User:Flammifer/NormSimulations

Social Simulation

Articles that would need better linking together:

• Computational sociology
• Norm (social)
• Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
• Social simulation
  • Agent-based social simulation
• Agent-based modeling
• Artificial morality (there's a book, it's more on the game theory side, near Axelrod)

Concepts

• Artificial Moral Agents (That term seems almost exclusively used in the context of Machine ethics, though I could swear I saw it used in the context of norm simulations)
• Normative agent, which might mean pretty much the same thing, but is used in the context of norm simulation.

Reciprocity

• Reciprocity (cultural anthropology)
• ... and all the other ones (why are there so many??)

Topics

Social simulations have been used to investigate a wide variety of topics:

• Social norms: Robert Axelrod has used simulations to investigate the foundation of morality An evolutionary approach to norms (PDF)]; others have modeled the emergence of norms using memes, using memes, or how social norms and emotions can regulate each other. See for an overview of the recent (as of 2008) research.

• The origin of Institutions, by investigating under what conditions agents manage to coordinate, or by modeling the works of Robert Putnam on civic traditions

• Reputation, for example by making agents with a model of reputation from Pierre Bourdieu (image, social esteem, and prestige) and observing their behavior in a virtual marketplace.

• Knowledge transmission and the social process of science: there is a [special section on that topic in the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation

• Elections: Kim (2011) has modeled a psychological model of judgement from previous research (notably featuring motivated reasoning), and compared the statistical regularities of the simulation with empirical observations of voter behavior; others have compared delegation methods.

• Economics: see computational economics and agent-based computational economics.

Technologies

(or, models used) (types of model)

• Genetic algorithms
• Agents on a grid
• Cellular automata

(Rough notes)

Economics should be one huge thing in here; models have been used in economics for a long time: see Economic model, as well as Computational economics and Agent-based computational economics.

• Norms: Axelrod, (that state of the art paper), different approaches: Game Theory (Axelrod), Cognitive AI (Castelfranchi)

• • Specific norms: reciprocity
  • Norm internalization (as opposed to coercion)
• Stereotyping and group reputation

• Segregation

• Language

• Institutions

• Knowledge propagation (the social process of science) JASSS vol. 14: Special section: Simulating the Social Processes of Science

Model vs. Simulation

Causal structure vs. observables? Two facets of the same thing?

A model tries to reproduce the causal structure as the scientist believes it to be. It's supposed to be predictive.

A simulation is more about superficial features, like fractal landscapes.

a discussion about that: "it is saying that the dyanmical model is not really any more causal that the simulation in the case of modeling organisms. That is is no better a model, and in fact because it tries to hard it may even be worse. Experiment bears this out, as currently the statistical models of ecosystem patterns actually seem to out-perform the supposedly dynamical/causal ones. In other words, given that we really don't know enough about the causalities to model them, it is better to model some more general aspect of the system, using fewer assumptions and fewer parameters subject to error."

Distinguishes two kinds of models:

• Statistical
• Causal / dynamic

Simulations, with varying parameters, are more about best/worst case estimates.

"The non-linear mathematical approach itself seems to be no more than a simulation, i.e., an instrumentalism (matching exercise between equation and natural behavior with no underlying causal theory). My sense is that because of the existence and importance of this deep level of organizational causality (pardon the invention of new terms), Rosen is then saying that everything model we currently have is really a simulation, even though many scientists humored themselves into thinking they were dealing with causalities. My own view is that Rosen's point is a good one, but a bit too harsh for many honest scientists who know their limits."

(on what a simulation is?) it "seems to be any representation of a natural system over time that is not constructed on sub-models of causalities, ie. generally thought of as the processes (efficient causes). However, it is quite subjective to decide when a model has taken into account enough causalities to qualify as a prediction." From here

Other source: "A part of the systems school sees qualitative modeling as a satisfactory way toapproach problems; while others see (quantitative) simulation necessary to achievethe rigorousness of scientific work. "

Other: "Traditionally, forming large models of systems has been via a mathematical model, which attempts to find analytical solutions to problems and thereby enable the prediction of the behavior of the system from a set of parameters and initial conditions. [...]

Note that the term computer simulation is broader than computer modeling, which implies that all aspects are being modeled in the computer representation."

History

Dispersed between articles (also, all surprisingly recent)

• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent-based_modeling#History
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_simulation#History_and_development

Books

• The Evolution of Cooperation, by Axelrod

• Cognitive and Social Action, by Castelfranchi

• here are some more

People

• Cristiano Castelfranchi and his cognitive agent approach to norm simulation
• Constrast that with Axelrod's game theory approach
• Rosario Conte
• David Hales (several books)

Intermediate

More general stuff on morality

• Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations

Worth putting somewhere: distinction between Goals and Interests; maybe more generalized concept of "interest":

• Vested interest ?
• Best interest
• Conflict of interest
• Benefit / advantage?
• Prevailing interest

May be relevant in Decision Analysis.

The discussion of known and unknown interests by Castelfranchi is pretty darn interesting. It ties into:

• The Marxist concept of False Consciousness
• A way to integrate learning, coordination and norms
• Adaptive beliefs
• Changing one's utility function
• Conflict between short term and long term interests (learning to value long term interests)

"Utility Scientists (Luce and Raiffa 1990) hold a harmonious view of agents interests." in summary, unitary interest = individual, conflicting interests = group.

(And some discussion of interest adoption, tutorial roles - that is pertinent for FAI)

Machine Ethics

Machine Ethic / Friendly AI

• Ethics of artificial intelligence (general page)
  • Machine ethics
  • Roboethics ("robot rights" and the like, less interesting, except maybe for the "ethics of replacing people" angle, but even that's unrelated to the rest of the topics here.)
• Friendly artificial intelligence

Books of note

• Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution, edited by Edited by Peter A. Danielson, review here. (possible bridge!)

• Artificial Morality aka Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games, 1992 by Peter Danielson too

• • Cited by 2001 Flordi, Luciano and Sanders, J.W. "On the Morality of Artificial Agents", presented at Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiries, Dec 2001. (uses term Artificial Moral Agent)

• SKYRMS B. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

• Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong - review here; it talks about Artificial Moral Agents. Review has a nice summary of the important points in the book, which is more about describing the actual field - though the scope seems narrow to me.

• • "Pereira & Saptawijaya (2007) looks like it has some interesting stuff discussion on implementing morality, in "Modelling Morality with Prospective Logic"

People

• Brian Skyrms is a name that often pops up.

From a review: "Other essays are by philosophers, concerning the nature of rationality and morality, many of which are by some of the most well known philosophers in their fields: Michael Bratman, Paul Churchland, David Gauthier, Edward McClennen, Brian Skyrms and Eliot Sober are among the more famous names."

Peter A. Danielson

homepage, author of a couple of books above. From University of British Columbia, Centre for Applied Ethics.

"My theoretical interest is to use modeling methods – agent-based computational methods from cognitive science, evolutionary game theory from economics and biology – better to understand how moral and ethical agents interact with social norms to solve (and create) problems. "

on UBC researcher list:

"Areas of specialization include ethical theory, cognitive science, applied ethics (environment and technology). Recent publications include Artificial Morality (Routledge, 1992), "Evolutionary Models of Cooperative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming," in Modelling Rationality, Morality and Evolution, ed. Peter Danielson (Oxford, 1998) and "Evolution and the Social Contract," Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1998). His main interest is in the development of evolutionary computer models to supplement and replace rational choice and traditional ethical theories."

Worked on Your Views, which looks interesting.

Nice list of papers here.

Norms and reciprocity

Some overlap:

• Norm (social)
• Norm (philosophy)
• Norm (artificial intelligence) <-- needs to be expanded

Reciprocity actually has that problem a bit more:

• The Golden Rule/ethic of reciprocity
• Norm of reciprocity, social norm of in-kind responses to the behavior of others
• Reciprocity (cultural anthropology), way of defining people's informal exchange of goods and labour
• Reciprocity (evolution), mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation
• Reciprocity (international relations), principle that favours, benefits, or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another, should be returned in kind
• Reciprocity (social and political philosophy), concept of reciprocity as in-kind positive or negative responses for the actions of others
• Reciprocity (social psychology), in-kind positively or negatively connotated responses of individuals towards the actions of others
• Ethic of reciprocity (The Golden Rule), one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself
• Serial reciprocity, where the benefactor of a gift or service will in turn provide benefits to a third party

This paper has a nice summary on the sociologucal study of norms:

The statistical conceptualization of norms originates in behaviourism. A behavioural pattern becomes a norm if the majority of actors in fact behave due to this pattern. Thus, norms are objectively observeable and measureable. From this perspective any regular behaviour becomes a norm. One cannot distinguish between regular and rule-obeying behaviour, or conditioned and rule-obeying behaviour, or sanction-avoiding and rule-obeying behaviour. Examples of this approach are the theories of the formation of social norms by Sherif (1967) and Geiger (1962).

The theories of action of Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons represent the 'sociological' conceptualization of norms. According to Durkheim norms are social facts which can be identified through the mere existence of certain sanctions (1965: 112). The sanction does not constitute the norm, it is the symbol of it 'and as this symbol has the great advantage of being objective, accessible to observation and even to measurement, it is a good method to prefer it to the thing it represents' (Durkheim 1966: 426). Durkheim does not deny the reality of a subjective perspective on norms, but he promotes the methodological principle that scientists should choose the perspective of an objective observer. It was Weber (1960) who made explicit the difference between objectively observed behaviour and subjectively intended action. There are behavioural regularities which are based on practice (customs or tradition), on similar interest (market behaviour), and on notions of legitimate order. It is constitutive of normative action that the actor perceives behavioural rules as obliging or representative (1960: 26). In Parson's theory (1964) norms represent institutionalized role expectations. The objective character of norms is guaranteed by the integration of role expectations into the cultural system, its subjective character by internalization.

Ethnomethodologists deny the overall relevance of the sociological conceptualization of norms. According to Garfinkel (1967) there is not such a thing as a general norm which is independent of concrete context conditions. There are only situation specific expectations of concrete interaction partners which are actively negotiated by both sides. It is then the question how individuals constitute a common world. Ethnomethodologists have discovered several basic rules which have a pseudo-normative character. They are seen as obliging, and deviations are sanctioned. But they are not equivalent to sociological norms: they are far more deeply rooted in sociality, and are not amenable to reflection. Deviation from these basic rules is judged in clinical, not moral categories. Furthermore, 'a society's members know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action' (Garfinkel 1967: 35), i.e., in concrete interactions actors resort to the statistical conceptualization of norms.

Finally, developmental psychologists have put forward an ethical conceptualization of norms. Piaget and Kohlberg (1969, 1971) reconstruct the development of the moral consciousness of man. At any time, a subject is actively structuring and reflecting his/her social environment. Throughout his/her moral development three main stages can be distinguished: at the first stage of preconventional morality a child conforms to norms in order to avoid punishment - this corresponds to behaviourism; at the second stage of conventional morality a subject conforms to norms because he/she has internalized the norms of his family, peer group, or society - this corresponds to Parson's view; at the third, and final stage of postconventional morality a subject conforms to norms because of insight into abstract principles that allow for the foundation and justification of norms - this corresponds to the ethical conceptualization of norms. At this stage the subject is able to distinguish between statistical norms, 'sociological' norms, and ethical norms.

That is Harold Garfinkel.

references

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