Draft:Suffering in simulations
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Suffering in simulations refers to the ethical, philosophical, and metaphysical implications of conscious or seemingly conscious experiences of suffering occurring within simulated realities. As advances in artificial intelligence and virtual environments increasingly blur the boundary between simulated agents and sentient beings, scholars have begun examining whether suffering experienced in simulations may hold moral weight comparable to suffering in non-simulated ("base") reality.
Simulation hypothesis and ethical implications
[edit]Philosopher Brian Tomasik explores the implications of Nick Bostrom's simulation hypothesis, which posits that advanced civilizations might run ancestor-simulations for purposes such as studying evolution, exploring moral values, entertainment, or understanding historical contingencies.[1] Tomasik argues that full-scale, quantum-accurate simulations of an entire universe are computationally implausible. Instead, it is more likely that simulations approximate human experiences only where necessary, dynamically rendering fine details as needed. This leads to the possibility that our universe might be a stylized or partial simulation rather than a complete and accurate reproduction of a real world.
Tomasik also considers solipsistic scenarios, such as simulations involving a single conscious mind, but deems it more plausible that multiple interacting agents are simulated, drawing analogies with massively multiplayer online games. Importantly, he concludes that even under the simulation hypothesis, ethical behavior remains meaningful—especially from a negative utilitarian perspective focused on minimizing suffering—since our actions likely affect other sentient minds, whether simulated or not.[1]
Simulated consciousness and moral equivalence
[edit]A related line of inquiry questions whether simulated suffering is ontologically and ethically equivalent to "real" suffering. One study explores whether advanced artificial intelligences capable of mimicking human emotional responses are merely imitative or actually conscious.[2] It argues that if suffering can be precisely modeled, then the simulation process itself might constitute a form of genuine suffering. This presents philosophical challenges regarding the thresholds of consciousness, raising questions about whether a minor deviation in emotional modeling undermines or preserves the moral status of simulated beings.
Simulation theodicy
[edit]David Chalmers introduces the idea of simulation theodicy in his work Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. He proposes several possible explanations for the presence of suffering in simulated realities, paralleling traditional religious theodicies that reconcile the existence of evil with a benevolent creator.[3] Possible justifications include the use of suffering as a moral testing ground, as a means of fostering empathy, courage, and resilience, or as a method of enhancing the realism and engagement of a simulation. Additionally, some suffering may be a result of technical limitations or stem from inscrutable motives held by simulators.
Tensions with post-scarcity ethics
[edit]The Simulation Argument intersects with the Hedonistic Imperative, which envisions the abolition of biological suffering through technological and pharmacological means. If posthuman civilizations have eradicated suffering, it would seem irrational for them to reintroduce it through ancestor-simulations.[4] This contradiction suggests several possibilities: either posthumans do not create such simulations, they simulate suffering for specific reasons (such as realism), or they value the reproduction of authentic human conditions, including pain. The presence of suffering in our perceived world, then, may imply certain limits or choices in posthuman simulation design that challenge optimistic forecasts about the future elimination of suffering.
Concerns about limited simulations
[edit]Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel critiques David Chalmers’ optimistic views on simulated reality by emphasizing the "Size Question"—the possibility that we live in a small or temporary simulation, such as one confined to a single city or short time period.[5] This raises epistemic concerns about the fragility and limits of our perceived reality. It also introduces moral hazards: if only part of the population or reality is simulated, ethical calculations based on broader utilitarian reasoning may be compromised.
Simulating suffering at scale
[edit]Tomasik and others have also warned of the risks of astronomical future suffering in large-scale simulations run by superintelligent agents or posthuman civilizations.[6] These simulations could include detailed recreations of evolution, wild-animal suffering, and adversarial future planning. Such scenarios may be used to test strategic decisions or explore hypothetical minds, with potentially massive moral consequences if sentient suffering is instantiated as part of the computational process.
See also
[edit]- Simulation hypothesis
- Problem of evil
- Negative utilitarianism
- Artificial consciousness
- Philosophy of mind
References
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- ^ a b Tomasik, Brian (5 January 2013). "Thoughts Regarding the Simulation Hypothesis". Reducing Suffering. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ "A Paradox of Simulated Suffering". LessWrong. 2 December 2024. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ James, Nic (22 June 2024). "Theodicy in the Matrix: David Chalmers on Suffering in Simulated Realities". Medium. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ "The Simulation Argument". hedweb.com. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ Schwitzgebel, Eric (April 1, 2024). "Let's Hope We're Not Living in a Simulation". University of California, Riverside - Department of Philosophy. Riverside, CA, USA: University of California, Riverside. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ Tomasik, Brian (9 April 2015). "Risks of Astronomical Future Suffering". Center on Long-Term Risk. Retrieved 17 May 2025.