Draft:KLM Flight 543

KLM Flight 543

Accident
Date	19 February 1958
Summary	Controlled flight into terrain on approach
Site	Cairo-Almaza Airport, Cairo, Egypt
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Douglas DC-6
Aircraft name	Jan Huyghen van Linschoten
Operator	KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Registration	PH-DFK
Flight origin	Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Netherlands
1st stopover	Prague
2nd stopover	Vienna
3rd stopover	Athens
4th stopover	Beirut
Destination	Cairo-Almaza Airport, Egypt
Occupants	20
Passengers	13
Crew	7
Fatalities	1
Injuries	1
Survivors	19

KLM Flight 543 was a scheduled international passenger service operated by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines from Amsterdam Schiphol Airport to Cairo-Almaza Airport with multiple stopovers. On 19 February 1958, the Douglas DC-6 aircraft operating the flight crashed during approach to Cairo. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, there were no fatalities among the passengers. One crew member was killed after the landing while exiting the aircraft.

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Accident

The aircraft, a Douglas DC-6B registered PH-DFK and named Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, was approaching Cairo-Almaza Airport at night. During a right-hand circuit to land on runway 34, the aircraft performed a steep turn at low altitude. As a result, the aircraft descended below the minimum safe height and struck a sand dune adjacent to the runway.

The impact caused severe structural damage, but all 13 passengers and six of the seven crew members survived. The co-pilot, First Officer Willem Jan Kroon, exited the aircraft following the crash and was fatally struck by one of the still-operating propellers.

Investigation

The Dutch Civil Aviation Authority conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that the landing had been carried out with considerable negligence. There were multiple course deviations, the prescribed approach speed was exceeded, and due to an excessively steep right-hand turn, the aircraft lost altitude. Flight engineer De Koning testified that Kroon had instructed him to extend the flaps, but he had to inform Kroon that the command could not be executed because the aircraft's speed at that moment was unacceptably high.

Kroon had initially assumed he would be landing on runway 05 and was surprised when runway 34 was assigned instead. The right-hand turn required for this approach, combined with his position in the left-hand seat, made the landing more challenging. He did not begin preparing for an approach to runway 34 with the appropriate chart until after completing the turn.

It was concluded that the crash resulted from inadequate approach planning by the co-pilot and a lack of sufficient oversight by the captain. The crew had descended below a safe altitude during final approach, possibly due to misjudgment of terrain and poor visibility at night. The downward slope of the runway may also have contributed to the misperception of the aircraft's altitude.

Investigators concluded that the accident would not have occurred if the aircraft had flown just one meter higher. Conversely, it was noted that had the aircraft flown one meter lower, the consequences could have been catastrophic. The investigation commission commended Captain Musselman for his rapid and effective response after the aircraft struck the terrain. His performance in safely landing the damaged aircraft was described as exceptional. However, the commission also found that Musselman shared partial responsibility for the collision with the terrain, citing insufficient supervision of the third pilot Kroon and inadequate monitoring of the altimeter readings.

The investigation further revealed that runway 34 at Cairo-Almaza Airport had a downward slope. While the elevation at the threshold was approximately 311 feet (95 meters), the elevation at the opposite end was only 194 feet (59 meters). This slope created the illusion of a shorter runway when viewed from approach altitude, potentially causing pilots—even when at the correct altitude—to perceive themselves as flying lower than they actually were.

On 6 February 1959, the Dutch aviation safety authority published its final report on the accident. It concluded that a poorly executed approach procedure, insufficient preparation by Kroon, and inadequate vigilance and oversight by Musselman contributed to the accident. Both pilots were criticized for not paying enough attention to the altimeter readings and the elevation of the surrounding terrain.

Aftermath

Personal consequences

Following the incident, KLM implemented changes to its operational procedures. Notably, second officers were no longer permitted to conduct landings at night without direct supervision by the captain. Captain Harold Musselman, who had logged over 10,000 flying hours, received a temporary suspension of his flying license.

Aircraft

Despite the damage sustained in the accident, the aircraft was repaired and returned to service. It was later leased to Rutas Aéreas SAM in Colombia in 1960, returned to KLM in 1961, and eventually sold to Adriatic Aviopromet and later Iscargo Iceland. The aircraft was retired from service in 1974.