military services to the Swedish sovereign. He forbade them to undertake their mission, noting to the Danish king that the only mission he sanctioned was one of a merchant of Dieppe. The Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II was keen to reassert Imperial arbitration for the conflict, little enthused for French intrusions into Scandinavian affairs. He proposed a conference in Stralsund for 16 March 1567.^β Both Denmark and Sweden assented to this proposal. Dançay urged Charles to write to all parties so that the French could reclaim the initiative. Dançay was sure that the Emperor had sabotagued the negotiations at Falkenberg for his own selfish ends. Acknowledging the diplomatic failures in a dispatch of 26 February 1567, the ambassador feared a new Swedish offensive. The Emperor's men arrived at Stralsund in May 1567, where they were joined by the Danes. Dançay was absent, but more importantly the Swedes also failed to show for the mediation, sinking any prospects of reconciliation.

Colonial conflict

Spain enjoyed a commercial monopoly in the Americas. This was to the vexation of both the French and English, and sailors of both countries violated the monopoly. The Spanish negotiators in the peace deals of 1559 hoped to see French trade prohibited in the Americas, as well as French colonial ventures. This was justified on the grounds of the treaty of Tordesillas in which the world was divided between zones of Spanish and Portuguese predominance. The French plenipotentiaries by contrast argued that the only lands that could be considered Spanish were ones that they permanently occupied. As part of the 1559 treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis a verbal agreement was reached between France and Spain by which the French were permitted to operate in North America but if their ships crossed a particular line towards South America they would be treated as pirates by the Spanish.

On 18 December 1563, Philip wrote to his ambassador in France, Álava, to complain about the abuses committed by French vessels against Spanish merchants. Some French sailors, under a certain 'Gatamor' had attacked a Spanish vessel, taking all the merchandise on board and abandoning the looted ship out at sea. Philip demanded the return of the stolen goods, and the exemplary punishment of those responsible for the crime. The matter was still at large in March 1564, as Philip asked Álava to take up the matter again, a letter from the French ambassador Saint-Sulpice to Charles IX was added to the case.

Coligny had a tripartite aim in the colonisation program he supported in the Americas. New lands could be taken for France, a safe place found for French Protestantism, and Spain given a kicking in an area of relative weakness for the Spanish monarchy. Crété writes that Philip II was correct in his assumption Coligny intended his Floridian colony to be prejudicial to his interests in the region. Though the area had been explored by the Spanish decades ago, they had not established settlements in the peninsula. Florida offered several prospective advantages to Coligny: it presented a favourable climate for agriculture, there were possibilities of trade with the indigenous population and it also served as a promontory from which the routes of Spanish galleons could be observed. The historian Augeron noted that through the colonisation of the southern tip of Florida, the French would have the ability to control the Florida straits, and therefore the traffic that went through them. The French colony of 'Charlesfort' in Florida was established by Coligny in 1562 but, according to Crété the colonists soon mutinied and then abandoned the colony after failing to cultivate food and beginning to starve. Cloulas reports by contrast, that the colony did well for food through hunting and fishing. With the colonists only mutinying after the majority had returned home for reinforcements, at which point they were then preyed upon by the Spanish. After peace had returned to the French kingdom, Coligny endeavoured to send a new mission to Florida, with Charles granting permission for three boats to head west to this end. They would be captained by the Poitevin Laudonnière. Laudonnière was granted a sum of 100,000 livres to equip his three ships.

Laudonnière found recruitment easy, and among his recruits were survivors of the first expedition. In total he would boast several hundred men, and a handful of women for the mission. On 24 April, the expedition set sail from Le Havre. On route to Florida, his ships attacked Spanish vessels. Arriving at 'cape François' (now named Cape Canaveral) in Florida, the colonists began work on a new fort they named 'La Carolina'. Laudonnière erred by flip flopping on the local alliances he established with the indigenous Floridians, first hitching himself with one confederation, before abandoning them for a policy of neutrality. He thus appeared a traitor to his first ally, a certain Saturiwa, without securing the friendship of the rival Utina. As had been the case with the first colony, there was little appetite for agricultural work in the colony. Mutineers assumed control of two of the ships and drove them into the Caribbean sea. Laudonnière attempted to build some new boats, but the soldiers involved rebelled, discontented that men of their station (i.e. noble) might be expected to engage in craft labour. In December, revolt erupted. Laudonnière was seized as were the recently completed boats. With their new boats, the rebels launched an assault on the Spanish Carribbean. They bagged several Cuban caboteurs (trading ships) and the governor of Jamaica. In the hopes of securing a ransom they set ashore, but were then entrapped, with many killed or captured. A handful made their way back to La Carolina. Those who had led the rebellion were shot, Laudonnière pardoned the others. In early 1565, conditions continued to be rotten in the French colony, with a lack of both cultivation and fishing undertaken by the French. The indigenous Americans charged a high price for the fish they sold the Frenchmen. Crété sees the diplomatic blundering of Laudonnière, and the actions of some French soldiers as responsible for alienating the Americans from them. Indeed, in addition to insulting the local population, some Frenchmen set fire to their houses, hoping this would help them to acquire food. Laudonnière came up with the idea of kidnapping Utina, and then ransoming him for food. This had the effect of alienating everyone from the French. When the French went to collect their foodstuff on 27 July for the ransom, they were descended upon and some were killed or wounded.

While he had found it difficult to attack the French previously, without uniting the Protestants and Catholics of the troubled French kingdom with which he was presently at peace, the marauding of the French ships served as a perfect pretext for Philip II to move against La Carolina. Philip was also alarmed by preparations being undertaken at the French port of Dieppe, that Coligny had entrusted to the leadership of Ribault. Ribault saw the prospect of a Protestant colonisation of Florida as a god given opportunity to 'introduce the word of the god to the ignorant' (i.e. the indigenous population). In his world view, god had kept this land as it was until now, so that they might now convert the indigenous Floridians to Protestantism. This third expedition to Florida was to be a true colonisation, bringing over to the colony four compaines of arquebusiers and around six hundred more artisans, labourers, shepherds and their families. King Charles forbade Ribault from landing on any island or country, in particular any under the dominion of the king of Spain. This group departed Dieppe on 22 May 1565. Philip was well appraised of the goings on in France, thanks to the efforts of his ambassador Álava, who on 1 May he had requested inform him of all news about the French fleet departing for Florida, be it the number of ships, their armaments or their crews. The Spanish king quickly moved to launch an armada of his own to Florida under the command of a certain Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. Avilés was granted an asiento (a colonial contract) by Philip on 20 March authorising Avíles to establish a Spanish colonial presence in Florida, and to drive out the French. The Spanish commander had with him 2,000 soldiers. The matter of the French colonisation of Florida had first appeared in the correspondence of the French ambassador in Spain in March 1565. The following month, on 3 April, the seigneur de Saint-Sulpice reported on Spanish concern about the French Florida project. He noted that a Spanish fleet, under the command of Avilés had left port with the hope of intercepting and destroying the French. Coligny was not without his own intelligence network, and in his final correspondence to Ribault he warned him that Avilés was intending to travel to the coast of nouvelle France. He urged Ribault to ensure that Avilés undertook nothing against the French.

Philip's advisor, the duke of Alba thought the most effective tonic to the French colonisation of Florida (which he understood as being led by Coligny and Catherine) was to send a solemn diplomatic protest to Catherine. In a letter of 2 June 1565 to Álava, Philip noted that while he had not previously made the French expeditions to Florida a diplomatic issue with the French court, it was because he was under the impression they had left without the approval of Catherine on their own initiative for plunder. However, now that it was the admiral de Coligny who was orchestrating these efforts, if Catherine did not stop the departure of the ships from port then Philip would pursue the interests of his state, if they had already left (as in fact they had), the duke of Alba would discuss the matter with Catherine. By 8 June, Philip was confident in his understanding of the French designs in the Americas, and wrote again to Álava to confirm Avilés departure to protect Spanish possessions. Due to the delicate nature of the issue, Álava avoided raising it with Catherine. Philip preferred to present the French with a 'fait accomplit'.

Meanwhile, in La Carolina, Laudonnière was looking to abandon the colony, as soon as his ships were repaired. The English privateer and slaver John Hawkins came by the territory, and offered to take the colonists back to France on his ships. Laudonnière did not agree to this, unsure on the state of Anglo-French relations at this juncture. Instead a ship under Hawkins' command was bought for 700 écus. Seeing the dismal state of the French colonists, he also left them with some victuals.

On 28 August, Laudonnière was about ready to depart for France. Ribault's fleet was near, sighted offshore. In fact, Ribault had been around the coast already for fourteen days, but had been enjoying a leisurely exploration of the rivers, throwing the caution of his final correspondence from Coligny about the Spanish to the wind. That same day, Avilés had sight of Cape Canaveral. Ribault brought with him a letter relieving Laudonnière of his command. He was to return to France to report on whether Florida was worth French investment or not. In a verbal report, Laudonnière was presented a slate of rumours of his conduct that had made their way back to the admiral de Coligny's ears. Laudonnière hotly disputed the allegations against him.

On 4 September, the Spanish ships appeared by the colony. Initially, affairs seemed friendly, with the Spaniards promising their friendship to the French, and calling out to various members of the French expedition whose names they knew. Suspicious of the Spanish, and without men to man the cannons, Ribault and his ships slipped away during the night. The Spaniards set out in pursuit, and fired broadsides at Ribault's ships, but they were unable to catch the French, and abandoned the pursuit. The following day, Ribault and his squadron returned to La Carolina. The Spanish ships were now anchored at the mouth of the rio San Agustín. Against the advice of Laudonnière and others, Ribault decided to launch an attack on the Spanish, as revenge for their prior assault on his ships. On 10 September he sighted the Spanish ships, but they withdrew to a place the heavier French ships could not pursue. A storm now descended upon the area, and much of Ribault's flotilla was carried away, with four of the ships driven ashore. Avíles was unaware of this fact, but deduced that the majority of the French forces were on the ships, and that La Carolina would be little defended. Setting out on 18 September, he carried the fort in an assault two days later. All the men in the fort were killed, while all the children and women were spared. The Protestant bibles and gilded psalters, which were found in the fort, were torched in an auto-de-fé. The Spanish were scandalised by the lack of crosses and religious images, and set about instituting these in the place. Two crosses were installed on the bastions. Laudonnière and a few others made their escape. They were able to embark upon the ships the Spanish had not seized, and make for the open sea.

Avíles returned to San Agustín on 24 September. The local indigenous population informed him of the shipwrecked Frenchmen of Ribault's squadron who were wandering the coast. They found the starving men in small groups along the coast and, after they had surrendered, killed most of them. Ribault had surrendered on the understanding that he was under commission from the French king, and thus an allied sovereign must surely respect his surrender. The Protestants, under the lead of Ribault, died while singing psalms, their throats being slit by the Spanish. To avoid disease, as well as for religious reasons, the corpses were burned. A few Catholics, musicians, carpenters and sailors were spared. Around 200 men refused to surrender and instead made into the woods. There they built a crude fort, which was then approached by Avíles in November. He demanded their surrender, which they gave. This time, it was honoured, and they were returned to the prisons of Philip II. French Florida ceased to exist. Some French women who had been taken to Puerto de Plata were re-captured by a Protestant captain who assumed a Catholic guise before throwing off the pretence once they were at sea.

Avíles wrote to Philip on what he had accomplished with pride, stating that he had done the work of 'god and your majesty' by his actions against the Protestants, and that now the good (Catholic) word could be spread in the region.

In the destroyed French colony, documents were found which seemed to validate the Spanish opinion that the Protestant colonists under Coligny's direction had the ambition to establish a base of operations from which they would harry the Spanish ports of the area.

With news of these events not yet having reached France, the new French ambassador to Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux reported on the affair of Florida in some of his earliest correspondence with the French court. The queen of Spain, Élisabeth, had made Fourquevaux aware of the fury of Philip on the matter, noting he would little tolerate a French presence so close to the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. Ribera notes that in times of tension between France and Spain, the presence of the French princess Élisabeth, as queen of Spain, allowed her to serve as mechanism for the passage of recrimination, in addition to her more friendly role as a conduit for information. The French ambassadors also sought to use her as a diplomatic instrument when possible. The new ambassador enjoyed his first audience with Philip on 18 October. During November, Philip II lodged complaint with Charles about French activities in Florida. Through the duke of Alba, he complained that the French colonisation of Florida was in contravention of his rights, the friendship between them, and the peace of 1559. The forts that had been built could have little purpose other than to engage in piracy against the Spanish holdings in the area. Charles protested that while he of course would not wish for his subjects to make for the lands of the king of Spain, Florida had been discovered by the French. Catherine took the same tack with the Spanish ambassador in France, Álava. She noted that the seas were open to those who traded with good intentions, and that Florida was known as the terre aux Bretons (land of the Bretons). While her son was young, the 'kings of France were not accustomed to being threatened'. Fourquevaux advised Catherine, on 3 November, to utilise a fleet with strong defensive capabilities if she intended to send more ships to Florida. This was followed up with a despatch of 5 November in which Fourquevaux described how he had defended the right of navigation for Frenchmen in places where the Spanish had no colonial presence. On 13 December, Charles counselled the baron de Fourqeuvaux to keep his eye on a Spanish fleet of sixty ships, which nominally intended to be used for anti-Ottoman action. The king, not realising French Florida had already been destroyed, suspected this fleet might be the one intended for its destruction. In late December, on the 26th of that month, the ambassador noted Élisabeth's concern this matter could damage the friendship between France and Spain, and that he had assured her the French were not seeking a fight, but would defend themselves if it became necessary.

In discussions with the duke of Alba, that Fourquevaux reported on to Charles on 24 December, the ambassador made the same argument Charles and Catherine had to Álava a little while earlier: Florida was far from the Spanish possessions and was known as the "coste de Bretons" (Breton coast). Spanish ships who passed the French here could expect nothing other than good friendship from the French. This argument had no chance of convincing Philip, especially as French corsairs had already preyed upon Spanish ships in the Caribbean.

The survivors made their way back to France, with word reaching the Moulins through the son of Ribault, a certain Jacques Ribault on 6 January 1566. He reported on the destruction of Charlesfort and the slaughter of its garrison. Come 17 January, Fourquevaux (who was not yet aware of what had transpired) was warning the French court that if the Spanish attained victory in Florida, it would be a terrible one, in which all the French colonists were martyred. The next day, 18 January, Fourquevaux learned of the events in Florida from France. Events were still not crystal clear though, and on 4 February, Fourquevaux warned of plans for a new Spanish armada, to head to Florida in support of Avilés lest the French send more ships in favour of the colonists (this would have comprised eight ships with 2,000 soldiers). Spanish reinforcements would indeed make their way to Florida, twenty-five vessels leaving Sevilla, weighed down with wheat, powder and cannonballs. The Spanish thus demonstrated their concern about the possibility of a retaliatory attack. Fourquevaux also held out hope that more favourable news would arrive from Florida. The ambassador noted that the joy in Spain at the capture of the French forts had been shortlived, as (unfounded) fear now existed that Ribault (who was in fact dead) would take his revenge. This ambiguity was gone by Fourquevaux's despatch of 18 February, in which he narrated the massacre to the French court in detail, stressing the barbarity of the Spanish, who he described murdering the defeated. With some bitterness, Fourquevaux reported that word of the massacre had brought great joy to the Spanish ('more than a victory against the Turk'), who wished to erect Florida into a marquisate in favour of Avilés. Catherine wrote to Fourquevaux with a great anger, stating she could not believe Philip would not provide the French compensation and justice to the French for this episode. She affirmed Florida belonged to the French and that Charles was appraised of the expedition. The massacre was a 'gift to the Protestants', as it illustrated the illusory nature of Spanish friendship for the kingdom of France. On 22 February, Fourquevaux reported that the Spanish king had demanded the punishment of the admiral de Coligny by the French king as a disturber of the peace, with Philip arguing that any of his subjects who had acted in such a way against the French king would surely have been subject to exemplary punishment. By focusing his displeasure on the figure of Coligny specifically, Philip sought to avoid implicating the French royal family itself in the enterprise, thereby allowing friendly relations to continue between the two states. Fourquevaux could not support the request against Coligny by Philip, and argued that the French were in waters in which they had a long history, and had acted peaceably. It was rather Avilés who brought the warlike posture to the confrontation. Writing to Charles, he contrasted the posture of the admiral de Coligny, acting as a proper admiral should to know the comings and goings of the French ships, with Avilés, who if he could would surely kill all the French. The following day, Fourquevaux opined that Philips attacks on Coligny were a smokescreen designed to obscure the fact that the Spanish had murdered subjects of the French crown. Laudonnière presented himself at the French court on 19 March while it was wintering in Moulins to seek justice. He enjoyed a cold reception. Nevertheless, Charles and Catherine protested to Philip II. With word having spread around the kingdom, there was considerable outrage with their reports. Catherine even implied to Álava that the alliance between the two states might be compromised by the affair, noting that going forward it appeared one could act as one saw fit. Álava was under instruction from Philip to make it clear that Charles and Catherine were not suspected of any involvement in the sordid exercise of their subjects. The relatives and associates of the victims presented a petition to Charles asking for justice over the cruel affair. Catherine took a position that threatened the Spanish approach, she asserted that Ribault enjoyed a royal licence for his acts. Avilés had executed French subjects on French land, therefore he must be put on trial. Rather than punished, Avilés was fêted in Spain. On 9 April, Fourquevaux wrote to Charles that, as instructed, he had enjoyed an audience with Philip and Élisabeth in which he complained on the events that had transpired in Florida, and demanded justice and compensation. That same day he wrote a long missive to the queen mother on the Florida affair, outlining what he had done and where things stood. He was pessimistic on the prospects of attaining justice beyond fine words. He noted that in discussions with Élisabeth he had urged her to remind her husband that reason demanded justice be done for the 'murders' which had exceeded the commission Avilés had been granted. Before his meeting with Philip, he had again met with Élisabeth to determine the outcome of her intervention with Philip. In the audience with Philip itself, Fourquevaux dismissed Philip's defence of the attack on religious grounds, arguing that Avilés had acted more like a mercenary than a Christian soldier. He highlighted how the French encountered by Avilés were already in a miserable state prior to their massacre, and that it was customary to summon an enemy to surrender, so that they might be taken prisoner, but this had not taken place. He compared the act disfavourably with the acts of the 'Turks', who he stated would never do something so foul outside of combat. Philip took the position that Avilés had only attacked Protestant pirates (who had attacked his ships) in the pay of the admiral de Coligny, who was the one truly responsible here. To deal with pirates it was not required to employ the customs of war common between professional soldiers. With Fourquevaux remaining hot on the matter, Philip told him that he could continue the discussion with Alba. Fourquevaux took this to mean a refusal, as he saw little prospect with Alba. The next day, Fourquevaux took the matter up with Alba, who yielded nothing to his efforts. Fourquevaux pointed out to Alba that the French in Florida held letters patent from the French king. With Alba offering nothing, Fourquevaux advised Catherine that the prospect of receiving reparations was dim.

In Ribera's opinion these conversations ended the serious period of efforts by Fourquevaux to attain satisfaction from the Spanish for the Florida affair. While the matter would continue to appear in Fourquevaux's correspondence on occasion, it was no longer something he saw realistic prospects from a full throated effort.

Back in Paris, the widows of those killed in Florida made procession through the streets. Álava despaired around April 1566, that Paris was a Protestant city.

In May, Charles wrote to Fourquevaux to renew the French complaints and demands, as something necessary for the maintenance of Franco-Spanish friendship. In July, Charles again requested Fourquevaux raise the matter with the Spanish king. Fourquevaux would do so, but in the words of Ribera, without 'much conviction'.

It had not been possible to take prisoners due to the low number of Spaniards who had made the journey. In fact, it was Coligny who deserved punishment for the episode as a violator of the peace. In addition to his warlike efforts, Coligny was also trying to introduce Protestantism to what Philip described as the "simple" indigenous people of the Americas. He further requested the crown disavow the colony.(Find where it belongs)

Moving on from addressing the specifics of the situation, Philip deplored the lethargic French efforts to come to the aid of Malta when it was subject to Ottoman attack in 1565. He further critiqued Catherine's policy, contrasting it with the discussions held at Bayonne the prior year. Now Coligny was held in esteem by the French crown, which had even gone to the trouble to reconcile him with the Lorraine-Guise.(where)

The crown was put in a difficult position by this unyielding response. Catherine neither wanted to alienate Philip nor to cast Coligny to the wind. The French ambassador in Spain, the baron de Fourquevaux was sent the royal response. He was to be firm with Philip. Charles took credit for the colony in Florida. Catherine took a similarly forward position with the Spanish ambassador Álava, taking credit for the colony and describing the Spanish cruelties in Florida as exceeding those of the 'Moor and Turk'. They soon yielded. The French response had to be limited to this diplomatic rebuke, with the kingdom in no position to seek reparations for the slaughter. Fourquevaux was supportive of Coligny, despite his Protestantism, noting to the Spanish queen that even if he were a 'Jew or a Turk' he would still be worthy of esteem.(where)

The former French ambassador to Spain, Saint-Sulpice, was sent back to the country in the Autumn of 1566 so that the French crown might congratulate the Spanish on the birth of the infanta (princess) Isabella Clara Eugenia. As a supplementary part of his instructions for the extraordinary diplomatic mission, he was told to raise the matter of Florida with Philip. Fourquevaux enjoyed some limited success in his efforts. In December, women and children under the age of fourteen were ordered released. This was followed by the release of the eight prisoners that were held in Havana.

Around July-August 1567, Avilés visited the Spanish court on a visit back from Spanish Florida. Fourquevaux remarked bitterly to Charles in August on the great reception granted to him, one that a 'far worthier' man than [Avilés] would be well pleased by.

The only satisfaction the French would attain from Spain for the Florida affair, was the release of what captives there were in Spanish custody. Even this concession was a long and drawn out process however.

On 2 August 1567, a Catholic gentleman named de Gourgues armed and launched an expedition to Florida at his own expense, with about 200 men to his name. He was keen to get revenge for the destruction of French Florida. The brutal and murderous actions of the Spanish in Florida had now alienated them from the indigenous population, and de Gourgues was able to enter into alliance with Saturiwa. Together with Saturiwa's forces, de Gourges launched an attack on one of the new Spanish forts on the river. The place was stormed with the population massacred, only fifteen being left alive. Subsequently the second Spanish fort was taken, with the inhabitants killed. Finally the Franco-American army approached the largest fort, San Mateo, which had a garrison of 300 men. They were caught at dinner and the fort was taken. 30 men were left alive while the rest were killed. After successfully capturing all the forts, they were razed. De Gourgues forced sailed back for France on 3 May 1568, arriving in the country on 12 June. He received a heroes welcome from the populace, but was kept at arms length by the court. Philip II put a price on de Gourgues head. When Fourquevaux received the news he was perplexed, and wrote to Charles that he had surely neither ordered de Gourgues to undertake this effort, nor sanctioned the operation.

In 1566, a French expedition, intended for the west African coast, received the blessing of the admiral de Coligny. The expedition was under the charge of the seigneur de Monluc's son, the seigneur de Caupène. In the wake of the destruction of French Florida by the Spanish, Charles wrote warnings to Caupène in July and August. The flotilla of three well stocked French ships departed from Bordeaux on 23 August 1566. Travelling with Caupène were several hundred nobles, and another few hundred soldiers. Crété puts the numbers at 1,200 soldiers. The mission was a disaster. The expedition having stopped off in Madeira, where sailors disembarked to take on water. However, they were greeted by arquebus fire from Funchal in a misunderstanding. Aggrieved at this, the French nobles and soldiers launched an attack, and Funchal was sacked by the French. During the fighting, the seigneur de Caupène received a wound from which he would die. Having seized Funchal, the French laid claim to it. The Portuguese reacted with considerable fury to this episode, expressing their desire to revenge themselves upon France and the French. Appraised of the French actions by the king of Portugal, Philip II lodged protest with Charles IX. Meanwhile, the French who had occupied Madeira returned to France. With the members of the expedition returning to France, they were put under arrest at the ports. Soon information arrived that the people of Funchal had instigated the combat. The admiral de Coligny protested against this, arguing they had avenged the wounds of Florida, and moreover they had not started the quarrel in Funchal. He succeeded in convincing Charles that the action had avenged France.

The French ambassador in Spain, the the baron de Fourquevaux asserted that it was much the same as the Spanish act in Carolina. Catherine took a less confrontational line, and offered her apologies to Philip. On 30 November, the baron de Fourquevaux reported that it was recognised in Spain by the less fervent, that the people of Funchal had brought their destruction on themselves. After a few months, the arrested members of the expedition were released on the orders of the admiral de Coligny.

On 25 July 1564, the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I died. The seigneur de Lanssac was entrusted with expressing the condolences of Catherine and Charles on this news to his successor. Lanssac was also to work on the possibility of marriage between the king's sister, Marguerite, and the son of the new Emperor Maximilian, Rudolf. Departing from Avignon on 30 September, he arrived in Vienna on 9 November, but the Emperor was not to be found there. He therefore made for Prague. These negotiations would yield no fruit. However, Maximilian would produce a handful of letters for the French king and his mother.

The Spanish sovereign would work to scupper any possibility of marriage between the French and the Empire. In December 1565, he counselled Maximilian, his cousin, not to allow either of his daughters (Anna or Elisabeth) to become party to a French match. If a marriage was to take place between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Valois, it must be between Marguerite and the Emperor's son, Rudolf.

During 1566, a dual marriage prospect for Charles and the duc d'Anjou was considered that paired them with two daughters of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, Anna and Elisabeth. This project was being pursued by the French ambassador Bernadin Bochetel, the bishop of Rennes. Maximilian demanded that the French return the 'Three Bishoprics' to the Holy Roman Empire in return for this proposal going forward. This was unacceptable for the French.

Around September 1567, Catherine requested her daughter Élisabeth again work to convince Philip of the Charles-Anna match.

The new French ambassador to the Emperor, the comte de Fiesque would pick up the baton of the marriage proposals with Maximilian. The Emperor argued to Fiesque, that it was through no fault of his that the previous talks had fallen through. The French needed to withdraw from the Three Bishoprics and cease their connivances with the Ottomans. Fiesque, ignoring these objections highlighted the great glory that could accumulate in Maximilian's hands by having both the king of France and the king of Spain as his son-in-laws. He informed Catherine of these new talks he had enjoyed in October 1567.

Come December, Fiesque was fairly optimistic. He saw the main roadblock to Maxmimilian progressing with the match between Charles and the Emperor's second daughter Elisabeth as being the delays in the marriage negotiations for Philip II with his elder daughter Anna. Maximilian was reportedly furious at the delays on this marriage, and would turn his attention to the French match only after this affair had been concluded. Charles maintained optimism on his relationship with Maximilian. The two marriages would finally be celebrated in 1570, Philip with Anna and Charles with Elisabeth.

During February 1566, at the suggestion of the Danish king, the prospect of marrying the duc d'Anjou to a daughter of the the elector of Saxony, a Protestant, was floated. This was to the alarm of Álava, who, in conjunction with other anxieties he had about the young duc, feared that he might be planning to convert to Protestantism. He wrote to Philip on this matter, hoping that this Protestant connection would prove to be compromising. Another prospect considered for Anjou in 1566 was the English king Elizabeth I, even though she was twice his age. This was the succession to a January 1565 effort, Paul de Foix undertook to see Elizabeth married to Charles IX. Elizabeth had shot down this earlier proposal (made in November 1564) on the grounds of the gap in their ages, while the royal council rebuffed it on grounds it may delay the arrival of royal children. Her refusal had reached the French court from the hands of her ambassador, Thomas Smith, while Catherine was in Nérac. The French ambassador in London, La Fôret brought this new proposal to the English court's attentions. For Catherine, this was not only a matter of her son's advancement, it was also a prospect for understanding to be reached between England and France. She was well aware England was looking to unite with Scotland and had a penchant for supporting Protestants in France. According to Spanish sources, Anjou, who hated the Protestant Elizabeth, rebuked the queen as a 'whore'. Nevertheless, this project would remain active until 1571.

A further development in 1567, was the renewal of English demands for the city of Calais and the comté de Guînes. The English had seen opportunity in the crisis brought about by the passage of the Spanish army along the French frontier. Thomas Smith was sent to France by Elizabeth as an extraordinary ambassador to make this request, under the terms of the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. After a prolonged wait, Smith, and the regular ambassador Henry Norris were received by the king on 1 May. Their request was dismissed out of hand. The English, claimed Charles and L'Hôpital, had violated the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis first through their occupation of Rouen and Le Havre during the first French War of Religion. Elizabeth should find herself content with her kingdoms natural borders.

Notes

^α Lhoumeau mistakenly places this diplomatic mission in February 1563, however he notes that it was shortly followed by the treaty of Troyes, which occurred in April 1564, and more recent scholarship confirms this meeting in fact occurred in 1564. ^β Labourdette records this as being 16 March 1566, but this does not make sense given it is a response to the failure of the Falkenberg conference, which took place in November 1566.

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