User:Phlsph7/Proposition - Definition
Definition and roles
[edit]Propositions are typically characterized in terms of three interlocking roles: as the meanings of declarative sentences, as the contents of psychological attitudes like beliefs, and as the bearers of truth values. Philosophers debate the relations between these characterizations, questioning whether one is more fundamental than the others and whether they all describe the same class of entities.[1]
In their role as the meanings of declarative sentences, propositions are the ideas or semantic contents expressed by assertions such as "The door is open". Declarative sentences express what is the case.[2] They contrast with interrogative sentences, like "Is the door open?", which request information, and imperative sentences, such as "Open the door!", which issue commands.[3] Different declarative sentences can express the same idea, like the English sentence "Snow is white" and the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß". Accordingly, propositions are not identical to individual sentences and do not belong to any particular language.[a] Instead, they reflect the information content of sentences and track cross-linguistic sameness.[5] The terms "proposition" and "statement" are sometimes used as synonyms.[b] However, the word "statement" is ambiguous since it can also refer to declarative sentences themselves rather than their meanings.[7] The term proposition also overlaps with the term judgment, with one difference being that judgments are more closely associated with mental processes that affirm or deny the truth of a content.[8]
Propositions are further characterized as the contents or objects of psychological attitudes like beliefs. For example, if Leila believes that the train will be delayed, then she has a mental state, called a propositional attitude, directed at the proposition that the train will be delayed. There are many propositional attitudes besides beliefs, such as desires, hopes, and fears, like when Leila fears that the train will be delayed. The contents of propositional attitudes are shareable: different persons can have the same beliefs or fears, like when Diego also fears that the train will be delayed. Accordingly, propositions are not identical to individual beliefs or desires since the same proposition can underlie many individual mental states. Traditionally, propositions have been understood as non-mental or abstract entities, though alternative proposals see them as general types of mental entities. Propositional attitudes are typically expressed through that-clauses to link a psychological attitude to a proposition, as in "she believes that it will rain". For this reason, propositions are also characterized as the referents of that-clauses.[9]
Propositions are additionally treated as bearers of truth values. This means that each proposition is either true or false. The truth value of a proposition depends on its accuracy: true propositions describe the world as it is while false propositions fail to do so. Propositions are not the only entities that have truth values. Other truth-bearers include declarative sentences and beliefs, raising the question of how these truth-bearers relate to each other. According to one proposal, propositions are the primary truth-bearers, meaning that declarative sentences and beliefs are true or false in a derivative sense by being about true or false propositions.[10] Propositions are also discussed as bearers of modal properties: a proposition can be possible, impossible, or necessary, depending on whether it is logically compatible with coherent scenarios, or in some sense conceivable or contradictory.[11]
The word proposition originates from the Latin term proponere, meaning 'to set forth or propose'. Through its past participle propositus, it gave rise to the Latin terms propositio and proposition and the Old French term proposition. The word entered the English language as a borrowing from Latin and French during the Middle English period, with its first known use in Wycliffe's Bible in 1382.[12]
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ The difference is sometimes marked by using angle brackets for propositions instead of quotation marks for sentences, as in Snow is white.[4]
- ^ Logical positivists use the verification principle to distinguish statements from propositions. According to this view, all declarative sentences express statements but only verifiable statements are propositions.[6]
Citations
[edit]- ^
- Speaks 2014, pp. 1–4
- King 2014, pp. 5–8
- McGrath & Frank 2024, Lead section
- Salmon & Soames 1988, pp. 1–2
- ^
- Bunnin & Yu 2004, pp. 567–568, 658
- Audi 1999, pp. 753–754
- Salmon & Soames 1988, pp. 1–2
- ^
- Hurford 1994, p. 56–57
- Akmajian et al. 2001, p. 249
- ^ McGrath & Frank 2024, § 7. The Nature and Status of Propositions
- ^
- King 2014, pp. 5–8
- McGrath & Frank 2024, Lead section, § 3.2. Meanings of Sentences
- King 2013
- ^ Bunnin & Yu 2004, pp. 658
- ^
- Bunnin & Yu 2004, pp. 567–568, 658
- Gupta 2014, § 4.2 Statement (Proposition)
- Williamson 2005a, p. 894
- ^
- Lindeman, § 5b. Judging
- Williamson 2005, p. 763
- ^
- McGrath & Frank 2024, Lead section, § 7. The Nature and Status of Propositions
- Buchanan & Grzankowski 2014, pp. 424–425
- King 2014, pp. 5–8
- ^
- King 2024, Lead section
- Salmon & Soames 1988, pp. 1–2
- Merricks 2015, pp. 22–25
- ^
- McGrath & Frank 2024, § 2. Roles for Propositions: Modality
- King 2014, pp. 5–6
- ^
- HarperCollins 2022
- OED staff 2025
- Shanker 2003, pp. 416–417
Sources
[edit]- Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2004). The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. Blackwell. ISBN 1-4051-0679-4.
- Audi, Robert (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-63722-8.
- King, Jeffrey C. (2024). "Structured Propositions". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 7 November 2025.
- McGrath, Matthew; Frank, Devin (2024). "Propositions". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 7 November 2025.
- Speaks, Jeff (2014). "Introduction". In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff (eds.). New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–4. ISBN 978-0-19-969376-4.
- King, Jeffries C. (2014). "1. What Role do Propositions Play in our Theories?". In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff (eds.). New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press. pp. 5–8. ISBN 978-0-19-969376-4.
- HarperCollins (2022). "Proposition". American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Retrieved 8 November 2025.
- OED staff (2025). "Proposition, n.". Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Shanker, S. G. (2003). Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IX: Philosophy of the English-Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 1: Science, Logic and Mathematics. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-39336-7.
- Hurford, James R. (1994). Grammar: A Student's Guide. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-45627-2.
- Akmajian, Adrian; Demer, Richard A.; Farmer, Ann K.; Harnish, Robert M. (2001). Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-51123-0.
- Gupta, Uma Shanker (2014). Discrete Mathematical Structures. Pearson Education India. ISBN 978-93-325-3722-4.
- Moltmann, Friederike (2014). "25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions". In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff (eds.). New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press. pp. 408–423. ISBN 978-0-19-969376-4.
- Buchanan, Ray; Grzankowski, Alex (2014). "26. Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes". In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff (eds.). New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press. pp. 424–436. ISBN 978-0-19-969376-4.
- King, Jeffrey C. (2013). "Propositions". Oxford Bibliographies Online. doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0212.
- Merricks, Trenton (2015). Propositions. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-104652-0.
- Salmon, Nathan U.; Soames, Scott (1988). "Introduction". Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–15. ISBN 978-0-19-875092-5.
- Lindeman, David. "Propositional Attitudes". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Williamson, MrColwyn (2005). "Proposition". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 736.
- Williamson, MrColwyn (2005a). "Statements and Sentences". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 894.