Draft:American and Soviet naval ballistic systems

• Comment: Create separate articles on Soviet naval ballistic systems or American naval ballistic systems if needed. This likely fails WP:NLIST. Gheus (talk) 00:38, 30 May 2025 (UTC)

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American SSBN ship

The development of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems was a critical aspect of the Cold War arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. These systems, deployed on nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), were at the forefront of technological competition between the two superpowers, driving advancements in both military and civilian technologies, including space exploration. The rivalry shaped the design, automation, and operational tactics of these systems, reflecting the distinct economic, scientific, political, ideological, and cultural characteristics of each nation. While both countries pursued similar strategic goals, their approaches to SLBM development diverged significantly, with each responding to the other's technological advancements.

Technologically, the United States favored solid-fuel rocket engines for their SLBMs, while the Soviet Union relied on liquid-fuel missiles. The Soviet Navy prioritized high automation in submarine operations, whereas the United States Navy emphasized human control, particularly over nuclear reactors. The Soviet Union focused on maximizing submarine performance, while the United States Navy prioritized stealth through noise reduction. Despite these differences, both nations achieved significant innovations, occasionally gaining advantages over one another in specific technical areas. However, both agreed that SLBM systems were the most effective means of strategic nuclear deterrence, forming a cornerstone of their respective nuclear triads, alongside land-based missiles and strategic bombers, except during the early Cold War period.

Origins

V-2 missile

The concept of submarine-launched ballistic missiles is related to the German V-2 rocket program during World War II. In 1944, Klaus Riedel, a member of the Peenemünde research team, proposed launching V-2 rockets from the North Sea against Great Britain, using submarines to tow launch containers. These containers, approximately 32 meters long, 5.7 meters in diameter, and with a displacement of 500 tons, housed a single V-2 missile, crew quarters, a control center, and fuel and ballast tanks. A single submarine could tow up to three containers. Plans also included towing containers across the Atlantic to target New York City. The crew would travel aboard the submarine, transfer to the container for fueling, and launch the missile. The project, developed at the AG Vulcan Stettin shipyard in Szczecin, reached 65–70% completion for three containers by the war's end, with a prototype tested near Peenemünde.

After the war, many German V-2 scientists, including Wernher von Braun, were recruited by the United States to bolster its ballistic missile program under the United States Army. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, established the Rabe Institute in Bleicherode, near Nordhausen, where captured German scientists, including Helmut Gröttrup, continued their work under Soviet supervision. In October 1946, the NKVD arrested approximately 5,000 German specialists, relocating them to the Soviet Union to advance Soviet ballistic missile development. As a result, the German V-2 designers made a significant contribution to both the American and Soviet ballistic missile programs.

First-generation systems

Starting in October 1945, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union began a series of tests on captured or assembled V-2 missiles. On 6 September 1947, an "American" V-2 was launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Midway (CV-41), marking the first-ever launch of a ballistic missile from a mobile platform. From that point on, guided missile ships – vessels capable of carrying and launching rockets – became a priority for the United States Navy. The first such vessels were to be multi-role aircraft carriers, capable of both carrying ballistic weapons and fulfilling the usual functions of this class, as well as the unfinished battleship USS Kentucky (BB-66) and the large cruiser USS Hawaii (CB-3). Both the United States and the Soviet Union were aware of the German concept of underwater missile launchers, but showed little interest in this idea at the time, placing greater hopes in sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range strikes.

In the United States, the newly formed Air Force (United States Air Force) conducted research in ballistic technology, competing with the United States Army's program led by von Braun. In the Soviet Union, the ballistic missile program was overseen by government structures, especially the NKVD and the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army.

In 1949, the Soviet Union developed a preliminary design for a missile submarine under the designation Project P-2, intended to strike land targets. The design was developed by CKB-18 (later the Rubin Design Bureau). The submarine was projected to have a surface displacement of nearly 5,400 tons and to carry 12 R-1 missiles (Soviet versions of the V-2) and Lastochka cruise missiles. However, the program encountered numerous issues that the designers could not overcome, including, among others, problems with stabilizing the missile prior to launch. In the early phase of developing sea-to-land missile systems, both the Soviet Union and the United States regarded this kind of weapon solely as a tactical asset without strategic significance.

Soviet Union

Soviet development of SLBM systems began with a government decree on 26 January 1954, appointing Sergei Korolev, head of OKB-1 NII-88, to lead the D-1 missile system program. Between 1953 and 1954, Korolev proposed a naval variant of the liquid-fueled R-11 missile, designated R-11FM, with modified fuel components and navigation systems to accept launch data from submarines. Test launches of the R-11FM were carried out between 1954 and 1955 at the 4th Missile Test Range in Kapustin Yar. After three launches from a stationary platform, one launch was conducted from a moving platform to simulate motion. OKB-1 developed a launch procedure involving the missile being raised from a surfaced submarine container before ignition from above the container. Although the Soviet Navy insisted on the ability to launch the missile from a submerged submarine, Korolev opposed the idea, arguing that a surface launch would take less time. Apart from the missile itself, the program faced numerous challenges, including determining the submarine's exact position, accurately aiming at targets, ensuring safe communication, and other related issues. However, all of these were eventually resolved, and by the end of 1956 a full set of construction documents had been completed.

Project 611 submarine (NATO code: Zulu)

The world's first submarine equipped with ballistic missiles was the Soviet modified Project 611 submarine (NATO code: Zulu) – B-67. On this submarine, two vertical R-11FM missile launchers were installed in an enlarged sail, which required sacrificing part of the electric battery compartments beneath the sail as well as several officers' quarters, who were relocated to the torpedo storage area. The first-ever launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine took place on 16 September 1955. Fired from the surfaced B-67 in the White Sea, the R-11FM missile struck the test range on Novaya Zemlya. That same year, work began on a modified version of Project 611, designated AW611.

In 1959, the first R-11FM missiles achieved operational readiness, making the Soviet Union the first country armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. During regular patrols, these missiles were not equipped with their designated RDS-4 nuclear warheads (yield: 10 kilotons), which were stored on land and could be installed on the missiles in case of an imminent threat.

Meanwhile, in 1955, Sergei Korolev decided to transfer work on submarine ballistic missiles from OKB-1 to a special design bureau, SKB-385, headed by Viktor Makeyev. This allowed Korolev to focus on longer-range strategic missiles and space programs. After the transfer, SKB-385 began developing the D-2 missile system, consisting of the new R-13 missile and a new series of submarines under Project 629 (NATO: Golf class). The R-13 missile, with a range of 650 kilometers, was powered by a liquid-fuel engine and, like the R-11, was launched from the surface. The submarines designed for this missile used the same diesel-electric propulsion system as their contemporary Project 641 boats (NATO code: Foxtrot). Built at CKB-16 under the direction of Isanin, the Project 629 submarines had a surface displacement of 2,850 tons and could carry three R-13 missiles.

Project 629 ship (NATO code: Golf)

The launch tubes for these missiles extended through the entire height of the inner hull, reaching up into the submarine's sail. Launches took place from the surface, after the missiles were raised above the sail. The first five submarines of this type carried R-11FM missiles, while later ones were equipped with R-13s. During the construction of the first vessels, CKB-16 began developing a system with a small reactor designed to supply energy for battery charging on Project 629 submarines, eliminating the need for diesel engines for this purpose. However, this program was discontinued. The lead ship of Project 629 was B-41 (later designated K-79), which was built in Severodvinsk and delivered to the navy in 1959. Over the following three years, shipyards in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur built 22 submarines of this class. Sections for two additional units built at the latter yard were transferred to China, where one was assembled in Dalian and designated as Type 035. The second unit was never completed.

On 20 October 1961, the world's first test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile armed with a thermonuclear warhead was conducted. A Project 629 submarine launched an R-13 missile equipped with a 1-megaton warhead, which detonated at the "Rainbow" military training area on Novaya Zemlya. As a result of this test, nuclear-armed R-13 missiles were approved for use on submarines. In 1955, experimental work began on launching ballistic missiles from submerged submarines. After overcoming numerous difficulties, the first test involving the launch of a missile mock-up from a submerged vessel was carried out in 1957. The mock-up was launched from the submerged Project 613D4 (NATO: Whiskey) submarine S-229. The vessel was modified at the Black Sea Shipyard in Mykolaiv on the Black Sea, with two launch towers protruding above the hull and sail installed amidships. The missile mock-ups featured a solid-fuel booster stage and a second liquid-fuel stage.

In Severodvinsk, the previously used test submarine B-67 of Project W611 (Zulu) was also modified under the designation PW611. The first underwater launch from B-67 took place in August 1959 but ended in failure. On 10 September 1960 – less than two months after George Washington (SSBN-598) conducted a submerged launch of a Polaris A-1 missile – the S4-7 missile (a modified R-11FM) was successfully launched from a submerged submarine. Shortly before the completion of the first Project 629 (NATO: Golf) submarine, SKB-385 began work in 1958 on a new liquid-fueled missile, the R-21 (NATO: SS-N-5 Serb), with a range of 755 nautical miles (1,400 kilometers), twice that of the R-13. The R-21 could be launched from depths of 40 to 50 meters while the submarine was moving at speeds of up to 4 knots.

Project 658M ship

The first submerged launch of an R-21 missile took place in 1961 from the submarine S-229. The vessel had been fitted with two individual launch tubes housed in towers protruding above the hull. A year later, two such launch towers were installed on K-142, the final Project 629 (Golf) submarine built in Severodvinsk – this version was redesigned as Project 629B. Completed in 1961, K-142 carried out its first submerged missile launch on 24 February 1962.

By 1972, 13 additional submarines from Projects 629 (Golf) and 658 (NATO: Hotel) were modified to carry three R-21 missiles capable of being launched from underwater. These submarines became, respectively, Projects 629A (Golf II) and 658M. The modified 629A vessels were repurposed as non-strategic missile platforms. In 1976, six of them were transferred from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic Fleet to serve as sea-based platforms for tactical ballistic missiles; the remaining seven served with the Pacific Fleet. These submarines remained in service for nearly three decades – until 1989, when the last units were decommissioned. The Golf-class submarines were considered relatively successful, although one of them, K-129 (a converted Project 629A/Golf II), sank during a patrol in the North Pacific on 25 February 1968, with the loss of all 98 crew members.

Following the disaster, the United States Central Intelligence Agency launched a recovery effort under the codename Operation Jennifer. The goal was to raise the sunken submarine, but due to a structural failure during the lifting process, only the forward portion of the vessel (Sections 1 and 2) was successfully recovered. This section contained two nuclear-armed torpedoes, conventional torpedoes, and the bodies of six crew members. The recovered remains were ceremonially buried at sea on 4 September 1974, in accordance with naval tradition.

In September 1956, the Rubin Design Bureau – initially led by P. Z. Golosovsky, then I. B. Mikhailov, and ultimately Sergey Nikitich Kovalev – began intensive work on a new class of submarines under Project 658 (NATO: Hotel). Due to the tight schedule, the program proceeded without the development of a preliminary design. As a result, by the first quarter of the following year, the design was completed for submarines with a surface displacement of 4,080 tonnes and a length of 114 metres. These vessels were originally equipped with three R-13 missiles (NATO: SS-N-4), as well as 533 mm and 400 mm torpedo tubes – similar to those found on Project 675 (NATO: Echo II) submarines – for anti-submarine warfare against destroyers. Their propulsion systems resembled those used on Project 627A (NATO: November-class SSN) and Projects 659 and 675 (NATO: Echo SSGNs), utilizing two VM-A nuclear reactors. All units of this class faced technical issues. The main causes were poor workmanship and inadequate or entirely lacking quality control in the shipyards and among component suppliers. According to chief designer Sergey Kovalev: "It was a real disaster – leaking steam generators, leaking condensers, and, practically speaking, their military usefulness was doubtful".

Also in 1956, the SKB-143 bureau began design work on a larger nuclear-powered submarine capable of carrying heavier missiles. Project 639 submarines were to have a surface displacement of 6,000 tonnes, nuclear propulsion driving four shafts, and armament consisting of three R-15 missiles developed by OKB-586. These liquid-fuel missiles had a range of 540 nautical miles (1,000 km) and were launched from the surface. CKB-16 also developed a new diesel-electric design, the W629, capable of carrying a single large R-15 missile. However, because the R-15 required surface launching and had inferior performance compared to other missiles, both the missile and submarine programs were cancelled in December 1958.

United States

After launching a V-2 rocket from the aircraft carrier Midway in 1947, the United States Navy paid little attention to ballistic missiles, focusing instead on other types of new weaponry – particularly those related to aircraft carriers. One of the few instances of interest from the United States Navy in ballistic missile weaponry during this period came in 1950, when Commander Francis D. Boyle – a World War II submarine commander – proposed adapting existing submarines into guided missile submarines. This innovative idea included, among other things, vertical launch tubes and replacing traditional propeller-based propulsion with pump-jets. However, no ballistic missile program was undertaken by the United States Navy at that time.

The idea gained momentum only after the Soviet Union conducted a hydrogen bomb test on 12 August 1953. Fear of Soviet advancements in strategic missile technology pushed the United States Department of Defense to order the Navy to join the United States Army's IRBM (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile) program. In the Navy's case, the missile would be launched from surface ships. Naval leadership, however, was highly skeptical of joining the Army's program, which involved the liquid-fueled Jupiter missile. This fuel was considered too hazardous for handling at sea. The missile itself, measuring 18.3 metres, was also thought to be too unwieldy even aboard a surface vessel.

At the time, the Navy had two additional unofficial reasons for its reluctance to pursue a ballistic missile program. First, since the late 1940s, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance had each been independently developing cruise missile programs (for submarines) intended for land-attack missions. Neither bureau was willing to divert its scientific and engineering resources to a ballistic missile initiative. The second unofficial reason stemmed from the Navy's bitter loss in a high-profile inter-service rivalry with the Air Force over the B-36 bomber versus the United States-class aircraft carriers. This defeat cost the Navy significant prestige and led to the cancellation of the United States carrier program, an episode known as the "Revolt of the Admirals". As a result, Navy leadership wanted to avoid another inter-branch conflict – this time over ballistic missiles. A further and more tangible reason for resistance was concern over the financial burden of developing a new class of weapons outside the Navy's regular budget. Tensions reached a point where Admiral Robert Carney, Chief of Naval Operations from 1953 to 1955, imposed restrictions on naval officers who supported the ballistic missile program.

Admiral Arleigh Burke

The position of the United States Navy toward the ballistic missile program changed when Admiral Arleigh Burke assumed the post of Chief of Naval Operations. According to the admiral's biographer, David A. Rosenberg, Burke's support – despite internal opposition within the Navy – for granting the Navy's ballistic missile program the highest priority was the most significant initiative of his first term in that office, from 1955 to 1957. Despite this backing, the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) program for the fleet did not develop well, primarily due to resistance from Navy bureaucracy. Seeking to elevate the program's status and accelerate work on the Navy's own missile, the admiral established the Special Projects Office (SPO), independent of other technical bureaus, with the sole task of developing a sea-based ballistic missile. In these efforts, Admiral Burke had strong support from Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas. On 8 November 1955, the Secretary of Defense launched a joint Army-Navy IRBM program. The Navy's portion of the Jupiter missile project, along with the Air Force's Atlas ICBM program, was granted the highest national priority – Brickbat 01. Work on the naval version of the Jupiter missile gained momentum in 1956, and the deployment of the first missiles aboard modified commercial ships was scheduled for 1959.

On 8 February 1957, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke established the requirements for the developing ballistic missiles, which were to have a range of 1,500 nautical miles (2,778 km) and be ready for operational use by 1965. This range was calculated to enable an attack on the Soviet capital – Moscow – from a submarine positioned in the Norwegian Sea. However, due to Soviet progress in developing strategic rocket weapons, the Polaris program was repeatedly accelerated. Admiral Burke funded it from the regular United States Navy budget, while also seeking resources for the Navy's top-priority programs, including nuclear-powered surface ships and the Polaris project.

The Polaris undertaking became even more urgent on 3 August 1957, when the Soviet Union conducted the world's first long-range ICBM test. During this test, the R-7 missile flew several thousand kilometers from the launch site at Töretam to strike in Siberia. A few weeks later – on 4 October 1957 – the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial Earth satellite, into orbit using the R-7. This prompted Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates to propose, on 23 October of that year, an acceleration of the Polaris program by deploying shorter-range missiles (1,200 nautical miles – 2,225 km) by December 1959, along with three submarines to carry them by mid-1962 at the latest, and a missile with a range of 1,500 nautical miles by mid-1963. A month later, the program was accelerated again by shortening the deadline for preparing the 1,200-nautical-mile missile to October 1960. In December 1957, after meeting the initial schedule for preparing the submarines to carry Polaris missiles, the ballistic missile program's timeline was revised once more, accelerating the delivery of the second Polaris submarine to March 1960 and the third to December of that year.

Construction of the ships

USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599), George Washington class

In order to enable the rapid construction of underwater ballistic missile carriers, the United States Navy altered its plans regarding the nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) that had already begun construction. For this reason, the first five units carrying Polaris missiles (SSBN 598–602) were derivatives of the Skipjack-class submarines.

These vessels had a streamlined hull with a single propeller and a nuclear propulsion system using the S5W reactor, delivering 15,000 horsepower. To accommodate ballistic missiles, this class of submarine was lengthened by 39.6 metres – 13.7 m for specialized navigation and missile control systems, 3 m for auxiliary equipment, and 22.9 m for two rows (eight in each) of launch tubes. The choice of 16 launch tubes per submarine was based on polling members of the Special Projects Office (SPO) team and averaging their recommendations. Much larger than the original Skipjack-type submarines, the SSBNs retained the same propulsion plant, which made them significantly slower than the Skipjack-class vessels.

The first SSBN, USS George Washington (SSBN-598), was created by combining components from the submarine Scorpion (SSN-589), whose keel was laid on 1 November 1958, with those of Skipjack. To build the George Washington, a new order was placed, this time for a vessel of a new type, initially designated SSGN(FBN)-588. Due to the development of the Soviet missile program and, more significantly, the political phenomenon known as the "missile gap", the production of SSBN submarines received the highest national priority.

USS Thomas A. Edison (SSBN-610), Ethan Allen-class

The first five submarines were based on the Skipjack-class design, with a test depth of 215 metres, except for the first vessel, George Washington, whose missile compartment was not – unlike the hulls of the other units – built from HY-80 steel, but from less durable High-Tensile Steel, resulting in a test depth of 183 metres for this submarine. The five Ethan Allen-class units were larger submarines based on the hull and machinery of the Thresher/Permit-class, with a test depth of 400 metres and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons. The Lafayette-class submarines were the last Polaris units; they surpassed the other vessels in dimensions and displacement (8,250 tons submerged), and featured an improved sound-silencing system. All three classes carried 16 Polaris missiles each.

Polaris missiles could be launched while the submarine was fully submerged, at a depth of about 60 feet (18.3 m), at a rate of roughly one missile per minute. The biggest issue for Polaris submarines was communication, especially the delay in delivering a launch order to a submerged vessel. This problem was partially mitigated by technological upgrades, the use of towed antennas and satellite communications, as well as airborne relay platforms. However, the submarines' one-way communication and the potential delay meant these vessels were not suitable first-strike nuclear weapons (a fact known both to leaders in the Kremlin and in Washington). Nevertheless, thanks to the relatively high survivability of ballistic missile submarines compared to other strategic systems, they were ideal as second-strike or retaliatory weapons, making them a reliable means of strategic deterrence.

The first Polaris submarine, George Washington, was commissioned on 20 December 1959, and on 18 June the following year, it set out on its first patrol, during which it conducted the first launch of an unarmed Polaris A-1 missile. On board at the time were Rear Admiral William F. Raborn – head of the Special Projects Office – both crews, and a number of technicians, making for a total of about 250 people. During the launch, minor issues arose with the countdown procedure, prompting the submarine to return to port without launching the remaining two scheduled missiles. After correcting the malfunctions, the vessel put out to sea again and completed the two remaining launches. After the second launch, Rear Admiral Raborn sent a direct message from the submarine to President Dwight D. Eisenhower: "POLARIS – FROM OUT OF THE DEEP TO TARGET. PERFECT". These submarines introduced a new operational standard in which each vessel had two full crews, in this case, 135 officers and sailors. These crews were known as the "Gold" and "Blue" crews. One crew would take the submarine on a 60-day patrol, after which the vessel would return to port for resupply and minor repairs, and then head out again on another 60-day patrol with the second crew, while the first would rest and train. In this way, two-thirds of all Polaris submarines were at sea at any given time.

The first operational combat patrol of USS George Washington began on 15 November 1960. During this patrol, it carried 16 Polaris A-1 missiles with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, armed with W47 nuclear warheads, each with a yield of 600 kilotons. SSBN-598 remained on patrol for 67 days, 66 of which were spent fully submerged. Before its return to base on 30 December 1960, the second Polaris submarine, Patrick Henry (SSBN-599), set out on patrol, marking the beginning of regular United States SSBN patrols.

Polaris A-1 at the test launch pad on land

United States Navy planners prepared SSBN deployment sites in the Atlantic and Pacific where the submarines would be less vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare systems. However, President John F. Kennedy's administration decided to send three Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean Sea as replacements for the IRBM Jupiter missiles that were being withdrawn from Turkey following the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. To reveal the presence of Polaris submarines in the region to the Soviet Union, the first SSBN to enter the Mediterranean – Sam Houston (SSBN-609) – arrived at the Turkish port of İzmir on 14 April 1963. The entry of Sam Houston into Izmir marked the first visit of a Polaris submarine to a foreign port outside Holy Loch Refit Site One in Holy Loch, Scotland, which had served as a forward base for these submarines since March 1961. The first American SSBN to begin a strategic deterrence patrol in the Pacific was Daniel Boone (SSBN-629), which departed the Guam base on 25 December 1964, carrying 16 Polaris A-3 missiles in its launch tubes.

Initially, the United States Navy proposed a final number of about 40 Polaris submarines. However, some Pentagon officials – including Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles – demanded as many of these units as possible, anticipating strong congressional support for building as many as one hundred of them. Admiral Arleigh Burke, however, stated that when developing the requirement for 39 to 42 submarines (each carrying 16 missiles), he based it on the current number of targets for nuclear strikes on Soviet territory, which was then doubled for redundancy and reliability. An additional 10 percent was added to account for losses due to Soviet anti-ballistic missile defenses, and another 20 percent was added to compensate for potential missile malfunctions. The total number of Polaris submarines was determined with the assumption that two-thirds of the fleet would be on patrol at any given time, operated using two crews per submarine. As a result, the United States Navy and the Department of Defense planned a fleet of 45 SSBNs, with at least 29 of them patrolling at any given time and capable of striking 232 Soviet targets. However, in September 1961, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recommended to President Kennedy a final total of 41 Polaris submarines, carrying 656 missiles. This led to the adoption of a plan for 41 submarines, known as the 41 for Freedom program. As a result, by 1967, the United States Navy had received 41 Polaris submarines organized into four squadrons, carrying a total of 656 SLBMs. Additionally, the British Royal Navy constructed four Polaris submarines equipped with American Polaris A-3 missiles armed with British nuclear warheads. Between 1960 and 1967, American shipyards produced nearly 9½ nuclear submarines per year – a rate never again achieved in the United States, though it was surpassed by Soviet shipyards in the 1970s.

In contrast to the two or three ballistic missiles carried by first-generation Soviet ballistic missile submarines, the American Polaris submarines carried 16 SLBMs. Additionally, the American missiles could be launched from fully submerged submarines and had better accuracy. Along with missile development, the United States heavily invested in the advancement of fire control and navigation systems for submarines, which became critically important in the future due to the development of missiles with very long (intercontinental) range. Despite the technological primitiveness – by today's standards – of the Polaris submarines' satellite navigation system, the "Ships Inertial Navigation System" (SINS) was an extraordinary achievement at the time. It provided accurate navigation based on the submarine's movement using external navigational sources, with only periodic updates.

Another significant achievement was the development of life-support systems onboard the submarine for the duration of a patrol, including the ability to produce oxygen and drinking water while submerged. Overall, at the time they were built, alongside the Triton (SSRN-586), the Polaris submarines were the largest, most complex, and – considering their combat payload – the most powerful submarines ever constructed up to that point.

The missile launch preparation time was 15 minutes from the moment the launch order was received. The missiles could be launched at intervals of about one minute, and the submerged submarine could be moving at a maximum speed of 1 knot during the launch. The launch depth, measured from the submarine's keel, was approximately 125 feet (38.1 meters). During the Polaris program, the United States Navy also considered the possibility of launching Jupiter and Polaris missiles from surface ships and disguised commercial merchant vessels, including those with mixed international crews from NATO member states; however, this concept was never widely developed.

Development of Polaris missiles

UGM-27C Polaris A-3

The UGM-27A Polaris A-1 missiles, with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, were conceived as a temporary weapon at the beginning of the solid-fuel missile program. A newer, longer-range version was already in development when USS George Washington embarked on its first patrol equipped with these missiles.

The UGM-27B Polaris A-2, with a range of 1,500 nautical miles, first went on patrol in June 1962 aboard USS Ethan Allen. A month earlier, on 6 May 1962, Ethan Allen, operating 2,000 km from the Hawaiian Islands, conducted the first and so far only full American ballistic missile system test – from launch to atmospheric nuclear detonation – as part of Operation Frigate Bird. The Polaris A-2 missile used in this test carried a W47 warhead with a yield of 1.2 megatons over a distance of 1,760 km, detonating 840 km northeast of Christmas Island. The next missile version – the UGM-27C Polaris A-3 – was first deployed in September 1964 aboard USS Daniel Webster (SSBN-626). All three Polaris variants had the same diameter of 1.37 meters, which allowed for missile replacement via standard loading procedures. Nevertheless, all 41 Polaris submarines were ultimately equipped with A-3 missiles.

While the A-1 and A-2 missiles carried a single W47 re-entry vehicle (RV) warhead, the A-3 missiles were equipped with three MRV (Multiple Re-entry Vehicle) warheads launched toward a single target. Each of the three W58 warheads had a yield of 200 kilotons, and the total weight of the MRV package was approximately 500 kg. The introduction of MRVs into the A-3 missile was intended to compensate for the limited accuracy of ballistic missiles at that stage of development.

The fourth deployed missile, in the C-3 variant, was named the UGM-73 Poseidon C-3. The Poseidon was a significantly larger missile, with a diameter of 1.88 meters, though it had the same range as the A-3 missiles – 2,500 nautical miles. However, it had a major advantage over the Polaris missiles: due to the expansion of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense system, it became the first missile in the world to be equipped with MIRVs(Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles). This missile carried between 10 and 14 W68 MIRV warheads, each with a yield of 50 kilotons, all capable of being independently aimed at separate targets within a given area.

At the same time, the Navy proposed the Polaris B-3 as the successor to the A-3. This missile, with a diameter of 1.88 meters, could carry six warheads with a yield of 170 kilotons each, along with penetration aids, to the same range as the A-3. The first 16 Poseidon C-3 missiles went on patrol in March 1971 aboard USS James Madison (SSBN-627).

UGM-73 Poseidon C-3

The installation of new, larger missiles aboard Polaris submarines required appropriate modifications to these vessels; however, the scope of these changes turned out to be relatively minor, and all 31 Lafayette-class submarines were adapted to carry the missiles. The final version of the Polaris/Poseidon system was called EXPO (Extended-range Poseidon), and it entered an advanced stage of development in the early 1970s. The foundation of this process soon became the UGM-93A Trident I C-4 missiles, carried by 12 Lafayette-class submarines modified to accommodate them. The C-4 missiles, with a diameter of 1.88 meters, had a theoretical range of 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km) and carried six MIRV W76 warheads, each with a yield of 100 kilotons.

The last Polaris submarine patrol ended in 1994, marking the end of an important era in the history of ballistic missile submarines. As these submarines were retired, efforts were made to adapt them for other tasks – particularly as attack submarines (SSN) – but these attempts failed due to weak armament, limited sonar capabilities, low speed, and high noise levels. Ultimately, the last submarine of the 41 for Freedom program – USS Kamehameha – was fully retired in 2002, having completed its service as a transport vessel.

Second-generation systems

On 20 February 1959, the Soviet Union was the first in the world to deploy ballistic missile rockets on board submarines. However, American submarines armed with such missiles, which went on patrol only a year later, surpassed the Soviet vessels in every respect. Due to the limited Soviet capabilities to counter submarines at that time, the Polaris SSBNs constituted an almost completely invulnerable and unthreatened part of the American nuclear triad. When the last Polaris submarine was completed in 1967, 41 American SSBNs carried 656 ballistic missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Union had eight nuclear-powered submarines and 29 diesel-electric submarines, carrying a total of 104 missiles. Unlike the Soviet systems, all American submarines used nuclear propulsion; American Polaris missiles had greater range, were more accurate, and were adapted for underwater launch. Introduced in 1971, the Poseidon was the world's first missile deployed with independently targetable MIRV warheads.

Soviet Union

The Soviet second-generation naval systems programs aimed to eliminate the American qualitative advantage in first-generation systems. The design of Soviet ships of this generation began in 1950 at the CKB-18 bureau. Nine years later, due to the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the work was halted and then resumed after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Yankee

Project 667A submarine

Initially, the design work focused on Project 667 submarines intended to carry eight R-21 (SS-N-5) missiles. However, due to significant design difficulties, such extensive modifications to the project became necessary that the result was a nearly completely different design, known as Project 667A (Navaga class, NATO code: Yankee).

The complexity of the original Project 667 design, caused by the need to assemble the missiles only once aboard the submarines and by the concept of a rotating launcher, meant that the project was never realized. Meanwhile, work was nearing completion on the new, smaller solid-fueled RT-15M missiles – naval versions of a land-based missile – which underwent testing aboard a Project 613D7 submarine (NATO: Whiskey; S-229), followed by 20 test launches from a Project 629B submarine.

Design bureau SKB-385 – apparently – was not significantly interested in developing a heavy solid-fueled missile or was unable at the time to produce one comparable to the American Polaris missiles. Moreover, the development program for this missile significantly exceeded the planned timeline. As a result, the entire RT-15M missile program was canceled in 1964. Instead, SKB-385 proposed the introduction of smaller and three times lighter single-stage liquid-fueled R-27 missiles (NATO: SS-N-6 Serb), used in the D-5 system. The R-27 was a single-stage, underwater-launched, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 2,500 km. Initial R-27 tests were conducted between 1963 and 1967 from a Project 613D5 submarine equipped with two launchers, followed by tests from a modified Project 629B submarine (NATO: Golf SSB), rebuilt to Project 605 with four launchers.

In the early 1960s, the possibility of retrofitting the earlier Project 658 submarines (NATO: Hotel class) with the D-5 system and R-27 missiles was considered. Additionally, between 1964 and 1965, design bureau CKB-16 began preliminary work on Project 687 – an ultra-fast submarine based on the Project 705 design (NATO: Alfa class), with a submerged displacement of 4,200 tons and equipped with the D-5 system carrying either R-27 missiles or the R-27K, an anti-ship variant of the R-27. At the same time, SKB-143 initiated work on Project 679 submarines, which were based on the Project 671 design and also armed with the D-5 missile system. The design approach was similar to the American conversion of Skipjack-class submarines to the Polaris configuration. However, these efforts were halted before any results were achieved. Instead, based on the promising D-5/R-27 system, design bureau CKB-18 focused its efforts on the development of Project 667A, whose chief designer was Sergei Kovalev, the final chief designer of Project 658. The Project 667A submarines were sent into production in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Similar to the American Polaris submarines, the Project 667A boats were fitted with 16 vertical launch tubes arranged in two rows just behind the sail. Although they were broadly comparable to the George Washington-class submarines, the Soviet boats had a greater diving depth, a shorter interval between missile launches, and a higher maximum speed.

The 667A submarines could launch their missiles from a depth of 50 meters – twice the depth possible for Polaris-class boats. They could also fire missiles while moving underwater at speeds of 3 to 6 knots, whereas the American submarines had to do so at lower speeds, and ideally while stationary. However, according to Soviet designers themselves, the Soviet submarines were significantly noisier than their American counterparts. The pre-launch preparation time was approximately 10 minutes, and the time to fire a salvo of four missiles was 24 seconds, but pauses were required between salvos. Thus, the total time from the first to the last launch (with 16 missiles aboard) amounted to 27 minutes. Representatives of the Soviet Navy and industry openly admitted that due to the much higher noise levels of Soviet submarines, they were inferior to American boats. Similarly, Soviet missiles received poorer evaluations compared to their American counterparts – especially when compared to the Polaris A-3. As Sergei Kovalev explained, Soviet design bureaus struggled with mastering the complex nature of sound propagation underwater. Although the design teams did everything possible to reduce the noise of the new submarines, after launching and during trials it turned out that all the components together did not function quietly – the submarine turned out to be loud.

The first Project 667A submarine, K-137 Leninets, was commissioned on 5 November 1967. By 1972, a total of 34 vessels of this type had been built – 24 at the shipyard in Severodvinsk and 10 in Komsomolsk. The construction pace exceeded that of the American Polaris submarines, averaging 6.8 submarines per year compared to 5.5 in American shipyards. Additionally, while the American program ended after the construction of 41 vessels, the Soviet SSBN-building program continued.

Project 667AM submarine K-140

The first 667A (Yankee) submarine went on an Atlantic patrol in June 1969. 16 months later, in October 1970, SSBNs of this class began patrols in the Pacific, operating in areas from which the U.S. coast was within the range of their missiles. Despite the significantly shorter range of Soviet missiles compared to the American Polaris A-3, all major U.S. coastal cities were within range of the Soviet submarines. From 1971 onwards, two 667A submarines were regularly, and occasionally up to four, patrolling the Atlantic within missile range of the U.S., while in the Pacific at least one submarine always kept the United States within range.

During the construction of these submarines, the existing vessels were upgraded: in 1983, they were equipped with the D-5U missile system with R-27U missiles. These missiles extended the possible attack range to 3,000 km, using either a single warhead or – in a later stage – three MRV (multiple reentry vehicle) warheads targeting the same point, similar to those carried by the Polaris A-3. At that time, all 34 operational submarines received the new D-5U missile system and advanced navigation systems. As a result of these upgrades, the submarines were reclassified as Project 667AU.

Between 1973 and 1976, an earlier Project 667A submarine – K-140 – was modernized in Severodvinsk through the replacement of its missile system with the D-11 system. The missiles comprising this system, the R-31 (NATO: SS-N-17 Snipe), with a range of 3,900 km, were the first Soviet solid-fueled SLBMs and were intended to demonstrate the Soviet Union's capability to deploy SLBMs using this type of fuel. The modified vessel, renamed Project 667AM K-140, carried 12 ballistic missiles instead of the standard 16. Between 1969 and 1973, the CKB-16 design bureau began a program to develop Project 999 submarines, capable of carrying 16 R-31 missiles. This program ended in failure, and K-140 remained the only Project 667AM submarine – the sole Soviet SLBM platform armed with solid-fueled missiles until 1984, when the R-39 (NATO: SS-N-20 Sturgeon) entered service.

Technical problems

The liquid-fuel propulsion system used in Soviet missiles of that era caused numerous problems aboard the submarines that carried them. In 1970, a leak occurred aboard K-219, followed by a fire and, ultimately, an explosion at sea. The submarine survived and was brought back to port, where it underwent repairs. However, not long afterward – on 3 October 1986 – another accident involving missile fuel took place aboard the same submarine, which was carrying 15 missiles beneath its deck and was cruising about 600 nautical miles (1,100 km) from the Bermuda Islands. The submarine managed to surface, but the onboard fire could not be brought under control. A Soviet merchant ship attempted to tow the vessel, but due to the crew's lack of training, K-219 sank on 6 October 1986, along with four crew members.

Delta

In 1963, the Soviet Union began work on the advanced D-9 missile system, featuring the liquid-fueled R-29 missile (NATO: SS-N-8 Sawfly). In the same year, CKB-16, under the direction of A.S. Smornov and N.F. Shulchenko, developed preliminary designs for Project 701 submarines with a surface displacement of about 5,000 tons, carrying six R-29 missiles. As a result of these efforts, in 1964 the Soviet Navy decided to extend and rearm the K-145 submarine of Project 658/Hotel SSBN with six R-29 missiles, thereby creating the Project 701/Hotel III submarine. The next submarine to be extended and rearmed was K-118 of Project 629/Golf SSB, redesignated as Project 601/Golf III. The conversions were carried out in Severodvinsk, likely also involving the Zvyozdochka shipyard.

Work on an entirely new design to carry the R-29 missile was rejected by the Navy. As a result, in 1965, the CKB-18 design bureau under the direction of Sergey Kovalev began developing Project 667B (Murena class, NATO: Delta I). Project 667B was a scaled-up version of the Project 667A submarine, modified to carry the R-29 missile. Although the new submarines were to carry only 12 missiles (compared to 16 on the 667A submarines), the initial range of the R-29 (4,200 nautical miles – 7,850 km) was expected to enable the Navy to change its strategy and method of conducting operations. When the Delta I submarines entered production at the shipyards in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the world's first nuclear arms agreement – SALT I. In 1974, the Soviet SSBN construction program surpassed the number of 41 "modern" submarines built by the United States. The following year, the number of missiles carried by Soviet submarines exceeded the number deployed aboard U.S. Navy submarines.

Starting in 1971, construction work on Project 667B submarines (NATO: Delta I) progressed rapidly. That year, the prototype vessel of the class, K-279, began construction in Severodvinsk and was commissioned on 27 December 1972. By 1977, 10 submarines of this type had been built in Severodvinsk and 8 more in Komsomolsk. These submarines had a surface displacement of approximately 9,000 tons and a hull extended by 11 meters compared to the Project 667A boats. In most other respects, the two designs were similar.

While these submarines were being constructed, work also proceeded in parallel on four submarines of the 667BD class (Murena-M type, NATO: Delta II). These boats were slightly larger than the 667B due to the intention to accommodate 16 R-29D missiles (NATO: SS-N-8 Mod 2), which was the rationale behind launching the program. The additional four missiles could be launched in a second salvo, following the initial twelve. As part of the design process, the fourth and fifth sections of the hull were extended by a total of 16 meters to make room for the four extra launch tubes. These modifications increased the displacement by 1,500 tons and reduced the maximum speed by one knot. They also made the submarines too large to be constructed in Komsomolsk, which is located approximately 450 km inland.

Project 667BDR

The specification for the new class of submarines – designated Delta III by NATO – was presented in 1972. Project 667BDR (Kalmar class) was developed for the D-9R missile system, which carried 16 R-29R missiles. Depending on the warhead type installed, these missiles had a range of between 6,500 and 8,000 km. The R-29R was the first Soviet sea-launched missile capable of carrying MIRV warheads, with each missile equipped with between three and seven independently targetable warheads. The new missile system allowed any number of the submarine's missiles to be launched in a single salvo.

The first submarine of this project was commissioned in 1976. In total, between 1975 and 1982, 14 units of this type were built at the shipyard in Severodvinsk. At the time the START I treaty was signed in 1991, five 667BDR-class submarines were in service with the Northern Fleet and nine with the Pacific Fleet. By 1995, one submarine from each fleet had been decommissioned. As of 2009, five submarines of this class remained in active service.

SALT I Treaty

Signed in 1972, the SALT I Treaty limited the number of nuclear weapons delivery platforms, including the number of operational units and those under construction as of 26 May 1972. Under this agreement, the United States, which was at the time launching its Trident program, agreed to a limit of 44 ballistic missile submarines carrying a total of 710 SLBMs. The Soviet Union, in turn, accepted a limit of 62 submarines (the number then in service and under construction) equipped with a total of 950 SLBMs. The introduction of new launchers (i.e., on new submarines) required – according to the agreement – the dismantling of an equivalent number of land-based ICBM launchers or other sea-based SLBM launchers, no later than the start date of sea trials of the new submarine. This treaty represented the most significant legal framework limiting the number of warships since the London Naval Treaty of the 1930s. Since SALT I applied only to the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter argued that it did not bind the United Kingdom, France, or China – the other potential adversaries of the Soviet Union, who were also building SSBNs.

Third-generation systems

United States

The development of Soviet offensive and defensive potentials – especially the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and anti-submarine warfare forces – shook American chances of surviving a first nuclear strike and conducting an effective response. Additionally, there was a noticeable lack of coordination among various branches of the U.S. armed forces in the development of strategic weapons. To address these problems, in 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the conduct of studies under the codename Strat-X, tasked with identifying possible alternatives to counter the Soviet ABM system. The Strat-X studies involved officers from the U.S. Navy and the USAF as well as civilian scientists and engineers. These efforts focused on considering about 125 alternative missile projects, of which only two were based on naval systems. In this latter area, consideration was given both to carrying ballistic missiles on surface ships and on a new type of submarine – referred to in these studies as a suboption. This alternative was based on new Poseidon missiles carried by 31 existing Polaris submarines and 20 to 25 submarines of the new type. In the final Strat-X conclusions, the creation of four new missile systems was proposed:

• a new ICBM system in hardened missile launch facilities;
• a new mobile ICBM system;
• a ship-based long-range missile system (SLMS);
• an undersea long-range missile system (ULMS).

ULMS/Trident

Contrary to the Strat-X secretary of defense's demand to propose the best strategic system, Strat-X presented a set of land-based and sea-based options. Ultimately, the only feasible solution at that time proved to be the ULMS system. Within Strat-X, a missile 15.2 meters long and 2 meters in diameter was considered – significantly larger than the Poseidon missile. The concept of using such a large missile led to an initial vision of an ULMS submarine with a surfaced displacement of 8,240 tons and a length of 135 meters. 24 missiles were nominally to be carried horizontally (not vertically) outside the pressure hull in protective canisters. According to these assumptions, the missiles could be released from the submarine at any achievable speed and diving depth. The missile launch itself was to be delayed to avoid revealing the submarine's position through the tracked backward trajectory of the missile – which was expected to greatly increase the submarine's chances of survival. The ULMS submarine was to have nuclear propulsion, with a relatively low speed – not exceeding 25 knots. The speed limitation was based on the assumption that higher speed increases the submarine's noise level, thus increasing the risk of detection – in a situation where a large ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) obviously would not outrun a Soviet hunter-killer submarine (SSN) anyway.

In July 1968, the Special Projects Office (SPO), which had overseen the Polaris and Poseidon programs, was renamed the Strategic Systems Project Office (SSPO), and Rear Admiral Levering Smith was appointed as its head. Like his predecessor, Admiral Raborn – the father of the Polaris system – Smith had no background in submarines. He also made the decision to abandon the innovative horizontal missile stowage system. Over time, however, the SSPO gradually lost influence over the ULMS program. As a result of lobbying by Admiral Rickover, the U.S. Navy's Office of the Chief of Naval Operations established a separate ULMS project office, headed by Rear Admiral Harvey E. Lyon – a submarine officer – while control over the new submarine's missile system program remained with the SSPO under Rear Admiral Smith.

Ohio-class ship

Soon afterward, the General Dynamics-owned shipyard Electric Boat received a contract to develop a design for the new submarine. Admiral Rickover, who had significant influence over the submarine program, pushed to replace the proposed 17,000 hp S5G reactor for the new class with a more powerful 60,000 hp unit and advocated for a larger submarine capable of carrying 24 ballistic missiles. Ultimately, it was decided to construct the submarine with the S8G reactor, generating 35,000 hp and powering a single propeller via two steam turbines. This arrangement created the most powerful single-reactor propulsion system ever designed for a U.S. submarine. The final design envisioned submarines with a surface displacement of 16,700 tons and a submerged displacement of 18,700 tons, a length of 170.7 meters, and 24 vertical SLBM launch tubes, with an officially stated top speed of about 25 knots. Special emphasis was placed on quieting the submarine, particularly its propulsion system. Reports suggest that the final result exceeded noise reduction requirements at low speeds, when the propulsion used natural circulation (convection) instead of forced circulation in the primary loop.

Admiral Rickover and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt lobbied Congress for the ULMS program's approval, which on 16 May 1972 received the name Trident. The program faced significant controversy – some members of Congress and anti-nuclear organizations campaigned against it. Both sides used the SALT treaty to support their arguments. The situation was further complicated when Jimmy Carter became President of the United States. Carter initially sought to limit the number of SLBMs to 200. In January 1980, his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, announced a plan to build a new, lower-cost class of strategic missile submarines as an alternative to the Trident type. The Carter administration allocated 106 million dollars (in then-current value) for research and development of this smaller, budget-friendly missile submarine. For many observers, this signaled a sidelining of the Trident program. However, the situation changed with Ronald Reagan's electoral victory. As part of Reagan's strategic 600-ship Navy plan, the Trident program was given high priority, with the aim of building one submarine per year.

The missile program for the Trident submarines, however, encountered technical and organizational difficulties. This led SSPO to propose a temporary alternative: the EXPO (Extended Range Poseidon) missile. Presented as a system that could be fielded by 1972 – many years ahead of the intended Trident missile – it offered shorter range but faster availability. EXPO was an evolution of the existing Polaris–Poseidon missiles, with a range of 4,000 nautical miles (7,410 km) and the capability to carry up to eight 100-kiloton MIRV warheads. Eventually designated Trident I C-4, the missile could be deployed on existing Polaris–Poseidon submarines as well as on the new Trident subs, serving as an interim weapon until the long-range missile was ready. Initial contracts for the design, development, and production of the C-4 and the eventual D-5 missiles were awarded to Lockheed Corporation, which had experience from its work on Polaris and Poseidon.

In reality, the first two stages of the EXPO/Trident C-4 were the same as those of the Poseidon missile. As an alternative to the MIRV warheads (W76/Mk-4) of the C-4, the MaRV (maneuverable reentry vehicle) warhead Mk 500 Evader was under development for penetrating ABM systems. Although several tests of this warhead were successfully conducted, the program was never completed.

After an intense debate in 1974, funding was allocated for the first Trident-class submarine. Initial plans envisioned a construction schedule of 1-3-3-3 new submarines between 1977 and 1982. However, once construction of the first unit began, the entire building program was accelerated, with a new completion date set for 30 April 1979. Just like the Polaris submarines two decades earlier, the Trident submarines were granted the highest priority – Brickbat.

The first units of the program faced delays due to management difficulties, design changes, and issues stemming from the simultaneous construction of the new generation Los Angeles-class (688) attack submarines at the Electric Boat shipyard. Additionally, the second American shipyard capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, Newport News, was also participating in the construction of the 688-class SSNs and was already operating at full production capacity. Since 1972, only these two shipyards in the United States have been formally and practically capable of producing nuclear submarines. Personal controversies surrounding Admiral Rickover also contributed to the Trident program's challenges, stemming both from his personality traits and several substantive decisions he made.

The prototype submarine of the Trident class – Ohio (SSBN-726) – was launched at Electric Boat on 7 April 1979. At the time, it was the largest submarine ever built in the world. SSBN-726 was commissioned into the U.S. Navy on 11 November 1981, marking the beginning of a new family of submarines known as the Ohio class (the terms "Ohio class" and "Trident class" are equivalent and used interchangeably). Ohio set out on its first patrol on 1 October 1982, carrying 24 Trident I C-4 missiles, which had already completed their first patrol back in October 1979 aboard the Polaris submarine USS Francis Scott Key. To demonstrate the flexibility of the Polaris submarines, 11 other older vessels were also rearmed with the new missiles.

Construction of the Ohio-class submarines was halted following the end of the Cold War. The construction of the final – 18th – Trident submarine was authorized by the U.S. president in 1990. When its construction was completed in 1997, all 41 Polaris–Poseidon–Trident C-4 submarines had been decommissioned, with the exception of two vessels that had been converted for special operations.

Trident II D-5

Trident D-5

The UGM-133A Trident II D-5 missiles represent the pinnacle of United States achievements in submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) design to date and, aside from the now-retired LGM-118A Peacekeeper, in ballistic missile design overall, considering the missile's range and – above all – its accuracy. The guidance system of the missile is capable of placing eight thermonuclear MIRV warheads within a circle 170.7 meters in diameter at a distance of 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km). The D-5 missile nominally carries eight MIRV warheads with yields ranging from 100 to 475 kilotons. In total, around 400 W88/Mk5 MIRV warheads were produced for the Trident II, each with a yield of 475 kilotons. The remaining missiles of this type are armed with W76/Mk-4 MIRV warheads. In the latter case, the D-5 can carry up to 14 warheads.

After the missile's development process – marked by numerous test failures – was completed, the D-5 entered operational service in March 1990 aboard the ninth Trident submarine to be built, USS Tennessee (SSBN-734). Of the 18 Trident submarines, the first 8 were equipped with Trident C-4 missiles, and the following 10 with Trident D-5 missiles. Originally, all Ohio-class submarines were to be outfitted with the D-5 system, but these plans were altered as a result of arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union. Eight submarines of the Pacific Fleet remained equipped solely with Trident I C-4 missiles. The Navy's decision to equip these eight Pacific Fleet submarines with Trident D-5 missiles was not made until 1996. As of 2008, a total of 122 underwater test launches of this missile had been conducted; since 22 March 1989 – when a missile exploded four seconds after launch – there have been no failed tests.

The missile is capable of striking any target on Earth within 30 minutes and can carry out what NATO terms a "prompt attack", in which the time from launch to target destruction is no more than 10–15 minutes. Combined with an exceptionally low circular error probable (CEP) of 90 meters, Trident II is considered an excellent weapon for an effective first strike. The missile owes its high accuracy to its guidance technology, which includes a two-dimensional triangulation system that takes angular measurements of two stars to update the inertial navigation system. The missile is significantly larger than the D-4, and its warheads are arranged in the post-bus section around the third-stage propulsion engine. A particularly notable feature at the time of the missile's introduction into service was its "instant targeting" capability – allowing the target coordinates to be changed at any time during a patrol. Earlier American missiles lacked this feature; even the most advanced of them at the time, the Trident C-4, only allowed selection from a limited number of pre-programmed targets set before the patrol began.

Soviet Union

Akula/Typhoon

Project 941 submarine

The American Trident submarine program accelerated the construction of third-generation submarines in the Soviet Union. During a meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford in November 1974 in Vladivostok, both leaders agreed on the framework for the SALT II treaty, which imposed further limitations on strategic offensive weapons. However, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union declared that if the United States deployed the Trident system, the Soviet Union would be forced to develop a new strategic submarine program. In reality, the new ballistic missile submarine program – Project 941 – had already begun two years earlier, in 1972, at the Rubin Design Bureau under the direction of Kovalev.

As a result of this program, the Project 941 submarines were created (Akula type; NATO reporting name: Typhoon) – the largest submarines ever built. In Soviet nomenclature, the Akula-class submarines were referred to as heavy strategic nuclear-powered cruisers. Kovalev and his team examined numerous design concepts, including a gigantic 235-meter-long submarine – an idea that was eventually abandoned due to the Soviet Union's lack of dry docks and other facilities capable of accommodating such large vessels. Ultimately, the Rubin Bureau developed a unique and highly innovative design, which was the 941st concept reviewed by the bureau.

In practice, Akula-class submarines are comparable in length to American Ohio-class submarines – 172 meters compared to the latter's 170 meters. However, while American submarines have a beam (width) of 11.7 meters, the Soviet submarines have a beam of 23.2 meters and a submerged displacement of 48,000 tons – three times greater than that of a Trident submarine. Project 941 submarines had a hydrostatic reserve buoyancy of around 48%, whereas Ohio-class submarines had only about 15%. This reserve helped reduce the vessel's draft and significantly facilitated surfacing through ice, particularly drift ice, to launch missiles. On 25 August 1995, one Project 941 submarine surfaced at the North Pole, breaking through a 2.5-meter-thick layer of ice before launching an R-39 missile.

Project 941 was the first Soviet design to feature a catamaran structure. The submarines were built using two parallel pressure hulls, which housed crew quarters, equipment, and engine rooms. Each hull, measuring 149 meters in length and up to 7.2 meters in diameter, was divided into eight sections. The 20 missile launch tubes were placed in two rows between the pressure hulls, located in the forward part of the vessel (in front of the sail). The control room, missile system command center, and other management compartments were situated in two large modules between the pressure hulls. The command center measured 30 meters in length and 6 meters in diameter. The submarine's sail extended 13 meters above the waterline. An additional module – connecting the pressure hulls – was installed at the front. It housed the torpedo launchers and torpedo storage. Altogether, the Typhoon consisted of seventeen sections enclosed within a massive outer hull measuring 172 meters in length, with all the hulls and modules interconnected via passageways. The pressure hulls, control spaces, and torpedo sections were made of titanium, while the light outer hull was constructed from steel. These submarines offered the best living conditions in the Soviet – and now Russian – navy, including a small gym, solarium, sauna, and even an aviary.

The submarines of this project were equipped with the Skat sonar system, capable of simultaneously tracking 10–12 targets, and included the low-frequency MGK-503 sonar with a spherical array (NATO designation: Shark Gill). Each of the two pressure hulls houses one OK-650 reactor with a steam turbine – a power unit rated at 50,000 horsepower (190 megawatts) – as well as one 800-kilowatt generator. To protect each of the two propellers from damage or destruction by ice, they were enclosed in special housings. The Typhoon is also equipped with two auxiliary propulsion pods – located at the bow and stern – which can be lowered and activated for maneuvering and for stationary hovering underwater.

The Typhoon-class submarines were armed with the D-19 missile system, equipped with 20 R-39 solid-fuel missiles with a range of 10,000 km, as well as an automated torpedo-missile system featuring two 650 mm launchers and four 533 mm launchers. The propulsion systems of these vessels housed two water-cooled reactors, each with a power output of 190 MW, and two steam turbines, allowing for a submerged speed of 27 knots. The submarine featured the most advanced silencing technologies available in the Soviet Union at the time, making Project 941 quieter than any previous Soviet submarines. To reduce noise levels, a two-stage, rubber-coated pneumatic shock-absorbing ring was used, along with a modular design of the submarine’s mechanisms and equipment.

The first vessel of this class – TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy – was launched on 23 September 1980, with tests and sea trials beginning in June 1981. The submarine was officially commissioned into the Northern Fleet on 12 December 1981. Following the first unit, five more were constructed. All submarines of this type entered service between 1981 and 1989. They were grouped under the "First Flotilla of Nuclear Submarines" at Zapadnaya Litsa (Nerpichya base).

All submarines of this class have been retired from service. One of them – TK-208 – now serves as an experimental and test vessel (primarily for ballistic missile testing), while the remaining ones are in the process of being dismantled and scrapped, to be replaced by the new Borei-class (Project 955) submarines.

Solid-fuel SLBM

Preliminary work on an ICBM missile system powered by solid fuel began at the Makeyev Design Bureau of Machine Building in 1971. Development of the first SLBM system using this type of fuel started two years later. Work on the D-19 system equipped with R-39 missiles was initiated in accordance with a decree by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in September 1973. The R-39 was a three-stage solid-fuel missile, with the first and second stage engines enclosed in an epoxy resin casing, and had a range of 8,300 km. To reduce the missile's size, retractable nozzles were used in the first and second stage engines.

The missile's front section housed the post-booster, containing a navigation system and a liquid-fueled propulsion system for the delivery of 10 MIRV warheads. The warheads themselves, featuring a smaller frontal angle than those of previous SLBM warheads, were located in the rear section of the post-booster, surrounding the nose (front section) of the third propulsion stage. The missile was installed in a launch tube, where it was supported from above by a shock-absorbing mechanism. The R-39 was launched using pressurized gas (cold launch), while a special solid-fuel counter-shock system created a gas shroud around the missile to reduce the effects of hydrodynamic pressure during the underwater launch phase. The ignition of the first-stage engine occurred only after the missile had exited the launch tube.

Missile testing began in 1979 with trials conducted from the deck of the submarine K-153 (Project 629/619), followed by tests from land-based launch sites. Out of 17 land-based tests, half ended in failure due to issues with the first and second stage engines. After redesigning the propulsion systems, testing continued from the first Project 941 submarine (TK-208), of which 11 launches were successful.

The D-19 system was officially accepted into service in 1984. Following TK-208, five more submarines of this project were each equipped with 20 missiles of this system. However, the formal commissioning of the R-39 missile did not occur until 1989. Work on the missile's successor, the R-39M, intended both for Project 941 submarines and the future Borei-class (Yury Dolgorukiy), began as early as 1980. Flight tests of the R-39M began in 1996, but after four failed attempts, the program was canceled in favor of a new solid-fuel missile, the R-30, developed under the direction of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) – an organization with no prior experience in designing SLBMs – working in cooperation with the Design Bureau of Machine Building.

Delta IV

Project 667BDRM Submarine

Almost simultaneously with Project 941/Typhoon, Kovalyov's team at the Rubin Design Bureau developed the design for the Project 667BDRM submarines (NATO designation: Delta IV). A decree initiating work on this project was issued on 10 September 1975. While incorporating design solutions from earlier Yankee and Delta classes, these submarines are largely a completely new third-generation design. The vessels are significantly larger than their predecessors – displacing 1,200 tons more and being 12 meters longer. They were equipped with more advanced noise-reduction technologies and carried larger, three-stage, liquid-fueled missiles as part of the D-9RM system: the R-29RM (NATO: SS-N-23 Skiff). To improve structural strength, the pressure hull and bulkheads at both ends were produced using an electro-slag remelting process, which increased the steel's ductility.

Depending on the number of MIRV warheads carried (up to 4), the R-29RM missile could strike targets at distances of up to 4,480 nautical miles (8,300 km). These missiles could be launched underwater by Delta IV submarines from depths of up to 55 meters, at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Just like its predecessors, the Delta IV is powered by two nuclear reactors (VM-4SG) and two propellers, but with an improved stern configuration that results in greater propulsion efficiency and reduced noise levels. One Soviet analyst described the Project 667BDRM submarines as follows:

Second-generation submarines were quieter; however, significant progress in noise reduction by Soviet industry was only achieved in the 1980s, with the advent of the 667BDRM submarines. At that time, new technologies were introduced that improved the precision of the propulsion shaft and propellers by an order of magnitude. A major breakthrough in noise suppression was also achieved through the implementation of active noise-canceling methods.

Among the mentioned active noise-reduction techniques are likely computer-assisted technologies, which theoretically allow for noise suppression by up to 40 dB. Better soundproofing than in other submarines of the 667 series was also achieved by mounting all machinery and equipment within a common frame, isolated from the pressure hull by a special buffer. Additionally, local sound absorbers were installed around power systems, more effective sound-absorbing coatings were applied inside and outside the hull, and five-blade propellers with improved acoustic properties were used. Altogether, this system reduces the noise levels of Delta IV submarines to one-third of those produced by the 667BDR (Delta III) submarines.

The Project 667BDRM submarines were equipped with the TRV-671 RTM missile-torpedo system, consisting of four 533 mm launch tubes. Unlike the system installed on the 667BDR submarines, the 667BDRM vessels received all types of torpedoes, anti-submarine rocket torpedoes, and hydroacoustic decoys. These submarines were also fitted with the Omnibus BDRM combat management system, which provides centralized control over all types of combat operations. This system collects and processes data and facilitates the selection of tactical maneuvers as well as decision-making during combat regarding the use of torpedo or missile-torpedo weapons. The submarines were additionally equipped with the Szljuz navigation system, which ensures the accuracy of position determination necessary for the vessel and its ballistic missile system. Position data updates are performed twice daily using an astro-correction system installed in the periscope. This system is supplemented by a sonar navigation transponder. The sonar system of these submarines is the Skat-BDRM.

Fourth-generation submarines

At the end of the Cold War, the United States developed and introduced into service a type of submarine representing the pinnacle of American underwater military engineering and technology – the Seawolf-class hunter-killer submarines, also known as SSN21. They were designed for extended patrols in Soviet territorial waters – especially in the Barents and Okhotsk seas. Their design enabled combating Soviet SLBM-carrying submarines. The noise reduction technologies applied on Seawolf submarines lowered the noise levels generated by these units to a level ahead of their time. The quietness of SSN21 submarines remains a benchmark to this day in the construction of nuclear-powered submarines, regardless of the country developing the design. Due to the end of the Cold War, the U.S. halted the construction program of Seawolf-class units, focusing instead on building versatile, multi-mission Virginia-class NSSN (New Attack Submarine) vessels, but did not pursue a new SSBN construction program.

Russia, after a temporarily failed SSN program with the Severodvinsk-class (Yasen), began construction in November 1996 of a new type of ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) – the Borei-class Yury Dolgorukiy. The design of the new Project 955 was developed at the Rubin Design Bureau. Although Borei-class submarines are to be significantly smaller than the Typhoon-class, their size exceeds all other Soviet and Russian submarines except for the Granit/Antey SSGN units (Project 949) (NATO: Oscar). The latest plans anticipated introducing a prototype of this project into service in 2009; however, due to failures in the Bulava missile program, the first Borei-class submarine entered service in 2013.

Soviet system vs. the American system

Both the Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated great innovation in the design of submarines and the missile systems they carried. The truth of this statement is best demonstrated by the large number of submarine designs, missiles, as well as propulsion systems, and the pace at which advanced technological solutions were introduced.

However, after the loss of the Thresher (SSN-593) in 1963, the United States Navy became very conservative in the design and construction of submarines, and to some extent also in operational terms. This conservative approach to submarine design was visible, for example, in the prolonged use of HY-80 steel. HY-80 steel – first used on Skipjack-class submarines in 1959 – was used through the Polaris submarines and up to the Los Angeles-class SSNs. This resulted not only in a failure to increase operational depth but even a decrease in operational depth for 62 Los Angeles-class units. The U.S. Navy's persistence in using this steel instead of the stronger HY-100 was dictated by difficulties in processing the latter, as well as weight considerations of the vessels. This affected not only the allowable operational depth of the vessels but also hull strength, reducing the number of sections exposed to pressure, decreasing hydrostatic reserve buoyancy, and limiting the margin for future modernization. At the same time, the operational depth of Soviet submarines significantly increased. The first submarine to use the stronger HY-100 steel in its construction was the prototype Seawolf (SSN-21), and this change allowed submarines of this class to return to an operational depth of 400 meters.

The conservatism of the U.S. Navy, triggered by the Thresher disaster, was also evident in Admiral Rickover's abandonment of the cutting-edge, revolutionary hunter-killer submarine design developed under the CONFORM program. On the other hand, U.S. Navy caution led to the construction of reactors that were significantly safer than the Soviet ones, stricter safety procedures, and better crew training.

Hyman Rickover

Throughout the Cold War, the primary factor in the technological rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet navies was the degree of submarine silencing. Unlike parameters such as speed and permissible diving depth – where U.S. Navy submarines generally lagged behind their Soviet counterparts – the American navy managed to maintain technological superiority for decades in the field of noise reduction. Submarines of each American generation – both attack (SSN) and ballistic missile (SSBN) types – were significantly quieter than their Soviet equivalents. This advantage often exceeded the gap of a single generation and, in principle, persists to this day. Both sides engaged in a kind of intelligence race, the main goal of which – for the Americans – was to assess Soviet technological progress, and for the Soviets, to obtain the technology itself.

Sergey Gorshkov (on the left)

The two competing sides were divided by the way they organized the support structure of their respective systems. The Soviet approach in this area diverged significantly from Western standards. Both submarines and missiles were designed by several relatively independent design bureaus, each employing a few thousand workers. For instance, the Rubin Design Bureau had about 3,000 employees, Malakhit employed 2,500, and Lazurit around 1,500. In the United States, at the beginning of the Cold War, the design of submarines was handled directly by shipyards such as Electric Boat, Mare Island Naval Shipyard, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. In the nuclear era, however, the design teams at these American shipyards lost their independence in favor of the Bureau of Ships and its successor organizations. In the 1960s, Admiral Hyman Rickover effectively took control of this centralized system.

In the Soviet Union, each design bureau operating under a chief designer had considerable autonomy. In the 1980s, the position of chief designer was renamed general designer, reflecting the growing complexity of the projects. The heads of these bureaus had wide-ranging independence, although they still reported to the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, the Military-Industrial Commission, and the Navy's leadership.

The Soviet Navy's strong influence on the design bureaus became evident particularly under Admiral Sergey Gorshkov's leadership. Although the Soviet design bureaus typically had their own areas of specialization, together with cooperating technical and research institutes, they also competed in certain areas – similar to American research labs. This internal competition played a significant role in enabling the Soviet Union to surpass the U.S. in some key submarine performance parameters. Unlike the United States, in the Soviet system, the efficiency of financial expenditures allocated to various programs was not of primary importance. In contrast, U.S. Navy funding programs were under strict oversight by multiple congressional committees, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office, all of which continuously monitored and audited how funds were spent.

Igor Spassky

Equally significant was the role of the head of the Rubin Design Bureau, Professor Igor Spassky. His influence and ability to operate behind the scenes enabled him to secure a leading position for his bureau in the design of naval vessels. During his tenure at Rubin, the heads of other design bureaus changed several times. Among Spassky's achievements was pushing through the production of Project 941 Typhoon-class submarines and Project 949 SSGN cruise missile submarines (NATO reporting name: Oscar). The production of these enormous vessels met with resistance from some senior naval officers, government representatives, and industrial rivals. Their objections were primarily based on the high cost of construction and the availability of raw materials. However, much like Rickover in the U.S. Navy, Spassky was able to use his influence to push his own designs through to production.

Industry

The fundamental problem of the Soviet system for the design, construction, and maintenance of nuclear submarines was the poor quality of materials used, as well as the lack of adequate support infrastructure. Quality issues were a widespread problem across all branches of the Soviet armed forces, often causing frustration at the highest levels of government. At one point, Nikita Khrushchev asked: "When they [the Americans] begin serial production, they don’t produce defective parts. What prevents us from doing the same?!". As a result, although in some respects Soviet hull construction technologies surpassed those used in the United States, the outstanding performance parameters of Soviet submarines were, in many cases, merely theoretical. To mitigate the negative consequences of poor quality, Soviet submarines had more complex structures with a greater number of compartments. On the one hand, this increased the survivability of both the vessel and its crew; on the other, it led to the production of submarines requiring more extensive maintenance. The latter aspect is particularly significant, as it highlighted another issue faced by the Soviet Navy – the shortage of adequately qualified personnel.

Production of nuclear ballistic-missile submarines in the Soviet Union was concentrated at two yards: Plant No. 402 – today's Severnoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye in Severodvinsk – and Plant No. 199 (the Lenin Komsomol Shipyard), now the Amur Shipbuilding Plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

During the Cold War, the U.S. defense industry benefited from relatively high component quality and ready access to an industrial base of advanced technologies (for example, electronics, instrumentation and – later – computers). The United States' comparatively open society also enabled the swift exchange of experience that accelerated technological progress, while the economy's reliance on private industry allowed quicker responses to the Navy's changing needs. As in the Soviet Union, two shipyards built ballistic-missile submarines in the United States: the versatile Newport News yard and Electric Boat, which specialized in nuclear-powered submarines.

Operational differences

Like the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines, that country's ballistic-missile submarines spent significantly more time at sea than their Soviet counterparts. Beginning in the early 1960s, the United States consistently kept more than half of its SSBN fleet on patrol at any given time. In contrast, the Soviet Union typically maintained no more than 15% of its SSBNs at sea at any one time. Most of the remaining force was kept in a state of readiness to deploy, though at a relatively low level of strategic alert.

The Soviet Navy conducted a dozen or so large-scale exercises to demonstrate the effectiveness of this operational model. It was based on the assumption that Soviet intelligence would provide timely warning of a potential conflict with the West, and that rapid deployment of fully armed forces following such a warning would be more efficient than maintaining a high percentage of the fleet in constant operational readiness. However, this approach did not favor systematic and intensive training of crews in operational conditions, which meant Soviet submarine crews had significantly less operational experience than their American counterparts.

Closely tied to operational issues were the challenges faced by the Soviet maintenance infrastructure in supporting new submarine designs. In some cases, the demands placed by new submarine classes were so unique that a decade or more could pass before the necessary support equipment became available to service the new vessels. According to American intelligence at the time, these deficiencies in Soviet maintenance capabilities led to more rapid wear and tear on the submarines. As Vice Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, former Director of Naval Intelligence for the U.S. Navy, observed: "They didn’t have enough facilities to conduct overhauls at the required frequency". The problem was further compounded by the sheer number of different submarine classes (projects), which made both production and in-service maintenance more complicated.

Human resources

Soviet engineering personnel were highly narrowly specialized, in contrast to the more broadly educated and mobile American engineers. Both systems had their advantages and disadvantages, but the differences were significant and led to the two countries producing distinctly different types of equipment. In the field of undersea weapons, Soviet submarines tended to be more specialized, whereas American ones were more multipurpose. Human resource issues also had an impact on submarine design itself. Due to the size of the submarine fleet, the Soviet Navy required a large number of personnel, recruited and trained through a conscription system that was not always efficient. In a system based on short-term conscripts and mostly professional officers, it was difficult to establish a coherent and competent human base for the fleet – issues that plagued the Soviet Navy until the very end of the Soviet Union.

Senior Soviet officers worked in a system that prioritized quantity over quality. They often deliberately altered statistics, favoring appearances over reality. By falsifying data or reports, they covered up facts instead of showing initiative to fix shortcomings. The scale of this problem was recognized by many of the highest-ranking officers and submarine designers, which led to the conclusion that the best solution under such conditions would be to maximize submarine automation. The most important designers believed that removing the human factor from the most critical components of a submarine was the key to increasing the unit's safety – a mindset that was the exact opposite of the American approach.

For the first 15 years of the Cold War, American submarines were operated by a relatively narrow elite – a completely voluntary group. As a result, the large-scale Polaris submarine program led to a crew staffing problem. The U.S. Navy had to provide 82 highly trained crews within six years, each consisting of 136 people, plus crews for 20 new attack submarines – about 100 personnel for each unit. This became a bottleneck in the program and prompted a very difficult recruitment process, during which older officers and sailors were sometimes accepted for service on the new submarines in the 1960s. The U.S. Navy did not fully recover from all the personnel errors made by those officers recruited out of necessity, nor from the staffing policies of that era, until the mass personnel reductions that followed the end of the Cold War.

The U.S. Navy did not seek to resolve its personnel challenges by significantly increasing the level of automation aboard its submarines. The latest classes of American submarines have reduced crew sizes by only about five percent compared to those of 25 years prior. In practice, this situation is satisfactory for the U.S. Navy – something not changed even by the most modern attack submarines of the Seawolf and Virginia classes.

Bibliography

• Polmar, Norman (2003). Cold War Submarines, The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines. Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-530-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)

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• Cold War submarines of the United States
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