Benutzer:Autokrator/Spätrömische Armee

Vorlage:Expand Vorlage:RomanMilitary The Late Roman army refers to the military forces of the Roman Empire of the Dominate period, from the latter part of the 3rd century to the its reorganization into the thematic armies in the mid-7th century in the Eastern Empire.

Sources

Much of our evidence for the 4th century's army's unit deployments is contained in a single document, the Notitia Dignitatum, compiled ca. 395-420, a manual of all late Roman public offices, military and civil. Unfortunately, the Notitia gives us a confused and incomplete picture of the late 4th century army. For the earlier part of the 4th century, it can only give an even more limited picture.

The Notitia presents three main problems, as regards the study of the Empire's military establishment:

1. It was compiled at two different times. The Eastern section apparently dates from ca. 395 AD; the Western from considerably later, ca. 420. Furthermore, each section is probably not a contemporaneous "snapshot", but relies on data stretching back as far as twenty years. The Eastern section may contain data from as early as 379, the start of the rule of Theodosius I. The Western section contains data from as early as ca. 400: for example, it shows units deployed in Britain, which must date from before 410, when Roman troops were evacuated from the island. In consequence, there is substantial duplication, with the same unit often listed under different commands. It is impossible to ascertain whether these were detachments of the same unit in different places at the same time, at the same whole unit at different times.
2. The Notitia has many sections missing and lacunae (gaps) within sections. This is doubtless due to accumulated text losses and copying errors as it was repeatedly copied over the centuries: the earliest manuscript we possess today dates from the 15th century. The Notitia cannot therefore provide a comprehensive listing of all units in existence.
3. The Notitia does not contain any personnel figures. Therefore, the size of individual units, and of the various commands, cannot be ascertained, as we have little other evidence of unit sizes at this time. In turn, this makes it impossible to assess accurately the overall size of the army. Depending on the strength of units, the late 4th century army may, at one extreme, have equalled the size of the 2nd century force (i.e. over 400,000 men); at the other extreme, it may have been far smaller. For example, the forces deployed in Britain ca. 400 may have been just 18,000 against ca. 55,000 in the 2nd century.

Despite these drawbacks, the Notitia remains the central source on the late Army's structure due to the dearth of other evidence.

The main literary source for the 4th century Army are the Res Gestae (History) of Ammianus Marcellinus, whose surviving books cover the period 353 to 378. Marcellinus, himself a veteran soldier, is regarded by scholars as a reliable and valuable source. But he largely fails to remedy the deficiencies of the Notitia as regards army and unit strength or units in existence, as he is rarely specific about either. Also valuable are the military manual of Vegetius (despite its many deficiencies), and the works of 6th century authors, most prominent among them Procopius of Caeaarea, who described in great detail the Wars of Reconquest of Justinian I.

Historical developments

Structural changes

The army of the Principate, as it was established by the founder-emperor Augustus (ruled 30 BC - 14 AD) and survived until well into the 3rd century, consisted of two distinct corps. The legions were ca. 30 large formations of about 5,500 men, almost entirely infantry, which admitted only Roman citizens. The auxilia were ca. 450 much smaller units of about 500 men (a minority were up to 1,000 strong), which were divided into ca. 100 pure cavalry units (alae), ca. 100 pure infantry (cohortes) and ca. 250 mixed cavalry/infantry units (cohortes equitatae); some of these units were designated sagittariorum, meaning they contained archers. The auxilia thus contained almost all the Roman army's cavalry and archers, as well as approximately the same number of foot soldiers. The auxilia were mainly recruited from the peregrini (provincial subjects of the empire who did not hold Roman citizenship), but also admitted Roman citizens and barbari, the Roman term for peoples living outside the empire's borders.

The so-called "Crisis of the Third Century" heralded a gradual overhaul of this system, a transformation which was furthered and completed under the emperors Diocletian (r. 284-305) and Constantine I (r. 312-336), in parallel to a similarly wide-ranging reform of the administrative and social structure of the Empire. These developments included the increase of the size of the army (including the navy) from ca. 400,000 men under the Severan dynasty to ca. 435,000 men under Diocletian, while Agathias records 645,000 men as the high water mark of the army.. Also, under Diocletian, the separation of civil and military offices began, which was accompanied by the removal of the senatorial class from command and the rise of a "professional" officer corps. This was drawn mostly from the equestrian class, but also open to centurions and lower ranks (a notable example being Diocletian himself) through the existence of the collegium protectorum, a sort of staff academy.

Structural changes were more complex in detail, but two fundamental trends may be discerned: the break-up of the legions into much smaller, and tactically more flexible, formations comparable to the earlier auxilia regiments or legionary vexillations; and the grading of units by strategic role into more or lass static frontier forces and mobile field armies. Under Diocletian, the number of legions, and probably of other units, appears to have more than doubled. At the same time, however, unit strengths appear to have been reduced, in some cases drastically. For example, there are legions in the mid-4th century that are documented with just 1,000 effectives, less than a fifth of their 2nd-century strength. Under Constantine, the army's units appear to have been divided into 3 grades, according to their strategic role and, to a lesser extent, quality:

• praesentales or palatini, elite imperial escort troops which were based at or near the imperial capitals (Milan, Nicomedia, Sirmium, Trier and Constantinople) and accompanied the emperors on campaign. These were later complemented by the imperial guard units of the Scholae Palatinae and the Excubitores.

• comitatenses, mobile field army troops (sacer comitatus), composed mostly of cavalry, and based well behind the border in key provinces. Initially attached to each Augustus or Caesar, after Constantine they were commanded by a magister militum and evolved from imperial retinues to regional mobile strategic reserve forces, and already by the mid-4th century they were loath to leave their home provinces to campaign elsewhere.

• limitanei or ripenses, static border troops stationed on the empire's frontiers, under the command of regional comites and duces. In the past, it was generally thought that the limitanei were a part-time militia of local farmers, of low combat capability. However, although they were certainly less well trained and equipped that the palatini or comitatenses troops, they were full-time professionals charged with combating the incessant small-scale raids of barbari intruders that were the empire's enduring security problem. Indeed, it was forbidden by law for them to work in the fields or herd animals. Limitanei units often joined the comitatenses armies on campaign, sometimes staying on permanently as pseudocomitatenses.

Unit types also became more varied. Alongside the traditional legiones, alae and cohortes, there appear several new unit types, such as schola, vexillationes, cuneus and equites for the cavalry, and milites, numerus and auxilia (different from the Principate-era auxilia) for the infantry. There are no clear rules as to which unit type belonged to which grade (except that scholae were always praesentales). For example, new-style auxilia units could be either auxilia palatina - some of the best units in the late army or border units. The strength of new-style units is very uncertain (and may have varied during the 4th century). It is likely that scholae and auxilia had roughly the same number of effectives as the old-style auxilia regiments i.e. ca. 500 men.. Other new-style units were probably smaller, perhaps half the size or less.

The rise of the cavalry and decline of the infantry

The common public perception of the army of the Principate is that of the all-conquering heavy infantry legion, assisted by second-rate (as the auxilia are wrongly perceived) cavalry and light infantry troops. In reality, the Roman army appreciated the value of cavalry, especially when dealing with its Eastern opponents, the heavily cavalry-based Parthians. Nevertheless, the infantry legions, composed of Roman citizens, had the highest prestige and pay, and on campaign, cavalry was used as a supporting arm to the infantry.

During the 3rd century, the infantry legions themselves departed from the older model. The use of smaller vexillationes became established practice, while light infantry (javelin throwers, archers and slingers) was mixed with the heavy infantry lines. The use of the pilum was gradually abandoned in favour of a combination of spear and javelin (lancea).

Starting with Gallienus however, the cavalry started gaining in status. Gallienus recruited large numbers of cavalry, especially from Dalmatia (equites Dalmatae), which together with the imperial guard cavalry (equites singulares Augusti), the legionary cavalry (now separated from their parent units and brigaded into equites promoti units) and mounted foederati formed the core of his field army. The rise of the imperial cavalry corps is illustrated by the fact that two of Gallienus' immediate successors, Claudius II and Aurelian, were its commanders.

The splitting up of the infantry legions into smaller units, and the formal creation of the permanent comitatus, which was a cavalry force, meant that infantry was relegated to a lower status, although it still formed the bulk of the army, and remained an effective weapon until at leat the Battle of Adrianople. The emphasis laid on mobility and versatility favoured the cavalry, a process that continued until the 6th century, when the campaigns of Belisarius make clear that it had become the main striking arm of the Roman army. By that time, it was composed of cataphracti units, armoured horsemen capable of fighting either with the lance (kontos) or with the bow, or dismounting to fight as infantry, complemented by mercenary horse-archers (mostly Huns). Nevertheless, infantry continued to perform important duties, providing the necessary manpower during sieges, and forming a steady line in the battlefield, behind which the cavalry could withdraw and regroup.

The role of barbarians in the Late Roman army

Rise of barbari in the army

Barbari ("barbarians") had played an important part in the army of the Principate throughout its history. Apart from ad hoc levies of troops from Rome's amici (satellite kings), it is likely that large irregular forces of barbarian-born troops were in semi-permanent service alongside the regular auxilia. We have no idea how many at any given time, but an example are the 5,500 surrendered Sarmatian riders posted on Hadrian's Wall in Britain by emperor Marcus Aurelius in ca. 175. In addition, most scholars believe that the regular auxilia themselves recruited significant numbers of barbari through their history (although there is little hard evidence of this).

But there is substantial evidence that the proportion of barbarian-born troops in the regular army may have increased sharply during the 4th century.

1. The Notitia lists a number of barbarian military settlements in the empire. Known as laeti or gentiles ("natives"), these were an important source of recruits for the army. Groups of Germanic or Sarmatian tribespeople were were granted land to settle in the Empire, in return for military service. Most likely each community was under a treaty obligation to supply a specified number of troops to the army each year. Laeti settlements were outside the normal framework of the provincial administration, and under the control of specially-appointed Roman officials called praefecti laetorum. The latter were evidently military, rather than civilian officers, as they reported to a magister militum praesentalis. The settlements were thus essentially military cantons whose raison d'etre was to breed soldiers.
2. The Notitia lists a large number of units with barbarian names. Among others, regiments of Franks, Saxons, Goths, Sarmatians, and Vandals are listed. During the Principate, regular units with barbarian names did not exist until the 3rd century and even then rarely. However, it was established practice to use defeated enemies from one front as soldiers in other parts of the Empire. For example, Justinian I used defeated Vandals (Vandali Iustiniani) in the East, and Persians in Italy.
3. The emergence during the 4th century of barbarian military groups called foederati (confederates). The use of this term is confusing, since it was used to describe different phenomena: During the early 4th century, the term foederati applied to irregular units of barbarian allies, tied to Rome by treaty (foedus) to provide troops and fight alongside Roman forces. In this sense, although now well-integrated into the Roman army and led by Roman officers, the term is found in the 6th century East Roman army. However, starting from Theodosius the Great, entire tribal subgroups under the command of their own kings entered the empire after the Adrianople disaster (with or without the imperial government's permission) and were then granted entire regions to settle (and rule) as foederati by a government that was unable to eject them. These tribes effectively formed their own autonomous states, and paid little heed to the Roman administration. Officially, they were similar in status to the laeti, but in reality quite different, as they were not integrated into the Roman army's unit structure, but a foreign army on Roman soil under its own leadership.
4. The emergence of barbarian-born officers in the senior military echelons, and eventually in the high command itself. In the early 5th century, the Western Roman forces were often controlled by barbarian-born generals, such as the famed magistri utriusquae militiae Arbogast, Stilicho and Ricimer. In the East, this process was far less pronounced, and, with the expulsion of Gainas and the murder of Aspar, the influence of the Goths over the imperial government was removed.

The barbarisation fallacy

The factors above gave rise to the "barbarisation theory", i.e. that a major factor in the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the 5th century was a "barbarian takeover" of the Roman military. This view ultimately derives from Edward Gibbon's 18th-century magnum opus, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. According to this view, during the 4th century there was a creeping "barbarisation" of the Roman military, which eventually degenerated into just a collection of foreign mercenary bands. These men, and their generals, came from tribes that had been enemies of Rome for centuries and were fundamentally disloyal, repeatedly failing to defend the Empire effectively, and colluding with invading barbarian tribes, especially if they were related to them. Meanwhile the Romans had become soft and averse to military service, and thus unable to resist the barbarian takeover. This view is today largely discredited. Reasons for discounting it include:

1. Settlements of barbari inside the Empire were not unique to the 4th century. Although the term laeti only appears in the 4th century, there is evidence that the practice of settling barbari in return for military service stretches back to the days of Caesar Augustus. The latter allowed a number of Germanic tribes, who felt threatened by their neighbours, to move from the eastern bank of the Rhine to the Roman-controlled western bank, e.g. the Cugerni,a branch of the Sugambri tribe, and the Ubii. The latter, who moved from the Taunus region to the area around Colonia Agrippina (Cologne), were specifically given the task of guarding their stretch of Rhine. The Ubii repaid the Romans with unswerving loyalty, for instance in the revolt of the Batavi in 70 AD. In the late 2nd century, Marcus Aurelius settled large numbers of Quadi and Sarmatians in the Danubian provinces. Further, laeti settlers were only "barbarians" in the first generation. Their sons and descendants were native-born Romans, who had no reason to be disloyal. In any case, they generally joined existing regiments, rather than forming their own. There is no evidence that laeti were anything other than first-class recruits for the Roman army.
2. The establishment of a large number of units with barbarian names was the continuation of a process that had already begun in the 3rd century, if not earlier: the transformation of irregular allied units serving under their own native officers (known variously as socii, symmachiarii or foederati) into regular formations e.g. the ala I Sarmatarum attested in 3rd century Britain, doubtless an offshoot of the Sarmatian horsemen posted there in 175. In any case, the ethnic identity of such units would rapidly be dissipated by recruitment of local Romans and other barbari There is no evidence that such units were any less loyal or reliable than units with Roman names.
3. The foederati have been regarded as the main culprits by proponents of the barbarisation thesis. As stated above, the original foederati had a long history in the empire: they are depicted in action in Trajan's Dacian Wars (101-5). Again, there are few instances where such units behaved treacherously. The later type of foederati were totally different: effectively independent tribal armies established in various parts of the empire in the late 4th/early 5th century, their loyalty was not assured, and their leaders acted independently of the Roman government. Their activities could certainly be disloyal and very destructive, as evidenced by the career of Alaric, king of the Visigoths, who sacked Rome in 410. But they could also be staunchly loyal and crucial contributors to imperial defence, like the Alans in Gaul under king Goar, who were the only effective military force at the disposal Flavius Aetius, magister militum per Gallias in 425-453. Even the Visigoths helped Aetius: their support was critical in the defeat of Attila's Huns at Chalons in 451.
4. The role of barbarian-born commanders-in-chief should not be overstated. Roman-born generals were also present in the high command of the 5th century Western Empire: e.g. Flavius Constantius, Bonifacius and Aetius himself. It is true that some barbarian generals were disloyal and colluded with Rome's enemies, e.g. Ricimer, who treacherously overthrew his emperor, Majorian, in 461 and was strongly suspected of collusion with king Genseric while leading an East Roman expedition to recover Africa from the Vandals in 468. But Roman-born generals could also be treacherous and they, unlike their barbarian counterparts, had the added incentive that they could aspire to the imperial throne themselves. For example Aetius, who led an army of Huns into Italy in support of the usurper Joannes in 425.

Sources

Primary

• Vegetius, De Re Militari
• Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History
• Zosimus, Historia Nova
• Procopius, Histroy of the Wars

Secondary and tertiary

• Karen R. Dixon: The Late Roman Army. Routledge, 2000, ISBN 978-0-415-22296-9. 
• Hugh Elton: Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-425. Oxford University Press, 1998, ISBN 978-0-19-815241-5. 
• Paul (ed.) Erdkamp: A Companion to the Roman Army. Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007, ISBN 978-1-4051-2153-8. 
• Adrian Goldsworthy: Roman Warfare. 2000. 
• Adrian Goldsworthy: Complete Roman Army. 2005.