Oregon Boundary Dispute

The Oregon Country/Columbia District
stretched from 42N to 54 40'N. The most heavily disputed portion is highlighted

The Oregon boundary dispute or the Oregon Question, occurred in the first half of the 19th century, between the conflicting territorial and commercial aspirations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, in the Pacific Northwest of North America. Following long European precedent, both nations recognized only limited sovereign rights of the local indigenous nations. The region was often referred to as the Columbia District by the British and the Oregon Country by the Americans, with both governments having residual claims from treaties with the Russian and Spanish Empires. The broadest definition of the disputed region was defined by the following: west of the Continental Divide of the Americas, north of the 42nd parallel north (the northern border of Alta California established in 1818), and south of the parallel 54°40′ north (the southern border of Russian America after 1825).

The Oregon Dispute became important in geopolitical diplomacy between the British Empire and the new American Republic. In 1844 the U.S. Democratic Party, appealing to expansionist sentiment and the popular theme of manifest destiny, asserted that the U.S. had a valid claim to the entire Oregon Country up to Russian America at parallel 54°40′ north. Democratic presidential candidate James K. Polk won the 1844 election, but then sought a compromise boundary along the 49th parallel, the same boundary proposed by previous U.S. administrations. Negotiations between the U.S. and the British broke down, however, and tensions grew as American expansionists like U.S. Senator Edward A. Hannegan of Indiana, and Congressman Leonard Henly Sims of Missouri, urged Polk to annex the entire Oregon Country north to the parallel 54°40′ north, as the Democrats had called for in the election. The turmoil gave rise to slogans such as "Fifty-four Forty or Fight!", and is an example of the concept known as "Manifest Destiny".

The expansionist agenda of Polk and the Democratic Party created the possibility of two different, simultaneous wars, because relations between the United States and Mexico were deteriorating following the annexation of Texas. Just before the outbreak of the war with Mexico, Polk returned to his earlier position on the Oregon boundary and accepted a compromise along the 49th parallel as far as the Strait of Georgia. This agreement was made official in the 1846 Oregon Treaty, and the 49th parallel remains the boundary between the United States and Canada west of Lake of the Woods, other than the marine boundary which curves south through the Haro Strait (settled over the Rosario Strait in 1872) to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and so excludes from the United States Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands. As a result, much of Point Roberts (a small peninsula extending south into the Strait of Georgia from Canada) is an exclave of the United States.

Exploration

Vorlage:Main article Early European or American exploration of the Oregon Country was done by such naval captains as the Spanish Juan José Pérez Hernández, British George Vancouver and American Robert Gray. Defining regional water formations like the Columbia River and the Puget Sound were given their modern names and charted by these men in the 1790s. Overland explorations were commenced by the British Alexander Mackenzie in 1792 and later followed by the American Lewis and Clark expedition, which reached the mouth of the Columbia River in 1805. While individuals acting in the name of their respective governments often claimed sovereignty over the northern Pacific shore, the knowledge they gained was used primarily to expand the Maritime Fur Trade by enterprising fur traders. Beginning in the early 1800s, land based fur trading companies headquartered in either Lower Canada or the United States expanded into the Pacific Northwest like the Pacific Fur Company and the North West Company.

Map of the Columbia River and its tributaries, showing modern political boundaries and cities.

Joint occupation

Treaty of 1818

Vorlage:Main article In 1818, diplomats of the two countries attempted to negotiate a boundary between the rival claims. The Americans suggested dividing the Oregon Country along the 49th parallel, which was the border between the United States and British North America east of the Rocky Mountains. The lack of accurate cartographic knowledge led American diplomats to declare the Louisiana Purchase gave them an incontestable claim to the region. British diplomats wanted a border further south along the Columbia River, so as to maintain the North West Company's (later the Hudson's Bay Company's) control of the lucrative fur trade along that river. The diplomatic teams couldn't agree upon mutually satisfactory terms and remained in deadlock by October. Albert Gallatin, the main American negotiator, had previously instructed to have a tentative agreement by the convening of the 3rd session of the 15th United States Congress, set for 16 November.

A final proposition was made to the British plenipotentiary, Frederick John Robinson, for the continuation of the 49th parallel west while leaving the United Kingdom, as Gallatin stated, "all the waters emptying in the sound called the Gulf of Georgia." This would have awarded "all the territory draining west from the Cascade divide and north from the Columbia River divide into the gulf" and the entirety of the Puget Sound along with the Straits of Georgia and Juan de Fuca to the United Kingdom. Robinson demurred from the proposal however, the Anglo-American Convention of 1818, which settled most other disputes from the War of 1812, called for the joint occupation of the region for ten years.

Renewal

As the expiration of the Joint Occupation treaty approached, a second round of negotiations commenced in 1824. American Minister Richard Rush offered for the extension of agreement with an additional clause on 2 April. The 51° parallel would be a provisional border within the Oregon Country, with no British additional settlements to be established south of the line, nor any American settlements north of it. Despite Rush offering to modify the temporary border to the 49° parallel, the British negotiators rejected his offer. His proposal was seen as the likely basis for the eventual division of the Pacific Northwest. The British plenipotentiaries William Huskisson and Stratford Canning on 29 June pressed instead for a permanent line along the 49° parallel west until the main branch of the Columbia River. With the British formally abandoning claims south or east of the Columbia River, the Oregon Question from then on became focused what later became Western Washington and the southern portion of Vancouver Island. Rush found the British proposal as unfavorably as they had to his own offer, leaving the talks in a stalemate.

Throughout 1825 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Canning held discussions with Governor Pelly of the HBC as to a potential settlement with the United States. Pelly felt a border along the Snake and the Columbia Rivers was advantageous for the United Kingdom and his company. Contacting American minister Rufus King in April 1826, Canning requested that a settlement be reached over the Oregon dispute. Gallatin was appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom and given instructions by Secretary of State Henry Clay in July 1826 to offer a division of the Pacific Northwest along the 49th parallel to the British.

Huskisson was appointed along with Henry Addington to negotiate with Gallatin. Unlike his superior Canning, Huskisson held a negative view of the HBC monopoly and found the region held in dispute with the Americans "of little consequence to the British." At time the HBC was the only continuous white occupants in the Oregon Country, though their economic activities weren't utilised by Huskinisson in exchanges with Gallatin. The division suggested by Pelly and Canning's 1824 offer of a Columbia River boundary were both rejected. The argument used to counter these offers was the same as in 1824, that a Columbia boundary would deny the U.S. an easily accessible deep water port on the Pacific Ocean. The British negotiators to allay this attack offered a detached Olympic Peninsula as American territory, giving access to both the Straits of Juan de Fuca and the Puget Sound. This was seen as unsatisfactory by the Americans however. The diplomatic talks were continued but failed to divide the Oregon Country in a satisfactory way for both nations. The Treaty of 1818 was renewed on 7 August 1827, with a clause added by Gallatin that a one-year notice had to be given when either party intended to abrogate the agreement.

British interest

Compared to other foreign policy matters, the Pacific Northwest was of minimal interest to British politicians. The maritime fur trade drew British subjects to the region after its exploration by Captains Cook and Vancouver. Merchants exchanged goods for fur pelts along the coast with indigenous nation like the Chinookan people and the Nuu-chah-nulth. These oceanic traders played an active role in promoting the territorial claims of the United Kingdom. Starting with a party of the Montreal based North West Company (NWC) employees led by David Thompson in 1807, the British began land based operations and opened trading posts throughout the region. Thompson extensively explored the Columbia River watershed. While at the junction of Columbia and Snake Rivers, he erected a pole on July 9, 1811 with a notice stating "Know hereby that this country is claimed by Great Britain as part of its territories..." and additionally stated the intention of the NWC to build a trading post there. Fort Nez Percés was later established at the location in 1818.

Map of the route of the York Factory Express, 1820s to 1840s. Modern political boundaries shown.

The Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) merged with the North West Company in 1821 and assumed its various fur trading stations. The HBC held a license to trade with the populous aboriginal peoples of the region, and its network of trading posts and routes extended southward from New Caledonia, another HBC fur-trade district, into the Columbia basin. The HBC's headquarters for the entire region became established at Fort Vancouver (modern Vancouver, Washington) in 1824. At its pinnacle in the late 1830s and early 1840s, Fort Vancouver watched over 34 outposts, 24 ports, six ships, and 600 employees.

Rupert's Land Governor George Simpson continued to be supportive of British claims to the Pacific Northwest, reporting the HBC committee in 1837 that

The possession of that country to Great Britain may become an object of very great importance, and we are strengthening that claim to it... by forming the nucleus of a colony through the establishment of farms, and the settlement of some of our retiring officers and servants as agriculturalists.

George Canning has been appraised the most active Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in maintaining the British claims of a border along the Columbia River. In a letter to Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, Canning presented the possibilities of trade with the Qing Empire if such a division were to be made with the Americans. Such a border would give "an immense direct intercourse between China and what may be, if we resolve not yield them up, her boundless establishments on the N. W. Coast of America." With his death and the failure of negotiations with the Americans in the 1820s, "Oregon had been almost forgotten by the politicians..."

Significance in America

Regional activities

The American Pacific Fur Company (PFC) began operations in 1811 at Fort Astoria, constructed at the entrance of the Columbia River. The eruption of the War of 1812 didn't create a violent confrontation in the Pacific Northwest between the competing companies. Led by Donald Mackenzie, PFC officers agreed to liquid its assets to their NWC competitors, with an agreement signed on 23 November 1813.

After the collapse of the PFC, American fur traders often operated in small groups in the Oregon Country, based east of the Rocky Mountains. Nathaniel Wyeth attempted challenging the HBC for a portion of the regional fur trade starting in 1832, eventually establishing Fort William on Wapato Island and Fort Hall in modern Idaho. However, he was unable to effectively compete against the British, and sold his two stations to them in 1837. The principal American commercial ventures until the rise of pioneer colonists in the 1840s was focused on the ongoing Maritime Fur Trade vessels.

American missionaries began to arrive in the 1830s and established the Methodist Mission in the Willamette Valley and the Whitman Mission east of the Cascades. Ewing Young created a saw mill and a grist mill in the Willamette Valley early in the 30s. He and several other American colonists formed the Willamette Cattle Company in 1837 to bring over 600 head of cattle to the Willamette Valley, with about half of its shares purchased by McLoughlin. Over 700 U.S settlers arrived via the Oregon Trail in the "Great Migration of 1843". The Provisional Government of Oregon was established in the Willamette Valley during 1843 as well. Its rule was limited to those interested Americans and former French-Canadians HBC employees in the valley.

Congress

1820s

The first attempts by the American Government for proactive action in colonising the Pacific Northwest began in 1820 during the 2nd session of the 16th Congress. John Floyd, a Representative from Virginia spearheaded a report that would "authorize the occupation of the Columbia River, and to regulated trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes thereon." Additionally the bill called for cultivating commerical relations with the Qing Empire and the Tokugawa shogunate. His interest in the distant region likely began after meeting former PFC employee Russell Farnham. Floyd had the support of fellow Virginian Representative Thomas Van Swearingen and Representative Thomas Metcalfe of Kentucky. The bill was presented to both the House and to President Monroe. In the House, Floyd's bill was defended by one member who stated that didn't "attempt a colonial settlement. The territory proposed to be occupied is already a part of the United States." Monroe inquired the opinion of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams for potential revisions. Adams retorted that "The paper was a tissue of errors in fact and abortive reasoning, of invidious reflections and rude invectives. There was nothing could purify it but the fire." Read twice before the legislature, "most of the members not considering it a serious proceeding", it didn't pass.

Floyd continued to authorise legislation calling for an American colony on the Pacific. His career as a Representative ended in 1829, with the matter of the Oregon Country not discussed at Congress until 1837. The northern border proposed by Floyd was at first the 53°, and later 54°40′. These bills were still met with the apathy or opposition of other Congressional members, one in particular not being tabled for consideration by a vote of 100 to 61. Missouri Senator Thomas H. Benton became a vocal supporter of Floyd's efforts, and thought that they would "plant the germ of a powerful and independent Power beyond the Rockies." John C. Calhoun, then Secretary of War, while somewhat interested in Floyd's considered bills, gave his opinion to that the HBC was an economic threat to American commercial interests in the west.

"....so long as the traders of the British Fur Company have free access to the region of the Rocky Mountains from the various posts... they will in great measure monopolize the Fur Trade West of the Mississippi, to the almost entire exclusion in the next few years of our trade."

1840s

Senator Lewis Cass was a leading advocate of 54°40′, but backed away from the claim when it became untenable. Like James Buchanan, Cass had presidential ambitions and did not want to alienate Americans on either side of the Oregon question.

Senator Lewis Linn of Missouri tabled legislation in 1842, inspired in part by Floyd's previous efforts. Linn's bill called for government land grants to men interested in settling the Pacific Northwest. The arrival of Baron Ashburton and the subsequent Webster-Ashburton Treaty however delayed the proposed articles. At the final session of the 27th Congress on 19 December, Linn presented a similar bill to colonize the Oregon Country as he put it, "by the Anglo-American race, which will extend our limits from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean." Arguments over the bill lasted over a month, and eventually was passed in the Senate 24-22. In opposition to Linn's bill, Calhoun famously declared that the U.S. government should pursue a policy of "wise and masterly inactivity" in Oregon, letting settlement determine the eventual boundary. Many of Calhoun's fellow Democrats, however, soon began to advocate a more direct approach.

Polk Presidency

At the 1844 Democratic National Convention, the party platform called for the annexation of Texas and asserted that the United States had a "clear and unquestionable" claim to "the whole" of Oregon and "that no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England or any other power." By informally tying the Oregon dispute to the more controversial Texas debate, the Democrats appealed to both Northern expansionists, who were more adamant about the Oregon boundary, and Southern expansionists, who focused on annexing Texas. The Oregon Question according to Edward Miles wasn't "a significant campaign issue" as "the Whigs would have been forced to discuss it." Their silence "indicated that Oregon had failed to arouse widespread interest."

"Fifty-four Forty or Fight!" was not yet coined during this election as appeared by January 1846, driven in part by the Democratic press. The phrase is frequently misidentified as a campaign slogan from the election of 1844, even in many textbooks. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations attributes the slogan to William Allen. 54°40′ was the southern boundary of Russian America, and considered the northern most portion of the Oregon Country. One actual Democratic campaign slogan from this election (used in Pennsylvania) was the more mundane "Polk, Dallas, and the Tariff of '42". Democratic candidate James K. Polk went on to win a narrow victory over Whig candidate Henry Clay, in part because Clay had taken a stand against expansion.

In his March 1845 inaugural address, President Polk quoted from the party platform, saying that the U.S. title to Oregon was "clear and unquestionable". Tensions grew, with both sides moving to strengthen border fortifications in anticipation of war. Despite Polk's bold language, he was actually prepared to compromise, and had no real desire to go to war over Oregon. He believed that a firm stance would compel the British to accept a resolution agreeable to the United States. While meeting with Representative James A. Black on 4 January 1846, Polk that "the only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye... if Congress faultered [sic]... John Bull would immediately become arrogant and more grasping in his demands..." But Polk's position on Oregon was not mere posturing: he genuinely believed that the U.S. had a legitimate claim to the entire region. He rejected British offers to settle the dispute through arbitration, fearing that no impartial third party could be found.

Many newspaper editors in the United States clamoured for Polk to claim the entire region as the Democrats had proposed in the 1844 campaign. Headlines like "The Whole of Oregon or None" by The Union editor Thomas Ritchie appeared on 6 November 1845. In a column in the New York Morning News on December 27, 1845, editor John L. O'Sullivan argued that the United States should claim all of Oregon "by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent". Soon afterwards, the term "Manifest Destiny" became a standard phrase for expansionists, and a permanent part of the American lexicon. O'Sullivan's version of "Manifest Destiny" was not a call for war, but such calls were soon forthcoming.

Negotiations in 1840s

Baron Ashburton arrived in the United States in April 1842 to resolve several territorial disputes with the United States. Initially focusing on the Pacific Northwest, he once again presented the 1824 offer of Canning to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, that of a division along the Columbia River. Webster rejected the offer for the same reasons it was previously rejected, the deal would leave the United States with no suitable locations for a large port. Webster suggested that the United States could be compensated with the Mexican owned San Francisco Bay, Ashburton's proposal may be found acceptable by the Americans. Ashburton passed on the offer to his superiors, but no further action was taken. Both diplomats became focused on settling the Aroostook War and formulated the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. By early 1843 Webster returned to the Oregon Question, formalising a plan that included the 1826 British offer of the Olympic Peninsula enclave and the purchase of Alta California from Mexico. The increasing hostility President Tyler had with the Whig Party lead to Webster's disinterest in continuing to act as the Secretary of State and his plan was shelved.

The American minister to the UK, Edward Everett, was given authority to negotiate with British officials to settle the Oregon Question in October 1843. Meeting with Prime Minister Robert Peel's Foreign Secretary, Earl of Aberdeen on 29 November, Everett presented the terms considered by the President John Tyler. The old offer of the 49th parallel was once more presented, along with a guarantee to free access to the Columbia River. During State of the Union address that year on 6 December however, President Tyler claimed "the entire region of country lying on the Pacific and embraced within 42° and 54° 40' of north latitude."

After receiving this declaration, Aberdeen began to consult with the committee and Governor Pelly, previously left out of the most recent diplomatic exchanges. Diplomats began to receive instructions influenced from HBC officials like Simpson, whose suggestions were transmitted through Pelly and then Aberdeen to the British Ambassador Richard Pakenham. In a letter written to Calhoun in August 1844, Pakenham pressed for a border along the Columbia River. He made an offer that likely originated from Simpson that Americans could select naval bases on the portion of Vancouver Island south of the 49th parallel or along the Strait of Juan de Fuca in return. Diplomatic channels continued negotiations through out 1844, by early 1845 Everett reported the willingness of Aberdeen to accept the 49th parallel, provided the southern portion of Vancouver Island would become British territory.

In the summer of 1845, the Polk administration renewed the proposal to divide Oregon along the 49th parallel to the Pacific Ocean. U.S. Secretary of State James Buchanan on 12 July offered the British any desired ports on the portion of Vancouver Island south of this line, though navigation rights of the Columbia River weren't included. Because this proposal fell short of the Tyler administration's earlier offer, Pakenham rejected the offer without first contacting London. Offended, Polk officially withdrew the proposal on August 30, 1845 and broke off negotiations. Aberdeen censured Pakenham for this diplomatic blunder, and attempted to renew the dialogue. By then, however, Polk was suspicious of British intentions, and under increasing political pressure not to compromise. He declined to reopen negotiations. Everett contacted the Whig leader John Russell on 28 December 1845, supporting a revision of the American offer so as to allow the British to keep the entirety of Vancouver Island. He warned Russell that influence among the Whigs could stifle the negotiations. "If you choose to rally the public opinion of England against this basis of compromise, it will not be easy for Sir. R. Peel and Lord Aberdeen to agree to it." While still considering the Columbia River important for British interests, Russell assured Aberdeen of his support in settling the Oregon Question. While Everett's was influential in this political move, Russell felt it was, as Frederick Merk stated, "prudent Whig policy" to support Aberdeen in this case.

Breakdown

In his annual address to Congress on December 2, 1845, Polk recommended giving the British the required one-year notice of the termination of the joint occupation agreement. In Congress, Democratic expansionists from the Midwest, led by Senators Lewis Cass of Michigan, Edward A. Hannegan of Indiana, and William Allen of Ohio, called for war with the United Kingdom rather than accepting anything short of all of Oregon up to Parallel 54°40′ north.

War crisis

Important figures in the Oregon question
United States	United Kingdom
James K. Polk President	Robert Peel Prime Minister
James Buchanan Secretary of State	Earl of Aberdeen Foreign Secretary
Louis McLane Minister to the UK	Richard Pakenham Minister in Washington

The calls to war were fueled by a number of factors, including traditional distrust of the British and a belief that the U.S. had the better claim and would make better use of the land. Moderates like Webster warned that the U.S. could not win a war against the British Empire, and that negotiation could still achieve U.S. territorial goals. Webster confided to Viscount Ossington, a personal friend, in 26 February 1846 that it would be a "stupendous folly and enormous crime" for the two nations to declare war over the Pacific Northwest. Although the debate in the U.S. was not strictly divided along party or sectional lines, many who clamored for the 54°40′ border were Northerners upset that Polk, a Southern slave owner, had been uncompromising in his pursuit of Texas, a cause deemed favorable to Southern slave owners, but willing to compromise on Oregon. As historian David M. Pletcher noted, "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight" seemed to be directed at the southern aristocracy in the U.S. as much as at the United Kingdom. By this time, American colonists were increasing traveling along the Oregon Trail to the disputed area, a development that some observers—both British and American—realized would eventually decide the outcome.Vorlage:Citation needed

Due his extensive travels throughout the western stations of the HBC, Governor Pelly instructed Simpson to draft a plan for the British Government if hostilities were to arise with the Americans. Finalizing the proposal on 29 March 1845, Simpson called for two areas to launch offensives. The Red River Colony would be the base of operations for forays into the Great Plains, an expansive region then only light colonized by Americans. A militia composed of Métis riflemen and neighboring First Nations like the Ojibwe would be created, along with a garrison of Regular Army infantry. To secure the Pacific Northwest and the Columbia River, Simpson felt Cape Disappointment was of critical importance. A naval force of two steamboats and two ships of the line would bring a detachment of Royal Marines to create a coastal battery there. Recruitment was hoped by Simpson to gain a force led by Regular Army officers of 2,000 Métis and indigenous peoples in the region. His proposal quickly earned the interest of the British Government as on 2 April he met with Prime Minister Peel and Foreign Secretary Aberdeen. £1,000 were awarded to lay the ground work for defensive operations in the Pacific Northwest. Secretary of State for War and the Colonies Lord Stanley was favorable of the plan, declaring the HBC had to maintain military operations west of Sault Ste. Marie.

Aberdeen had no intention of going to war over a region that was of diminishing economic value to the United Kingdom. Furthermore the United States was an important trading partner, especially with the need of American wheat in the onset of famine in Ireland. Aberdeen and Pakenham were negotiating from a position of strength. The key was the overwhelming naval power which Britain could have brought to bear against the United States, combined with a diplomatic and political landscape that ultimately favored the British government's aim of protecting her interests robustly but without resort to armed conflict. Local interests were protected by the 80-gun ship-of-the-line HMS Collingwood under the CinC Rear Admiral Sir George Seymour. During the crisis his squadron was augmented by HMS America (74 guns), under the command of Captain John Gordon (younger brother of the Foreign Secretary), an officer whose misjudgment during the crisis – in contrast to Seymour’s exemplary behavior – led to his court-martial and reprimand.

Ultimately British politicians and naval officers recognized that any conflict over the Oregon boundary, however undesirable, would be decided, like the War of 1812, on the Eastern Seaboard of the U.S. and the Great Lakes. It was here that the full influence of British naval dominance could be brought to bear and it was this influence that played most strongly upon American decision-making during the crisis, especially their decision to compromise. From London, McLane reported that the British were prepared “to commission immediately some thirty ships-of-the-line in addition to steamers and other vessels held in reserve.” Polk’s bluff had been called.

Against this background, skillful diplomacy by the Peel government offered Polk the chance to back down, which was a course he accepted. A repeat of the War of 1812 was not on anyone’s agenda, and with no prospect of French support over such a trivial point Polk had little choice. While the Hudson’s Bay Company gradually lost commercial dominance over Oregon, the company’s interests were increasingly turning towards shipping which rendered the Columbia River less important than Vancouver Island. Shipping and trade interests could be protected by the development of the Esquimalt naval base and RN squadron based there. Although the Royal Navy’s presence locally may not have been superior, vast overall superiority to the U.S. Navy enabled Britain’s politicians to secure their central objective of defeating the wild assertions of American politicians, retaining Vancouver Island and avoiding a potentially costly, distracting war with a major trading partner at seemingly small cost at a time when the European continental balance was a far more pressing problem.

Resolution

Although Polk had called on Congress in December 1845 to pass a resolution notifying the British of the termination of joint occupancy agreement, it was not until April 23, 1846 that both houses complied. The passage was delayed (especially in the Senate) by contentious debate, and ultimately a mild resolution was approved, the text of which called on both governments to settle the matter amicably. By a large margin, moderation had won out over calls for war. Unlike Western Democrats, most Congressmen—like Polk—did not want to fight for 54° 40′. 

The Polk administration then made it known that the British government should offer terms to settle the dispute. Time was of the essence, because it was well known that the Peel government would fall with the impending repeal of the corn laws in the United Kingdom, and then negotiations would have to begin again with a new ministry. Aberdeen and Louis McLane, the American minister in the United Kingdom, quickly worked out a compromise and sent it to the United States.

Oregon Treaty

→ Hauptartikel: Oregon Treaty

The Oregon Territory, as established after the Oregon Treaty, superimposed over the current state boundaries.

Pakenham and Buchanan drew up a formal treaty, known as the Oregon Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate on June 18, 1846 by a vote of 41–14. The border was set at the 49th parallel, the original U.S. proposal, with navigation rights on the Columbia River granted to British subjects living in the area. Senator William Allen, one of the most outspoken advocates of the 54° 40' claim, felt betrayed by Polk and resigned his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Canadian Hugh LL. Keenlyside and American Gerald S. Brown wrote a century after the treaty that Vorlage:Quote

The terms of the Oregon Treaty were essentially the same ones that had been offered earlier by the Tyler administration, and thus represented a diplomatic victory for Polk. However, Polk has often been criticized for his handling of the Oregon question. Historian Sam W. Haynes characterizes Polk's policy as "brinkmanship" which "brought the United States perilously close to a needless and potentially disastrous conflict". David M. Pletcher notes that while Polk's bellicose stance was the by-product of internal American politics, the war crisis was "largely of his own creation" and might have been avoided "with more sophisticated diplomacy". According to Jesse Reeves "Had Palmerston been in Aberdeen's position at the time of Polk's 'firm' pronouncement, Polk might have lost Oregon." Aberdeen's desire for peace and good relations with the United States "are responsible for the settlement that Polk thought to gain by a firm policy. That Aberdeen was "bluffed" by Polk is absurd."

The treaty was ambiguously phrased about the route of the boundary, which was to follow "the deepest channel" out to the Strait of Juan de Fuca leaving the fate of the San Juan Islands in question. After the Pig War, arbitration by Kaiser William I of the German Empire led to Treaty of Washington (1871), which awarded America all of the islands.

Upper Canada politicians and public, already angry with the Oregon Treaty, were once again upset that Britain had not looked after their interests and sought greater autonomy in international affairs.

Historical maps

The boundary between British and American territory was shown differently in maps at the time:

• 
  The 1826 proposal of Huskisson and Addington
• 
  An 1841 American map showing the 54°40′ line near Fort Simpson as the boundary
• 
  An 1844 British map showing the Columbia River as the boundary
• 
  An 1846 map showing the 49th parallel as the boundary through Vancouver Island

See also

• Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, between U.S. and Spain, resolved borders from Florida to the Pacific Ocean.
• Alaska boundary dispute, mid-to-late-19th century, resolved in 1903, resolved border between Alaska and British Columbia.
• Pig War
• Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, primarily concerned the border between Maine and New Brunswick, but reaffirmed other aspects of the U.S.–Canadian border.

Further reading

• Sir James Douglas, Chapter V The Oregon Boundary, Robert Hamilton Coats and R. Edward Gosnell, publ. Morang, Toronto, 1908
• A history of British Columbia, Chapter IX "The Oregon Boundary", pp 89-96, E.O.S. Scholefield, British Columbia Historical Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, 1913

External links

Party platform and speeches

• Polk's March 1845 inaugural address, in which he reasserted the "clear and unquestionable" claim
• Polk's December 1845 message to Congress, in which he called for the end of the joint occupation of Oregon

Political cartoons from Harper's Weekly, 1846

• "Polk's Dream", in which the Devil, disguised as Andrew Jackson, advises Polk to fight for the 54°40′ line
• "Present Presidential Position", in which the Democratic Party's "jackass" is standing on the 54°40′ line
• "Ultimatum on the Oregon Question", Polk talks with Queen Victoria, while others make comments
• "War! or No War!", two Irish immigrants face off over the boundary question

Other

• Fifty-Four Forty or Fight at About.com, an example of a reference that mistakenly describes the phrase as an 1844 campaign slogan
• 54-40 or Fight shows the quilt block named after the slogan. In this time period, women frequently used quilts to express their political views.