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Meta-Ontologie

Studium des Forschungsgebiets, das als Ontologie bekannt ist
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Meta-ontology deals with the nature of ontology and ontological questions. Some proponents of the term, which is of recent origin, distinguish 'ontology' (which investigates what there is) from 'meta'-ontology (which investigates what we are asking when we ask what there is).[1] Hofweber suggests that while strictly construed, meta-ontology is a metatheory, ontology when broadly construed contains its metatheory.[2] Inwagen[3] exemplifies meta-ontology using Rudolf Carnap's extension of Kant's analytic–synthetic distinction, a distinction between internal and external questions, respectively,[4] and Quine's famous refutations thereof.[5][6] Other publications about meta-ontology include a collection of essays,[7] and a book about the misuses of language that can arise in discussing ontology.[8]

Carnap and Quine

Vorlage:See also Inwagen exemplified meta-ontology by analyzing Quine's critique of Carnap's analytic/synthetic distinction.[3] raising the question of what techniques can be brought to bear in judging an ontology. [9]

Linguistic frameworks

According to Rudolf Carnap, to discuss a kind of entity requires relevant terms which are part of a linguistic framework that includes rules for the use of the terms. In this framework, questions regarding the existence of these kinds of entities are called internal questions. Two examples of terms for kinds of entities are 'paper' and 'desk' in the linguistic framework of 'everyday language'. An internal question in this framework could be, “Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?” The answer can be found by the empirical method of looking at the desk. Another example is the linguistic framework of 'natural numbers' and an internal question could be, “Is there a prime number greater than 100?” The answer here can be found by a logical method. Linguistic frameworks are either factual or logical, depending on whether the answers to internal questions can be found using empirical or logical methods.[10]

Existence questions that are not asked inside a linguistic framework are called by Carnap 'external questions'. These are questions asked by philosophers and tend to be general in nature, such as "Do numbers exist?" or "Do material objects exist?" These general questions could be asked as internal questions, but then the answer would be obvious in the relevant framework. For the two example questions, the answers found within the framework of everyday language would be trivially "yes, numbers exist" and "yes, material objects exist". However, when a general existence question, like the two example questions, is asked and discussed by philosophers as an external question, there are lengthy arguments that don't result in any generally agreed upon answer. According to Carnap, external questions should be reinterpreted as practical questions about whether or not to accept the relevant linguistic framework, or philosopher's could construct one. In any case, there is no resulting gain in understanding the reality of the related kinds of entities as viewed from outside the framework.[10]

Quine's approach

Quine's response to these arguments by Carnap extended over many publications and many years.[11][12][13] Quine argued that there is no sharp differentiation between internal and external questions, and their separation in Carnap's sense is untenable.[11][12][13] There is not a sharp distinction between theory and observation. Quine held that an ontological commitment[14] to the existence of 'such-and-such' was inseparable from the framework behind that commitment, and the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths was invalid.[2][15][11]

Vorlage:Quote

In regard to Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Frank Ryan concludes his article on the analytic–synthetic distinction: Vorlage:Quote

Deflationism

Vorlage:See also A deflationary meta-ontological view argues that ontological questions, such as whether numbers exist, are meaningful only on the common sense level in which they are trivially true,[16] thereby accounting for the lack of progress in resolving a purportedly deeper philosophical sense of the question. Eklund, for example, considers the contemporary meta-ontological debate, for the most part, to be whether such deeply philosophical questions are genuinely worthwhile.[17] Carnap's view holds that ontology, like all metaphysics, is meaningless. Carnap argues that ontological sentences are trivial within a 'framework' and meaningless outside of it.[4]

Schaffer has criticized the deflationist meta-ontology view of Thomasson as being inconsistent because it says that certain ontological questions are unanswerable, but accepts her ontology.[18]

The most prominent deflationist approach, that of Hilary Putnam and Eli Hirsch,[19] is to view ontological disputes as nothing more than verbal arguments wherein the only disagreement is one of definition or how we should use certain expressions. Hirsch holds that for any ontological position, a language exists in which that ontological position comes out to be true.[20][8] " Whatever the metaphysicians in this debate might think they are doing, their various positions merely reflect different uses of terms like 'object', 'exists' and 'there is'."[21]

Further views

The basic issue that formed Inwagen's notion of meta-ontology is discussion of whether 'there exists...' has a different meaning for different kinds of things, for instance, material objects, minds, supernatural beings, numbers, or possibilities.[3] Inwagen, like Quine, suggested that there is no difference, leading to a 'flat' ontology in which all things exist in the same sense.[3]

Schaffer [22] argues that there is a different question for meta-ontology to discuss namely the classification of ontologies according to the hierarchical connections between the objects in them, and which are the fundamental objects and which are derived. He describes three possible approaches to ontology: flat (top), that is an array of undifferentiated objects; sorted, that is an array of classified objects (center); and ordered (bottom), that is an array of inter-related objects. Schaffer says Quine's ontology is flat, a mere listing of objects, while Aristotle's is ordered, with an emphasis upon identifying the most fundamental objects.

Thomasson says that the Carnap-Quine debate is misplaced: "The real distinction instead is between existence questions asked using a linguistic framework and existence questions that are supposed to be asked somehow without being subject to those rules—asked, as Quine puts it ‘before the adoption of the given language’."[16]

See also

References

Vorlage:Reflist


Further reading

  • David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman: Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press, 2009, ISBN 0-19-954604-5 (google.com). Chapter 2: Composition, Colocation and Metaontology" (Karen Bennett); Chapter 6: The Metaonology of Abstraction (Bob Hale, Crispin Wright)
  • Frank X Ryan: American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. Hrsg.: John Lachs, Robert B. Talisse, eds. Psychology Press, 2004, ISBN 0-203-49279-X, Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic, S. 36–39 (google.com).
  • Eli Hirsch: Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University Press, 2011, ISBN 0-19-973211-6 (google.com): „'''meta-ontology''': a term that has recently become popular, referring to the philosophical theory concerning the nature and proper methodology for ontology, including the nature of existence claims. p. 278“
  • Peter van Inwagen: Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-521-79548-6, Chapter 1: Meta-ontology, S. 13 ff (google.com).
  • Julian Dodd: Adventures in the metaontology of art: local descriptivism, artefacts and dreamcatchers. In: Philosophical Studies. Springer, 10. August 2012, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9999-z (springer.com).
  • Matti Eklund: Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Hrsg.: Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, Dean W. Zimmerman, eds. Blackwell, 2008, ISBN 978-1-4051-1228-4, The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump, S. 382 ff (cornell.edu [PDF]): Metaontology, which I will be concerned with, is about what ontology is.
  • Amie L Thomasson: Carnap and the prospects for easy ontology.: „After more than fifty years, metaontology has come back in fashion.“ To be published in Ontology after Carnap Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.)
  • Willard van Orman Quine: Pursuit of Truth. 2nd Auflage. Harvard University Press, 1990, ISBN 0-674-73950-7, Chapter 1: Evidence, S. 1 ff (google.ca).
  1. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Rosenkrantz.
  2. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Hofweber.
  3. ↑ a b c d Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Inwagen.
  4. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Carnap.
  5. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Katz2000p69.
  6. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Manley.
  7. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Chalmers.
  8. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Hirsch.
  9. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Inwagen2.
  10. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Thomasson1§1.
  11. ↑ a b c Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Quine0.
  12. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Quine1.
  13. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Quine2.
  14. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen definition.
  15. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen McDonald.
  16. ↑ a b Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Thomasson1.
  17. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Eklund.
  18. ↑ Jonathan Schaffer: The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson's Ordinary Objects. In: Philosophical Books. 50. Jahrgang, Nr. 3, 3. Juli 2009, S. 142–157 (jonathanschaffer.org [PDF; abgerufen am 25. April 2013]). See p. 142.
  19. ↑ Amie L Thomasson: The Easy Approach to Ontology. In: Axiomathes. 19. Jahrgang, Nr. 1, 2009, S. 1–15 (amiethomasson.org): „But the vast majority of the metaontological discussion thus far has focused on a different sort of skeptical view: the view suggested by Hilary Putnam (1987) and prominently defended by Eli Hirsch (2002a, 2002b), that ontological debates are merely verbal disputes, in which the disputants simply talk past each other by using the quantifier with different meanings, although they are really (in some sense) ‘saying the same thing’, each in his or her own idiolect.“
  20. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Swetly.
  21. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Jackson.
  22. ↑ Referenzfehler: Ungültiges <ref>-Tag; kein Text angegeben für Einzelnachweis mit dem Namen Schaffer.
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