Benutzer:Autokrator/Spätrömische Armee
Vorlage:RomanMilitary The Late Roman army refers to the military forces of the Roman Empire of the (the Dominate period, from the latter part of the 3rd century until its definitive division into Eastern and Western halves in 395 AD i.e. the Roman army of the 4th century AD. A few decades afterwards, the Western army disintegrated as the Western empire collapsed. The East Roman army, on the other hand, continued intact and essentially unchanged until its reorganisation by themes and transformation into the Byzantine army in the 7th century.
The army of the Principate underwent a significant transformation as a result of the chaotic 3rd century. Unlike the Principate army, the army of the 4th century was heavily dependent on conscription and its soldiers were much worse remunerated than in the 2nd c. Barbarians from outside the empire probably supplied a much larger proportion of the late army's recruits than in the army of the 1st/2nd centuries. There is no evidence, however, that this damaged the army's effectiveness.
The army of the 4th c. was probably no larger in numbers than that of the 2nd c. The main change in structure was the establishment of large reserve armies that accompanied the emperors (comitatus) and were generally based away from the frontiers. The legions were split up into smaller units of comparable size to the auxiliary regiments of the Principate. In parallel, legionary armour and equipment were abandoned in favour of auxiliary equipment, and the infantry adopted the weapons of the Principate cavalry.
There is no evidence for an increase in the proportion of cavalry in the late army, as compared to the Principate army. Nor was the cavalry's tactical role or prestige any greater. Indeed, the late army's cavalry acquired a reputation for incompetence and cowardice for their role in three major battles in mid-4th c. The infantry remained the backbone of the army, as they had always been.
The 3rd and 4th centuries saw the upgraded fortification of army forts and installations to make them more defensible. But there is no evidence of a defence-in-depth strategy of the kind proposed by Edward Luttwak.
Evolution of the 4th century army
The army of the Principate, as it was established by the founder-emperor Augustus (ruled 30 BC - 14 AD) and survived until the end of 3rd century, consisted of two distinct corps. The legions were c30 large formations of about 5,500 men, almost entirely infantry, which admitted only Roman citizens. The auxilia were ca. 400 much smaller units of about 500 men (a minority were up to 1,000 strong), which were divided into c100 pure cavalry units (alae), c100 pure infantry (cohortes) and c200 mixed cavalry/infantry units (cohortes equitatae). Some auxilia regiments were designated sagittariorum, meaning they contained archers. The auxilia thus contained almost all the Roman army's cavalry and archers, as well as approximately the same number of foot soldiers. The auxilia were mainly recruited from the peregrini (provincial subjects of the empire who did not hold Roman citizenship), but also admitted Roman citizens and barbari, the Roman term for peoples living outside the empire's borders. Both legions and auxilia were almost all based in frontier provinces, although in varying proportions. The only substantial military force at the immediate disposal of the emperor was the elite Praetorian Guard of c10,000 men , based in Rome. The senior officers of the army were, until the 3rd century, mainly from the Italian aristocracy: senators, the highest order, provided the legati Augusti (provincial governors, who commanded military forces in the province as well as heading the civil administration); legati legionis (legion commanders); and tribuni militum laticlavii (legion deputy commanders); the equites ("knights"), the second order of nobility, provided the governors of Egypt and a few smaller provinces, the praefectus praetorio (commander of the Praetorian Guard), the legions' remaining 5 tribuni militum (senior staff officers) and the praefecti (commanders) of the auxiliary regiments. Both senators and knights combined military service with civilian posts, typically sandwiching 5-10 years in the military between a period of junior administrative posts in Rome and a final period of senior positions in the provinces and Rome.
The close connection between the Italian aristocracy and military command was gradually severed during the 2nd and 3rd centuries. The last Julio-Claudian emperor Nero (r.54-68) was also the last member of an old Roman noble family to hold supreme power. By the end of the 1st century, Italians had largely been replaced in the legion ranks by provincials, especially Illyrians, who dominated the Roman provinces of Pannonia, Dalmatia and Moesia Superior. The latter were originally tough shepherd stock from the Balkan mountains who became the backbone of the Roman army, over half of which was deployed along the Danube frontier. The 3rd century saw the replacement of the Italian aristocracy in the highest command echelons of the military by Illyrian career officers many of whom had risen through the ranks from common soldier, and were granted admission to the aristocratic orders on promotion to the top military commands.[1] Their exclusively military, merit-based careers contrasted with those of the Italian hereditary aristocrats, whose careers had typically mixed military with civilian posts.[2] Eventually, in the later 3rd century, the Illyrian officer caste took over supreme power in the state. The "Illyrian emperors" ruled the empire for over a century. Virtually every emperor from 268 to 379 AD was of Illyrian origin, including the two founders of the 4th century army, Diocletian (284-305) and Constantine I, the Great (312-37). The Roman high command echelons thus became dominated by a distinct ethnic military caste, many of whom were born in the same provinces (several in the same city, Sirmium, a major legionary base in Moesia Superior), had served in the same regiments or were tied by blood or marriage. Government by the aristocracy was replaced by government by a military junta. This trend probably resulted in generally more competent leadership of the armies and saved the empire from disintegration after the mid 3rd century crisis. Although fiercely loyal to Rome, the focus of these emperors was narrow, solely concerned with the needs and interests of the military. They were also divorced from the immensely wealthy Roman aristocratic families that continued to dominate the Senate. This in turn bred a feeling of alienation from the army among the Roman aristocracy which in the later 4th century began to resist the military's exorbitant demands for recruits and supplies.
The 3rd century saw some limited innovations to the 2nd century configuration:
- Septimius Severus (r.197-211) stationed legion II Parthica near Rome from 200 AD onwards, the first legion to be stationed in Italy since Augustus. This, together with the Praetorian Guard and an expanded imperial escort cavalry (equites singulares Augusti) added up to a substantial elite strike force of c20,000 - the equivalent of 3 legions of infantry and 10 alae of cavalry- at the immediate disposal of the emperor.[3]
- The emperor Gallienus (r. 260-8) appears to have deployed in the approaches to northern Italy an escort army consisting of legionary detachments and elite cavalry units.[4] The latter included detached cavalry contingents of some legions (equites promoti), some apparently new Dalmatian cavalry (equites Dalmatarum) and elements of allied cavalry (equites foederati). The whole cavalry element was under the command of single officer called a dux.[5] But both Severus' and Gallienus' armies should probably not be seen as strategic reserves, but rather as enhanced personal protection against usurpers.[6] They were the forerunners of the comitatus (escort armies) of the 4th century.
- A small number of regular units appear in the record, bearing the names of barbarian tribes (as opposed to peregrini tribal names) for the first time. These were clearly foederati (allied troops under a military obligation to Rome) converted into regular units, a trend that was to accelerate in the 4th century e.g. the ala I Sarmatarum attested in Britain, probably composed of some of the 5,500 captured Sarmatian horsemen sent to garrison Hadrian's Wall by emperor Marcus Aurelius in c175.[7]
The mid 3rd century saw the empire plunged into a military and economic crisis which almost resulted in its disintegration. It consisted of a series of military catastrophes in 251-271 when Gaul, the Alpine regions and Italy, the Balkans and the East were simultaneously overrun by Alamanni, Sarmatians, Goths and Persians respectively. At the same time, the Roman army was struggling with the effects of two devastating pandemics, both probably of smallpox. The Antonine Plague of the late 2nd century and the Plague of Cyprian which began in 251 and was still raging in 270, when it claimed the life of emperor Claudius II (r. 268-70). The evidence for the earlier pandemic indicates a mortality of 15-30% in the empire as a whole.[8] The armies would likely have suffered deaths at the top end of the range, due to their close concentration of individuals and frequent movements across the empire. The Cyprian pandemic also created serious manpower shortages, both in the army and agriculture.[9] The recruitment shortfalls that these events must have caused probably resulted in the start of large-scale recruitment of barbarians into the regular army, an important feature of the 4th-century army. In addition, the combination of barbarian devastation and reduced tax-base due to plague bankrupted the imperial government, which resorted to issuing ever more debased coin: the antoninianus, the silver coin used to pay the troops in this period, lost 95% of its silver content between its launch in 215 and its demise in the 260's.[10] This inevitably led to rampant price inflation: the price of wheat under Diocletian was 67 times the typical Principate figure.[11] In turn, this forced the government to resort to levies in kind to provide the armies with sufficient supplies. The burden of these levies inevitably fell disproportionately on already enfeebled frontier provinces.
These trends led to the extensive reforms of government and the army carried out under Diocletian. The latter, a career Illyrian officer, was determined to address what he saw as the failings in the Roman system and to ensure that the army was properly staffed and supplied.
To deal with the perennial problem of usurpers which repeatedly plunged the empire into civil war at immense cost in lives and treasure and were a greater danger to the empire than barbarian invasions, and also to address the problem that the empire was too vast to be governed effectively by one man, he instituted the Tetrarchy. This divided the empire into two halves, East and West, each to be ruled by an Augustus (emperor); each Augustus would in turn appoint a deputy called a Caesar, who would act both as his second-in-command and designated successor. This four-man team would thus have the flexibility to deal with multiple and simultaneous challenges, while also providing a legitimate succession.[12] The system certainly did not prevent usurpations and civil wars, as the career of Constantine I demonstrates: he was himself a usurper and fought major wars against his rivals Maxentius and Licinius. But its core feature, the division of the empire into Eastern and Western halves, each governed by an equal co-emperor, proved enduring.[13]
To deal with the difficulties of finding sufficient recruits, Diocletian introduced regular military conscription of Roman citizens for the first time since the days of the Roman Republic. He also probably decreed that the sons of serving or retired soldiers must follow their fathers into the army, making compulsory a practice that had long been widespread on a voluntary basis.[14] Diocletian's reformed provincial administration, dividing the provinces into smaller units, grouped together into super-divisions called dioceses under a Praetorian Prefect and instituted the system of tax indictiones (tax demands issued in advance of the tax cycle) were all aimed at making more efficient and more equitable the collection of taxes in kind. To deal with the problem of rural depopulation (and consequent loss of food production), he decreed that peasants must register in their home locality and never leave it.[15] (This measure was the origin of the medieval system of tied serfs). In the words of one historian, "Diocletian... turned the entire empire into a regimented logistic base" (to supply the army).[16]
Diocletian divorced military from civil command in some cases. The old legatus Augusti (governor) of the Principate had combined the role of administrative head with that of military commander-in-chief of forces in his province. Now, command of troops in some provinces were entrusted to purely military officers called duces limitis ("border commanders", singular form dux, literally "leader": the origin of the medieval noble rank of duke). However, this was not universally applied. In many provinces, the governor remained in command. Above him, the praefectus praetorio of the diocese remained in overall command of the diocesan military forces.[17] Diocletian and his 3 colleagues also each had a comitatus (escort army) at their disposal. These were probably the origin of the large escort army of Constantine, but under Diocletian they remained informal and small in size and relied on reinforcements from frontier forces for major operations.[18]
The rule of Constantine I saw (a) the expansion of his comitatus into a major and permanent force and (b) the divorce between civil and military commands. (a) The major expansion of the comitatus was achieved by the addition of units withdrawn from the frontier provinces and by creating new units: more cavalry vexillationes and new-style infantry units called auxilia. The expanded comitatus was now placed under the command of two new officers, a magister peditum to command the infantry and magister equitum for cavalry. Comitatus troops were now formally denoted comitatenses to distinguish them from the frontier forces (limitanei) (b) Constantine probably completed the replacement of provincial governors as commanders of military units in their provinces by duces. The Praetorian prefects lost their military command and became purely administrative officials.[19] In addition, Constantine appears to have reorganised the border forces along the Danube, replacing the old-style alae and cohortes with new units of cunei (cavalry)and auxilia (infantry) respectively.[20] It is unclear how the new-style units differed from the old-style ones, but they may have been smaller, perhaps half the size.[21]
The subsequent development of the comitatus is conjectural as our main source, the Notitia Dignitatum, gives us the picture at the end of the 4th century, of the system in its mature form.[22] In 350 there appears to have been three comitatus: in Gaul, Illyricum and the East.[23] However, the establishment of large army groups of 30,000-40,000 men located in the interior of the empire inevitably entailed a substantial drawdown of forces from the frontier regions, even if overall army numbers were increased significantly. This increased the risk of large-scale barbarian incursions. It was probably this factor that led to the detachment, in the later 4th century, from the escort armies of smaller field forces to be based in frontier regions (the regional comitatus) under the command of senior officers called comites (singular form comes, literally "companion" (of the emperor), the origin of the medieval noble rank of count).[24] This was, in effect, a return to the Principate formula of concentrating military forces in border provinces. But, unlike during the Principate, the escort armies remained in existence, now called comitatus praesentales: "escort armies in the presence (of the emperor)".
Army size
The traditional view of scholars is that the 4th century army was much larger than the 2nd century army, perhaps even double the size. The late 6th century writer Agathias, gives a global total of 645,000 effectives for the army "in the old days", presumed to mean when the empire was united.[25] This figure probably includes fleets, giving a total of c600,000 for the army alone. A.H.M. Jones' Later Roman Empire (1964), which contains the fundamental study of the late Roman army, calculated a similar total of 600,000 (exc. fleets) by applying his own estimates of unit strength to the units listed in the Notitia Dignitatum.[26] Since then, estimates have ranged from 400,000-600,000[27]
Jones' figure of 600,000 is based on assumptions about unit strengths which are probably too high. This especially concerns limitanei units (there is less dispute about the size of comitatus units, for which there is more available evidence). Examples: (a) Jones calculated unit strengths in Egypt under Diocletian using papyrus evidence of unit payrolls. But a rigorous reassessment of the evidence by R. Duncan-Jones concluded that Jones had overestimated unit sizes by 2-5 times.[28] (b) Jones estimated legions on the frontiers (as opposed to field army legions of 1,000 men) at c3,000 men:[29] But Duncan-Jones' revisions and other evidence suggest that frontier legions probably did not exceed 500.[30] A much lower total for the late army is also indicated by the other global figure from ancient sources, that of the 6th century writer John Lydus of 389,704 (excluding fleets) for the army of Diocletian. Lydus' figure is accorded greater credibility than Agathias' by scholars because of its precision (implying that it was found in an official document) and the fact that it is ascribed to a specific time period.[31]
It is therefore likely that the size of the late army was at the lower end of the range of estimates. Elton's recent detailed study of the late army estimates the most likely size of the army under Constantine (when the 4th century army's size is widely considered to have peaked) at 450,000 men inc. fleets [32] i.e. c410,000 for land forces only. If one applies the modern estimates of unit sizes given in the table below to the list of Notitia units, a total army size of c350,000 results (200,000 for the Eastern army in c395 and 150,000 for the Western army in c410-25) (see Command Organisation charts below). This is consistent with 410,000 for the Constantinian army, if one takes account the big losses to the West due to the barbarian invasions of 405-6. At this level, it would be similar in size to the 2nd century army and below its 3rd century peak under Septimius Severus. On the basis of the most recent work on auxilia numbers in the 2nd century, the likely progression in the Roman army's numbers may be summarised as follows:
| Army corps | Tiberius 24 AD |
Hadrian ca. 130 AD |
S. Severus 211 AD |
Diocletian Start 284 AD |
Diocletian Mid rule ca. 300 |
Constantine End rule 337 |
| LEGIONS | 125,000[33] | 155,000[34] | 182,000[35] | |||
| AUXILIA | 125,000[36] | 218,000[37] | 250,000[38] | |||
| PRAETORIAN GUARD | ~~5,000[39] | ~10,000[40] | ~10,000 | |||
| Total Roman Army | 255,000[41] | 383,000[42] | 442,000[43] | 350,000?[44] | 390,000[45] | 410,000[46] |
NOTE: Figures are based on official (not actual) unit strengths and exclude Roman navy effectives and barbarian foederati.
Furthermore, the 410,000 estimate is proposed as the army's official strength. In reality, units were in practice always under-strength. The available evidence for the 4th century indicates that actual numbers may have been on average only about two-thirds of official.[47] Thus the Constantinian army may not in reality have deployed more than c275,000 men at any given time. Elton suggests 300,000 as the minimum figure, inc. fleets.[48] In the 2nd century, it appears that units were normally manned at a higher 80-90% of official strength.[49] Therefore, the 2nd century army may have been considerably larger than the late army in terms of actual number of troops deployed at any given moment.
Army structure
The later 4th century army contained three types of army group: (1) Imperial escort armies (comitatus praesentales). These were ordinarily based near the imperial capitals (Milan in the West, Constantinople in the East), but often accompanied the emperors on campaign. (2) Regional interception armies (comitatus). These were based in strategic regions, but normally well to the rear of the frontier. (3) Border armies (exercitus limitanei). These were based on the frontiers themselves. This configuration differed radically from that of the 2nd century, when the vast bulk of the army, both legions and auxilia, were stationed on the frontiers.
Types (1) and (2) are often undifferentiated by scholars, and both frequently defined as "mobile field armies". This is because they are both called comitatus (type 2 having evolved from type 1) and both contained the same types of unit. But their strategic role was quite different. The escort armies' primary role was to provide the emperor's ultimate insurance against usurpers:[50] the very existence of such a powerful force would deter many potential rivals, and if it did not, the escort army alone was often sufficient to defeat them. Their secondary role was to accompany the emperor on major campaigns such as a foreign war or to repel a major barbarian invasion.[51] The regional comitatus, on the other hand, had the task of intercepting medium-sized barbarian incursions into the region that the border forces were unable to block on their own.[52]
Command structure
The command structures of the Eastern and Western armies of the empire, as recorded in the Notitia Dignitatum, are represented diagramatically in the organisation charts (right). The eastern section of the Notitia is dated to c395, at the death of Theodosius I. The western section was completed later, in the 420's, after the West had been overrun by barbarian tribes.
By the end of the 4th century, there were 3 comitatus praesentales: 2 in the East and 1 in the West. The two Eastern armies wintered near Constantinople at Nicaea and Nicomedia and the Western army was usually based in the Po valley near Milan. Each was commanded by a magister militum ("master of soldiers", the highest military rank, also known as magister peditum or equitum: these titles had lost their literal meaning and were no longer related to infantry or cavalry). The magistri all reported direct to their respective emperors. Each was assisted by a deputy called a vicarius.[53]
In the East, there were 3 major regional comitatus, also with apparently settled winter bases: Oriens (based at Antioch), Thraciae (Marcianopolis), Illyricum (Sirmium) plus two smaller forces in Aegyptus (Alexandria) and Isauria. The large comitatus were commanded by magistri, the smaller ones by comites. All five reported direct to the emperor. This structure remained essentially intact in the East Roman army until the 6th century.[54]
In the West, there were 6 regional comitatus. By far the largest was in Gaul (Trier), under a magister equitum (literally "master of cavalry", although his army was composed mainly of infantry). The others were in West Illyricum (Sirmium), Britain, Spain, Tingitania and Africa, all under comites.[55] All these officers reported to the magister in Italy, who was effectively supreme commander of the Western army: holders of the post such as the barbarian-born Stilicho and Ricimer acquired the even higher title of magister utriusque militiae ("master of both services" i.e. of cavalry and infantry). In practice, however, it is likely that the comites of Britain and Spain reported to the magister in Gaul.
Under the regional comitatus commanders were the duces, commanders of the limitanei (border forces).
It is important to bear in mind that the western section of the Notitia Dignitatum was drawn up in the 420's in the chaotic conditions caused by the great barbarian invasion of Gaul in 406. It therefore represents a reporting structure and force distribution that was probably very different from that of 350 to 395. It is likely that in the earlier era, the two magistri (Italy and Gaul) were equal and that they and the comites reported direct to the emperor as in the East. After 395, the Western throne was occupied by an infant, Honorius (emperor), and power was exercised by the barbarian-born magister Stilicho, who established the supremacy of his office. By the 420's the border forces of the Rhine had been stripped of regiments to reinforce the Gaul comitatus as pseudocomitatenses.[56] The forces in Britain must refer to the position before 410, when the island was finally evacuated by the Roman army. Even then, the British forces are probably much lower than in the mid 4th century, as they had been denuded of troops to support the imperial ambitions of usurpers Magnus Maximus and Constantine III: they amount to only c18,000 men (in the 2nd century, c55,000 had been stationed in Britain).[57]
Unit structure
(2) The changes to unit structure in the 4th century were (a) reduction of unit sizes and increase in unit numbers; (b) establishment of new unit types; (c) establishment of a hierarchy of units more complex than the old one of legions and auxilia.
Under Diocletian, the number of legions, and probably of other units, appears to have more than doubled. But it is unlikely that overall army size increased as unit strengths appear to have been reduced, in some cases drastically. For example, there are legions in the mid-4th century that are documented with just 1,000 effectives, less than a fifth of their 2nd-century strength.[58]
Unit types also became more varied. Alongside the traditional legiones, alae and cohortes, there appear several new unit types, such as schola, vexillationes, cuneus and equites for the cavalry, and milites, numerus and auxilia (not to be confused with Principate-era auxilia) for the infantry.
The strength of old and new-style units is very uncertain, and may have varied during the 4th century. Size may also have varied depending on the grade of the unit. The table below gives some recent estimates of unit strength, by unit type and grade:
| Cavalry unit type |
Grade: palatini |
Grade: comitatenses |
Grade: limitanei |
XXXXX | Infantry unit type |
Grade: palatini |
Grade: comitatenses |
Grade: limitanei |
| Ala | 120-300 | Auxilia | 800-1,000 | 400-600 | 200-300 | |||
| Cuneus | 200-300 | Cohors | 160-300 | |||||
| Equites | 500 | 80-300 | Legio | 800-1,200 | 800-1,200 | 500 | ||
| Schola | 500 | X | X | Milites | 500 | 200-300 | ||
| Vexillatio | 400-600 | 400-600 | X | Numerus | 1,000 | 200-300 |
Note: X = unit type not known at that grade; blank = no estimate available
In tandem with the structural changes, the army's units appear to have been divided into 3 grades, originally based on which type of army they belonged to, but eventually based on quality and status:[60] The grade of a unit would determine its level of pay.
- palatini, elite troops, normally serving in the comitatus praesentales (imperial escort armies). These included the Scholae Palatinae (imperial horse guard units).
- comitatenses, higher-grade troops, normally serving in the regional comitatus
- limitanei or ripenses, lower-grade troops, normally serving in the limites (border protection forces). In the past, it was generally thought that the limitanei were a part-time militia of local farmers, of poor combat capability.[61] In reality, they were full-time professionals.[62] Indeed, it was forbidden by law for them to work in the fields or herd animals.[63] The view that limitanei were low-quality derives primarily from references in the legal codes, but it is unlikely that these give a balanced picture. Indeed, given that the limitanei were charged with combating the incessant small-scale barbarian raids that were the empire's enduring security problem,[64] it is likely that their combat capability and experience were high. This was demonstrated at the siege of Amida (359) where the besieged frontier legions resisted the Persians with great skill and tenacity.[65]Most likely, they differed from higher-grade troops in that they were not trained for large-scale formation manoeuvres. Nonetheless, limitanei units often joined the comitatenses armies on campaign.[66]
Over time, the link between a unit's grade and the type of army it belonged to was severed. At the end of the 4th century, we find palatini units serving in the regional comitatus, and comitatenses units in the praesentales armies. There were also limitanei units attached to praesental and regional comitatus, classified as pseudocomitatenses. There are no clear rules as to which unit type belonged to which grade (except that scholae were always palatini).[67] For example, new-style auxilia units could be either auxilia palatina - some of the best units in the late army[68] or border units.
Even within grades, units were ranked into seniores and iuniores, although this does not appear to have reflected any significant difference in quality.[69]
Rank structure
At the bottom end of the rank pyramid were the common soldiers: pedes (infantryman) and eques (cavalryman). Junior officer grades in old-style units (legiones, alae and cohortes) remained the same as under the Principate up to and including centurion and decurion. In the new-style units, (vexillationes, auxilia, etc), ranks with quite different names are attested.[70] So little is known about these ranks that it is impossible to equate them with the traditional ranks with any certainty. Vegetius states that the ducenarius commanded, as the name implies, 200 men. If so, the centenarius may be the equivalent of a centurion in the old-style units.[71] But Vegetius is not a reliable source: for example he seems to state that 4th century infantry rarely wore body armour. This is clearly contradicted by the archaeological record.[72] Probably the most accurate comparison is by the known pay level:
| Multiple of basic pay (2nd c.) or annona (4th c.) |
Ascending ranks: 2nd c. cohors (ala) |
Ascending ranks: New-style units |
| 1 | pedes (eques) | pedes (eques) |
| 1.5 | tesserarius (sesquiplicarius) |
semissalis |
| 2 | signifer optio (curator) vexillarius |
circitor biarchus |
| 2.5 to 5 | centurio (decurio) beneficiarius |
centenarius (2.5) ducenarius (3.5) senator (4) primicerius (5) |
NOTE: Ranks correspond only in order and pay scale, not necessarily in function
A significant innovation of the 4th century was the corps of protectores. Cadet senior officers that were given a commission by the emperor were initially given the rank of protector. Although protectores were supposed to be soldiers who had risen through the ranks by meritorious service, it became a widespread practice to admit to the corps young men from outside the army (often the sons of senior officers). The protectores formed a corps that was both an officer training school and pool of staff officers available to carry out special tasks for the magistri militum and the emperor (as protectores domestici). For example, protectores might be detailed to supervise recruitment for the army; carry out inspections of goods on public highways; arrest important persons; or supervise fortification works. The protectores domestici were organised in 4 scholae under a comes domesticorum. After a few years' service in the corps, a protector would normally be promoted to command a military regiment.[74]
Regimental commanders were known by one of three possible titles: tribunus, praefectus or praepositus. Tribunus was the most common title and was often used loosely to mean the commander of any unit. Strictly speaking, the commanders of scholae, vexillationes, auxilia, legiones palatinae and cohortes were called tribuni.[75]
Recruitment
Romans
During the Principate, it appears that most recruits, both legionary and auxiliary, were volunteers (voluntarii). Compulsory conscription (dilectus) was never wholly abandoned, but was generally only used in emergencies or before major campaigns when large numbers of additional troops were required.[76] In marked contrast, the late army relied mainly on compulsion for its recruitment of Roman citizens. Firstly, the sons of serving soldiers (and officers) or veterans were required by law to enlist. This rule existed in 313 and was probably decreed by Diocletian. Secondly, Diocletian appears to have instituted a regular annual conscription linked to the annual assessment of land tax. Depending on the amount of land tax due on his estates, a landowner (or group of landowners) would be required to provide a commensurate number of recruits to the army (in some provinces, in some years, the conscription requirement was commuted into a cash levy, at a fixed rate per recruit due). Conscripts recruited under this system were thus exclusively the sons of peasants, as opposed to townspeople.[77]
Prospective recruits had to undergo an examination. As in the Principate, slaves were not admissible. Nor were freedmen and persons in certain occupations. In addition, provincial officials and curiales (city council members) could not enlist. These rules were relaxed only in emergencies, as during the military crisis of 405-6 (Radagaisus' invasion of Italy and the great barbarian invasion of Gaul). Recruits had to be 20-25 years of age, a range that was extended to 19-35 in the later 4th century. Recruits had to be physically fit and meet the traditional minimum height requirement of 5ft 10in (6 Roman feet) until 367, when it was reduced to 5ft 7in.[78]
Once a recruit was accepted, he had to undergo branding to facilitate recognition if he attempted to desert. The recruit was then issued with an identification disk (which was worn around the neck) and a certificate of enlistment (probatoria). He was then assigned to a unit. A law of 375 required those with superior fitness to be assigned to the comitatenses. A law of Constantine decreed that the son of a cavalryman had the right to enrol in a cavalry regiment if he brought his own horse.[79] In the 4th century, the minimum length of service was 20 years (24 years in some limitanei units).[80] This compares with 25 years in the Principate army.
The widespread use of conscription, the compulsory recruitment of soldiers' sons, the relaxation of age and height requirements and the branding of recruits all add up to a picture of an army that had severe difficulties in finding, and retaining, sufficient recruits. Recruitment difficulties are confirmed in the legal code evidence: there are measures to deal with cases of self-mutilation to avoid military service (such as cutting off a thumb), including an extreme decree of 386 requiring such persons to be burnt alive.[81] It is also supported by the evidence that late army units were typically one third under-strength.[82] Desertion was clearly a serious problem, and was probably much worse than in the Principate army, since the latter was mainly a volunteer army. This is supported by the 4th century practice of branding recruits and the fact that the granting of leave of absence (commeatus) was more strictly regulated: in the 2nd century, a soldier's leave was granted at the discretion of his regimental commander;[83] in the 4th century, leave could only be granted by a far senior corps commander (dux, comes or magister militum) and regimental commanders were forbidden by imperial decree to grant leave to their men on pain of severe penalties.[84]
Barbarians
Barbari ("barbarians") was the generic term used by the Romans to denote peoples resident beyond the borders of the empire, and best translates as "foreigners" (it is derived from a Greek word meaning "to babble": a reference to their outlandish tongues).
Most scholars believe that the regular auxilia recruited significant numbers of barbari throughout their history.[85] However, there is little evidence of this before the 3rd century: the scant evidence suggests that the vast majority, if not all, of auxilia were Roman peregrini (second-class citizens).[86] Indeed, it is not impossible that the 1st and 2nd century auxilia were recruited from inhabitants of the Roman empire only. In any case, the 4th century army was probably much more dependent on barbarian recruitment than its 1st/2nd c. predecessor. The evidence for this may be summarised as follows:
- The Notitia lists a number of barbarian military settlements in the empire. Known as laeti or gentiles ("natives"), these were an important source of recruits for the army. Groups of Germanic or Sarmatian tribespeople were granted land to settle in the Empire, in return for military service. Most likely each community was under a treaty obligation to supply a specified number of troops to the army each year.[87] The resettlement within the empire of barbarian tribespeople in return for military service was not a new phenomenon in the 4th century: it stretches back to the days of Augustus. [88] But it does appear that the establishment of military settlements was more systematic and on a much larger scale in the 4th century.
- The Notitia lists a large number of units with barbarian names. This was probably the result of the transformation of irregular allied units serving under their own native officers (known as socii, or foederati) into regular formations. During the Principate, regular units with barbarian names are not attested until the 3rd century and even then rarely. (e.g. the ala I Sarmatarum attested in 3rd century Britain,[89] doubtless an offshoot of the Sarmatian horsemen posted there in 175).
- The emergence of significant numbers of senior officers with barbarian names in the regular army, and eventually in the high command itself. In the early 5th century, the Western Roman forces were often controlled by barbarian-born generals, such as Arbogast, Stilicho and Ricimer.
- The adoption by the 4th century army of barbarian (especially Germanic) dress, customs and culture, suggesting enhanced barbarian influence. For example, Roman army units adopted mock barbarian names (e.g. Cornuti = "horned ones", a reference to the German custom of attaching horns to their helmets) and the barritus, a German warcry.[90]
Quantification of the proportion of barbarian-born troops in the 4th century army is highly speculative due to the lack of any substantial evidence such as that provided by military diplomas for the 2nd century. Elton has the most detailed analysis of the meagre evidence. According to this, 23% of the sample of army officers was barbarian-born in the period 350-400. Analysis by decade shows that this proportion did not increase over the period, or indeed in the early 5th c.[91] The latter trend implies that the proportion of barbarians in the lower ranks was not much greater, otherwise the proportion of barbarian officers would have increased over time to reflect that.
If the proportion of barbarians was in the region of 25%, then it is probably a much higher proportion than in the 2nd century regular army: if the same proportion had been recruited into the auxilia of the 2nd century army (the legions were closed to non-citizens), that would imply that barbarians would have constituted c42% of recruits to the auxilia, since the latter constituted 60% of the regular land army. There is no evidence that recruitment of barbarians was on such a large scale in the 2nd century.
A substantial majority of barbarian recruits were Germanic: Franks, Alamanni, Saxons, Goths, and Vandals are attested in the Notitia unit names. An analysis of named soldiers of non-Roman origin shows that 75% are Germanic.[92] Other significant sources of recruits were the Sarmatians from the Danubian lands; and Armenians, and Iberians from the Caucasus region.[93] In contrast to Roman recruits, the vast majority of barbarian recruits were probably volunteers, drawn by conditions of service and career prospects that to them probably appeared desirable, in contrast to their living conditions at home. A minority of barbarian recruits were enlisted by compulsion, namely dediticii (barbarians who surrendered to the Roman authorities, often to escape strife with neighbouring tribes) and tribes who were defeated by the Romans, and obliged, as a condition of peace, to undertake to provide a specified number of recruits annually.[94]
Foederati
Outside the regular army were substantial numbers of allied forces, generally known as foederati (from foedus = "treaty") or symmachi in the East. The latter were forces supplied either by barbarian chiefs under their treaty of alliance with Rome or by tribes surrendering to the Romans (dediticii).[95] Such forces were employed by the Romans throughout imperial history: the battle scenes from Trajan's Column in Rome show that foederati troops played an important part in the Dacian Wars (101-6 AD).[96] It is uncertain whether the 4th c. army employed greater numbers of foederati than the 2nd c. army before Adrianople in 378. What does appear to be new is the large number of foederati numeri converted into regular army formations in the 4th c. After that battle, it became the practice of the Western empire to accept entire tribal groups as foederati which the imperial authorities were unable to expel.
In times when they were needed, or on a regular basis, the ally would supply troops to support Roman operations. Normally their service would be limited to the region where the tribe lived, but sometimes could be deployed elsewhere.[97] In the 4th century, these forces were organised into units based on a single ethnic group loosely called numeri ("troops", although numerus was also the name of a regular infantry unit).[98] They served alongside the regular army for the duration of particular campaigns or for a specified period. They were commanded by their own leaders. It is unclear whether they used their own weapons and armour or the standard equipment of the Roman army. The more useful and long-serving numeri appear to have been absorbed into the regular army, rapidly becoming indistinguishable from other units.
Conditions of service
Pay and benefits
Vorlage:FixHTML Vorlage:Externalimage Vorlage:FixHTML The 4th century soldier's remuneration consisted of an annual cash salary (stipendium); food rations (annona), which were paid in kind or in cash equivalent (always the latter from the late 4th c.): in addition cavalrymen received a fodder allowance (capitus) probably worth the same as the annona; an equipment allowance to cover clothes and maybe armour and weapons; a cash bonus (donativum) paid on the accession of a new emperor and every five years thereafter; and a discharge bonus (praemium). Excluding the salary, the cash equivalent of all these emoluments has been calculated by Elton at 6 solidi (gold pieces) per annum for a common soldier.[102]
Using Elton's methodology, it is a useful exercise to compare this remuneration with that of an early 2nd century soldier:
| Item | 2nd c. legionary amount |
2nd c. legionary annualised |
2nd c. auxiliary amount |
2nd c. auxiliary amount |
XXX | miles c300: amount |
miles c300: annualised |
| Stipendium (salary) | 18 p.a. | 18 | 15 p.a. | 15 | 2 p.a.* | 2 | |
| Annona (food allowance) | none | none | 4 p.a. | 4 | |||
| Equipment allowance | none | none | 6 once | 0.25 | |||
| Donativa (cash bonuses) | 4.5 every three yrs | 1.5 | prob. none | 5 every five yrs | 1 | ||
| Praemia (discharge bonus) | 180 once | 7.5 | prob. none | 18 once | 0.75 | ||
| TOTAL | 27 | 15 | 8 |
NOTE: All values in Diocletianic aurei solidi. Principate aureus converted at rate 1 aureus (1/40 lb of gold) = 1.5 solidi (1/60 lb of gold). * Salary in Diocletian's time of 1,800 denarii, converted at then official rate of 1 solidus = 1,000 denarii[104]
The above comparison is valid as the value of gold was very stable throughout the period.[105] The comparison may, however, suffer some distortion from uncertainties about deductions e.g. were soldiers in either era expected to pay the cost of armour and weapons (as opposed to clothes, which were deducted in both periods) from their salary/allowances or were these provided free by the army?
However, the overall picture is clear: the 4th c. soldier was far worse paid than his 2nd century legionary counterpart.[106] Even if comparison is made with a 2nd c. auxiliary, the 4th c. soldier is worse off. The Principate auxiliaries' salary was typically 20% less than a legionary's and they probably were not paid the valuable donativa and praemia (the discharge bonus for an auxiliary was the grant of Roman citizenship, with its related tax privileges).[107] Nevertheless, the 2nd c. auxiliary still remains about twice as well paid as the 4th c. trooper. In terms of disposable income (i.e. income after paying food and equipment), a 4th c. soldier had only 3 solidi per year, compared to 15.25 for a 2nd c. legionary and 11.25 for an auxiliary. Indeed the 4th c. soldier's disposable income considedrably diminished over the century: under Constantine I, the gold content of the solidus was reduced from 60 to 72 to the pound (a 20% devaluation). In addition, the salary was continually eroded by inflation and appears to have been rarely paid after 350 AD.[108]
However, retired veterans were granted important tax privileges. In the Principate, auxiliary veterans were granted Roman citizenship, which carried exemption from direct taxes (tributum): poll tax (tributum capitis) and other imposts. With the grant of Roman citizenship to all the free inhabitants of the empire in 212, citizens' exemption from tributum was abolished. But it was retained for military veterans. In the 4th century, veterans were exempt from poll tax, customs and market dues. They were also exempt from corvées (compulsory labour for the state). Finally, if they owned land, they were not subject to curial duties (i.e. service in the town councils, which was extremely unpopular, as it was unpaid and indeed expensive, as curiales were expected to pay for public works and events out of their own pockets).[109]
The question arises of how attractive the rewards of service were. Despite the disparity with the Principate, Jones and Elton argue that 4th c. remuneration was attractive compared to the subsistence level existence that an average peasant had to endure.[110] Against that has to be set the clear unpopularity of military service: the late army had to rely largely on conscription, while the 2nd c. army was able to find sufficient volunteers to meet recruitment requirements.
As in the Principate army, pay levels varied according to the unit's position in the military hierarchy. In the Principate, pay levels were (in descending order) Praetorian Guard, legions, auxilia. In the late army, the top of the pyramid were the scholae elite cavalry regiments.[111] Next came palatini units, then comitatenses, and finally limitanei. There is little evidence about the pay differentials between grades.
Differentials between junior officer grades are given in the rank table, above. Senior officer differentials are largely unknown. Protectores domestici (cadet officers attached to the emperor) received 6 annonae and 6 capitus (12 times a common soldier) and so presumably tribuni (regimental commanders) received more than this. Duces (border army commanders) were paid 50 annonae and 50 capitus, amounting to 100 times that of a common soldier. Thus comites and magistri militum (field marshals) were presumably paid even more.[112]
Accommodation
Comitatus troops and border troops had different accommodation arrangements. Most border units were based in forts as were their predecessors, the auxiliary regiments of the Principate (indeed, in the same forts, in many cases)[113]. Some of the larger limitanei units (legiones and vexillationes) were based in cities, probably in permanent barracks.[114]
Comitatus troops were also based in cities (when not on campaign: then they would be in temporary camps). But it seems that did not usally occupy purpose-built accommodation like the city-based limitanei. From the legal evidence, it seems they were normally compulsorily billeted in private houses (hospitalitas).[115] This is because they often wintered in different provinces: the comitatus praesentales accompanied their respective emperors on campaign. However, in the 5th century, emperors campaigned more rarely in person, so the praesentales became more static in their winter base: It is therefore possible that permanent barracks were established in these cities.
Having troops occupying rooms in private houses was obviously an unpopular burden, and exemption from hospitalitas was a sought-after privilege (among others, clergy, doctors, teachers and fabrica workers were exempt).[116] There are several imperial decrees regulating the behaviour of billeted troops. Landlords were only obliged to provide empty rooms and no furniture, food or other services could be demanded without payment. In practice, however, it seems that landlords were frequently bullied by their guests into providing such services free of charge.[117] However, there was a positive side: the presence of a large number of troops with relatively substantial spending power was an important economic boost for the host cities.[118]
Equipment
The 4th century soldier's attire, armour and weapons developed in significant respects from those of the 2nd century, although there were no radical innovations. Much of the evolution took place during the 3rd century. Trends included the adoption of warmer clothing; the disappearance of distinctive legionary armour and weapons; the adoption by the infantry of equipment used by the cavalry in the earlier period; and the greater use of heavily armoured cavalry called cataphracts.
In the 1st and 2nd centuries, a Roman soldier's clothes consisted of a single-piece, short-sleeved tunic whose hem reached the knees and special hobnailed sandals (caligae). This attire, which left the arms and legs bare, had evolved in a Mediterranean climate and was not suitable for northern Europe in cold weather. Already in the 2nd century, socks were commonly worn inside the caligae; and caligae were increasingly replaced by fully-enclosed laced boots. During the 3rd century, the tunic became long-sleeved and trousers (bracae), a barbarian attire long derided by earlier Romans as effeminate, were increasingly worn.[119]
Legionary soldiers of the 1st and 2nd centuries had exclusive use of the following: (a) the lorica segmentata or laminated-strip cuirass which was a complex piece of armour which provided superior protection to the other types of Roman armour, chain mail (lorica hamata) and scale armour (lorica squamata). Testing of modern replicas have demonstrated that this kind of armour was impenetrable to most direct and missile strikes. It was, however, uncomfortable: reenactors have discovered that chafing renders it painful to wear for longer than a few hours at a time. It was also expensive to produce and difficult to maintain.[120] (b) the scutum, a convex rectangular shield renowned for allowing troops to lock shields protectively in battle, such as the testudo formation; (c) the pilum, a special kind of javelin. This distinctive legionary equipment seems to have disappeared during the 3rd century, as legions adopted the equipment of the Principate auxiliary forces: chain mail, oval shield (clipeus) and spear (hasta).
The gladius, a short (median length: 460 mm) stabbing-sword that was designed for close-quarters fighting, and was standard for the Principate infantry (both legionary and auxiliary), also was phased out during the 3rd century. The infantry adopted the spatha, a longer (median length: 960mm) sword that during the earlier centuries was used by the cavalry only.[121]
In the 1st and 2nd centuries, the standard design of the Roman infantry helmet is today called the "Imperial Gallic" type: its essential features were a single-piece bowl with reinforced front to resist downward sword-thrusts, a wide neck-guard at a shallow angle and large, hinged cheek-guards. However, the front of the face and ears were left uncovered, to allow maximum field of vision and range of hearing.[122] This inevitably entailed frequent facial injuries.[123] The cavalry version of the Imperial Gallic differed in having extended cheek-guards that covered the ears and neck-guards that were much longer and more steeply-angled but also narrower than the infantry helmet: these features were designed to give more protection to the rear and sides of the head, which were more likely to receive blows in cavalry mêlées than in an infantry line. This was achieved, however, at the expense of poorer vision and hearing.[124] During the 3rd century, infantry helmets adopted these cavalry features, and added additional protective features such as nose-guards, and in some cases, even face-guards of mail or metal piece with eye-holes.[125] Later helmets were also predominantly of the "Intercisa" design: the bowl was made of two separate pieces joined by a ridge in the middle.[126]
In addition to his fighting-spear (hasta, used for stabbing), a late foot soldier might also carry a throwing-spear (lancea), or a couple of short javelins and some lead-weighted throwing-darts called plumbatae (from plumbum = "lead", also mattiobarbula). These distinctive late missiles had an effective range of ca. 30m, well beyond that of a javelin. The darts were carried clipped to the back of the shield.[127] The late foot soldier thus had greater missile capability than his Principate predecessor, who was limited to one pilum.[128]
The late Roman army contained a significant number of heavily armoured cavalry called cataphracti (from the Greek kataphraktos, meaning "covered all over"). These were covered from neck to foot by scale and/or lamellar, and their horses were often armoured also. Cataphracts carried a long, heavy lance called a contus, ca. 3.65m long, that was held in both hands.[129] Some also carried bows. The central tactic of cataphracts was the shock charge, which aimed to break the enemy line by concentrating overwhelming force on a defined section of it. This type of cavalry had been developed by the Iranic horse-based nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppes from the 6th-century BC onwards: the Scythians and their kinsmen the Sarmatians. The type was adopted by the Parthians in the 1st century BC and later by the Romans,[130] who needed it to counter Parthians in the East and the Sarmatians along the Danube. The first Roman cataphracts to appear in the archaeological record are the men of the ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum cataphractaria, attested in Pannonia in the early 2nd century.[131] Although Roman cataphracts were not new to the 4th century, they increased significantly in numbers in that century, with most stationed in the East.[132] Almost all cataphract units belonged to the comitatus armies. A type of cataphract called a clibanarius also appears in the 4th century record. This term is believed derived from Greek klibanos (a bread oven) or from a Persian word. It is unclear whether clibanarius is simply an alternative term to cataphract, or a special type of cataphract. It is possible that the term, which may refer to the build-up of heat in enclosed armour,[133] implies the use of a single-piece enclosed helmet (similar to a medieval great helm) with slit-opening for the eyes.[134]
Archer units, both mounted and infantry, are denoted in the Notitia by the term sagittariorum ("of archers" from sagitta = "arrow"). This is the same term as used in the Principate. As in the Principate, it is likely that many non-sagittariorum regiments also contained some archers. Mounted archers appear to have been exclusively in light cavalry units.[135]
Overall, the 4th c. army gives the impression of being more concerned with protecting its soldiers' safety than in the early Principate: more protective helmet design, heavily armoured cavalry. The infantry's abandonment of the gladius in favour of the longer spatha implies the demotion of the sword as the primary weapon in close-order combat in favour of the thrusting-spear.[136] Combined with the soldier's enhanced missile capability, the pattern is of greater emphasis on killing the enemy "at arm's length". As mentioned, the differences in equipment between the 4th c. army and its 2nd c. predecessor were established during the 3rd century. The latter was a period of crisis for the army: depopulation due to plague combined with huge losses on the battlefield and the destruction of soldiers' standards of living by inflation led to acute recruitment problems. This in turn made preserving soldiers' lives a greater priority than previously.
Fortifications
Compared to the 1st and 2nd centuries, the 3rd and 4th centuries saw greater fortification activity, with many new forts built.[137] Later Roman fortifications, both new and upgraded old ones, contained much stronger defensive features than their earlier counterparts.[138] In addition, the late 3rd/4th centuries saw the fortification of many towns and cities.
Roman forts of the 1st/2nd centuries, whether castra legionaria (inaccurately translated as legionary "fortresses") or auxiliary forts, were clearly residential bases that were not designed to withstand attack. The typical rectangular "playing-card" shape, the long, thin and low walls and shallow ditch and the unfortified gates were non-defensible features whose purpose was delimitation and keeping out intruders.[139]
In contrast, later forts were built to much higher defensive specifications, including the following features:
- Deeper (average: 3m) and much wider (av. 10m) perimeter ditches (fossae). These would have flat floors rather than the traditional V-shape.[140] Such ditches would make it difficult to bring siege equipment (ladders, rams, and other engines) to the walls. It would also concentrate attackers in an enclosed area where they would be exposed to missile fire from the walls.[141]
- Higher (av. 9m) and thicker (av. 3m) walls. Walls were made of stone or stone facing with rubble core. The greater thickness would protect the wall from enemy mining. The height of the walls would force attackers to use scaling-ladders. The parapet of the rampart would have crenellations to provide protection from missiles for defenders.[142]
- Higher (av. 17.5m) and projecting corner and interval towers. These would enable enfilading fire on attackers. Towers were normally round or half-round, and only rarely square as the latter were less defensible. Towers would be normally be spaced at 30m intervals on circuit walls.[143]
- Gate towers, one on each side of the gate and projecting out from the gate to allow defenders to shoot into the area in front of the entrance. The gates themselves were normally wooden with metal covering plates to prevent destruction by fire. Some gates had portcullises. Postern gates were built into towers or near them to allow sorties.[144]
More numerous than new-build forts were old forts upgraded to higher defensive specifications. Thus the two parallel ditches common around earlier forts could be joined by excavating the ground between them. Projecting towers were added. Gates were either rebuilt with projecting towers or sealed off by constructing a large rectangular bastion. The walls were strengthened by doubling the old thickness. Upgraded forts were generally much larger than new-build. New forts were rarely over one hectare in size and were normally placed to fill gaps between old forts and towns.[145] However, not all of the old forts that continued to be used in the 4th century were upgraded e.g. the forts on Hadrian's Wall and some other forts in Britannia were not significantly modified.[146]
The main features of late Roman fortification clearly presage those of medieval castles. But Isaac cautions that the defensibility of late Roman forts must not be exaggerated. Late Roman forts were not always located on defensible sites, such as hilltops and they were not designed as independent logistic facilities where the garrison could survive on internal supplies (water in cisterns or from wells and stored food) for a long period. They remained bases for troops that would sally out and engage the enemy in the field.[147]
Nevertheless, the benefits of defensible forts are evident: they could act as temporary refuges for overwhelmed local troops during barbarian incursions, while they waited for reinforcememnts. The forts were difficult for the barbarians to take by assault, as they generally lacked the necessary equipment. The forts could store sufficient supplies to enable the defenders to hold out for a few days, and to supply relieving troops. They could also act as bases from which defenders could make sorties against isolated groups of barbarians and to cooperate with relieving forces.[148]
What is less clear is why the 4th century army needed forts with such defensive features that the 2nd century army apparently did not. E. Luttwak argues that defensible forts were an integral feature of a 4th century defence-in-depth "grand strategy", while in the 2nd century "preclusive defence" rendered such forts unnecessary (see Strategy, below). But the existence of such "strategies" appear to lack any evidential basis.[149] The most obvious explanation for defensible forts is simply that in the 4th century there was a much higher incidence of successful barbarian incursions into the empire than in the 2nd century (although the evidence is insufficient to prove this). Traditionally, it has been argued that during the 2nd/3rd centuries, barbarian society, especially in Germania Libera, changed: the small, fragmented tribes of the 1st century coalesced into much larger confederations, such as the Franks and Alamanni, that could assemble much larger raiding forces and were thus more dangerous to the empire.[150] Another possible factor is that the late army was less effective in preventing and/or repelling such incursions than in the earlier period. This in turn may have been caused by the reduction of forces on the frontier to create and man the comitatus praesentales (imperial escort armies). The latter were generally based too far from the borders to be of any use in intercepting in a timely way a significant incursion.[151]
Strategy and Tactics
Strategy
Edward Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976) launched the thesis that in the 3rd and early 4th centuries, the empire's defence strategy mutated from "forward defence" (or "preclusive defence") in the Principate to "defence-in-depth" in the 4th century.
According to this view, the Principate army had relied on neutralising imminent barbarian incursions before they reached the imperial borders. This was achieved by stationing units (both legions and auxiliary regiments) right on the border and establishing and garrisoning strategic salients beyond the borders (such as the Agri Decumates in SW Germany. The response to any threat would thus be a pincer movement into barbarian territory: large infantry and cavalry forces from the border bases would immediately cross the border to intercept the coalescing enemy army; simultaneously the enemy would be attacked from behind by crack Roman cavalry (alae) advancing from the strategic salient(s).[152] This system obvously required first-rate intelligence of events in the barbarian borderlands, which was provided by a system of watch towers in the strategic salients and by continuous cross-border scouting operations (explorationes).
According to Luttwak, the forward defence system was always vulnerable to unusually large barbarian concentrations of forces, as the Roman army was too thinly spread along the enormous borders to deal with such threats. In addition, the lack of any reserves to the rear of the border entailed that a barbarian force that successfully penetrated the perimeter defences would have unchallenged ability to rampage deep into the empire before Roman reinforcements could arrive to intercept them.[153] The first major challenge to forward defence was the great invasion of Sarmatians (Quadi and Iazyges) and Marcomanni across the Danube in 166-7. The barbarians reached as far as Aquileia in northeastern Italy and were not finally expelled from the empire until 175. But the response of the imperial high command was not to change the forward defence strategy, but to reinforce it (by the founding of 2 new legions under Marcus Aurelius and 3 more under Septimius Severus and probably matching auxiliary forces).[154] It was only after the catastrophic military crises of 251-71 that the Roman command under Diocletian turned to defence-in-depth: but only out of necessity, not conviction, as there were attempts to return to forward defence as late as Valentinian I (ruled 264-75)[155] Forward defence had become simply too costly to maintain, especially with the emergence of a more powerful and expansionist Iranian empire (the Sasanian Persians) which required greater deployments in the East.
The essential feature of defence-in-depth, according to Luttwak, was the acceptance that the Roman frontier provinces themselves would become the main combat zone in operations against barbarian threats, rather than the barbarian lands across the border.[156] Under this strategy, border forces would not attempt to repel a large incursion. Instead, they would retreat into fortified strongholds and wait for mobile forces (comitatenses) to arrive and intercept the invaders. Border forces would be substantially weaker than under forward defence, but their reduction in numbers (and quality) would be compensated by the establishment of much stronger fortifications to protect themselves: hence the abandonment of the old "playing-card" rectangular design of Roman fort. The new forts were so designed that they could only be taken with the use of siege engines (which barbarians generally lacked): square or even circular layout, much higher and thicker walls, wider perimeter berms and deeper ditches; projecting towers to allow enfilading fire; and location in more defensible points, such as hilltops. At the same time, many more small forts were established in the hinterland, especially along roads, to impose delays on the invaders. Also, fortified granaries were built to store food safely and deny supplies to the invaders. Finally, the civilian population of the province was protected by providing walls for all towns, many villages and even some villas (large farm headquarters); some pre-Roman hillforts, long since abandoned, were re-occupied in the form of new Roman walled settlements.[157] The invading force would thus find itself in a region peppered with strongholds in enemy hands and where it could not easily get access to sufficient supplies. If the invaders ignored the strongholds and advanced, they risked sorties and attacks in the rear. If they attempted to besiege the strongholds, they would give the mobile troops valuable time to arrive. Overall, the aim of defence-in-depth was to provide an effective defence system at a sustainable cost, since defence-in-depth required much lower troop deployments than forward defence. To be more precise, the cost was transferred from general taxpayers to the people of the frontier provinces,[158] especially the rural peasantry, who, for all the fortifications, would often see their family members killed or abducted, homes destroyed, livestock seized and crops burnt by marauding barbarians.
Luttwak's work has been praised for its lucid analysis of, and insights into, issues regarding Roman military dispositions, and for stimulating much scholarly debate about these issues.[159] But the validity of his basic thesis has been strongly disputed by a number of scholars, especially in a powerful critique by B. Isaac, the author of the fundamental study of the Roman army in the East (1992).[160] The objections fall under two broad headings: (a) Defence-in-depth is not, in the main, consistent with the literary and archaeological evidence;[161] (b) even where defence-in-depth is supported by the evidence, it did not develop as a result of a conscious strategy i.e. the Roman empire had no "grand strategy".[162]
(a) Luttwak claims that Diocletian established a system of defence-in-depth along the imperial borders.[163] But J.C. Mann points out that there is no evidence, either in the Notitia Dignitatum or in the archaeological record, that units along the Rhine or Danube were stationed in the border hinterlands. On the contrary, all of Diocletian's newly-formed units were stationed along the rivers.[164] Only in the desert borderlands of the East is the evidence consistent with defence-in-depth, in the province of Arabia. But here it cannot be proven that the defence system developed only under Diocletian. It may have dated from as early as the 2nd century. Indeed, such material as can be dated to Diocletian suggests that his reorganisation resulted in a massive reinforcement of linear defence along his newly-built desert highway, the Strata Diocletiana. In Britain, the configuration of a large number of 4th century units stationed between Hadrian's Wall and the legionary fortresses at Deva (Chester) and Eboracum (York), superficially resembles defence-in-depth. But the same configuration existed in the 2nd century, and was due to the short length of the frontier, forcing a "vertical" rather than horizontal deployment, as well as the need to protect the coastlines from seaborne attack. It was not defence-in-depth in the Luttwak sense.[165] Mann's critique was written in 1979, so does not take account of the substantial corpus of archaeological data accumulated since. But that data does not significantly contradict his conclusions. Virtually all identified forts built in the 4th century lay on, very near or even beyond the border.[166]
(b) Luttwak's thesis of an imperial grand strategy rests on a number of assumptions: (a) that the empire's strategic posture was basically defensive; (b) that Roman expansion and choice of borders were systematic and rational, with the main objective of securing defensible borders; (c) that the Roman government's primary concern was to ensure the security of its provincial subjects. But Isaac demonstrates that these assumptions are probably false and result from inappropriate application of modern concepts of international relations and military strategy to the ancient world.[167] Isaac suggests that the empire was fundamentally aggressive both in ideology and military posture, up to and including the 4th century. This was demonstrated by the continued military operations and siting of fortifications well beyond the imperial borders.[168] The empire's expansion was determined mostly by the ambitions of emperors; and that the choice of borders, to the extent that they were planned at all, was more influenced by logistical considerations (e.g. rivers, that were critical conduits for supplies) rather than defensibility. Finally, the imperial government probably was far less concerned with the security of its subjects than would be a modern government.[169] Isaac shows that the empire did not develop the centralised military planning, or even accurate enough cartography, necessary to support grand strategy. Rome did not develop the equivalent of the centralised general staff of a modern army (and even less strategic studies institutes of the kind frequented by Luttwak). Emperors depended on the theatre military commanders (the provincial governors, later the magistri militum and duces) for all military intelligence.[170]
It is therefore likely that a grand strategy of the kind described by Luttwak did not exist. It is ironic that Luttwak terminates his analysis in mid-4th century, just before the establishment of the regional comitatus.[171] These could be seen as evidence for a strategy of defence-in-depth. As Luttwak himself admits, the imperial escort armies (comitatus praesentales) were too distant from the frontier to be of much value in intercepting barbarian incursions:[172] their arrival in theatre could take weeks, if not months.[173] The regional comitatus frequently changed bases, but those we know about e.g. Trier (comitatus of Gaul); Sirmium (Illyricum) Marcianopolis and Serdica (Thrace) and Antioch (East),[174] were usually within 60 miles (100 km - 3 days' march) of the frontier (at its nearest point: perhaps 2-3 times that distance from the furthest point on the frontier sector covered by the comitatus). This proximity would certainly enable them to intervene in theatre in a timely fashion. From this configuration can be discerned a possible three-tier defence-in-depth: small-scale incursions (probably under 400 individuals)[175] would be dealt with by the border troops alone. Medium size incursions which the border troops were unable to stop would be intercepted by the regional comitatus. Finally, large-scale invasions that defeated (or eluded) the regional comitatus, and penetrated deep into imperial territory, would be met by the emperor and his escort army (or armies).
One "defence strategy" the empire certainly deployed was a system of treaties of mutual assistance with tribes living on the imperial frontiers, but this was not unique to the 4th c., but a long-standing practice dating to the days of the late Republic. The Romans would promise to defend the ally from attack by its neighbours. In return, the ally would promise to refrain from raiding imperial territory, and prevent neighbouring tribes from doing the same. In many cases, the loyalty of the ally would need to be further secured by gifts or regular subsidies. In some cases, the Romans would assume a loose suzerainty over the tribe, in effect dictating the choice of new chiefs. This practice was applied on all the frontiers: Germans along the Rhine, Sarmatians along the Danube, Armenian kings and Caucasian and Saracen tribes on the Eastern frontier and Mauri in North Africa. On the desert frontier of Syria, the Romans would appoint a Saracen sheikh (called a phylarchos in Greek), according him an official rank in the Roman hierarchy, to "shadow" each dux limitis in the sector. In return for food subsidies, the phylarchs would defend the desert frontier against raiders.[176] This system of "client tribes" represented an efficient and economical form of "forward defence".
Role of cavalry
A traditional thesis is that cavalry assumed a much greater importance in the 4th century army than it enjoyed in the 2nd century. According to this view, cavalry increased significantly as a proportion of the total forces and took over the leading tactical role from the infantry. It also enjoyed much higher status than in the 2nd century. At the same time, the infantry declined in efficiency and value in operations, leaving the cavalry as the effective arm. In fact, there is no good evidence to support this view[177], and plenty of evidence against it.
As regards numbers, the 2nd century army had c80,000 cavalry[178] out of c385,000 total effectives i.e. cavalry was 21% of the total forces. Estimating the cavalry share in the 4th century army is impeded by the fundamental problem that unit sizes are not known with any certainty. About one third of the army units in the Notitia are cavalry, but cavalry numbers were less than that proportion of the total because cavalry unit sizes were smaller.[179] The available evidence suggests that the proportion of cavalry was much the same as in the 2nd century: in 478, a comitatus of 38,000 men contained 8,000 cavalry (21%).[180]
There is thus no evidence for an increase in the relative importance of cavalry in the army. It appears that in the 4th century there was a substantial increase in the number of heavily-armoured cavalry in the East (cataphracti and clibanarii).[181] It is important, however, not to exaggerate the role of cataphracts. Only 15% of comitatenses cavalry units were cataphracts. The majority of Roman cavalry in the comitatus (61%) remained of the traditional type, similar in equipment and tactical role to the alae of the Principate, with the remaining 24% being light cavalry (of which 15% mounted archers).[182]
The supposed higher status of cavalry in the 4th century is also open to doubt. This view is largely based on underestimating the importance of cavalry in the 2nd century.[183] Cavalry always had greater prestige than infantry in the Principate: in the time of Domitian (r. 81-96), although an auxiliary infantryman (pedes cohortalis) was paid less than a legionary foot soldier, a cavalryman from a cohors equitata (eques cohortalis) was paid the same, and an elite ala cavalryman (eques alaris) 20% more.
The view of some modern scholars that the 4th century cavalry was a more efficient service than the infantry was certainly not shared by Ammianus and his contemporaries. Ammianus describes three major battles which were actually or nearly lost due to the incompetence or cowardice of the Roman cavalry.[184] (1) The Battle of Strasbourg (357), where the cavalry, including cataphracts, were routed by their German counterparts at an early stage, leaving the Roman infantry light wing dangerously exposed. After fleeing behind the infantry lines, it took the personal intervention of Julian to rally them and persuade them to return to the fight. (The cataphracts were later ordered to wear female clothes by Julian as punishment).[185] (2) During his Persian campaign (363), Julian was obliged to sanction two cavalry units for fleeing when caught by surprise attacks (one unit was decimated, the other dismounted). Later, the Tertiaci cavalry regiment was ordered to march with the camp followers for deserting the field just as the infantry was on the point of breaking the Persian line. (3) At the Battle of Adrianople (378), the Roman cavalry was largely responsible for the catastrophic defeat. Scholae units started the battle by an unauthorised attack on the enemy wagon circle, at a moment when their emperor Valens was still trying to negotiate a truce with the Goths. The attack failed, and when the Gothic cavalry appeared, the Roman cavalry fled, leaving the Roman infantry left wing exposed. The Gothic cavalry then routed the Roman left wing, and the battle was as good as lost.[186]
Role of infantry
The idea that in the 4th century, cavalry was the main tactical arm, with an ineffectual infantry relegated to a subsidiary role, is also false. The table above shows that the field armies continued to be dominated by infantry. The latter included large numbers of crack infantry regiments with an awesome reputation, including the famed Batavi, still classified as elite after 400 years of service to the empire. The auxilia palatina were rated among the best regiments in the army.[187]
Most battles fought by Roman forces in the 4th century continued to be essentially infantry encounters with cavalry playing a supporting role. A good illustration of the combat tactics of a 4th century field army is the Battle of Strasbourg in 357 AD, described by Ammianus in a somewhat fragmentary account. The Caesar (deputy emperor) Julian, in command of the comitatus Galliarum (field army of Gaul) of 13,000 men confronted a major raiding force of Alamanni Germans which outnumbered the Romans by 3 to 1. Julian's force was seriously understrength (due to losses in previous campaigns against the Germans) but high-quality, including elite infantry regiments of Batavi, Cornuti, Brachiati and Primani. The encounter took place on a rise a few miles from the river Rhine, on the Roman highway from Argentorate (Strasbourg) to Augusta Rauracorum.
The Roman order of battle was a traditional array of infantry in the centre (drawn up in two lines, front and rear, spaced widely apart) and the cavalry (of unknown size, but, by implication, not more than c2,000) on the flank: in this case all the cavalry was stationed on the right flank, as the left flank was wooded, broken ground that was impassable to cavalry. On this side, Julian stationed a division of perhaps 1,500 men under his second-in-command Severus. This division was probably ordered to move stealthily through the wooded area so as to surprise the Germans in the rear. The Roman cavalry included special heavily armoured cavalry called cataphracti. It is unclear what proportion of the total cavalry were cataphracti, but since Ammianus mentions them only, they may have been over half. The cataphracti were a serious threat to the lightly armoured German riders, and therefore to the German left flank as a whole. But the Alamanni's paramount leader, Chnodomar, had prepared a stratagem to deal with them. He ordered some lightly-armed warriors to ride pillion with his horsemen. When the enemy cavalry was engaged, they were to leap down on foot, and stab the Romans' horses in the flanks, which unlike their riders, were unprotected. Also he had hidden a division of troops in the woods on his right flank, presumably to ambush Severus' men.
As soon as the two armies were drawn up, battle began. The opposing infantry lines locked together in a fierce struggle, each side alternately advancing and retreating. The Roman cavalry engaged the German horsemen, but Chnodomar's stratagem paid dividends. The interspersed foot warriors wreaked havoc, bringing down the horses of the cataphracti and then killing their riders who, weighed down by their heavy armour, had little mobility on foot. Disconcerted by these tactics, the Roman cavalry panicked and fled the field, taking refuge behind the infantry lines, where it took the personal intervention of Julian himself to rally them. This was the first critical moment, as the Roman front line's right flank was now exposed to assault by the victorious German cavalry. But the right wing was held by the crack Cornuti and Brachiati regiments who, it appears, were now reinforced by the Regii and Batavi regiments, which moved forward from the right wing of the rear line. Together, these regiments managed to defend the Roman right wing until the regrouped Roman cavalry returned to relieve the pressure on the flank. In the meantime, on the Roman left wing, Severus must have suspected the prepared ambush, and held back from advancing into the woods. The hidden Germans eventually lost patience and advanced out of the woods and charged at Severus' division. But they were routed by Severus' crack troops.
Meanwhile Chnodomar and his entourage of chiefs, in response to the loud demands of their followers, dismounted and led the main body of German foot warriors in an all-out assault on the centre of the Roman front line. The Germans charged straight at the serried ranks of Romans, hoping to break through by sheer weight of numbers. But the Roman front line held for a long time, inflicting severe casualties on the Germans who flung themselves recklessly at the massed spears. Then, the spearhead group of German chiefs and their best warriors succeeded, by desperate efforts, in punching a hole through the centre of the Roman front line. This was potentially disastrous for the Romans. But despite being cut in two, the Roman front line did not collapse: the experienced frontline regiments managed to hold their separated wings in formation. Meanwhile, a large number of Germans poured through the breach in the line and charged the centre of the Roman rear line. This position was held by the elite Primani legion, which stopped the German attack in its tracks and then counterattacked, routing the breakthrough. The breach in the front line was presumably filled, either by the separated wings of the front line reconnecting, or by the Primani from the rear line (Ammianus does not specify which). The front line, now extended on the left flank by the rear line left wing, and by Severus' victorious division, began pushing the Germans back, and gradually hemmed them in from the flanks. At this point, the Germans were already exhausted and demoralised by their lack of progress and severe losses. The mass of their army was now trapped in an ever-tighter Roman crescent, with the troops on the edges being methodically cut down and the ones in the middle packed tightly together and unable to move. Finally, after more hours of relentless pressure from the Romans, the German line collapsed: as panic spread through their ranks, the Germans broke formation and ran for their lives. Many did not run fast enough: pursued all the way to the Rhine by Roman cavalry and infantry, many were cut down as they ran. Ammianus reports that 6,000 Germans perished on the battlefield and in the pursuit on land. Thousands more drowned as they tried to get across the river.[188] The battle was thus won, as were countless battles in the centuries before it, by the discipline, training, skill and resilience of the Roman foot soldiers.
The excellent performance of the infantry, both comitatenses and limitanei, is a striking feature of Ammianus' history, in contrast to the often lamentable failure of the officially senior cavalry service. At the Persian siege of Amida, Ammianus' eye-witness account describes the city's defence by limitanei units as skilful and tenacious, if ultimately unsuccessful.[189] Even at the disaster of Adrianople, the Roman infantry fought heroically, despite being abandoned by their cavalry and surrounded on three sides by overwhelmingly superior numbers of Goths.[190]
The "barbarisation" theory
For the late Roman army, a common hypothesis has become established that the much greater number of barbarian recruits to the Roman army resulted in the decline of its discipline, reliability and effectiveness and was a major factor in the collapse of the western Roman empire. This view ultimately derives from Edward Gibbon's 18th-century magnum opus, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. This hypothesis is known as the barbarisation theory.
According to this view, the barbarian officers and men recruited by the late army, coming from tribes that were traditional enemies of Rome, had no real loyalty to Rome and often betrayed her interests, colluding with invading barbarian tribes, especially if those tribes were their own. At the same time, the spread of barbarian customs and culture military led to a decline in traditional discipline, and internal army disunity due to friction between Romans and barbarians. Ultimately, the army degenerated into just a collection of foreign mercenary bands that were incapable of defending the empire effectively.[191]
Evidence adduced for the barbarisation theory includes:
- A number of incidents of alleged treachery by barbarian officers in the Roman army, e.g. when 3 high-ranking barbarian officers in Julian's army were alleged to have sent a secret warning to their fellow-tribesmen across the Rhine of a planned Roman operation against them.[192]
- The allegedly treacherous behaviour of a number of barbarian generalissimos, especially those who dominated the West in the period 395-476: Arbogast, Stilicho, Ricimer.
- Occasions when barbarian foederati troops were attacked by Roman units, e.g. the massacre of a Gothic unit in Constantinople in 378. This supposedly proves the bitter divisions in the army caused by the barbarian presence.
- The disloyal conduct of foederati forces e.g. the defection of 30,000 foederati troops to Alaric in 408
But on closer examination, none of these points are convincing. It is important to distinguish between the regular army and the foederati. Points 3 and 4 concern the behaviour of foederati and are therefore irrelevant to this article.
The incidents of alleged barbarian treachery in the regular army are very few (3 in all) and isolated. They all involved officers who allegedly warned their own tribal groups of campaigns planned against them. Only one case is clearcut or certain. Futhermore, Ammianus himself never chracterises barbarian-born troops as unreliable.[193] On the contrary, his evidence is that barbarian soldiers were as loyal, and fought as hard, as Roman ones.[194] Barbarian-born troops appear to have been especially concentrated in the elite vexillationes and auxilia units of the comitatus: in the elite auxilia palatina infantry regiments, the proportion of barbarians in the ranks appears to reach over a third of effectives.[195] This implies that they were generally considered reliable.[196] There is a tendency by some modern scholars to ascribe a degree of nationalist sentiment to ancient barbarians that did not exist. For example, German tribes were constantly fighting each other and even within such tribal confederations as the Franks or Alamans there was bitter feuds between the constituent tribes and clans. Conflicts of loyalty could only arise when the Roman army was campaigning against a barbarian's own specific clan.[197] It is also a fact that most barbarian-born troops became assimilated into Roman culture. There is no known case of a barbarian-born soldier returning to his homeland after completing his service (although deserters often did).[198]
Laeti were only "foreigners" in the first generation: thereafter they were Roman-born citizens. In both cases, they had every reason to be loyal to the state which had given them shelter and land (many of them had requested entry into the empire to escape attack by their neighbours). The very fact that the imperial government was willing to go to the major expense of providing them with land demonstrates how valued such troops were. Also, regiments with barbarian names soon became mixed, as new recruitment diluted their ethnic identity, in the same way that during the 1st century, auxiliary regiments originally drawn from particular peregrini tribes became staffed mainly by recruits from tribes in the province in which they were stationed.[199]
The performance of barbarian senior officers was no worse than that of their Roman counterparts. It is true that some barbarian magistri militum could be treacherous. A good example is Ricimer: it is likely that he colluded with the Vandals in Africa to defeat two Roman expeditions against them. This was disastrous for the Western empire, which needed African grain revenue to pay for its army. But Roman-born generals could be equally disloyal e.g. Flavius Aetius, who used his contacts with the Huns to lead a Hunnic army into Italy in support of the usurper Joannes in 425. Indeed a key reason for the dominance of barbarian-born army leaders in the West in the period 395-476 is the fact that non-Romans could not aspire to become emperor themselves and were thus considered less likely to rebel against the child-emperors Honorius (ruled 393-423, acceeded at age 9) and Valentinian III (r. 425-55, acc. age 6) than Roman-born generals. Rebellions by barbarian-born generals were greatly outnumbered by Roman usurpation attempts.
The regular army in the West remained an effective and formidable force until the disintegration of the West in the period after 406. It continued to win most of its encounters with barbarian forces e.g. the defeat of Radagaisus in 405. Overall, there is no convincing evidence that its barbarian element was damaging to its performance. On the contrary, it is likely that barbarian recruitment was crucial to the army's continued existence, by providing a badly-needed source of first-rate recruits.
In conclusion, the barbarisation theory is clearly invalid as regards the regular Roman army of the 4th century.[200][201][202][203]
Notes
Sources
Primary
Secondary
- Hugh Elton: Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-425. Oxford University Press, 1996, ISBN 978-0-19-815241-5.
- Adrian Goldsworthy: Roman Warfare. 2000.
- Adrian Goldsworthy: Complete Roman Army. 2005.
- B. Isaac: Limits of Empire. 1992.
- A.H.M. Jones: Later Roman Empire. 1964.
- Edward Luttwak: Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. 1976.
- David Mattingly: An Imperial Possession: Britain in the Roman Empire. 2006.
External links
- ↑ R.S.O. Tomlin The Army of the Late Empire in J. Wacher ed The Roman World (1988) 108
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 164
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 170
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 170
- ↑ Tomlin (1988) 108
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 170
- ↑ Dio Cassius LXXI
- ↑ D. Ch. Stathakopoulos Famine and Pestilence in the late Roman and early Byzantine Empire (2007) 95
- ↑ Zosimus New History 26, 37, 46
- ↑ J. Kent The Monetary System in J. Wacher ed The Roman World (1988) 576-7. There was no paper money in the ancient world. Further, coins were expected to have intrinsic as well as nominal value and were made with precious metals (gold, silver, bronze, copper) e.g. an aureus, the main gold coin of the Principate, was supposed to contain 1/40 of a pound of gold. Thus the government's ability to increase the money supply was restricted by the volume of precious metals mined each year. This natural constraint permitted only moderate inflation. But once the government started seriously debasing the coinage in the 3rd century, it was able to issue far more coins with the same amount of precious metal (e.g. a silver antoninianus of 260 had only 5% of its silver content at its launch in 215: i.e. the same amount of silver could produce 20 times the number of coins). This caused the runaway price inflation of that era. The Romans had no understanding of the law of supply and demand. Inflation was blamed on the greed of merchants. Hence the famous (and futile) Price Edict of Diocletian which attempted to stop inflation by fixing prices by decree. The Edict inevitably resulted in goods disappearing from the market (despite the execution of many merchants for hoarding) and was soon dropped
- ↑ Duncan-Jones (1990) 115
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 166
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 166
- ↑ Jones (1964) 615
- ↑ Jones (1964)
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 177
- ↑ A.H.M. Jones Later Roman Empire (1964) 608
- ↑ Jones (1964) 608
- ↑ Jones (1964) 608
- ↑ Jones (1964) 608
- ↑ Mattingly (2006) 239
- ↑ A. Goldsworthy Complete Roman Army (2005) 202
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 172
- ↑ Jones (1964) 608
- ↑ Agathias History V.13.7-8; Jones (1964) 680
- ↑ A. H. M. Jones Later Roman Empire (1964) 683
- ↑ Heather (2005) 63
- ↑ R. Duncan-Jones Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy (1990) 105-17
- ↑ Jones (1964) 681-2
- ↑ Mattingly (2006) 239
- ↑ Heather (1995) 63
- ↑ Elton (1996) 120
- ↑ 25 legions of 5,000 men each
- ↑ 28 legions of 5,500 each (double-strength 1st cohorts introduced under Domitian (r. 81-96)
- ↑ 33 legions of 5,500 each. Legions II and III Italica added under Marcus Aurelius; I, II and III Parthica under Septimius Severus
- ↑ Implied by Tacitus Annales IV.5
- ↑ Holder (2003) 120
- ↑ Assuming that auxilia would be expanded by the same amount as legions. J. C. Spaul ALA (1996) 257-60 and COHORS 2 (2000) 523-7 identify 4 alae and 20-30 cohortes raised in the late 2nd/early 3rd centuries
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 58: 9 cohorts of 480 men each plus German bodyguards
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 58: 9 double-cohorts of 800 men each plus 2,000 equites singulares
- ↑ Implied by Tacitus Annales
- ↑ Hassall (2000) 320 estimates 380,000
- ↑ MacMullen How Big was the Roman Army? in KLIO (1979) 454 estimates 438,000
- ↑ MacMullen (1979) 455
- ↑ John Lydus De Mensibus I.47
- ↑ Elton (1996) 120
- ↑ Elton (1996) 89
- ↑ Elton (1996) 118
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 210 Appendix D
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 170
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 171
- ↑ Elton (1996) 214-5
- ↑ Jones (1964) 609
- ↑ Jones (1964) 609
- ↑ Elton (1996) 208-9
- ↑ Heather (2005) 247
- ↑ Mattingly (2006) 239
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000), p. 167
- ↑ Data from Tomlin (1988) 113; Elton (1996) 89; Goldsworthy (2005) 206; Mattingly (2006) 239
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 171-2
- ↑ E. Luttwak Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976) 173
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 172
- ↑ Codex Justinianus, XII.35.15
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 203
- ↑ Tomlin (1988) 112
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 171-2
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 203
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 174
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 204
- ↑ Jones (1964) 634
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 202
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Based on: Jones (1964) 634; Goldsworthy (1995) 202; Holder (1980) 90-6
- ↑ Jones (1964) 636-40
- ↑ Jones (1964) 640
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 77
- ↑ Jones (1964) 615
- ↑ Jones (1964) 614, 616
- ↑ Jones (1964) 617
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 208
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 208
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 206
- ↑ Birley (2002)
- ↑ Jones (1964) 633
- ↑ M. Innes Introduction to early medieval Western Europe (2007) 79; Heather (2005) 119; Goldsworthy (2005) 208
- ↑ Roman Military Diplomas Vols IV and V
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005), p. 208
- ↑ Tacitus, Germania 28; Dio Cassius, LXXI.11
- ↑ www.roman-britain.org Table of auxiliary regiments
- ↑ Innes (2007) 80
- ↑ Elton (1996) 148-9
- ↑ Elton (1996) 136
- ↑ Jones (1964) 619
- ↑ Jones (1964) 619-20
- ↑ Jones (1964) 611
- ↑ L. Rossi Trajan's Column and the Dacian Wars (1971) 104
- ↑ Jones (1964) 611-2
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 204
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 202
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Elton (1996) 121-3
- ↑ Based on figs in Goldsworthy (2005) 94; Elton (1996) 121-3; Duncan-Jones (1994) 33-41
- ↑ Jones (1964) 623
- ↑ Elton (1996) 123; Duncan-Jones (1990) 115, 217. The stable purchasing power of gold is shown by the food allowance. In the 4th c. this was 4 solidi per annum. In the 1st c. the deduction for food from a soldier's salary was 60 denarii = 2.4 aurei = 3.6 solidi, implying only a c10% decline in p.p. over 220 yrs
- ↑ Tomlin (1987) 115
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 96; Duncan-Jones (1994) 36 argues that, despite the lack of evidence, auxiliaries probably did receive these bonuses
- ↑ Jones (1964) 623
- ↑ Jones (1964) 635
- ↑ Jones (1964) 647
- ↑ Jones (1964) 647
- ↑ Elton (1996) 121-3
- ↑ Mattingly (2006) 245
- ↑ Jones (1964) 631
- ↑ Jones (1964) 631-2
- ↑ Jones (1964) 631
- ↑ Jones (1964) 632
- ↑ A. D. Lee The Army in Cambridge Ancient History Vol XIII (1997) 231
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 120
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 129
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 124
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 135
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 137
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 123, 205
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 123
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 167; (2005) 205
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 168
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 139
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 213
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 138
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 169
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Bas-relief of heavily armoured horseman at Taq-e Bostan, Iran
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 205
- ↑ Elton (1996) 110
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 206
- ↑ Elton (1996) 161-71
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 134-5
- ↑ Goldsworthy (1995) 206
- ↑ Elton (1996) 161
- ↑ Elton (1996) 163
- ↑ Elton (1996) 162-3
- ↑ Elton (1996) 164
- ↑ Elton (1996) 165-7
- ↑ Elton (1996) 167
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 198
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 132-4
- ↑ Mann (1979) 175-83
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 175
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 190
- ↑ E. Luttwak (1976) Fig.3.3
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 136
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 131-2
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 132
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 132
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) Fig.3.2
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 137
- ↑ B. Isaac The Limits of Empire (1992) 377
- ↑ See J. C. Mann in Journal of Roman Studies 69 (1979); F. Miller in Britannia 13 (1982); B. Isaac The limits of Empire: the Roman Army in the East(1992) 372-418
- ↑ Mann (1979) 180-1
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 416
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 193
- ↑ Mann (1979) 180
- ↑ Mann (1979) 181
- ↑ Elton (1996) 157 and 159 (Fig 13)
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 373, 377
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 387-93
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 393-4
- ↑ Isaac (1992) 378, 383, 401-6
- ↑ Mann (1979) 181
- ↑ Luttwak (1976) 190
- ↑ Elton (1996) 215
- ↑ Elton (1996) 209
- ↑ Elton (1996) 206
- ↑ Jones (1964) 611
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 169
- ↑ 75,000 auxiliary cavalry (Holder (2003) 120; 3,360 legionary cavalry; 2,000 imperial escort cavalry
- ↑ H. Elton Warfare in Roman Europe 350-425 (1996) 106
- ↑ Elton (1996) 105-6
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 169
- ↑ Elton (1996) 106
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 169
- ↑ Tomlin (1998) 117-8
- ↑ Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae XVI.12
- ↑ Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae XXXI
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2000) 174
- ↑ Ammianus Marcellinus Res Gestae XVI.12; illustrated in Goldsworthy (2000) 176-7
- ↑ Ammianus XIX.1-8
- ↑ Ammianus XXXI.13
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 208
- ↑ Ammianus XX.2
- ↑ Jones (1964) 621-2
- ↑ Elton (1996) 138
- ↑ Elton (1996) 151
- ↑ Lee (1997) 224
- ↑ Jones (1964) 622
- ↑ Jones (1964) 622
- ↑ Elton (1996) 150
- ↑ Jones (1964) 621
- ↑ Elton (1996) 152
- ↑ Lee (1997) 223-4
- ↑ Goldsworthy (2005) 209