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User:Phlsph7/Ontology - Basic concepts

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Basic concepts

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Being

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Being, or existence, is the main topic of ontology. It is one of the most general and fundamental concepts, encompassing the whole of reality and every entity within it.[a] In this sense, being only contrasts with non-being or nothingness.[2] It is controversial whether a more substantial analysis of the concept or meaning of being is possible.[3] One proposal understands being as a property possessed by every entity.[4] Critics of this view argue that an entity without being cannot have any properties, meaning that being cannot be a property since properties presuppose being.[5] A different suggestion says that all beings share a set of essential features. According to the Eleatic principle, "power is the mark of being", meaning that only entities with a causal influence truly exist.[6] According to a controversial proposal by philosopher George Berkeley, all existence is mental, expressed in his slogan "to be is to be perceived".[7]

Depending on the context, the term being is sometimes used with a more limited meaning to refer only to certain aspects of reality. In one sense, being is unchanging and impermanent and is distinguished from becoming, which implies change.[8] Another contrast is between being, as what truly exists, and phenomena, as what merely appears to exist.[9] In some contexts, being expresses the fact that something is while essence expresses its qualities or what it is like.[10]

Ontologists often divide being into fundamental classes or highest kinds, called categories of being.[11] Proposed categories include substance, property, relation, state of affairs, and event.[12] They can be used to provide systems of categories, which offer a comprehensive inventory of reality in which every entity belongs to exactly one category.[13] Some philosophers, like Aristotle, say that entities belonging to different categories exist in distinct ways. Others, like John Duns Scotus, insist that there are no differences in the mode of being, meaning that everything exists in the same way.[14] A related dispute is whether some entities have a higher degree of being than others, an idea already found in Plato's work. The more common view today is that a thing either exists or not with no intermediary states.[15]

The relation between being and non-being is a frequent topic in ontology. Influential issues include the status of nonexistent objects[16] and why there is something rather than nothing.[17]

Particulars and universals

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Main articles: Particulars and Universals

A central distinction in ontology is between particular and universal entities. Particulars, also called individuals, are unique, non-repeatable entities, like Socrates, the Taj Mahal, and Mars.[18] Universals are general, repeatable entities, like the color green, the form circularity, and the virtue courage. Universals express aspects or features shared by particulars. For example, Mount Everest and Mount Fuji are particulars characterized by the universal mountain.[19]

Universals can take the form of properties or relations.[20][b] Properties express what entities are like. They are features or qualities possessed by an entity.[22] Properties are often divided into essential and accidental properties. A property is essential if an entity must have it; it is accidental if the entity can exist without it.[23] For instance, having three sides is an essential property of a triangle while being red is an accidental property.[24][c] Relations are ways how two or more entities stand to one another. Unlike properties, they apply to several entities and characterize them as a group.[26] For example, being a city is a property while being east of is a relation, as in "Kathmandu is a city" and "Kathmandu is east of New Delhi".[27] Relations are often divided into internal and external relations. Internal relations depend only on the properties of the objects they connect, like the relation of resemblance. External relations express characteristics that go beyond what the connected objects are like, such as spatial relations.[28]

Substances[d] play an important role in the history of ontology as the particular entities that underlie and support properties and relations. They are often considered the fundamental building blocks of reality that can exist on their own, while entities like properties and relations cannot exist without substances. Substances persist through changes as they acquire or lose properties. For example, when a tomato ripens, it loses the property green and acquires the property red.[30]

States of affairs are complex particular entities that have several other entities as their components. The state of affairs "Socrates is wise" has two components: the individual Socrates and the property wise. States of affairs that correspond to reality are called facts.[31][e] Facts are truthmakers of statements, meaning that whether a statement is true or false depends on the underlying facts.[33]

Events are particular entities[f] that occur in time, like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the first moon landing. They usually involve some kind of change, like the lawn becoming dry. In some cases, no change occurs, like the lawn staying wet.[35] Complex events, also called processes, are composed of a sequence of events.[36]

Concrete and abstract objects

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Main article: Concrete and abstract

Concrete objects are entities that exist in space and time, like a tree, a car, and a planet. They have causal powers and can affect each other, as is the case when a car hits a tree and both are deformed in the process. Abstract objects, by contrast, are outside space and time, like the number 7 and the set of integers. They lack causal powers and do not undergo changes.[37][g] It is controversial whether or in what sense abstract objects exist and how people can know about them.[39]

Concrete objects encountered in everyday life are complex entities composed of various parts. For example, a book is made up of two covers and pages between them. Each of these components is itself constituted of smaller parts, like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.[40] Mereology studies the relation between parts and wholes. One position in mereology says that every collection of entities forms a whole. According to a different view, this is only the case for collections that fulfill certain requirements, for instance, that the entities in the collection touch one another.[41] The problem of material constitution asks whether or in what sense a whole should be considered a new object in addition to the collection of parts composing it.[42]

Abstract objects are closely related to fictional and intentional objects. Fictional objects are entities invented in works of fiction. They can be things, like the One Ring in J. R. R. Tolkien's book series The Lord of the Rings, and people, like the Monkey King in the novel Journey to the West.[43] Some philosophers say that fictional objects are one type of abstract object, existing outside space and time. Others understand them as artifacts that are created as the works of fiction are written.[44] Intentional objects are entities that exist within mental states, like perceptions, beliefs, and desires. For example, if a person thinks about the Loch Ness Monster then the Loch Ness Monster is the intentional object of this thought. People can think about existing and non-existing objects, making it difficult to assess the ontological status of intentional objects.[45]

Others

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Ontological dependence is a relation between entities. An entity depends ontologically on another entity if the first entity cannot exist without the second entity.[46] For instance, the surface of an apple cannot exist without the apple.[47] An entity is ontologically independent if it does not depend on anything else, meaning that it is fundamental and can exist on its own. Ontological dependence plays a central role in ontology and its attempt to describe reality on its most fundamental level.[48] It is closely related to metaphysical grounding, which is the relation between a ground and facts it explains.[49]

An ontological commitment of a person or a theory is an entity that exists according to them.[50] For instance, a person who believes in God has an ontological commitment to God.[51] Ontological commitments can be used to analyze which ontologies people explicitly defend or implicitly assume. They play a central role in contemporary metaphysics when trying to decide between competing theories. For example, the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument defends mathematical Platonism, asserting that numbers exist because the best scientific theories are ontologically committed to numbers.[52]

Possibility and necessity are further topics in ontology. Possibility describes what can be the case, as in "it is possible that extraterrestrial life exists". Necessity describes what must be the case, as in "it is necessary that three plus two equals five". Possibility and necessity contrast with actuality, which describes what is the case, as in "Doha is the capital of Qatar". Ontologists often use the concept of possible worlds to analyze possibility and necessity.[53] A possible world is a complete and consistent way how things could have been.[54] For example, Haruki Murakami was born in 1949 in the actual world but there are possible worlds in which he was born at a different date. Using this idea, possible world semantics says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in at least one possible world. A sentence is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.[55]

In ontology, identity means that two things are the same. Philosophers distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity. Two entities are qualitatively identical if they have exactly the same features, such as perfect identical twins. This is also called exact similarity and indiscernibility. Numerical identity, by contrast, means that there is only a single entity. For example, if Fatima is the mother of Leila and Hugo then Leila's mother is numerically identical to Hugo's mother.[56] Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time. Diachronic identity relates an entity to itself at different times, as in "the woman who bore Leila three years ago is the same woman who bore Hugo this year".[57]

References

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Notes

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  1. ^ When used as a countable noun, a being is the same as an entity.[1]
  2. ^ This idea is opposed by trope theorists, who understand properties and relations as particular entities.[21]
  3. ^ Other influential distinctions are between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, between determinate or determinable properties, and between categorical and dispositional properties.[25]
  4. ^ The term substance has a specific meaning in philosophy distinct from ordinary language expressions such as chemical substance or substance abuse.[29]
  5. ^ David Armstrong and his followers use a different terminology that does not distinguish between states of affairs and facts.[32]
  6. ^ Some ontologists also use the term in a less common sense to refer to universals in the form of event types.[34]
  7. ^ The precise definition is disputed.[38]

Citations

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  1. ^ Lowe 2005a, p. 84
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  5. ^
    • Nelson 2022, § 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals
    • Casati & Fujikawa, § 1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification
  6. ^ Campbell 2006, p. 22
  7. ^
  8. ^
  9. ^ MacIntyre 2006, p. 527
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  21. ^ Campbell 2006, p. 25
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  23. ^ Orilia & Paolini Paoletti 2022, § 1.7 Kinds of Properties
  24. ^ Vaidya & Wallner 2024, p. 473
  25. ^
  26. ^
  27. ^ MacBride 2020, § 2. Eliminativism, External Relations and Bradley’s Regress
  28. ^
  29. ^ O'Conaill 2022, p. 1
  30. ^
  31. ^
  32. ^ Textor 2021, Lead Section
  33. ^ Textor 2021, Lead Section
  34. ^ Mackie 2005, p. 272
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  36. ^ Campbell 2006, p. 25
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  38. ^ Oliver 2005, p. 3
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  40. ^
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  47. ^ Nuñez Erices 2019, pp. 15–16
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  51. ^ Jubien 1998, Lead Section
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  54. ^
  55. ^
    • Menzel 2023, Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic
    • Kuhn 2010, p. 13
  56. ^
  57. ^

Sources

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