Hyperschallgleiter
Vorlage:Short description Vorlage:EngvarB Vorlage:Use dmy dates

A hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) is a type of warhead for ballistic missiles that can maneuver and glide at hypersonic speed. It is used in conjunction with ballistic missiles to significantly change their trajectories after launch. The concept of HGVs is similar to MaRVs, but HGVs are separated from their rocket boosters shortly after launch as opposed to MaRVs which can only maneuver just before the impact.[1] Conventional ballistic missiles follow a predictable ballistic trajectory and are vulnerable to interception by the latest anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. The in-flight maneuverability of HGVs makes them unpredictable, allowing them to effectively evade air defenses.[2][3][4] Vorlage:As of, hypersonic glide vehicles are the subject of an arms race.[5]
Projects
- VMaX (first flight test took place on June 26, 2023 from the DGA's site in Biscarrosse and was successful)[7][8][9][10][11]
- VMaX-2 (under development; first flight test expected in 2024 or 2025)[12]
- Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) (under development)[14]
- Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (experimental)
- OpFires (under development)
- Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) (in development for US Army (LRHW) and US Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS))
Countermeasures
Boost-glide weapons are generally designed to avoid existing missile defense systems, either by continually maneuvering or by flying at lower altitudes to reduce warning time. This generally makes such weapons easier to intercept using defensive systems intended for lower-altitude "low-tier" targets. Flying at lower speeds than short-range ballistic missile warheads makes them easier to attack.[17] Those that approach with very low terminal attack profiles are even subject to attack by modern hypervelocity guns and railguns.[18]
Russian sources claim that its Avangard HGV travels at Mach 27 and "constantly changes its course and altitude while it flies through the atmosphere, chaotically zigzagging on its path to its target, making it impossible to predict the weapon's location", thus making it supposedly "invulnerable to interception".[16] However these claims are problematic as hypersonic glide vehicles suffer from several known issues. Due to their speed, an envelope of ionized gas forms around the glide vehicle in atmosphere, making base-to-vehicle communication impossible. This cloud of ionized gas is easy for satellites to detect and track. Furthermore, the heat generated at those velocities renders external sensors inoperable and necessitates the detachment of HGVs from their carrier ballistic missiles at the upper limits of the atmosphere to avoid their burning up.
Hypersonics, like the Avangard HGV, generally use scramjet engines to achieve hypersonic speeds. Scramjet engines function only when the glide vehicle reaches mach 4.5. These engines are disengaged as the HGV enters the terminal phase of its flight. Failure to deactivate the engines would cause a catastrophic build up of heat in the vehicle as the atmosphere becomes denser during reentry, prematurely destroying the vehicle. Therefore, the terminal phase of an HGV's re-entry is similar to that of a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. For instance, the Avangard would not hit its target while "zig-zagging" at Mach 27, but rather would impact at a velocity under Mach 4 and on a linear trajectory.Vorlage:Citation needed The superior evasion capabilities that HGVs employ are largely limited to the upper atmospheric flight span.[19][20][21]
See also
- Hypersonic flight
- Hypersonic weapon
- Maneuverable reentry vehicle
- Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
- Non-ballistic atmospheric entry
References
- ↑ Vorlage:Citation
- ↑ Mark Zastrow: How does China's hypersonic glide vehicle work? In: Astronomy.com. 4. November 2021, abgerufen am 17. November 2022.
- ↑ Vorlage:Citation
- ↑ From Sänger to Avangard – hypersonic weapons come of age. In: Royal Aeronautical Society. Abgerufen am 14. November 2022.
- ↑ 'National pride is at stake.' Russia, China, United States race to build hypersonic weapons. In: Science.org. Abgerufen am 14. November 2022.
- ↑ Franz-Stefan Gady: China Tests New Weapon Capable of Breaching US Missile Defense Systems In: The Diplomat, 28 April 2016. Abgerufen am 14. Dezember 2018
- ↑ France debuts hypersonic glide weapon in first VMaX test flight. In: Air force tech. 28. Juni 2023 .
- ↑ France Conducts First VMaX Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Test. In: Naval news. 27. Juni 2023 .
- ↑ France conducts first test firing of V-MAX hypersonic glider demonstrator. In: Aero time. 27. Juni 2023 .
- ↑ La France a testé le planeur hypersonique VMAX d’Ariane Group. In: Ouest France. 27. Juni 2023 (französisch).
- ↑ Armées : la France a testé pour la première fois un planeur hypervéloce, capable de voler à plus de Mach 5. In: Le figaro. 27. Juni 2023 (französisch).
- ↑ Le ministère des Armées va financer un second démonstrateur de planeur hypersonique, le VMaX-2. In: Opex 360. 4. Mai 2023 (französisch).
- ↑ Is India developing a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle? In: Ajay Lele, IDSA, 24. Juni 2022. Abgerufen am 2. Januar 2023
- ↑ Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans. Yahoo
- ↑ Vorlage:Citation.
- ↑ a b Борисов: испытания комплекса "Авангард" доказали его способность разгоняться до 27 Махов. 27. Dezember 2018, abgerufen am 30. Dezember 2018 (russisch).
- ↑ Introducing The Ballistic Missile Defense Ship. In: Aviation Week. 11. April 2014, abgerufen am 29. Dezember 2019: „The downside is when the [HGV] warhead nears its target, it has less speed and altitude and is therefore more easily intercepted by low-tier interceptors, including potential rail guns.“
- ↑ Vorlage:Cite magazine
- ↑ Dominika Kunertova: Hypersonic Weapons: Fast, Furious… and Futile? In: RUSI. Abgerufen am 3. Januar 2023.
- ↑ Kolja Brockmann: A matter of speed? Understanding hypersonic missile systems. In: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI, abgerufen am 3. Januar 2023.
- ↑ David Wright: The Physics and Hype of Hypersonic Weapons. In: The Scientific American. Abgerufen am 3. Januar 2023.