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CILSS

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The Comité permanent Inter-États de Lutte contre La Sécheresse dans Le Sahel (CILSS) or the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel is an international organization dedicated to combatting the effects of drought and desertification in the Sahel region of Africa.[1] Founded in 1973 after major droughts across the Sahel, CILSS has worked to uphold the work of ECOWAS in ensuring food and energy security, to educate local engineers on more sustainable development practices, to provide information on ongoing environmental problems, and to research the effects of climate change and desertification.[1] While originally consisting of 13 mostly Francophone West African nations including Senegal, the organization was integrated into ECOWAS, expanding to a total of 17 members.[2]

Senegal is one of the founding members of CILSS and one of its biggest contributors[1] The nation and Senegalese President Macky Sall has been leaders in development projects like "2iS" or the "Sahel Irrigation Initiative" which would create a network of irrigation infrastructure across the Sahel belt to support water-insecure areas.[1]

African and Malagasy Common Organization (1961-1985)

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The African and Malagasy Common Organization or the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) was an international organization that encompassed much of Francophone West and Central Africa and Madagascar from 1961 to 1985.[3] It was originally established as the Union Africaine et Malgache in 1961, with the support of France, for the purpose of greater economic, political, and social integration of French-speaking West Africa.[3] At its height from 1961 to 1973, the organization included 14-15 members and changed names several times before finally settling on the African, Malagasy, and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAMM).[3][4] After 1973, member states began to leave the organization because of the lack of substantive work and integration of its governing bodies, especially following the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (later the African Union) in 1963 which had a broader Pan-African focus and mandate.[3]

Senegal was a member of OCAM from its founding to its eventual dissolution in 1985 and was instrumental in its development. President Senghor, in particular, was a major supporter of the organization because of his policy of " la Francophonie" or the integration of French-speaking Africa.[4] Senegal remains a member of several of the institutions that were initially created by the Conference of Heads of State while OCAM was still functional, including the African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education (CAMES).[3]

OMVG

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Senegal is one of the two founding members of the Organization pour la Mise en Valeur de la Fleuve Gambie (OMVG), also known as the Organization for the Development of the Gambia River Basin.[5] Its other members include Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. The objective of the organization is to ensure the proper management and shared usage of water resources in the Gambia and Geba River Basins across the borders of member states.[6] The OMVG has become increasingly important in recent years due to climate change and conflicts between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau over water resources in the Geba river.[6] One of its main projects is the usage of the river basin for hydro-electrification. Particularly in Southern Senegalese region of Kédougou, the planned construction of Sambangalou Hydroelectric Development (AHES) on the border of Guinea would provide power and greater agriculture potential to the area.[5]

OMVS

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The Organization pour la Mise en Valeur de la Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS) or the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Basin was established in 1972 and consists of four member states: Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania.[7] Former Senegalese President Senghor is considered one of the "founding fathers" of the organization.[7] The goals of the OMVS are to promote the economic integration, development, and sustainability of the river basin which provides essential natural resources to member states.[8] Dakar, the capital of Senegal, relies on the Senegal river for 75% of its water usage.[9]

The OMVS has been an effective organization at developing the Senegal River Basin, but have experienced diplomatic and environmental problems throughout its existence. The most serious of these conflicts was between Senegal and Mauritania. In the late-1980s and early-1990s, there were a series of violent clashes between Senegalese farmers and Mauritanian herders over scarce resources near the river.[9] After the murder and expulsion of Senegalese farmers from Mauritania, troops from both countries were mobilized to the border and over 100 Mauritanians were killed in Dakar while the rest were expelled.[9] The only remaining Mauritanians in Senegal were diplomats working for the OMVS which remained the only diplomatic relationship between Senegal and Mauritania at the time.[9] This period almost saw the two countries go to war and cemented current tensions within the organization despite continuing plans for development and research.

Post-Independence Foreign Relations (1960-1989)

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Senegalese independence began in 1960 with Léopold Sedar Sénghor as the first president and was succeeded by Abdou Diouf in 1980. There are four sets of principles key to conceptualizing foreign policy in Senegal. The first is a French term, reminiscent of colonial roots, called la francophonie (Schraeder and Gaye, 495) that is a part of a larger foreign policy initiative to self-affirm the values and cultures of African people while rejecting French colonialism and orientalist attitudes through the concept of Négritude (Diagne) and Pan-Africanism (Diagne). Senegelese diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believe that West Africa must unite in order to not only remain competitive in an international economy dominated by superpowers like China and the United States, but also promote and consolidate economic development within West Africa (Schraeder and Gaye, 495). Senegalese policy officials prioritize and use the individual strengths of surrounding African countries in order to strengthen regional economies and weaken regional dependency on foreign actors. This combative approach for western influence is underscored in the Senegalese constitution in clause four of the preamble: “must spare no effort in the fulfillment of African Unity” (Schraeder and Gaye, 493). These efforts have been actively pursued through formal diplomatic agreements with neighboring countries, such as the Mali Foundation in 1960, the Federation with Gambia from 1982 to 1989, as well as informal forms of cooperation such as the Inter-State Authority in the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), The Joint African and Malagasy Organization (OCAM), the Organization for the Development of the Gambia River Valley (OMVG), and the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Valley (OMVS) (Schraeder and Gaye, 493)."

Cold War Foreign Policy

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During the Cold War, Senegal was part of the non-aligned world and remained neutral throughout the conflict. In 1965, the first Foreign Minister of Senegal, Doudou Thiam, published a book titled "The Foreign Policy of African States."[10] Thiam implored Africa to move beyond the ideological divisions of the Cold War to form a third neutral ideology on which African states could build their own path.[10] This concept of non-alignment became a central theme in Senegalese politics. Senegal's first President Léopold Sedar Sénghor privileged the country's relationship with France and sided with French President Charles de Gaulle against "superpower" domination between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Schraeder 493).[11] France accounted for 95% of all investments in Senegal and 80% of Senegal's foreign trade in the 1960s (Steele 175).[12] Due to the close economic relationship between France and Senegal, Senegal appealed to French protectionism over West Africa, declining to move too closely to any superpower. Nonetheless, Senegal's ties with Western countries like France tilted its alignment westward.

"La Francophonie"

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One of the important strategic goals of Senegalese leaders was the integration and cooperation of Francophone Africa; a policy known as "la Francophonie" coined by President Senghor.[11] The promotion of this concept played a key role in the formation of worldwide summits, such as the Franco-African Summit, that allowed Senegal to emerge as a leader within the francophone movement in Africa, African consolidation, unification and cooperation are at the center of Senegalese foreign policy.[11] Senegal was also one of the founding members of several organizations designed to integrate Francophone Africa, including the African and Malagasy Common Organization in 1961 and the Malian Federation in 1960.[13][3]

Through this policy, Senegal also sought to strengthen its relationship with France

"Négritude"

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Another cornerstone of Senegalese foreign policy during the Cold War was the exemplification of African Art and international cultural ties. This was connected to President Senghor's ideology of "Negritude" which emphasized Pan-Africanism and the exceptionalism of African culture.[11] In 1966, the First World Festival of Negro Arts was hosted in Dakar, Senegal.[14] The event was a tribute the art and excellence of the African Diaspora across the world. In the development of the event, Senegal strengthened relations with the UN, African states like Ethiopia, and nations on both sides of the Cold War.[14] The United States was one of the key supporters of the event, sending the largest delegation of performers, artists, and technician of any of the 43 participating nations.[15] Despite an official policy of non-alignment, Senegal used African Art and Culture as a negotiation tool with international partners and build a "soft" foreign policy with a variety of nations. At the same time, the First World Festival of Negro Arts was seen by many post-colonial states as neocolonial due to its connection to French concept of Negritude and cooperation with Western powers.[14] The event strained relationships with Algeria and Guinea who would host their own festival in the years following in Algiers.[14]

Iran-Senegal Relations

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Senegal's non-alignment policy also contributed to the building of significant relationships with other nations. President Sénghor developed strong political and economic ties with the the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In 1971, formal diplomatic relations were established, and, by 1973, the Shah was providing $2.4 million in developmental loans for Senegal (Steele 180-1).[12] Iran continued to provide development investment and loans from 1974-1979 that focused on the trade of Iranian oil for Senegalese phosphate, including the creation of an oil refinery and a new adjacent city in Senegal (Steele 183-4).[12] The project was never completed due to funding gaps and the Iranian Revolution, despite strong intentions to move forward.

Major Partnerships

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U.S.-Senegal Relations

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Diplomatic relations between the United States and Senegal began in 1960, following independence and the dissolution of the Mali Federation.[16] Early after independence, a relationship was formed between President Senghor and U.S. President John F. Kennedy as part of the latter's "African Policy."[15] As part of Senegal's policy of non-alignment and African Socialism, bilateral relations between the two were limited but meaningful. The United States contributed aid to Senegal, including for the First World Festival of Negro Arts, and maintained consistent contact with the country throughout the Cold War via its US Agency for International Development (USAID). [15]

Today, U.S.-Senegal Relations are defined by foreign aid, military cooperation, and the protection of democracy in the region. The United States provides a growing amount of economic aid to the country. Senegal has received aid for democracy promotion, food security, and development projects like $1.5 million in aid for solar energy and nano-loan financing systems.[17] Health diplomacy is another sector of aid that the United States and Senegal collaborate on. These include programs for child health, the prevention of Malaria, and family planning funded by USAID.[18] Recently, the US sent $10.7 million of emergency aid and 99,450 vaccine does to Senegal to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.[16][19] Defense has also been a major area of partnership as Senegal has remained a stable nation in a region consistently fraught with violence. In 2016, both nations also signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement that would ensure joint-military training and missions in West African states affected by Islamic extremism and alleviate the need for more troops to be stationed in Senegal.[20] Senegal has also supported U.S. military missions in Iraq (1991), Niger (2016), and even its own territory during the Ebola outbreak of 2014, through the auspices of the United States African Command (AFRICOM).[21] Another major priority of the United States in Senegal is the promotion and protection of democracy. Senegal's democratic system has persisted for decades and has become more democratic following the Cold War, garnering the attention of the U.S. as a model state for West Africa.[16] The United States manages several programs or aid packets meant to increase democratic diplomacy. One of these programs is conducted by the United States Information Agency which help hold workshops and training with Senegalese news federation and reporters to increase the independence and power of the press in the country.[22]

The relationship between the United States and Senegal is often limited by the country's strong ties with France, preventing deep connections from forming without diplomatic conflict.[23] The French have been critical of recent "hard" diplomacy actions by the U.S., including AFRICOM and limited the nation's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to the training of African forces in West Africa.[24]

Franco-Senegalese Relations

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France, being the former colonizing power, has had an established relationship with Senegal since its inception. During the Cold War, France has traditionally followed a policy of "la Francophonie" or "la Françafrique" meant to maintain connections with its former colonial possessions in West Africa and a sphere of influence outside of Cold War politics.[25]

In more recent decades, French policy in Africa has expanded beyond la Francophonie and Senegal has developed more partnerships outside of bilateral relations with France.

Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc

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The Communauté Financière Africaine Franc, also known as the CFA Franc, is a currency established in 1959 and used by some former French colonies in West and Central Africa, including Senegal. It is the primary means by which France maintains financial and economic relations with former imperial holdings. The CFA Franc's value is pegged to the Euro (the currency of the EU) which can often overvalue the currency of less-developed African nations.[26] In 2013-2014, Senegal experienced an overvaluation of the real exchange rate estimated at 10%-35%.[26] This policy allows France to control the monetary policy of many African states and maintain its policy of Françafrique.[26] Senegal remains a member of the CFA to the present and even hosts in Dakar the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) or the Bank of West African States which is responsible for producing CFA Franc notes for West African members.[26]

References

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  1. ^ a b c d "CILSS - Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel". portails.cilss.bf. Retrieved 2022-05-10.
  2. ^ "USAID/West Africa and Permanent Interstate Committee Drought Control Sahel (CILSS)". www.usaid.gov. October 15, 2021. Retrieved May 10, 2022.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Vinokurov, Evgeny; Libman, Alexander (2017), "Dissolution of Regional Organizations", Re-Evaluating Regional Organizations, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 211–222, ISBN 978-3-319-53054-3, retrieved 2022-05-11
  4. ^ a b Ekue, Albert (1968). "L'Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 6 (3): 421–425. ISSN 0022-278X.
  5. ^ a b "Indemnisation du Plan d'Action de Réinstallation des Postes du Sénégal | Site Web du Projet Energie OMVG". www.pe-omvg.org. Retrieved 2022-05-11.
  6. ^ a b "Multinational - Projet de Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau dans le Bassin Versant du Fleuve Kayanga-Geba". projectsportal.afdb.org. Retrieved 2022-05-11.
  7. ^ a b "Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS)". OMVS (in French). Retrieved 2022-05-11.
  8. ^ Amar, M. Ould (1972). "L'Organisation Pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal". Journal of African Law. 16 (3): 299–303. doi:10.1017/S0021855300011670. ISSN 1464-3731.
  9. ^ a b c d Schmeier, Susanne (2012-12-12), "The Senegal River Basin and the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS): Benign Conditions, Deficient Effectiveness", Governing International Watercourses, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 237–288, retrieved 2022-05-11
  10. ^ a b Thiam, Doudou (1965). "The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, and Future Prospects. New York: Praeger. ISBN 978-0837185552.
  11. ^ a b c d Schraeder, P. J (1997-10-01). "SENEGAL'S FOREIGN POLICY: CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND MARGINALIZATION". African Affairs. 96 (385): 485–508. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a007881. ISSN 0001-9909.
  12. ^ a b c Steele, Robert (2020-08-20). "The Keur Farah Pahlavi Project and Iranian-Senegalese Relations in the 1970s". Iranian Studies. 54 (1–2): 169–192. doi:10.1080/00210862.2020.1792768. ISSN 0021-0862.
  13. ^ Walters, Kurt Cornelis Frederik (June, 1966). "The Mali Federation: A Case Study for Political Integration". Retrieved 04/27/2022. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |access-date= and |date= (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  14. ^ a b c d Taylor, Lauren Elizabeth (2019). "The Art of Diplomacy in Dakar: The International Politics of Display at the 1966 Premier Festival Mondial des Arts Negroes". UCLA.
  15. ^ a b c Ripert, Yohann C. (2021-01-05). "Decolonizing Diplomacy: Senghor, Kennedy, and the Practice of Ideological Resistance". African Studies Review: 1–23. doi:10.1017/asr.2020.91. ISSN 0002-0206.
  16. ^ a b c "The United States and Senegal: 60 Years of Partnership". United States Department of State. Retrieved 2022-05-12.
  17. ^ "U.S. Government supports access to energy and finance through new grants operating in Africa including Senegal | Press Release | Senegal | U.S. Agency for International Development". www.usaid.gov. 2022-03-31. Retrieved 2022-05-12.
  18. ^ Weiss, William; Piya, Bhumika; Andrus, Althea; Ahsan, Karar Zunaid; Cohen, Robert (2022-01-06). "Estimating the impact of donor programs on child mortality in low- and middle-income countries: a synthetic control analysis of child health programs funded by the United States Agency for International Development". Population Health Metrics. 20 (1): 2. doi:10.1186/s12963-021-00278-9. ISSN 1478-7954. PMC 8734298. PMID 34986844.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: PMC format (link) CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link)
  19. ^ "U.S. Donates 99,450 COVID-19 vaccines to Senegal". www.usaid.gov. 2022-05-03. Retrieved 2022-05-12.
  20. ^ "U.S. and Senegal sign defense cooperation deal". Reuters. 2016-05-02. Retrieved 2022-05-12.
  21. ^ Ripert, Yohann C. (2021-01-05). "Decolonizing Diplomacy: Senghor, Kennedy, and the Practice of Ideological Resistance". African Studies Review: 1–23. doi:10.1017/asr.2020.91. ISSN 0002-0206.
  22. ^ Datta, Christopher (2019-11-01). "The Power of Ideas That Won the Cold War is Still Needed". American Diplomacy: 1–3.
  23. ^ Elam-Thomas, Harriet Lee, (2017). Diversifying diplomacy my journey from Roxbury to Dakar. Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1-61234-950-3. OCLC 1175634734.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  24. ^ Bagayoko, Niagale (2009-04-03). "French Reactions to AFRICOM: An Historic Perspective". Contemporary Security Policy. 30 (1): 28–31. doi:10.1080/13523260902759761. ISSN 1352-3260.
  25. ^ Chafer, Tony (2014-10-02). "Hollande and Africa Policy". Modern & Contemporary France. 22 (4): 513–531. doi:10.1080/09639489.2014.957966. ISSN 0963-9489.
  26. ^ a b c d Taylor, Ian (2019-04-02). "France à fric: the CFA zone in Africa and neocolonialism". Third World Quarterly. 40 (6): 1064–1088. doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1585183. ISSN 0143-6597.