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{{Short description|Denied access to internet by Iranian government}}
{{Short description|Denied access to internet by Iranian government}}
{{GOCEinuse|date=July 2021}}
{{multiple issues|{{outdated|date=July 2021}}{{copy edit|date=May 2021}}}}


[[File:Page presented when searching for blocked content in Iran.jpg|alt=Internet Censorship in Iran – Internet shutdown in Iran|thumb|312x312px|Many of the world's most popular websites have been blocked in [[Iran]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=What You Need to Know about Internet Censorship in Iran|url=https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|access-date=2020-11-10|website=Centre for International Governance Innovation|language=en|archive-date=2020-11-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124164741/https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|url-status=live}}</ref> Also, the Iranian government in response to the [[2019–20 Iranian protests|2019 Iranian protests]], implemented an Internet shutdown that reduced Internet traffic in the country to 5% of its usual amount. [[Iran]] is widely seen by many to be a country with Internet censorship.<ref name="Skinner">{{Cite web|url=https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/22/how-did-iran-s-government-pulled-the-plug-on-the-internet|title=How did Iran's government pull the plug on the Internet?|last=Skinner|first=Helena|date=2019-11-22|website=euronews|language=en|access-date=2019-11-24|archive-date=2019-11-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191127185512/https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/22/how-did-iran-s-government-pulled-the-plug-on-the-internet|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Anderson|first=Finbar|date=2019-11-23|title=Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, and why did the government turn it off?|language=en-GB|work=The Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/23/irans-internet-blackout-happening-did-government-turn/|access-date=2020-11-10|issn=0307-1235|archive-date=2019-11-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128062826/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/23/irans-internet-blackout-happening-did-government-turn/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-19|title=It's not the first time Iran has shut down the internet, but this time, it's different|url=https://www.accessnow.org/its-not-the-first-time-iran-has-shut-down-the-internet-but-this-time-its-different/|access-date=2020-11-10|website=Access Now|language=en|archive-date=2019-11-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191119213324/https://www.accessnow.org/its-not-the-first-time-iran-has-shut-down-the-internet-but-this-time-its-different/|url-status=live}}</ref>]]
[[File:Page presented when searching for blocked content in Iran.jpg|alt=Internet Censorship in Iran – Internet shutdown in Iran|thumb|312x312px|Many of the world's most popular websites have been blocked in [[Iran]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=What You Need to Know about Internet Censorship in Iran|url=https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|access-date=2020-11-10|website=Centre for International Governance Innovation|language=en|archive-date=2020-11-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124164741/https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|url-status=live}}</ref> Also, the Iranian government in response to the [[2019–20 Iranian protests|2019 Iranian protests]], implemented an Internet shutdown that reduced Internet traffic in the country to 5% of its usual amount. [[Iran]] is widely seen by many to be a country with Internet censorship.<ref name="Skinner">{{Cite web|url=https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/22/how-did-iran-s-government-pulled-the-plug-on-the-internet|title=How did Iran's government pull the plug on the Internet?|last=Skinner|first=Helena|date=2019-11-22|website=euronews|language=en|access-date=2019-11-24|archive-date=2019-11-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191127185512/https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/22/how-did-iran-s-government-pulled-the-plug-on-the-internet|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Anderson|first=Finbar|date=2019-11-23|title=Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, and why did the government turn it off?|language=en-GB|work=The Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/23/irans-internet-blackout-happening-did-government-turn/|access-date=2020-11-10|issn=0307-1235|archive-date=2019-11-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128062826/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/11/23/irans-internet-blackout-happening-did-government-turn/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-19|title=It's not the first time Iran has shut down the internet, but this time, it's different|url=https://www.accessnow.org/its-not-the-first-time-iran-has-shut-down-the-internet-but-this-time-its-different/|access-date=2020-11-10|website=Access Now|language=en|archive-date=2019-11-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191119213324/https://www.accessnow.org/its-not-the-first-time-iran-has-shut-down-the-internet-but-this-time-its-different/|url-status=live}}</ref>]]
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Many [[blog]]gers, online [[activists]], and technical staff have faced [[Prison|jail]] sentences, torture, harassment and abuse.<ref>Amnesty International. (2004.) [http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE130452004?open&of=ENG-IRN "Iran: Civil society activists and human rights defenders under attack"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070914133132/http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE130452004?open&of=ENG-IRN|date=September 14, 2007}} ''AmnestyInternational.org. Retrieved December 9, 2006.''</ref><ref>Reporters Without Borders. (2005.) [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12636 "Reporters Without Borders welcomes release of blogger Arash Sigarchi"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070713180043/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12636|date=2007-07-13}} ''RSF.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref>
Many [[blog]]gers, online [[activists]], and technical staff have faced [[Prison|jail]] sentences, torture, harassment and abuse.<ref>Amnesty International. (2004.) [http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE130452004?open&of=ENG-IRN "Iran: Civil society activists and human rights defenders under attack"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070914133132/http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE130452004?open&of=ENG-IRN|date=September 14, 2007}} ''AmnestyInternational.org. Retrieved December 9, 2006.''</ref><ref>Reporters Without Borders. (2005.) [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12636 "Reporters Without Borders welcomes release of blogger Arash Sigarchi"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070713180043/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12636|date=2007-07-13}} ''RSF.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref>


== History ==
==History==
When first introduced, the internet services provided by Iran's government were comparatively open. Many users saw the Internet as an easy way to get around Iran's strict press laws.<ref>Feuilherade, P. (2002.) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm "Iran's banned press turns to the net"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040614185333/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm |date=2004-06-14 }}. ''BBC.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref><ref name="bbcnews">BBC News. (2003.) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3019695.stm "Iran Steps Up Net Censorship"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070222181031/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3019695.stm |date=2007-02-22 }}. ''BBC.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref>
At the beginning of the 21st century, Iran experienced a great surge in Internet usage.<ref name=":12"/> When first introduced, the internet services provided by Iran's government were comparatively open. Many users saw the Internet as an easy way to get around Iran's strict press laws.<ref>Feuilherade, P. (2002.) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm "Iran's banned press turns to the net"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040614185333/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm |date=2004-06-14 }}. ''BBC.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref><ref name="bbcnews">BBC News. (2003.) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3019695.stm "Iran Steps Up Net Censorship"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070222181031/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3019695.stm |date=2007-02-22 }}. ''BBC.com''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref>


At the beginning of the 21st century, [[Iran]] experienced a great surge in [[Internet]] usage. As international [[Internet]] usage grew, Internet [[censorship in Iran]] increased and many popular websites were blocked.<ref name=":12">{{Cite web|title=What You Need to Know about Internet Censorship in Iran|url=https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124164741/https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|archive-date=2020-11-24|access-date=2020-11-08|website=Centre for International Governance Innovation|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Aryan|first1=Simurgh|last2=Aryan|first2=Homa|last3=Halderman|first3=J. Alex|date=2013|title=Internet Censorship in Iran: A First Look|url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci13/workshop-program/presentation/aryan|url-status=live|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200923203213/https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci13/workshop-program/presentation/aryan|archive-date=2020-09-23|access-date=2020-11-08}}</ref> As of 2018, it is estimated that between 64% and 69% of Iranians are internet users.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2019-01-11|title=Some 64% of Iranians Are Internet Users: report|language=en|work=Tehran Times|url=http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/431713/Some-64-of-Iranians-are-internet-users-report|url-status=live|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025112446/https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/431713/Some-64-of-Iranians-are-internet-users-report|archive-date=2019-10-25}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Iran Internet Stats and Telecommunications Reports|url=https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025112436/https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm|archive-date=2019-10-25|access-date=2019-10-04|publisher=www.internetworldstats.com}}</ref>
As international Internet usage grew, Internet censorship in Iran increased and many popular websites were blocked.<ref name=":12">{{Cite web|title=What You Need to Know about Internet Censorship in Iran|url=https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124164741/https://www.cigionline.org/articles/what-you-need-know-about-internet-censorship-iran|archive-date=2020-11-24|access-date=2020-11-08|website=Centre for International Governance Innovation|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Aryan|first1=Simurgh|last2=Aryan|first2=Homa|last3=Halderman|first3=J. Alex|date=2013|title=Internet Censorship in Iran: A First Look|url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci13/workshop-program/presentation/aryan|url-status=live|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200923203213/https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci13/workshop-program/presentation/aryan|archive-date=2020-09-23|access-date=2020-11-08}}</ref> As of 2018, it is estimated that between 64% and 69% of Iranians are internet users.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2019-01-11|title=Some 64% of Iranians Are Internet Users: report|language=en|work=Tehran Times|url=http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/431713/Some-64-of-Iranians-are-internet-users-report|url-status=live|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025112446/https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/431713/Some-64-of-Iranians-are-internet-users-report|archive-date=2019-10-25}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Iran Internet Stats and Telecommunications Reports|url=https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025112436/https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm|archive-date=2019-10-25|access-date=2019-10-04|publisher=www.internetworldstats.com}}</ref>


Internet censorship increased with the administration of conservative president [[Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]] in 2005. Regime opponents in Iran are said to rely heavily on Web-based communication with the outside world.
Internet censorship increased with the administration of conservative president [[Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]] in 2005. Regime opponents in Iran are said to rely heavily on Web-based communication with the outside world.
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Beginning on November 17, 2019,<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-19|title=Iran has turned off the internet|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-internet-shutdown-protests-us-sanctions-a9209416.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120185038/https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-internet-shutdown-protests-us-sanctions-a9209416.html|archive-date=2019-11-20|access-date=2019-11-24|website=The Independent|language=en}}</ref> in response to the [[2019 Iranian fuel protests]], an internet shutdown reduced internet traffic in the country to 5% of normal levels.<ref name=":1">{{cite news|last1=Baraniuk|first1=Chris|date=20 November 2019|title=Iran's internet blackout reaches four-day mark|agency=BBC|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50490898|url-status=live|access-date=21 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191122051515/https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50490898|archive-date=22 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=KHATAMI|first1=ELHAM|date=20 November 2019|title=Iranian Americans Struggle to Reach Family Amid Internet Blackout|agency=Wired|url=https://www.wired.com/story/iran-us-internet-shutdown-skype-calls-family/|url-status=live|access-date=21 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120235437/https://www.wired.com/story/iran-us-internet-shutdown-skype-calls-family/|archive-date=20 November 2019}}</ref><ref name="Skinner" /> Internet access was gradually reactivated later that month.<ref>{{cite news|date=November 21, 2019|title=Iran begins reconnecting internet after shutdown over protests|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gasoline-protests-internet/iran-begins-reconnecting-internet-after-shutdown-over-protests-idUSKBN1XV19R|url-status=live|access-date=November 21, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191121125557/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gasoline-protests-internet/iran-begins-reconnecting-internet-after-shutdown-over-protests-idUSKBN1XV19R|archive-date=November 21, 2019}}</ref><ref name=":6" />
Beginning on November 17, 2019,<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-11-19|title=Iran has turned off the internet|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-internet-shutdown-protests-us-sanctions-a9209416.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120185038/https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-internet-shutdown-protests-us-sanctions-a9209416.html|archive-date=2019-11-20|access-date=2019-11-24|website=The Independent|language=en}}</ref> in response to the [[2019 Iranian fuel protests]], an internet shutdown reduced internet traffic in the country to 5% of normal levels.<ref name=":1">{{cite news|last1=Baraniuk|first1=Chris|date=20 November 2019|title=Iran's internet blackout reaches four-day mark|agency=BBC|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50490898|url-status=live|access-date=21 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191122051515/https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50490898|archive-date=22 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=KHATAMI|first1=ELHAM|date=20 November 2019|title=Iranian Americans Struggle to Reach Family Amid Internet Blackout|agency=Wired|url=https://www.wired.com/story/iran-us-internet-shutdown-skype-calls-family/|url-status=live|access-date=21 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191120235437/https://www.wired.com/story/iran-us-internet-shutdown-skype-calls-family/|archive-date=20 November 2019}}</ref><ref name="Skinner" /> Internet access was gradually reactivated later that month.<ref>{{cite news|date=November 21, 2019|title=Iran begins reconnecting internet after shutdown over protests|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gasoline-protests-internet/iran-begins-reconnecting-internet-after-shutdown-over-protests-idUSKBN1XV19R|url-status=live|access-date=November 21, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191121125557/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gasoline-protests-internet/iran-begins-reconnecting-internet-after-shutdown-over-protests-idUSKBN1XV19R|archive-date=November 21, 2019}}</ref><ref name=":6" />


===Post 2009-election developments===
== List of websites blocked in Iran ==
Following the 2009 election protests, Iran ratified the Computer Crimes Law (CCL) in 2010.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/computer-crimes-act_html/Computer_Crimes_Act.pdf|title=Islamic Republic of Iran's Computer Crimes Act|last=Islamic Republic of Iran|first=Cyber Police|date=2014|website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2020-05-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200510185839/https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/computer-crimes-act_html/Computer_Crimes_Act.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> The CCL established legal regulations for Internet censorship. Notable provisions of the CCL include: Article 10 which effectively prohibits Internet users and companies from using encryption, or protecting data, in a manner that would “deny access of authorised individuals to data, computer and telecommunication systems”; Article 14 which criminalises “producing, sending, publishing, distributing, saving or financially engaging in obscene content”; Article 21 which requires ISPs to maintain records of Internet traffic data and the personal information of their Internet users; and Article 48 which requires Internet Service Providers to record data from telephone conversations over the internet.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf|title=ARTICLE19's Legal Analysis of Iran's Computer Crimes Law|last=ARTICLE19|date=2012|website=ARTICLE19|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190809220223/https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf|archive-date=2019-08-09}}</ref>

In April 2011, Ali Agha-Mohammadi, a senior official, announced the government had plans to launch a"[[halal internet]]",<ref>Peccia, T., Meda, R., (2016) The Impact of Social Media in Modern Societies: Highlighting New Ideological Barriers, Geostrategic Divisions and Future Prospects, Scienza e Pace, Research Paper, University of Pisa.</ref> an internet that would conform to Islamic values and provide "appropriate" services.<ref name="Dehghan" /> Creating such a network, similar to [[Kwangmyong (network)|one used by North Korea]], would prevent unwanted information from outside of Iran from getting into the closed system. Myanmar and Cuba use similar systems.<ref>Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi, May 28, 2011, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704889404576277391449002016 Iran Vows to Unplug Internet] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519144428/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704889404576277391449002016 |date=2019-05-19 }}, Wall Street Journal</ref>

As of early 2012, Iran's ministry of information and communication technology was reportedly testing a countrywide "national Internet" network, its goal is to be a substitute for services ran through the World Wide Web.<ref name=Dehghan /> The government is also working on "software robots to analyse exchanging emails and chats", in order to find more "effective ways of controlling user's online activities." One Iranian IT expert source defended the program as aimed not "primarily" at curbing the global Internet, but at securing Iran's military, banking, and sensitive data from outside cyber-attacks such as [[Stuxnet]].<ref name=Dehghan />

In addition, by late January 2012, Internet cafe owners were required to record the identities of their customers before providing services. According to the news website Tabnak, an Iranian police statement states:

<blockquote>Internet cafes are required to write down the forename, surname, name of the father, national identification number, postcode, and telephone number of each customer. Besides the personal information, they must maintain other information of the customer such as the date and the time of using the Internet and the IP address, and the addresses of the websites visited. They should keep these informations for each individual for at least six months.<ref name=Dehghan /></blockquote>

In May 2012 Iran criticized Google for dropping the name "Persian Gulf" from its maps, leaving the feature unlabelled. Six days after Khamenei's statement, Iran announced that Google and Gmail would be added to the list of banned sites, to be replaced by the national Internet network. Iranian media reported that the new system would be ready by March 2013.<ref name=Hosseinian /> The network already hosts some government and academic sites.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-preparing-internal-version-of-internet/2012/09/19/79458194-01c3-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story_1.html|title=Iran preparing internal version of Internet|work=The Washington Post|date=2012-09-19|access-date=2017-09-01|archive-date=2018-01-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180109181707/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-preparing-internal-version-of-internet/2012/09/19/79458194-01c3-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story_1.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

The isolation of the separate network was also touted as an improvement to [[network security]], in the wake of the [[Stuxnet]] worm attack on Iranian's main uranium enrichment facility. A computer virus was also found in Iran's major [[Kharg Island]] oil export terminal in April. Communications and Technology Minister Reza Taqipour said, "Control over the Internet should not be in the hands of one or two countries. Especially on major issues and during crises, one cannot trust this network at all."<ref name=Hosseinian>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-iran-internet-national-idUSBRE88M0AO20120923|title=Iran readies domestic Internet system, blocks Google|author=Zahra Hosseinian and Yeganeh Torbati|publisher=Reuters|date=2012-09-23|access-date=2017-07-01|archive-date=2015-09-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150921134948/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/net-us-iran-internet-national-idUSBRE88M0AO20120923|url-status=live}}</ref>

In September 2012 Iran's top leader, [[Ayatollah]] [[Ali Khamenei]], called on Western leaders to censor the film trailer for ''[[Innocence of Muslims]]'', which was posted to [[YouTube]]. Khamenei alluded to bans on Nazi-related or anti-gay sites in some countries, asking "How there is no room for freedom of expression in these cases, but insulting Islam and its sanctities is free?".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-top-leader-urges-west-to-block-film-mocking-prophet-muhammad/2012/09/17/af3f952a-00b8-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_story.html|title=Iran's top leader urges West to block film mocking Prophet Muhammad|publisher=Associated Press|date=2012-09-17|access-date=2017-09-01|archive-date=2012-09-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120918132409/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-top-leader-urges-west-to-block-film-mocking-prophet-muhammad/2012/09/17/af3f952a-00b8-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_story.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>

As of mid-2014, the government of President [[Hassan Rouhani]] is seeking to ease Internet restrictions in the country, with [[Ali Jannati]], the culture minister, likening the restrictions to the ban on fax machines, video recorders and video tapes that was implemented following the 1979 revolution.<ref>[https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21607894-liberals-and-conservatives-argue-over-restrictions-internet-everyones-doing "Iran's internet politics: Everyone's doing it"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170206080102/http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21607894-liberals-and-conservatives-argue-over-restrictions-internet-everyones-doing |date=2017-02-06 }}, ''The Economist'', 19 July 2014.</ref>
In December 2016, Iranian Prosecutor Ahmad Ali Montazeri, who heads Iran's Internet censorship Committee banned and closed 14,000 websites and social networking accounts in Iran.<ref name=a8122016 /> He underlined that President Rouhani and the Interior Minister Rahmani Fazli agree with him and have addressed "serious warnings" on this issue.<ref name=a8122016>[https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2016/12/08/Iran-bans-14-thousand-websites-and-accounts-weekly-.html "Iran bans 14 thousand websites and accounts weekly"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161209005336/http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2016/12/08/Iran-bans-14-thousand-websites-and-accounts-weekly-.html |date=2016-12-09 }}, ''Al Arabiya'', 8 December 2016.</ref>

===Blocking in 2017–18 protests===
{{See also|Telegram in Iran}}
During the [[2017–18 Iranian protests]], the Iranian government blocked Internet access from mobile networks, blocked access to [[Instagram]], and blocked access to [[Telegram (messaging service)|Telegram]] in an effort to stymie protests. At some points, the government completely blocked Internet access in parts of the country.<ref>Ailsa Chang,[https://www.npr.org/2018/01/03/575252552/in-response-to-protests-iran-cuts-off-internet-access-blocks-apps In Response To Protests, Iran Cuts Off Internet Access, Blocks Apps] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180107030151/https://www.npr.org/2018/01/03/575252552/in-response-to-protests-iran-cuts-off-internet-access-blocks-apps |date=2018-01-07 }}, NPR, ''Morning Edition'' (January 3, 2018).</ref><ref name="Smith-Spark">Laura Smith-Spark, [http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/middleeast/iran-protests-united-nations-intl/index.html UN experts urge Iran to respect rights of protesters, end Internet crackdown] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180105171308/http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/middleeast/iran-protests-united-nations-intl/index.html |date=2018-01-05 }}, CNN (January 5, 2017).</ref> A January 2018 report by four [[United Nations special rapporteur|special rapporteurs]] of the [[Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights]] expressed deep concern about the blocking and stated: "Communication blackouts constitute a serious violation of [[fundamental rights]]."<ref name="Smith-Spark" />

===2019 total Internet shutdown===
{{Main|2019 Internet blackout in Iran}}
In November 2019, Iranian government imposed a week-long total [[Internet outage|internet shutdown]] in a response to 2019 [[2019 Iranian protests|protests]]. The blackout was organized by [[Supreme National Security Council|SNSC]] and [[Ministry of Information and Communications Technology of Iran|MICT]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-restored-in-iran-after-protest-shutdown-dAmqddA9|title=Internet being restored in Iran after week-long shutdown|date=2019-11-23|website=NetBlocks|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-01|archive-date=2019-11-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128081744/https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-restored-in-iran-after-protest-shutdown-dAmqddA9|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b|title=Internet disrupted in Iran amid fuel protests in multiple cities|date=2019-11-15|website=NetBlocks|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-01|archive-date=2019-11-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191116232625/https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b|url-status=live}}</ref> It was the largest wide-scale internet shutdown ever in Iran.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutoff/|title=How Iran's Government Shut Off the Internet|work=Wired|access-date=2019-12-01|language=en|issn=1059-1028|archive-date=2019-11-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191124045952/https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutoff/|url-status=live}}</ref>

==List of blocked websites==
Internet censorship in [[Iran]] has increased since 2010 and many mainstream websites have been blocked in Iran.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":14" /><ref name=":15" /> The number of blocked websites in Iran is very high.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Jafari|first=Hamed|date=2016-08-29|title=Iran Initiates the First Phase of the National Information Network|url=http://techrasa.com/2016/08/29/iran-initiates-first-phase-national-information-network/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170908182548/http://techrasa.com/2016/08/29/iran-initiates-first-phase-national-information-network/|archive-date=2017-09-08|access-date=2020-09-06|website=TechRasa|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="guardianuk" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite web|title=Iranians stay connected on social media despite regime restrictions|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/tech-savvy-iranians-stay-connected-social-media-despite-regime-restrictions-n1044016|access-date=2020-10-30|website=NBC News|language=en|archive-date=2020-10-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030020058/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/tech-savvy-iranians-stay-connected-social-media-despite-regime-restrictions-n1044016|url-status=live}}</ref> Even so, many Iranians remain on [[social media]] despite the government restrictions.<ref name=":13" />
Internet censorship in [[Iran]] has increased since 2010 and many mainstream websites have been blocked in Iran.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":14" /><ref name=":15" /> The number of blocked websites in Iran is very high.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Jafari|first=Hamed|date=2016-08-29|title=Iran Initiates the First Phase of the National Information Network|url=http://techrasa.com/2016/08/29/iran-initiates-first-phase-national-information-network/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170908182548/http://techrasa.com/2016/08/29/iran-initiates-first-phase-national-information-network/|archive-date=2017-09-08|access-date=2020-09-06|website=TechRasa|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="guardianuk" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite web|title=Iranians stay connected on social media despite regime restrictions|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/tech-savvy-iranians-stay-connected-social-media-despite-regime-restrictions-n1044016|access-date=2020-10-30|website=NBC News|language=en|archive-date=2020-10-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030020058/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/tech-savvy-iranians-stay-connected-social-media-despite-regime-restrictions-n1044016|url-status=live}}</ref> Even so, many Iranians remain on [[social media]] despite the government restrictions.<ref name=":13" />

SmartFilter blocks sites deemed immoral blocks access to most [[pornography|pornographic]] sites, [[gay]] and [[lesbian]] sites, reformist political sites, news media, sites that provide tools to help users cloak their Internet identity, and other sites nebulously deemed to be immoral. Iran has been accused by its critics of censoring more of the Internet than any other nation besides [[China]].<ref name="guardianuk" /> As of 2006, Iran's [[SmartFilter]] is configured to allow local [[Persian language|Persian]]-language sites, and block prominent English-language sites, such as the [[BBC]] and [[Facebook]].<ref name=":17">{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/dec/04/news.iran | location=London | work=The Guardian | first=Robert | last=Tait | title=Censorship fears rise as Iran blocks access to top websites | date=December 5, 2006 | access-date=December 14, 2016 | archive-date=April 20, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200420230728/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/dec/04/news.iran | url-status=live }}</ref> By 2008, Iran had blocked access to more than five million websites, whose content was deemed as immoral and anti-social.{{cn|date=July 2021}}
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On Sunday, September 6, 2020, Abolhassan Firoozabadi, director of the National Cyberspace Center of Iran, described [[China]] as a successful "model" in censoring and filtering the Internet, which they did by simulating applications and tools. He added that "if the operating system do not comply with Iranian law" or "create cultural, social, political and security problems" for the government, they will be filtered.<ref>{{cite news |title=وزیر ارتباطات ایران از ورود نیروهای مسلح به "توسعه" پیام‌رسان‌ها خبر داد |url=https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-influence-internet-apps/30825084.html |agency=radiofarda |date=2020-09-07 |access-date=2020-09-17 |archive-date=2020-09-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200907233224/https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-influence-internet-apps/30825084.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=فیروزآبادی در مورد شبکه‌های اجتماعی: اگر مسئله ایجاد کنند فیلتر خواهند شد |url=https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-filtering-social-media/30823481.html |agency=radiofarda |date=2020-09-06 |access-date=2020-09-17 |archive-date=2020-09-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200907121140/https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-filtering-social-media/30823481.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
== Internet service providers ==
{{See also|Blogging in Iran}}
Every internet service provider must be approved by both the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran]] (TCI) and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and must implement [[content-control software]] for websites and e-mail. ISPs face heavy penalties if they do not comply with the government filter lists. At least twelve ISPs have been shut down for failing to install adequate filters.<ref>Reporters Without Borders. [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10733 "Report on Iran"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080224063811/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10733 |date=February 24, 2008 }}. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> By 2008, Iran had blocked access to more than five million websites, whose content was deemed as immoral and anti-social.


There is also a newfound state awareness of how domestically produced content considered undesirable can pervade the Internet, highlighted by the 2006 controversy over the appearance of a [[celebrity sex tape]] featuring a popular Iranian [[soap opera]] actress (or a convincing [[look-alike]]).<ref name="guardianuk" /> (''See the [[Iranian sex tape scandal]]'')
== United States sanctions on internet in Iran ==
[[File:Google Developers webpage in Iran, July 2021.png|thumb|The error message shown to internet users in Iran attempting to access [[Google Developers]].]]
American technology companies block access to their services in Iran to comply with United States sanctions which outlaw financial transactions with Iran. In August 2019, access to free services on [[GitHub|Github]], [[GitLab|Gitlab]], and the [[Amazon Web Services|Amazon Cloud]] were suspended for users in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/github-starts-blocking-developers-in-countries-facing-us-trade-sanctions/ |title=GitHub starts blocking developers in countries facing US trade sanctions |last=Tung |first=Liam |publisher=ZDNet |language=en |access-date=2019-10-04 |archive-date=2019-09-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924024105/https://www.zdnet.com/article/github-starts-blocking-developers-in-countries-facing-us-trade-sanctions/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/locked-amazon-blocking-iranians-services-191001190202786.html|title=Locked out: Why is Amazon blocking Iranians from its services?|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191003140205/https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/locked-amazon-blocking-iranians-services-191001190202786.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The Amazon Cloud suspension has had particularly severe collateral impacts, as Amazon Cloud hosts the majority of the tools needed to bypass the government filters further restricting access to online content.<ref name="auto">{{Cite web|url=https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/more-iranians-forced-to-rely-on-unsafe-online-hosting-after-amazon/|title=More Iranians Forced to Rely on Unsafe Online Hosting After Amazon Ban|date=2019-08-07|website=Center for Human Rights in Iran|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025232226/https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/more-iranians-forced-to-rely-on-unsafe-online-hosting-after-amazon/|url-status=live}}</ref> This also has forced developers working inside Iran to use unsafe hosting tools that leave websites vulnerable to cyberattacks and risk users’ security.<ref name="auto" />


==Methods==
In December 2018, the platform [[Slack (software)|Slack]] temporarily suspended access to its services for all users who had ''ever'' connected to the platform from Iranian [[IP address]]es. Slack reinstated those accounts after facing public scrutiny, while continuing to suspend its services to users connecting directly from Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/20/18150129/slack-iran-deactivated-sanctions-license-cuba-crimea|title=Slack is banning some users with links to Iran even if they've left the country|last=Brandom|first=Russell|date=2018-12-20|website=The Verge|language=en|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191009202248/https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/20/18150129/slack-iran-deactivated-sanctions-license-cuba-crimea|url-status=live}}</ref>
The primary engine of Iran's censorship is the [[content-control software]] [[SmartFilter]], developed by [[San Jose, California|San Jose]] firm [[Secure Computing]].<ref>OpenNet Initiative (2006). [http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/ "Internet Filtering in Iran in 2004–2005: A Country Study"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090108054914/http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/ |date=2009-01-08 }}. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> The American company alleges that Iran did not purchase the software legally.<ref name="newscientist">Knight, W. (2005.) [https://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7589 "Iranian net censorship powered by US technology"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080315222128/http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7589 |date=2008-03-15 }}. ''The New Scientist''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> Iran has since developed its own hardware and software to filter the Internet.<ref name="opennet1">{{cite web|url=http://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran|title=Iran|access-date=25 August 2015|archive-date=26 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180926051715/https://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran|url-status=live}}</ref> All Internet traffic is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure of the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran]] (TCI), which implements additional surveillance measures.<ref name="opennet1"/>
Since March 2018, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]] has made the [[App store|App Store]] unavailable in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/15/17126342/apple-iran-app-store-block|title=Apple appears to have totally cut off Iran from the App Store|last=Kastrenakes|first=Jacob|date=2018-03-15|website=The Verge|language=en|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-07-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725224437/https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/15/17126342/apple-iran-app-store-block|url-status=live}}</ref>


Dozens of [[internet service provider]]s (ISP) operate in Iran.<ref name="opennet1"/> All of them must implement content-control software for websites and e-mail, with strict penalties for failure to comply. As of 2008, at least twelve ISPs have been shut down for failing to install adequate filters. Before it begins to operate, an ISP must be approved by both the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran]] (TCI) and the [[Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance]].<ref name="rsf">Reporters Without Borders. [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10733 "Report on Iran"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080224063811/http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10733 |date=February 24, 2008 }}. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> It then must [[Telecommunications data retention|store all data]] sent or received by a client for at least three months.{{cn|date=July 2021}}
Sanctions have also had significant impacts on the ability of people in the country to communicate online. The blocking of Telegram in April 2018 resulted in collateral blocking of WhatsApp and the disabling of many [[Virtual private network|VPNs]]. Users inside Iran using Apple devices were unable to access the App Store through their usual proxies, and were unable to download new VPN and communication apps.


Iran uses the [[lawful intercept]] capabilities of telecommunications systems to monitor communications by political dissidents. A monitoring center installed by [[Nokia Siemens Networks]] (NSN) intercepts and archives Internet communications for Iranian law enforcement officials.<ref name="WashTimes"/>
The suspension of communications services and platforms inside Iran continue despite the existence of a General License D-1—first issued by the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control|Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC)]] in 2014—which authorizes private companies to provide certain “personal communications” technologies to users in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_gld1.pdf|title=GENERAL LICENSE D-1: General License with Respect to Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications|last=OFAC|access-date=2019-10-05|archive-date=2019-06-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612030308/https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_gld1.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> When sanctions were reimposed by the United States, the US Treasury Department highlighted that General License D-1 would help with "fostering Internet freedom and supporting the Iranian people."<ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0322|title=Treasury Department Reaffirms Commitment to Fostering Internet Freedom and Supporting the Iranian People|publisher=U.S. Department of the Treasury|access-date=2019-10-05|archive-date=2019-10-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191001085605/https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0322|url-status=live}}</ref>


Online social networks, especially [[Facebook]], are monitored. Citizens returning home from living abroad have been questioned and detained due to the contents of their personal Facebook webpages. After protests outside Iran following the 2009 elections, such social media monitoring increased.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 | work=The Wall Street Journal | first=Farnaz | last=Fassihi | title=Iranian Crackdown Goes Global | date=December 3, 2009 | access-date=August 8, 2017 | archive-date=July 15, 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170715183106/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 | url-status=live }}</ref>
== Software ==
{{See also|Communications in Iran#Internet}}
The primary engine of Iran's censorship is the [[content-control software]] [[SmartFilter]], developed by [[San Jose, California|San Jose]] firm [[Secure Computing]].<ref>OpenNet Initiative (2006). [http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/ "Internet Filtering in Iran in 2004–2005: A Country Study"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090108054914/http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/iran/ |date=2009-01-08 }}. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> However, Secure Computing denies ever having sold the software to Iran, and alleges that Iran is illegally using the software without a license.<ref name="newscientist">Knight, W. (2005.) [https://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7589 "Iranian net censorship powered by US technology"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080315222128/http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7589 |date=2008-03-15 }}. ''The New Scientist''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref>


Iran [[Bandwidth throttling|throttles]] the [[Bandwidth|speed of the Internet]] to frustrate users and limit communication. Mass-scale throttling has been observed following the [[2009 Iranian presidential election]], the weeks leading to [[2013 Iranian presidential election|2013 election]], and during times of international political upheaval.<ref name="shaheed0514" /> In October 2006, the government ordered all ISPs to limit their [[download speed]]s to 128&nbsp;[[Kilobit per second|kbit/s]] for residential clients and [[Internet cafe]]s. No reason was publicly announced. The purpose, as widely believed according to [[Reuters]], was to constrain the consumption of [[Western mass media]].<ref>Reuters. (2006.) [http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=internetNews&storyID=2006-10-18T143910Z_01_BLA852298_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAN-INTERNET.xml&WTmodLoc=InternetNewsHome_C2_internetNews-1 "Iran cuts Internet speeds to homes, cafes""] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070714033620/http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=internetNews |date=2007-07-14 }}. ''Reuters.com''.</ref> As of 2010, ISPs in Tehran may offer a higher speed of at least two [[Mbit/s]] for only businesses while the residential speed limit remained.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.sabanet.ir/service_price.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100407053959/http://www.sabanet.ir/service_price.htm|url-status=dead|title=تعرفه صبانت برای اینترنت محدود|archive-date=April 7, 2010}}</ref> Since then, speed restrictions have been relaxed.{{cn|date=July 2021}}
As of 2006, Iran's [[SmartFilter]] is configured to allow local [[Persian language|Persian]]-language sites, and block prominent English-language sites, such as the [[BBC]] and [[Facebook]].<ref name=":17">{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/dec/04/news.iran | location=London | work=The Guardian | first=Robert | last=Tait | title=Censorship fears rise as Iran blocks access to top websites | date=December 5, 2006 | access-date=December 14, 2016 | archive-date=April 20, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200420230728/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/dec/04/news.iran | url-status=live }}</ref>


[[Deep packet inspection]] (DPI) is a technology that analyzes the contents of transmissions, even if they have been encrypted. Iran may use it to detect connections to [[TLS]]-based VPNs and use [[TCP reset attack]]s to interfere with them.<ref name="vpn-reset-attack">{{cite web|url=https://gitlab.com/openconnect/openconnect/-/issues/50|title=my ISP is injecting RST packets during a TLS handshake|date=June 7, 2019|access-date=May 19, 2020|archive-date=November 25, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125171629/https://gitlab.com/openconnect/openconnect/-/issues/50|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2009, the ''[[Wall Street Journal'' reported that NSN may have sold DPI software to Iran for monitoring and altering the content of Internet voice and e-mail communications.<ref>[https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124562668777335653 "Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170824090058/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124562668777335653 |date=2017-08-24 }} by Christopher Rhoads in New York and Loretta Chao in Beijing, ''The Wall Street Journal'', June 23, 2009. Retrieved 6/23/09.</ref> Andrew Lighten, an employee of NSN, claimed that it sold Iran software for lawful interception, but that the company does not sell products with deep packet inspection.<ref name=AndrewLighten>{{cite web|url=http://andrewlighten.com/2009/06/23/what-i-do-for-a-job/|title=''Andrew Lighten'' June 23, 2009, "What I do for a job"|access-date=25 August 2015|archive-date=11 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121111171300/http://andrewlighten.com/2009/06/23/what-i-do-for-a-job/|url-status=live}}</ref>
The software effectively blocks access to most [[pornography|pornographic]] sites, [[gay]] and [[lesbian]] sites, reformist political sites, news media, sites that provide tools to help users cloak their Internet identity, and other sites nebulously deemed to be immoral. Iran has been accused by its critics of censoring more of the Internet than any other nation besides [[China]].<ref name="guardianuk" />

Iran has since developed its own hardware and software for filtering purposes. The architecture of the Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance as all traffic from the dozens of ISPs serving households is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure of the [[Telecommunication Company of Iran]] (TCI).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran|title=Iran|access-date=25 August 2015|archive-date=26 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180926051715/https://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran|url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[Kurdish Wikipedia]] was [[Blocking of Wikipedia|blocked]] for several months in 2006<!--right?-->, according to [[Reporters Without Borders]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/2006-12-12-voa10.cfm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070103194517/http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/2006-12-12-voa10.cfm|url-status=dead|title=Iran Cracks Down On Internet Use|archive-date=January 3, 2007}}</ref>

== The American proxy server ==
Iranians can sometimes access 'forbidden' sites through [[proxy server]]s, although these can be blocked as well. In 2003, the [[United States]] began providing a free proxy server to Iranian citizens through its [[International Broadcasting Bureau|IBB]] service [[Voice of America]] with [[Internet privacy]] company [[Anonymizer (company)|Anonymizer, Inc]]. The proxy [[website]] changes whenever the Iranian government blocks it.<ref name="uk-register-anonimizer-up-02" />

However, even with the U.S. proxy filter, pornographic websites and keywords are still blocked. "There's a limit to what taxpayers should pay for," an [[International Broadcasting Bureau|IBB]] program manager was quoted as saying.<ref name="uk-register-anonimizer-up-02">Poulson, K. (2003). [https://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/29/us_sponsors_anonymiser_if_you/ "US sponsors Anonymiser – if you live in Iran"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170810141213/https://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/29/us_sponsors_anonymiser_if_you/ |date=2017-08-10 }}. ''The Register UK''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> The forbidden keywords are controversial—banning "gay" effectively bars access to a host of gay and lesbian sites—and has had [[unintended consequence]]s. The banning of "ass", for example, blocks access to the website of the United States Embassy.<ref>McCullagh, D. (2004). [https://archive.today/20120716002645/http://news.com.com/2010-1028_3-5204405.html "U.S. blunders with keyword blacklist"]. CNET News. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref><ref>A complete list of the blocked keywords on the American server can be found [http://opennet.net/advisories/words.html here] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110305025151/http://opennet.net/advisories/words.html |date=2011-03-05 }}.</ref>

Following the [[2009 Iranian presidential election]], the [[U.S. Senate]] ratified a plan to help curb "censorship in the Islamic Republic". The legislation dubbed the [[Victims of Iranian Censorship Act]] (VOICE) allocated $50 million to fund measures "to counter Iranian government efforts to jam radio, satellite, and Internet-based transmissions."<ref name="america1">{{cite web |url=http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html |title=Secretary of State Clinton on Internet Freedom |publisher=America.gov |date=2010-01-21 |access-date=2011-09-15 |archive-date=2011-10-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111014002413/http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Deep packet inspection ==
{{Main|Deep packet inspection#Iran}}
The possibility that, in 2008, Nokia Siemens Systems sold the Telecommunication Company of Iran [[deep packet inspection]] software with countrywide capacity for monitoring and altering the content of Internet voice and mail communications were [[Deep packet inspection#Deep Packet Inspection by governments|
raised]] in a ''Wall Street Journal'' report in June 2009.<ref>[https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124562668777335653 "Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170824090058/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124562668777335653 |date=2017-08-24 }} by Christopher Rhoads in New York and Loretta Chao in Beijing, ''The Wall Street Journal'', June 23, 2009. Retrieved 6/23/09.</ref> Nokia Siemens Systems has denied that what it sold to TCI had these capabilities.

Andrew Lighten, a NSN employee, stated<ref name=AndrewLighten>{{cite web|url=http://andrewlighten.com/2009/06/23/what-i-do-for-a-job/|title=''Andrew Lighten'' June 23, 2009, "What I do for a job"|access-date=25 August 2015|archive-date=11 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121111171300/http://andrewlighten.com/2009/06/23/what-i-do-for-a-job/|url-status=live}}</ref> that the company does not have products for Deep Packet Inspection, and only provided Iran [[lawful interception]] capability for 3G UMTS mobile networks, which he states, is a fundamental requirement of the [[UMTS]] network as defined by the [[ETSI]] standards.

Iran reportedly uses deep packet inspection to detect connections to [[Transport Layer Security|TLS]]-based VPNs, and use [[TCP reset attack]]s to interfere with them.<ref name="vpn-reset-attack">{{cite web|url=https://gitlab.com/openconnect/openconnect/-/issues/50|title=my ISP is injecting RST packets during a TLS handshake|date=June 7, 2019|access-date=May 19, 2020|archive-date=November 25, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201125171629/https://gitlab.com/openconnect/openconnect/-/issues/50|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Internet connection speed restrictions ==
Iranian government uses [[Bandwidth throttling|speed throttling]] as a means of frustrating users and limiting communication. There has been significant speed drops of Internet communications in the days following the [[2009 Iranian presidential election]], the weeks leading to [[2013 Iranian presidential election|2013 election]], and during times of international political upheaval.<ref name="shaheed0514" />

In October 2006, the [[Iran]]ian government ordered all internet service providers to limit their download speeds to 128[[Kilobit per second|kbit/s]] for all residential clients and Internet cafes. Although no reason for the decree was given, it is widely believed the move was designed to reduce the amount of western media (e.g. films and music) entering the country.<ref>Reuters. (2006.) [http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=internetNews&storyID=2006-10-18T143910Z_01_BLA852298_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAN-INTERNET.xml&WTmodLoc=InternetNewsHome_C2_internetNews-1 "Iran cuts Internet speeds to homes, cafes""] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070714033620/http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=internetNews |date=2007-07-14 }}. ''Reuters.com''.</ref> There is also a newfound state awareness of how domestically produced content considered undesirable can pervade the Internet, highlighted by the 2006 controversy over the appearance of a [[celebrity sex tape]] featuring a popular Iranian [[soap opera]] actress (or a convincing [[look-alike]]).<ref name="guardianuk" /> (''See the [[Iranian sex tape scandal]]'')

As of 2010, most major ISPs in Tehran offer 1&nbsp;[[Megabit per second|Mbit/s]] for 2,190,000 [[Iranian Rial|rials]]/month (around 60&nbsp;[[US Dollars|dollars]]/month), 2Mbit/s for 3,950,000&nbsp;rials/month (around 115 [[US Dollars|dollars]]/month) for unlimited data traffic. 1&nbsp;Mbit/s with 2&nbsp;GB traffic limitation costs 189,000&nbsp;rials/month (around 9 [[US Dollars|dollars]]/month).
Note these prices are just for Tehran. Prices are usually higher in other cities. Restriction for the residential client speed of 128kbit/s is still in place and the speeds mentioned above are just for offices and commercial firms.
<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.sabanet.ir/service_price.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100407053959/http://www.sabanet.ir/service_price.htm|url-status=dead|title=تعرفه صبانت برای اینترنت محدود|archive-date=April 7, 2010}}</ref>

Speed restrictions have been relaxed since and become cheaper, as of Oct. 2019 a major ISP provided 40Mbit/s Internet with 100&nbsp;GB of data per month, for 850,000 IRR (about 8 [[US Dollars|USD]]). Others provide unlimited data traffic plans with up to 16Mbit/s speed, just for 260,000 IRR/month (about 2.25 [[US Dollars|USD]]).

== Monitoring ==
{{See also|Lawful intercept}}
According to the American newspaper ''[[The Washington Times]]'', Iran is using the [[lawful intercept]] capabilities of telecommunications systems to monitor communications by political dissidents on the Internet. A "monitoring center" installed by Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) for Iran telecom intercepts web-based communications and archives them for Iranian law enforcement officials. [[Lily Mazahery]], a human rights and immigration lawyer who represents Iranian dissidents, reported that one of her clients was arrested because of instant messaging he had participated in with Ms. Mazahery.


==Punishment of dissidents==
[[Lily Mazahery]], a human rights and immigration lawyer who represents Iranian dissidents, reported that one of her clients was arrested because of instant messaging he had participated in with Ms. Mazahery.
<blockquote>He told me he had received a call from the Ministry of Intelligence, and this guy when he went to the interrogation, they put in front of him printed copies of his chats with me. He said he was dumbfounded, and he was sent to prison.<ref name=WashTimes>{{Cite journal |title=Fed contractor, cell phone maker sold spy system to Iran |author=Eli Lake |journal=[[Washington Times]] |date=April 13, 2009 |url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/13/europe39s-telecoms-aid-with-spy-tech/ |access-date=October 31, 2009 |archive-date=December 4, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101204175212/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/13/europe39s-telecoms-aid-with-spy-tech/ |url-status=live }}</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>He told me he had received a call from the Ministry of Intelligence, and this guy when he went to the interrogation, they put in front of him printed copies of his chats with me. He said he was dumbfounded, and he was sent to prison.<ref name=WashTimes>{{Cite journal |title=Fed contractor, cell phone maker sold spy system to Iran |author=Eli Lake |journal=[[Washington Times]] |date=April 13, 2009 |url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/13/europe39s-telecoms-aid-with-spy-tech/ |access-date=October 31, 2009 |archive-date=December 4, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101204175212/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/13/europe39s-telecoms-aid-with-spy-tech/ |url-status=live }}</ref></blockquote>


==Circumvention==
According to a newly passed legislation, Internet Service Providers (ISP) in Iran are [[Telecommunications data retention|required to store all the data]] sent or received by each of their clients. ISPs may delete the data no sooner than 3 months after the expiry of each client's contract.{{cn|date=July 2021}}
===Methods===
A [[proxy server]] is a technology that can be used to access a blocked site, as long as the proxy itself is not blocked. In 2003, the [[Voice of America]], an American government service, began to operate a proxy server for Iranian citizens, free of charge, with [[Internet privacy]] company [[Anonymizer (company)|Anonymizer]]. Whenever the proxy is blocked, it uses a new [[IP address]] until that one is also blocked.<ref name="uk-register-anonimizer-up-02" /> Some websites and keywords related to pornography are blocked in the American proxy. "There's a limit to what taxpayers should pay for," an [[International Broadcasting Bureau|IBB]] program manager explained.<ref name="uk-register-anonimizer-up-02">Poulson, K. (2003). [https://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/29/us_sponsors_anonymiser_if_you/ "US sponsors Anonymiser – if you live in Iran"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170810141213/https://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/29/us_sponsors_anonymiser_if_you/ |date=2017-08-10 }}. ''The Register UK''. Retrieved December 9, 2006.</ref> The list of banned words, 82 long, is publicly available.<ref>A complete list of the blocked keywords on the American server can be found [http://opennet.net/advisories/words.html here] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110305025151/http://opennet.net/advisories/words.html |date=2011-03-05}}.</ref> Non-pornographic websites may be inadvertently blocked; for example, the banning of <i>ass</i> blocks access to the website of the United States Embassy.<ref>{{cite web|last=McCullagh|first=Declan|date=May 3, 2004|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120716002645/http://news.com.com/2010-1028_3-5204405.html|title=U.S. blunders with keyword blacklist|website=CNET News|access-date=December 9, 2006|url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/u-s-blunders-with-keyword-blacklist/|archive-date=July 16, 2012}}</ref>


===United States sanctions===
Out-of-country protests following the 2009 elections resulted in Iran increasing their monitoring of online social networks, especially targeting Facebook. Upon re-entry to the country, citizens that had lived abroad have been questioned and detained due to the contents of their personal Facebook pages.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 | work=The Wall Street Journal | first=Farnaz | last=Fassihi | title=Iranian Crackdown Goes Global | date=December 3, 2009 | access-date=August 8, 2017 | archive-date=July 15, 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170715183106/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125978649644673331 | url-status=live }}</ref>
{{see also|United States sanctions against Iran}}
Following the [[2009 Iranian presidential election]], the [[US Senate]] ratified the [[Victims of Iranian Censorship Act]] (VOICE), which allocated $50 million to fund measures "to counter Iranian government efforts to jam radio, satellite, and Internet-based transmissions."<ref name="america1">{{cite web |url=http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html |title=Secretary of State Clinton on Internet Freedom |publisher=America.gov |date=2010-01-21 |access-date=2011-09-15 |archive-date=2011-10-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111014002413/http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100121142618eaifas0.6585352.html |url-status=live }}</ref>


Due to American commercial sanctions against Iran, multiple American technology companies have blocked access to their services in Iran. Since 2018, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]]'s [[Apple App Store|App Store]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/15/17126342/apple-iran-app-store-block|title=Apple appears to have totally cut off Iran from the App Store|last=Kastrenakes|first=Jacob|date=2018-03-15|website=The Verge|language=en|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-07-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725224437/https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/15/17126342/apple-iran-app-store-block|url-status=live}}</ref> and the messaging platform [[Slack (software)|Slack]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/20/18150129/slack-iran-deactivated-sanctions-license-cuba-crimea|title=Slack is banning some users with links to Iran even if they've left the country|last=Brandom|first=Russell|date=2018-12-20|website=The Verge|language=en|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191009202248/https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/20/18150129/slack-iran-deactivated-sanctions-license-cuba-crimea|url-status=live}}</ref> have been unavailable in Iran. In 2019, access to free services on [[GitHub|Github]], [[GitLab|Gitlab]], and the [[Amazon Web Services|Amazon Cloud]] were suspended for users in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/github-starts-blocking-developers-in-countries-facing-us-trade-sanctions/ |title=GitHub starts blocking developers in countries facing US trade sanctions |last=Tung |first=Liam |publisher=ZDNet |language=en |access-date=2019-10-04 |archive-date=2019-09-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924024105/https://www.zdnet.com/article/github-starts-blocking-developers-in-countries-facing-us-trade-sanctions/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/locked-amazon-blocking-iranians-services-191001190202786.html|title=Locked out: Why is Amazon blocking Iranians from its services?|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191003140205/https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/locked-amazon-blocking-iranians-services-191001190202786.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
== Post 2009-election developments ==
Following the 2009 election protests, Iran ratified the Computer Crimes Law (CCL) in 2010.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/computer-crimes-act_html/Computer_Crimes_Act.pdf|title=Islamic Republic of Iran's Computer Crimes Act|last=Islamic Republic of Iran|first=Cyber Police|date=2014|website=United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2020-05-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200510185839/https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/computer-crimes-act_html/Computer_Crimes_Act.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> The CCL established legal regulations for Internet censorship. Notable provisions of the CCL include: Article 10 which effectively prohibits Internet users and companies from using encryption, or protecting data, in a manner that would “deny access of authorised individuals to data, computer and telecommunication systems”; Article 14 which criminalises “producing, sending, publishing, distributing, saving or financially engaging in obscene content”; Article 21 which requires ISPs to maintain records of Internet traffic data and the personal information of their Internet users; and Article 48 which requires Internet Service Providers to record data from telephone conversations over the internet.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf|title=ARTICLE19's Legal Analysis of Iran's Computer Crimes Law|last=ARTICLE19|date=2012|website=ARTICLE19|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190809220223/https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2921/12-01-30-FINAL-iran-WEB%5B4%5D.pdf|archive-date=2019-08-09}}</ref>


Such closures of US-based Internet services may strengthen Iran's Internet censorship. Without Apple's App Store, users are unable to download VPN and communication apps.{{citation needed|date=July 2021}} Amazon Cloud, another banned service, hosts the majority of the tools needed to bypass the government filters further restricting access to online content.<ref name="auto">{{Cite web|url=https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/more-iranians-forced-to-rely-on-unsafe-online-hosting-after-amazon/|title=More Iranians Forced to Rely on Unsafe Online Hosting After Amazon Ban|date=2019-08-07|website=Center for Human Rights in Iran|access-date=2019-10-04|archive-date=2019-10-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191025232226/https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/more-iranians-forced-to-rely-on-unsafe-online-hosting-after-amazon/|url-status=live}}</ref> Iranian Internet developers have been forced to use less secure hosting tools, which leave websites vulnerable to [[cyberattacks]] and risk users' security.<ref name="auto" />
In April 2011, Ali Agha-Mohammadi, a senior official, announced the government had plans to launch a"[[halal internet]]",<ref>Peccia, T., Meda, R., (2016) The Impact of Social Media in Modern Societies: Highlighting New Ideological Barriers, Geostrategic Divisions and Future Prospects, Scienza e Pace, Research Paper, University of Pisa.</ref> an internet that would conform to Islamic values and provide "appropriate" services.<ref name="Dehghan" /> Creating such a network, similar to [[Kwangmyong (network)|one used by North Korea]], would prevent unwanted information from outside of Iran from getting into the closed system. Myanmar and Cuba use similar systems.<ref>Christopher Rhoads and Farnaz Fassihi, May 28, 2011, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704889404576277391449002016 Iran Vows to Unplug Internet] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190519144428/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704889404576277391449002016 |date=2019-05-19 }}, Wall Street Journal</ref>


These suspensions continue despite a General License D-1, first issued by the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control|Office of Foreign Asset Controls]] (ORAC) in 2014, which authorizes private companies to provide certain "personal communications" technologies to users in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_gld1.pdf|title=GENERAL LICENSE D-1: General License with Respect to Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal Communications|last=OFAC|access-date=2019-10-05|archive-date=2019-06-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612030308/https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_gld1.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> When sanctions were reimposed by the United States, the [[US Treasury Department]] highlighted that General License D-1 would help with "fostering Internet freedom and supporting the Iranian people."<ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0322|title=Treasury Department Reaffirms Commitment to Fostering Internet Freedom and Supporting the Iranian People|publisher=U.S. Department of the Treasury|access-date=2019-10-05|archive-date=2019-10-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191001085605/https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0322|url-status=live}}</ref>
As of early 2012, Iran's ministry of information and communication technology was reportedly testing a countrywide "national Internet" network, its goal is to be a substitute for services ran through the World Wide Web.<ref name=Dehghan /> The government is also working on "software robots to analyse exchanging emails and chats", in order to find more "effective ways of controlling user's online activities." One Iranian IT expert source defended the program as aimed not "primarily" at curbing the global Internet, but at securing Iran's military, banking, and sensitive data from outside cyber-attacks such as [[Stuxnet]].<ref name=Dehghan />

In addition, by late January 2012, Internet cafe owners were required to record the identities of their customers before providing services. According to the news website Tabnak, an Iranian police statement states:

<blockquote>Internet cafes are required to write down the forename, surname, name of the father, national identification number, postcode, and telephone number of each customer. Besides the personal information, they must maintain other information of the customer such as the date and the time of using the Internet and the IP address, and the addresses of the websites visited. They should keep these informations for each individual for at least six months.<ref name=Dehghan /></blockquote>

In May 2012 Iran criticized Google for dropping the name "Persian Gulf" from its maps, leaving the feature unlabelled. Six days after Khamenei's statement, Iran announced that Google and Gmail would be added to the list of banned sites, to be replaced by the national Internet network. Iranian media reported that the new system would be ready by March 2013.<ref name=Hosseinian /> The network already hosts some government and academic sites.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-preparing-internal-version-of-internet/2012/09/19/79458194-01c3-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story_1.html|title=Iran preparing internal version of Internet|work=The Washington Post|date=2012-09-19|access-date=2017-09-01|archive-date=2018-01-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180109181707/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-preparing-internal-version-of-internet/2012/09/19/79458194-01c3-11e2-b260-32f4a8db9b7e_story_1.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

The isolation of the separate network was also touted as an improvement to [[network security]], in the wake of the [[Stuxnet]] worm attack on Iranian's main uranium enrichment facility. A computer virus was also found in Iran's major [[Kharg Island]] oil export terminal in April. Communications and Technology Minister Reza Taqipour said, "Control over the Internet should not be in the hands of one or two countries. Especially on major issues and during crises, one cannot trust this network at all."<ref name=Hosseinian>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-iran-internet-national-idUSBRE88M0AO20120923|title=Iran readies domestic Internet system, blocks Google|author=Zahra Hosseinian and Yeganeh Torbati|publisher=Reuters|date=2012-09-23|access-date=2017-07-01|archive-date=2015-09-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150921134948/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/net-us-iran-internet-national-idUSBRE88M0AO20120923|url-status=live}}</ref>

In September 2012 Iran's top leader, [[Ayatollah]] [[Ali Khamenei]], called on Western leaders to censor the film trailer for ''[[Innocence of Muslims]]'', which was posted to [[YouTube]]. Khamenei alluded to bans on Nazi-related or anti-gay sites in some countries, asking "How there is no room for freedom of expression in these cases, but insulting Islam and its sanctities is free?".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-top-leader-urges-west-to-block-film-mocking-prophet-muhammad/2012/09/17/af3f952a-00b8-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_story.html|title=Iran's top leader urges West to block film mocking Prophet Muhammad|publisher=Associated Press|date=2012-09-17|access-date=2017-09-01|archive-date=2012-09-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120918132409/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-top-leader-urges-west-to-block-film-mocking-prophet-muhammad/2012/09/17/af3f952a-00b8-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_story.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>

As of mid-2014, the government of President [[Hassan Rouhani]] is seeking to ease Internet restrictions in the country, with [[Ali Jannati]], the culture minister, likening the restrictions to the ban on fax machines, video recorders and video tapes that was implemented following the 1979 revolution.<ref>[https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21607894-liberals-and-conservatives-argue-over-restrictions-internet-everyones-doing "Iran's internet politics: Everyone's doing it"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170206080102/http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21607894-liberals-and-conservatives-argue-over-restrictions-internet-everyones-doing |date=2017-02-06 }}, ''The Economist'', 19 July 2014.</ref>
In December 2016, Iranian Prosecutor Ahmad Ali Montazeri, who heads Iran's Internet censorship Committee banned and closed 14,000 websites and social networking accounts in Iran.<ref name=a8122016 /> He underlined that President Rouhani and the Interior Minister Rahmani Fazli agree with him and have addressed "serious warnings" on this issue.<ref name=a8122016>[https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2016/12/08/Iran-bans-14-thousand-websites-and-accounts-weekly-.html "Iran bans 14 thousand websites and accounts weekly"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161209005336/http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2016/12/08/Iran-bans-14-thousand-websites-and-accounts-weekly-.html |date=2016-12-09 }}, ''Al Arabiya'', 8 December 2016.</ref>

== Blocking in 2017–18 protests ==
{{See also|Telegram in Iran}}
During the [[2017–18 Iranian protests]], the Iranian government blocked Internet access from mobile networks, blocked access to [[Instagram]], and blocked access to [[Telegram (messaging service)|Telegram]] in an effort to stymie protests. At some points, the government completely blocked Internet access in parts of the country.<ref>Ailsa Chang,[https://www.npr.org/2018/01/03/575252552/in-response-to-protests-iran-cuts-off-internet-access-blocks-apps In Response To Protests, Iran Cuts Off Internet Access, Blocks Apps] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180107030151/https://www.npr.org/2018/01/03/575252552/in-response-to-protests-iran-cuts-off-internet-access-blocks-apps |date=2018-01-07 }}, NPR, ''Morning Edition'' (January 3, 2018).</ref><ref name="Smith-Spark">Laura Smith-Spark, [http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/middleeast/iran-protests-united-nations-intl/index.html UN experts urge Iran to respect rights of protesters, end Internet crackdown] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180105171308/http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/middleeast/iran-protests-united-nations-intl/index.html |date=2018-01-05 }}, CNN (January 5, 2017).</ref> A January 2018 report by four [[United Nations special rapporteur|special rapporteurs]] of the [[Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights]] expressed deep concern about the blocking and stated: "Communication blackouts constitute a serious violation of [[fundamental rights]]."<ref name="Smith-Spark" />

== 2019 total Internet shutdown ==
{{Main|2019 Internet blackout in Iran}}
In November 2019, Iranian government imposed a week-long total [[Internet outage|internet shutdown]] in a response to 2019 [[2019 Iranian protests|protests]]. The blackout was organized by [[Supreme National Security Council|SNSC]] and [[Ministry of Information and Communications Technology of Iran|MICT]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-restored-in-iran-after-protest-shutdown-dAmqddA9|title=Internet being restored in Iran after week-long shutdown|date=2019-11-23|website=NetBlocks|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-01|archive-date=2019-11-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128081744/https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-restored-in-iran-after-protest-shutdown-dAmqddA9|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b|title=Internet disrupted in Iran amid fuel protests in multiple cities|date=2019-11-15|website=NetBlocks|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-01|archive-date=2019-11-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191116232625/https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-fuel-protests-in-multiple-cities-pA25L18b|url-status=live}}</ref> It was the largest wide-scale internet shutdown ever in Iran.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutoff/|title=How Iran's Government Shut Off the Internet|work=Wired|access-date=2019-12-01|language=en|issn=1059-1028|archive-date=2019-11-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191124045952/https://www.wired.com/story/iran-internet-shutoff/|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Filtering ==
On Sunday, September 6, 2020, Abolhassan Firoozabadi, director of the National Cyberspace Center of Iran, described [[China]] as a successful "model" in censoring and filtering the Internet, which they did by simulating applications and tools. He added that "if the operating system do not comply with Iranian law" or "create cultural, social, political and security problems" for the government, they will be filtered.<ref>{{cite news |title=وزیر ارتباطات ایران از ورود نیروهای مسلح به "توسعه" پیام‌رسان‌ها خبر داد |url=https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-influence-internet-apps/30825084.html |agency=radiofarda |date=2020-09-07 |access-date=2020-09-17 |archive-date=2020-09-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200907233224/https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-military-influence-internet-apps/30825084.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=فیروزآبادی در مورد شبکه‌های اجتماعی: اگر مسئله ایجاد کنند فیلتر خواهند شد |url=https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-filtering-social-media/30823481.html |agency=radiofarda |date=2020-09-06 |access-date=2020-09-17 |archive-date=2020-09-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200907121140/https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-filtering-social-media/30823481.html |url-status=live }}</ref>


== See also ==
== See also ==
Line 776: Line 746:
* [[Internet in Iran]]
* [[Internet in Iran]]
* [[Media of Iran]]
* [[Media of Iran]]
* [[Blogging in Iran]]


== References ==
== References ==
{{Reflist |30em}}
{{Reflist |30em}}
{{use dmy dates}}


== External links ==
== External links ==

Revision as of 00:21, 30 July 2021

Internet Censorship in Iran – Internet shutdown in Iran
Many of the world's most popular websites have been blocked in Iran.[1] Also, the Iranian government in response to the 2019 Iranian protests, implemented an Internet shutdown that reduced Internet traffic in the country to 5% of its usual amount. Iran is widely seen by many to be a country with Internet censorship.[2][3][4]

Iran is one of the countries most strongly identified with internet censorship.[5][6] As of 2012, an average of 27% of Internet sites were blocked at any given time.[7] As of 2013, almost 50% of the top 500 visited websites worldwide were blocked.[8] The Iranian government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Sepah also blocked social media such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Blogger, Netflix, Hulu, Telegram, Snapchat, and Medium.[9][10] Other blocked sites cover a wide range of topics including health, science, sports, news, pornography, and shopping.[11]

The Internet in Iran is managed by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace of Iran.[12][13] The head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran is elected by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei.[12][14] Khamenei believes that the Internet was invented by the enemies of Iran to use against the Iranian people.[15][16][17] The sixth president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also supports internet censorship in Iran.[18][19][20][21][22] Despite their support of censorship, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have shared posts on social networks that are blocked in Iran[23] such as Facebook and Twitter.[23][17][24] Iranians stay connected on social media despite government restrictions.[25][26]

Many bloggers, online activists, and technical staff have faced jail sentences, torture, harassment and abuse.[27][28]

History

At the beginning of the 21st century, Iran experienced a great surge in Internet usage.[29] When first introduced, the internet services provided by Iran's government were comparatively open. Many users saw the Internet as an easy way to get around Iran's strict press laws.[30][31]

As international Internet usage grew, Internet censorship in Iran increased and many popular websites were blocked.[29][32] As of 2018, it is estimated that between 64% and 69% of Iranians are internet users.[33][34]

Internet censorship increased with the administration of conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Regime opponents in Iran are said to rely heavily on Web-based communication with the outside world.

In 2005–2018,[9][35] Ayatollah Khamenei sent letters to the presidents of Iran, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran, and the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah), ordering them to form a national intranet called the National Information Network.[15][36][37][38] The National Information Network (NIN) was unveiled during the 2019 Iranian protests.[6] The National Information Network works similarly to the Great Firewall of China, but with stricter monitoring of users.[9][39][16][38] After YouTube was blocked in Iran,[40] Aparat, an Iranian online video-sharing platform was founded. In 2020, due to the activity of an Aparat user, the CEO of Aparat was sentenced to 10 years in prison.[41][42] The business of selling virtual private networks (VPNs), SOCKS, and proxy servers in Iran is worth millions of U.S. dollars due to the large demand.[43] The twelfth minister of Iran Communication State announced that the lucrative business of selling VPNs and proxies has had huge profits for its manufacturers and retailers, and there are efforts to stop some businesses.[43][44]

In 2006 and 2010, the activist group Reporters Without Borders labeled Iran one of the 13 countries designated "Enemies of the Internet".[45][46] Reporters Without the Borders sent a letter to UN high Commissioner for human rights Navi Pillay to share its deep concern and ask for her intervention in the case of two netizens/free speech defenders, Vahid Asghari and Hossein Derakhshan.

In preparation for the March 2012 elections, the Iran government instituted strict rules on cybercafes and prepared to launch a national Internet.[47] They also require all Iranians to register their web sites with the Ministry of Art and Culture.[48]

At the beginning of March 2012, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader instructed the Iranian authorities to set up a body to oversee the Internet. That overseeing body, called the Supreme Council of Cyberspace of Iran, consists of the president of Iran, Minister of Intelligence and IRGC chiefs. Their mission is to define policy and coordinate decisions regarding the Internet. This is thought to be the country's authorities strongest attempt at Internet censorship so far.[49]

At the beginning of March 2012, Iran began implementing a national intranet. This effort was partially in response to Western actions to exploit its Internet connectivity, like the Stuxnet cyberattack, which has fueled suspicions of foreign technologies.[50] The government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Sepah's response has been to require the use of Iranian email systems, to block popular web-mail services, inhibit encryption use by disabling VPNs and HTTPS, and to ban externally developed security software.[9][51][52]

Beginning on November 17, 2019,[53] in response to the 2019 Iranian fuel protests, an internet shutdown reduced internet traffic in the country to 5% of normal levels.[54][55][2] Internet access was gradually reactivated later that month.[56][6]

Post 2009-election developments

Following the 2009 election protests, Iran ratified the Computer Crimes Law (CCL) in 2010.[57] The CCL established legal regulations for Internet censorship. Notable provisions of the CCL include: Article 10 which effectively prohibits Internet users and companies from using encryption, or protecting data, in a manner that would “deny access of authorised individuals to data, computer and telecommunication systems”; Article 14 which criminalises “producing, sending, publishing, distributing, saving or financially engaging in obscene content”; Article 21 which requires ISPs to maintain records of Internet traffic data and the personal information of their Internet users; and Article 48 which requires Internet Service Providers to record data from telephone conversations over the internet.[58]

In April 2011, Ali Agha-Mohammadi, a senior official, announced the government had plans to launch a"halal internet",[59] an internet that would conform to Islamic values and provide "appropriate" services.[47] Creating such a network, similar to one used by North Korea, would prevent unwanted information from outside of Iran from getting into the closed system. Myanmar and Cuba use similar systems.[60]

As of early 2012, Iran's ministry of information and communication technology was reportedly testing a countrywide "national Internet" network, its goal is to be a substitute for services ran through the World Wide Web.[47] The government is also working on "software robots to analyse exchanging emails and chats", in order to find more "effective ways of controlling user's online activities." One Iranian IT expert source defended the program as aimed not "primarily" at curbing the global Internet, but at securing Iran's military, banking, and sensitive data from outside cyber-attacks such as Stuxnet.[47]

In addition, by late January 2012, Internet cafe owners were required to record the identities of their customers before providing services. According to the news website Tabnak, an Iranian police statement states:

Internet cafes are required to write down the forename, surname, name of the father, national identification number, postcode, and telephone number of each customer. Besides the personal information, they must maintain other information of the customer such as the date and the time of using the Internet and the IP address, and the addresses of the websites visited. They should keep these informations for each individual for at least six months.[47]

In May 2012 Iran criticized Google for dropping the name "Persian Gulf" from its maps, leaving the feature unlabelled. Six days after Khamenei's statement, Iran announced that Google and Gmail would be added to the list of banned sites, to be replaced by the national Internet network. Iranian media reported that the new system would be ready by March 2013.[61] The network already hosts some government and academic sites.[62]

The isolation of the separate network was also touted as an improvement to network security, in the wake of the Stuxnet worm attack on Iranian's main uranium enrichment facility. A computer virus was also found in Iran's major Kharg Island oil export terminal in April. Communications and Technology Minister Reza Taqipour said, "Control over the Internet should not be in the hands of one or two countries. Especially on major issues and during crises, one cannot trust this network at all."[61]

In September 2012 Iran's top leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called on Western leaders to censor the film trailer for Innocence of Muslims, which was posted to YouTube. Khamenei alluded to bans on Nazi-related or anti-gay sites in some countries, asking "How there is no room for freedom of expression in these cases, but insulting Islam and its sanctities is free?".[63]

As of mid-2014, the government of President Hassan Rouhani is seeking to ease Internet restrictions in the country, with Ali Jannati, the culture minister, likening the restrictions to the ban on fax machines, video recorders and video tapes that was implemented following the 1979 revolution.[64] In December 2016, Iranian Prosecutor Ahmad Ali Montazeri, who heads Iran's Internet censorship Committee banned and closed 14,000 websites and social networking accounts in Iran.[65] He underlined that President Rouhani and the Interior Minister Rahmani Fazli agree with him and have addressed "serious warnings" on this issue.[65]

Blocking in 2017–18 protests

See also: Telegram in Iran

During the 2017–18 Iranian protests, the Iranian government blocked Internet access from mobile networks, blocked access to Instagram, and blocked access to Telegram in an effort to stymie protests. At some points, the government completely blocked Internet access in parts of the country.[66][67] A January 2018 report by four special rapporteurs of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep concern about the blocking and stated: "Communication blackouts constitute a serious violation of fundamental rights."[67]

2019 total Internet shutdown

Main article: 2019 Internet blackout in Iran

In November 2019, Iranian government imposed a week-long total internet shutdown in a response to 2019 protests. The blackout was organized by SNSC and MICT.[68][69] It was the largest wide-scale internet shutdown ever in Iran.[70]

List of blocked websites

Internet censorship in Iran has increased since 2010 and many mainstream websites have been blocked in Iran.[29][9][13][18] The number of blocked websites in Iran is very high.[71][45][72] Even so, many Iranians remain on social media despite the government restrictions.[72]

SmartFilter blocks sites deemed immoral blocks access to most pornographic sites, gay and lesbian sites, reformist political sites, news media, sites that provide tools to help users cloak their Internet identity, and other sites nebulously deemed to be immoral. Iran has been accused by its critics of censoring more of the Internet than any other nation besides China.[45] As of 2006, Iran's SmartFilter is configured to allow local Persian-language sites, and block prominent English-language sites, such as the BBC and Facebook.[73] By 2008, Iran had blocked access to more than five million websites, whose content was deemed as immoral and anti-social.[citation needed]

The number of websites blocked in Iran is very high.[9][72] Below is a list of well-known websites that are blocked.[74][75][73]
Site name Domains or URLs Alexa rank Type of site Duration of blockage Current status
YouTube youtube.com 2 Video 2010 to present[29][9] Blocked
Fox News foxnews.com 165 News unknown to present Blocked
SoundCloud soundcloud.com 109 Music streaming unknown to present Blocked
Facebook facebook.com 4 Social 2010 to present[29][9] Blocked
Netflix netflix.com 20 Entertainment unknown to present Blocked
CBS News cbsnews.com 841 News unknown to present Blocked
Telegram telegram.org 151 Messaging 2018 to present[75][76] Blocked
Bitly (bit.ly)
  • bit.ly
  • bitly.com
 5,357 URL shortening 2020 to present[77][78] Blocked
XVideos xvideos.com 89 Sharing 2010 to present Blocked
NFL nfl.com 495 Sport-News unknown to present Blocked
Facebook Messenger
  • messenger.com
  • fb.com/messages
 4 Messaging 2011 to present Blocked
TMZ tmz.com 1,514 Celebrity News unknown to present Blocked
Flickr flickr.com 871 image hosting 2010 to present Blocked
Uptodown uptodown.com 439 software and tech-news unknown to present Blocked
Associated Press ap.org 1,943 News unknown to present Blocked
9GAG 9gag.com 386 Social unknown to present Blocked
Blogger (Blogspot)
  • blogger.com
  • blogspot.com
 24 Blog 2010 to present Blocked
CNET cnet.com 172 technology news unknown to present Blocked
UFC (Ultimate Fighting Championship) ufc.com 7,745 Sport-News unknown to present Blocked
Chaturbate chaturbate.com 51 webcam models – live streaming unknown to present Blocked
Twitch
  • twitch.tv
  • twitch.com
 34 Live-streaming unknown to present Sometimes it gets blocked
Tumblr tumblr.com 111 Social unknown to present Blocked
WordPress.com wordpress.com 59 Blog hosting unknown to present Blocked
YouTube Music music.youtube.com 2 Music streaming unknown to present Blocked
ApkPure apkpure.com 974 Android-Application unknown to present Blocked
Deutsche Welle dw.com 694 News unknown to present Blocked
Twitter
  • twitter.com
  • t.co
 43 Social 2010 to present[29] Blocked
Pandora pandora.com 779 Music streaming unknown to present Blocked
Medium medium.com 81 News unknown to present Blocked
The Verge theverge.com 749 technology news unknown to present Blocked
BBC bbc.com 86 News and broadcasting 2010 to present Blocked
Deezer deezer.com 1,812 Music streaming unknown to present Blocked
Tmall tmall.com 3 business-to-consumer unknown to present Blocked
ABC News go.com 522 News unknown to present Blocked
Vimeo vimeo.com 178 Video-sharing unknown to present Blocked
Engadget engadget.com 1,081 Technology blog unknown to present Blocked
XHamster xhamster.com 108 Sharing 2010 to present Blocked
Discord discord.com 148 Messaging unknown to present Blocked
ApkMirror apkmirror.com 6,960 Android-Application unknown to present Blocked
Deadline Hollywood deadline.com 3,284 entertainment news unknown to present Blocked
Weibo weibo.com 15 social network unknown to present Blocked
Nico Video nicovideo.jp 219 Video-sharing unknown to present Blocked
Malavida malavida.com 2,170 software and tech-news unknown to present Blocked
PornHub pornhub.com 54 Sharing 2010 to present Blocked
Archive.org (Internet Archive) archive.org 223 Web archiving unknown to present Blocked
PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) pbs.org 1,930 News unknown to present Blocked
CBS Sports cbssports.com 551 Sport-News unknown to present Blocked
FileHorse filehorse.com 1,422 software downloading website unknown to present Blocked
TikTok (Douyin International) tiktok.com 298 Social unknown to present Blocked
Bleacher Report bleacherreport.com 1,256 Sport-News unknown to present Blocked
VK.com vk.com 23 social media unknown to present[72] Blocked
Baidu baidu.com 4 Search unknown to present Blocked
Disqus disqus.com 710 Social unknown to present Blocked
NDTV ndtv.com 362 News Network unknown to present Blocked
NBC News nbcnews.com 599 News unknown to present Blocked
YouTube Kids youtubekids.com 1,495 Sharing unknown to present Blocked
CNN cnn.com 70 News 2010 to present[29] Blocked
HBO (Home Box Office TV network) hbo.com 5,564 Entertainment unknown to present Blocked
BongaCams bongacams.com 33 webcam models unknown to present Blocked
Torrentz2 (formerly Torrentz) torrentz2.eu 1,522 Torrent sharing unknown to present Blocked
NordVPN nordvpn.com 1,868 VPN unknown to present Blocked
Plurk plurk.com 2,056 Social unknown to present Blocked
Voice of America voanews.com 3,547 News 2010 to present[29] Blocked
Wiki news (Persian) fa.wikinews.org 60,116 News unknown to present Blocked
Sohu sohu.com 7 Internet company unknown to present Blocked
Radio France Internationale rfi.fr 2,178 Radio 2010 to present Blocked
ExpressVPN expressvpn.com 2,643 VPN unknown to present Blocked
NBC nbc.com 3,691 News unknown to present Blocked
Taobao taobao.com 8 online shopping unknown to present Blocked
ProtonVPN protonvpn.com 17,956 VPN unknown to present Blocked
zhanqi zhanqi.tv 32 Entertainment unknown to present Blocked
Hotspot Shield hotspotshield.com 18,016 VPN 2010 to present Blocked
Human Rights Watch hrw.org 19,711 NGO 2010 to present Blocked
JD jd.com 10 e-commerce company unknown to present Blocked
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty rferl.org 34,734 News 2010 to present[29] Blocked
Sina Weibo sina.com.cn 16 microblogging unknown to present Blocked
Lantern getlantern.org 18,395 VPN unknown to present Blocked
TunnelBear tunnelbear.com 21,897 VPN unknown to present Blocked
The Pirate Bay
  • thepiratebay.org
  • thepiratebay.se
  • depiraatbaai.be
 309 Torrent Indexer 2010 to present Blocked
SimilarWeb similarweb.com 4,779 website rankings and analytics unknown to present Blocked
OK.ru ok.ru 67 social network service unknown to present Blocked
LiveJasmin livejasmin.com 46 webcam models unknown to present Blocked
Mastodon mastodon.social 85,200 Social unknown to present Blocked
IsoHunt isohunt.com unknown Torrent Indexer unknown to present Blocked
Panda.tv panda.tv 31 Entertainment unknown to present Blocked
KickAssTorrents
  • kat.ph
  • kickass.to
 unknown Torrent Indexer 2010 to present Blocked
Wayback Machine archive.org 223 Web archive unknown to present Blocked
TorrentFreak torrentfreak.com 14,073 Torrent Indexer unknown to present Blocked

On Sunday, September 6, 2020, Abolhassan Firoozabadi, director of the National Cyberspace Center of Iran, described China as a successful "model" in censoring and filtering the Internet, which they did by simulating applications and tools. He added that "if the operating system do not comply with Iranian law" or "create cultural, social, political and security problems" for the government, they will be filtered.[79][80]

There is also a newfound state awareness of how domestically produced content considered undesirable can pervade the Internet, highlighted by the 2006 controversy over the appearance of a celebrity sex tape featuring a popular Iranian soap opera actress (or a convincing look-alike).[45] (See the Iranian sex tape scandal)

Methods

The primary engine of Iran's censorship is the content-control software SmartFilter, developed by San Jose firm Secure Computing.[81] The American company alleges that Iran did not purchase the software legally.[82] Iran has since developed its own hardware and software to filter the Internet.[83] All Internet traffic is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure of the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI), which implements additional surveillance measures.[83]

Dozens of internet service providers (ISP) operate in Iran.[83] All of them must implement content-control software for websites and e-mail, with strict penalties for failure to comply. As of 2008, at least twelve ISPs have been shut down for failing to install adequate filters. Before it begins to operate, an ISP must be approved by both the Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.[84] It then must store all data sent or received by a client for at least three months.[citation needed]

Iran uses the lawful intercept capabilities of telecommunications systems to monitor communications by political dissidents. A monitoring center installed by Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) intercepts and archives Internet communications for Iranian law enforcement officials.[85]

Online social networks, especially Facebook, are monitored. Citizens returning home from living abroad have been questioned and detained due to the contents of their personal Facebook webpages. After protests outside Iran following the 2009 elections, such social media monitoring increased.[86]

Iran throttles the speed of the Internet to frustrate users and limit communication. Mass-scale throttling has been observed following the 2009 Iranian presidential election, the weeks leading to 2013 election, and during times of international political upheaval.[26] In October 2006, the government ordered all ISPs to limit their download speeds to 128 kbit/s for residential clients and Internet cafes. No reason was publicly announced. The purpose, as widely believed according to Reuters, was to constrain the consumption of Western mass media.[87] As of 2010, ISPs in Tehran may offer a higher speed of at least two Mbit/s for only businesses while the residential speed limit remained.[88] Since then, speed restrictions have been relaxed.[citation needed]

Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a technology that analyzes the contents of transmissions, even if they have been encrypted. Iran may use it to detect connections to TLS-based VPNs and use TCP reset attacks to interfere with them.[89] In 2009, the [[Wall Street Journal reported that NSN may have sold DPI software to Iran for monitoring and altering the content of Internet voice and e-mail communications.[90] Andrew Lighten, an employee of NSN, claimed that it sold Iran software for lawful interception, but that the company does not sell products with deep packet inspection.[91]

Punishment of dissidents

Lily Mazahery, a human rights and immigration lawyer who represents Iranian dissidents, reported that one of her clients was arrested because of instant messaging he had participated in with Ms. Mazahery.

He told me he had received a call from the Ministry of Intelligence, and this guy when he went to the interrogation, they put in front of him printed copies of his chats with me. He said he was dumbfounded, and he was sent to prison.[85]

Circumvention

Methods

A proxy server is a technology that can be used to access a blocked site, as long as the proxy itself is not blocked. In 2003, the Voice of America, an American government service, began to operate a proxy server for Iranian citizens, free of charge, with Internet privacy company Anonymizer. Whenever the proxy is blocked, it uses a new IP address until that one is also blocked.[92] Some websites and keywords related to pornography are blocked in the American proxy. "There's a limit to what taxpayers should pay for," an IBB program manager explained.[92] The list of banned words, 82 long, is publicly available.[93] Non-pornographic websites may be inadvertently blocked; for example, the banning of ass blocks access to the website of the United States Embassy.[94]

United States sanctions

See also: United States sanctions against Iran

Following the 2009 Iranian presidential election, the US Senate ratified the Victims of Iranian Censorship Act (VOICE), which allocated $50 million to fund measures "to counter Iranian government efforts to jam radio, satellite, and Internet-based transmissions."[95]

Due to American commercial sanctions against Iran, multiple American technology companies have blocked access to their services in Iran. Since 2018, Apple's App Store[96] and the messaging platform Slack[97] have been unavailable in Iran. In 2019, access to free services on Github, Gitlab, and the Amazon Cloud were suspended for users in Iran.[98][99]

Such closures of US-based Internet services may strengthen Iran's Internet censorship. Without Apple's App Store, users are unable to download VPN and communication apps.[citation needed] Amazon Cloud, another banned service, hosts the majority of the tools needed to bypass the government filters further restricting access to online content.[100] Iranian Internet developers have been forced to use less secure hosting tools, which leave websites vulnerable to cyberattacks and risk users' security.[100]

These suspensions continue despite a General License D-1, first issued by the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (ORAC) in 2014, which authorizes private companies to provide certain "personal communications" technologies to users in Iran.[101] When sanctions were reimposed by the United States, the US Treasury Department highlighted that General License D-1 would help with "fostering Internet freedom and supporting the Iranian people."[102]

See also

References

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  2. ^ a b Skinner, Helena (22 November 2019). "How did Iran's government pull the plug on the Internet?". euronews. Archived from the original on 27 November 2019. Retrieved 24 November 2019.
  3. ^ Anderson, Finbar (23 November 2019). "Iran's internet blackout: What is happening, and why did the government turn it off?". The Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Archived from the original on 28 November 2019. Retrieved 10 November 2020.
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  10. ^ Millichronicle (1 November 2020). "Iran's Intranet: a Master Plan for Internet Censorship". Archived from the original on 21 November 2020. Retrieved 15 November 2020.
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  12. ^ a b "Armed forces urges unity for active, deterrent cyber-defense". Mehr News Agency. 10 August 2020. Archived from the original on 11 August 2020. Retrieved 31 August 2020.
  13. ^ a b Azali, MohammadReza (27 August 2017). "All You Need to Know About Internet Censorship in Iran". TechRasa. Archived from the original on 3 November 2019. Retrieved 6 September 2020.
  14. ^ "Supreme Leader's important, strategic statement to Iranian nation". ISNA. 13 February 2019. Archived from the original on 24 November 2020. Retrieved 31 August 2020.
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