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Chinesische Eroberung Qamdos

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Vorlage:Infobox military conflict

The Battle of Chamdo, also referred to as the invasion of Tibet in the west and Liberation of Tibet in mainland China, was a military campaign by the People's Republic of China against a de facto independent Tibet in Qamdo after months of failed negotiations.[1] The purpose of the campaign was to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.[2] The campaign resulted in the Chinese capture of Qamdo,[3] and further negotiations between the PRC and Tibetan representatives, eventually resulting in the incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China.

Negotiations between the Government of Tibet and the PRC prior to hostilities

On March 7, a Tibetan Government delegation arrived in Kalimpong to open a dialogue with the newly declared PRC and to secure assurances that the PRC would respect Tibetan “territorial integrity”, among other things. The onset of talks was delayed by debate between the Tibetan delegation, India, Britain, and the PRC about the location of the talks. Tibet favored Singapore or Hong Kong (not Beijing), Britain favored India (not Hong Kong or Singapore), India and the PRC favored Beijing, but India and Britain preferred no talks at all. The Tibetan delegation did eventually meet with the PRC’s ambassador General Yuan Zhongxian in Delhi on September 16, 1950. Yuan communicated a 3 point proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet’s defense, and that China be responsible for Tibet’s trade and foreign relations. Acceptance would lead to peaceful liberation, or otherwise war. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one of preceptor and patron, and their head delegate Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on September 19th, recommended cooperation, with some stipulations about implementation. Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet, it was argued, since it was under no threat, and if attacked by India or Nepal could appeal to China for military assistance. While Lhasa deliberated, on October 7, Chinese troops advanced into eastern Tibet, crossing the de facto border[4] at 5 places. The purpose was not to invade Tibet 'per se' but to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms for a peaceful liberation of Tibet.[2] On October 21, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the Communist government, and to accept the first provision, if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before the Six-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the thre points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.[5][6][7]

Invasion of Tibet

After months of failed negotiations,[1] attempts by Tibet to secure foreign support and assistance,[8] and PRC[9] and TibetanVorlage:Citation needed troop buildups, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Jinsha River on 6 or 7 October.[10] Two PLA units quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and captured the border town of Qamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA[3] soldiers and 180 Tibetan[3][11][12] soldiers had been killed or wounded (5,000 Tibetan soldiers died in battle according to Thomas Laird[13]). Active hostilities were limited to a border area controlled by the Government of Tibet northeast of the Gyamo Ngul Chu River and east of the 96th meridian.[14] After capturing Qamdo, the PLA broke off hostilities[15][11], sent a captured commander, Ngabo, to Lhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation, and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates to Beijing.[16]

Tibetan prisoners of war were generally well treated. After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures on socialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes. According to Tenzin Gyatso, the current as well as the Dalai Lama of the time, the PLA did not attack civilians. [13]

Aftermath

The PLA sent released prisoners (among them Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, a captured governor) to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the PLA's behalf. Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites could keep their positions and power.[17] The Government of Tibet then sent representatives to Beijing to negotiate.

Notes

Vorlage:Reflist

References

  • Feigon, Lee. Demystifying Tibet: Unlocking the Secrets of the Land of Snows (1996) Ivan R. Dee Inc. ISBN 1-56663-089-4
  • Ford, Robert. Wind Between The Worlds The extraordinary first-person account of a Westerner's life in Tibet as an official of the Dalai Lama (1957) David Mckay Co., Inc.
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989) University of California Press. ISBN 978-0520061408
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (1997) University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21254-1
  • Grunfeld, A. Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet (1996) East Gate Book. ISBN 978-1563247132
  • Knaus, Robert Kenneth. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (1999) PublicAffairs . ISBN 978-1891620188
  • Laird, Thomas. The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama (2006) Grove Press. ISBN 0-80211-827-5
  • Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon In The Land Of Snows (1999) Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-11814-7
  • Robert W. Ford Captured in Tibet, Oxford University Press, 1990, ISBN 9780195815702

Vorlage:PRC conflicts

  1. ↑ a b Shakya 1999 p.28-32
  2. ↑ a b Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, vol.2, p.48-9.
  3. ↑ a b c Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen wg.
  4. ↑ Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951-1955, University of California Press, 2009, Vol.2,p.48.
  5. ↑ Shakya 1999 p.27-32 (entire paragraph).
  6. ↑ W. D. Shakabpa,One hundred thousand moons, BRILL, 2010 trans. Derek F. Maher, Vol.1, pp.916-917, and ch.20 pp.928-942, esp.pp.928-33.
  7. ↑ Melvin C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951-1955, Vol.2, ibid.pp.41-57.
  8. ↑ Shakya 1999 p.12,20,21
  9. ↑ Feigon 1996 p.142. Shakya 1999 p.37.
  10. ↑ Shakya 1999 p.32 (6 Oct). Goldstein 1997 p.45 (7 Oct).
  11. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Shakya9945.
  12. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Feigon96144.
  13. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Laird.
  14. ↑ Shakya 1999 map p.xiv
  15. ↑ Goldstein 1997 p.45
  16. ↑ Shakya 1999 p.49
  17. ↑ Laird, 2006 p.306.
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