Kirkby train crash

Kirkby train crash
Kirkby station, looking in the direction the crash occurred, showing the facing buffer stops
Details
Date	13 March 2021 (2021-03-13) 18:52
Location	Kirkby, Merseyside
Country	United Kingdom
Line	Northern line
Operator	Merseyrail
Incident type	Collision with buffer stop
Cause	Distracted driver
Statistics
Trains	1
Passengers	12
Crew	2
Injured	1
Damage	£450,000 (station)

On 13 March 2021, a Class 507 train operated by Merseyrail collided with the buffer stops at Kirkby railway station in Merseyside. The only person injured was the driver of the train. The cause was found to be that the driver was using a mobile phone whilst driving. The distraction led him to enter the station at excessive speed. He was dismissed from Merseyrail and later prosecuted, pleading guilty to a charge of endangering the safety of people on the railway, for which he received a 12-month suspended sentence. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch investigated the accident, and made recommendations including researching systems to measure driver alertness, and further assessing the risk of buffer stop collisions on the Merseyrail network.

Background

In 1977, the existing railway line was split at Kirkby, with Merseyrail trains running from Liverpool and British Rail trains from Wigan. At the time of the accident, buffer stops were located on the end of each line, with a passenger walkway between the two. Through-running at Kirkby was restored in 2023, when the Merseyrail line was extended to the new Headbolt Lane station.

The train involved was operated by Merseyrail and consisted of six cars, formed from two three-car Class 507 units coupled together. Both the train and the line were equipped with the Automatic Warning System (AWS) and Train Protection & Warning System (TPWS) safety systems. AWS magnets are located on the approach to certain line-side features, such as signs warning of upcoming speed restrictions. When the train passes over an activated on-track magnet, the AWS system provides the driver with an audible and visual alarm, which, on this class of train, automatically applies the brakes if not acknowledged within 2.5 seconds.

The TPWS system, among other features, provides the Overspeed Sensor System (OSS), which can automatically stop a train if it passes over two on-track loops above a certain speed. When a train passes over the first loop, an onboard timer is started; if the train then passes over the second loop within a set time, the system automatically applies the brakes. The distance between the two loops on the track determines the speed at which the train has to be travelling to trigger the system.

At the time of the accident, there was a set of OSS loops located around 300 metres before Kirkby station to protect a change of speed restriction from 60 mph (97 km/h) to 15 mph (24 km/h), with a trigger speed set to 53 mph (85 km/h). Another set of loops was located just before the buffer stops, set to trigger at 12.5 mph (20 km/h).

Crash

507 006, the train involved, photographed in August 2008 at Rock Ferry station

At 18:52 on 13 March 2021, a Class 507 electric multiple unit collided with the buffers. The train went through the buffer stop and collided with a bridge. The train formed the 18:35 service from Liverpool Central station to Kirkby. There were two crew and twelve passengers on board. The emergency services were alerted at 19:01 and arrived at 19:05. Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service, the North West Ambulance Service and Merseyside Police all attended the scene. The train was formed of two Class 507 units, 507 006 and 507 021. All fourteen people on board the train were treated at the scene by paramedics. The driver was taken to hospital with minor injuries.

As a result of the accident, services were suspended between Rice Lane and Kirkby. Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service had handed over control of the scene to the British Transport Police (BTP) by 21:40. The next day, replacement bus services were set up between Kirkby and Aintree. As a result of the crash, unit 507 006 was withdrawn from service. It was scrapped in September 2021. Damage to the station cost £450,000 to repair. The station reopened on 21 March.

Investigations

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch opened an investigation into the crash, and published its final report into the accident on 11 August 2022. The investigation found that the driver had left the previous station, Fazakerley, on time at 18:49:45, and then accelerated up to the maximum permissible speed of 50 mph (80 km/h). The driver kept coasting as the permissible speed increased to 60 mph (97 km/h), and did not accelerate any further.

A fixed distant signal sign (left) and a sign warning of an upcoming 50 mph speed restriction (right)

At 18:51:22, the driver acknowledged an AWS warning for a fixed distant signal sign and a sign warning of the upcoming 15 mph (24 km/h) speed restriction. At 18:51:34, a WhatsApp message was sent from the driver's phone; one second later, the train passed under the M57 motorway, which is around 900 metres away from Kirkby station and is used by Merseyrail as a landmark to start braking for the station. The driver did not start braking at this point, and the train was travelling at 42 mph (68 km/h) when it passed over the set of TPWS loops protecting the 15 mph speed restriction at 18:51:58. This was below the trigger speed of 53 mph (85 km/h), so the system was not activated.

The train passed the start of the 15 mph speed restriction at 18:52:14, still travelling at 41 mph (66 km/h). At 18:52:17, the driver applied the emergency brakes around 110 metres before the buffer stops. Three seconds later, the train passed over the set of TPWS loops protecting the buffer stops at 39 mph (63 km/h). This was above the trigger speed of 12.5 mph (20 km/h) and activated the system, but this had no effect as the emergency brakes had already been applied by the driver manually. Four seconds later, the train crashed into the buffer stops at 29 mph (47 km/h).

The driver stated that at some point between Fazakerley and Kirkby, the contents of his bag located on the opposite end of the cab had fallen onto the floor, and that he had reached over to retrieve the items. As a result of the design of the train's cab, this meant that the driver would have lost almost all view of the track whilst he did this.

The investigation found that at least three other buffer stop collisions had occurred at Kirkby in the 35 years preceding the accident, all of which occurred before the installation of TPWS. The TPWS loops on the approach to Kirkby were intended to protect against a train not slowing down from close to the maximum permitted speed of 60 mph, and not from a speed under 53 mph. The TPWS loops just before the buffer stops were intended to protect against a low-speed misjudgement from a driver. Both sets of loops operate independently, and protect against different risk factors.

Merseyrail had a generic risk assessment covering the risk of buffer stop collisions at terminal stations. It deemed this risk to be low due to factors including driver training, procedures and route knowledge. However, the assessed risk only included events where a possible consequence was either a TPWS activation or a low-speed collision; it did not include events where trains would enter the platform at speeds greater than 20 mph (32 km/h). This was possibly a result of an incomplete understanding of the capabilities of the TPWS system, and the fact that no crashes had occurred since the installation of TPWS. The investigation also found that Merseyrail's fatigue risk management system did not follow the latest industry guidance, although it noted that there was no indication that fatigue played any part in the crash.

Three recommendations were made in the report: further research should be undertaken into systems to measure driver alertness; the risk of buffer stop collisions should be further assessed on the Merseyrail network; and Merseyrail should review its fatigue risk management system. Two learning points were also noted: phone use whilst driving a train can lead to a significant distraction; and TPWS cannot fully eliminate the risk of over-speeding at terminal stations.

Prosecution

The Office of Rail and Road and BTP also opened investigations into the crash. The BTP investigation found that the driver had been using WhatsApp on his mobile phone. It was later disclosed that he had been messaging about the death that day of Murray Walker. On 31 March, the 58-year-old driver of the train was arrested by British Transport Police on suspicion of endangering the safety of the railway. He was released on bail, then charged on 20 January 2022. Merseyrail dismissed the driver in September 2021. At his trial on 8 February 2022, the driver pleaded guilty to endangering the safety of passengers on the railway. On 8 March 2022, the driver was sentenced to 12 months in prison suspended for two years, 180 hours of community service and a three month evening curfew.

See also

• 2008 Chatsworth train collision, crash in the United States in which a train driver was distracted by text messages on his mobile phone.
• Bad Aibling rail accident, 2016 crash in Germany caused when dispatcher was distracted by a game on his mobile phone.
• List of rail accidents (2020–present)
• List of rail accidents in the United Kingdom