Belagerung von Bastogne

The Siege of Bastogne was an engagement between American and German forces at the Belgian town of Bastogne, as part of the larger Battle of the Bulge. The goal of the German offensive was the harbor at Antwerp. In order to reach it before the Allies could regroup and bring their superior air power to bear, German mechanized forces had to seize the roadways through eastern Belgium. Because all seven main roads in the Ardennes mountain range converged on the small town of Bastogne, control of its crossroads was vital to the German attack. The siege lasted from 20 December to 27 December when the besieged American forces were relieved by elements of General George Patton's Third Army.

Background

After the successful Invasion of Normandy and the subsequent eastward push through France, the Allied front lines extended from Nijmegen in the north down to neutral Switzerland in the south. The valuable port city of Antwerp had been captured during the push, and by the time winter arrived, the Allies even had control of German territory near the city of Aachen. Hitler soon laid out a plan to attack the Allied lines in Belgium; 55 divisions would launch a surprise attack through the Ardennes, with the aim of crossing the Meuse River and recapturing Antwerp. Despite major misgivings from his senior commanders, including Gerd von Rundstedt and Walther Model, the plan was not modified and the jump-off date was eventually set as 16 December 1944. Meanwhile, the Allied commanders considered the Ardennes area to be unsuitable for a large-scale German attack, mainly because of terrain issues. In addition, intelligence reports suggested that the only German divisions stationed in the area were weary, and in the weeks leading up to the assault, no Allied commander saw reason to believe that an attack was imminent. Bastogne, a hub city that commanded several important roads in the area, was defended mainly by the 28th Infantry Division, which had seen continuous fighting from 22 July to 19 November, before being assigned to this relatively quiet area. The Allies believed only an infantry division was present opposite the 28th Infantry, and they believed any attack along this sector would be limited in scale.

Hasso von Manteuffel, commanding the Fifth Panzer Army, gave Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz's XLVII Panzer Corps the responsibility of capturing Bastogne, before crossing the Meuse near Namur. von Lüttwitz planned to attack a Vorlage:Convert front with three divisions: the 26th Volksgrenadier and the Second Panzer would lead the assault, with the Panzer-Lehr-Division behind them. Opposing this significant force were two battalions of the 110th Infantry Regiment (the third was held back as a division reserve), responsible for a nine-mile (14 km) front along the Our River. The Allied forces were gathered into small groups at major villages, with outposts along the river manned only during the daytime. Since the forces were too thin to maintain an even battle line, they focused their attention on the four roads that crossed the Our. Due to heavy rain preceding the German attack, only one of the roads was in good enough condition to be used as a crossing point - the northernmost road, which crossed the Our at Dasburg on its way to Clerf and Bastogne. The Second Panzer Division was assigned to cross the river along this road, while the 26th Volksgrenadier would construct a bridge near Gemünd for its crossing. von Lüttwitz realized the importance of the road network of Bastogne - he knew that the city had to be captured before his corps could venture too far westward. Therefore, he ordered the Panzer-Lehr-Division to push forward to Bastogne as soon as his other troops had crossed the Clerf River.

The attack

On the evening of 15 December, the 26th Volksgrenadier established an outpost line on the west bank of the Our, something they did routinely during the nighttime. At 0300, engineers began ferrying men and equipment over the river where they began assembling at the departure point, quite close to the American garrisons. At 0530 the German artillery began bombarding the American positions, knocking out telephone lines, as the infantry started to advance. The Germans attacked swiftly, their advances made possible by sheer weight of numbers. In Weiler, one American company, supported by some mortars and a platoon of anti-tank guns, lasted until nightfall against repeated attacks from multiple German battalions. German engineers completed bridges over the Our before dark, and armor began moving to the front, adding to the Germans' vast numerical superiority. But in the end, the Germans were significantly delayed by the American defenders - their plan to cross the Clerf River by nightfall on the first day was delayed by two days.

On 19 December, the 28th Division command post transferred to Bastogne from Wiltz, a large village to the southeast. At Wiltz, the division put up its last stand - 3rd Battalion of the 110th, supported by armor and artillery, arrived at the city around noon of that day. The 44th Engineer Battalion was set up north of the town, but they were soon overwhelmed and retreated into the city, blowing up a bridge behind them. This small force, numbering no more than 500 in total, held out until the evening, when their position became completely untenable and they retreated to the west. With the 110th Infantry completely destroyed as an effective combat unit, it would be up to the rest of the Allied army to defend Bastogne.

Commitment of reserves

Despite several notable signs in the weeks preceding the attack, the Ardennes Offensive achieved virtually complete surprise. By the end of the second day of battle, it became apparent that the 28th Infantry was near collapse. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commander of VIII Corps, ordered part of his armored reserve, Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division (United States) to Bastogne. CCB consisted of the 3rd Tank Battalion, 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, C Company 21st Tank Battalion, B Company 54th Armored Infantry Battalion, C Company 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and three companies of support troops. Meanwhile, Gen. Eisenhower ordered forward the SHAEF reserve, composed of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne at Reims. These were veteran troops that had served with distinction since the parachute drops in Normandy and were resting and re-equipping after two months of combat in Holland. Both divisions were alerted on the evening of December 17, and not having organic transport,Vorlage:Clarify began arranging trucks for movement forward. The 82nd, longer in reserve and thus better re-equipped, moved out first. The 101st left Camp Mourmelon on the afternoon of December 18, with the order of march the division artillery, division trains, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 506th PIR, 502nd PIR, and 327th Glider Infantry. Much of the convoy was conducted at night in drizzle and sleet, using headlights despite threat of air attack to speed the movement, and at one point the combined column stretched from Bouillon, Belgium, back to Reims.

The 101st Airborne was routed to Bastogne, located 107 miles away on a Vorlage:Convert high plateau, while the 82nd Airborne took up positions further north to block the critical advance of Kampfgruppe Peiper toward Werbomont. The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, in reserve sixty miles to the north, was ordered to Bastogne to provide anti-tank support to the armorless 101st Airborne on the 18th and arrived late the next evening. The first elements of the 501st PIR entered the division assembly area four miles west of Bastogne shortly after midnight of December 19, and by 0900 the entire division had arrived.

Gen. McAuliffe sent the 501st PIR east through Bastogne at 0600 to develop the situation. By 0900 it had advanced and deployed on either side of the highway to Magéret and Longvilly, where the Panzer-Lehr-Division was engaged in an all-day action to destroy the armor-infantry teams assigned to slow the German advance. The 506th followed shortly thereafter, its 1st Battalion instructed to establish a blocking position at Noville and its other two battalions ordered to act as reserves north of Bastogne. The 502nd PIR marched north and northwest to establish a line from Champs east to Recogne, while the 327th GIR, newly arrived, protected the division service area west of Bastogne until the German intentions could be surmised.

Initial combat at Noville

On December 19 and 20, the 1st Battalion of the 506th PIR, was ordered to support Team Desobry, a battalion-sized tank-infantry task force of the 10th Armored Division assigned to defend Noville located north-northeast of both Foy and of Bastogne just Vorlage:Mi to km away. With just four M18 tank destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion to assist, the paratroopers attacked units of the 2nd Panzer Division, whose mission was to proceed by secondary roads via Monaville (just northwest of Bastogne) to seize a key highway and capture, among other objectives, fuel dumps—for the lack of which the overall German counter-offensive faltered and failed. Worried about the threat to its left flank in Bastogne, it organized a major combined arms attack to seize Noville. Team Desobry's high speed highway journey to reach the blocking position is one of the few documented cases wherein the legendary top speed of the M18 Hellcat (Vorlage:Convert, faster than today's M1A2 Abrams) was actually used to get ahead of an enemy force as envisioned by its specifications.

The attack of 1st Battalion and the M18 Hellcat tank destroyers of the 705th TD Battalion together destroyed at least 30 German tanks and inflicted 500 to 1000 casualties on the attacking forces in what amounted to a spoiling attack.Vorlage:Citation needed A Military Channel expert historianVorlage:Who credited the M18 destroyers with 24 kills, including several Tiger tanks, and believes that, in part, their ability to "shoot and scoot" at high speed and then reappear elsewhere on the battlefield and therefore appear to be another vehicle entirely played a large part in confusing and slowing the German attack, which subsequently stalled, leaving the Americans in possession of the town overnight. 3rd Battalion was ordered forward from a reserve position north of Bastogne to ease the pressure on 1st Battalion by occupying a supporting position in Foy to the south.

The heavy losses inflicted by the tank-destroyers induced the German commander into believing the village was being held by a much stronger force and he recoiled from further attacks on the village, committing a strategic error while seeking tactical advantage—significantly delaying the German advance and setting the stage for the Siege of Bastogne just to the south. This delay also gave the 101st Airborne Division enough time to organize defenses around Bastogne. After two days, the 2nd Panzer Division finally continued on its original mission to the Meuse River. As a consequence of its involvement at Bastogne, and its failure to dislodge the airborne forces, the column ultimately ran out of gas at Celles, where it was destroyed by the U.S. 2nd Armored Division and the British 29th Armoured Brigade.

By the time the 1st Battalion pulled out of Noville on the 20th, the village of Foy half-way to Bastogne center had been captured from the 3rd Battalion by a separate attack, forcing the 1st Battalion to then fight its way through Foy. By the time 1st Battalion made it to the safety of American lines, it had lost 13 officers and 199 enlisted men, out of about 600 troops, and was assigned as the division reserve. Team Desobry lost a quarter of its troops and was reduced to just four medium tanks when it passed through the lines of 3rd Battalion.

Battle

December 19-23, 1944

The 101st Airborne formed an all-round perimeter using the 502nd PIR on the northwest shoulder to block the 2nd Panzer Division, the 506th PIR to block entry from Noville, the 501st PIR defending the eastern approach, and the 327th GIR scattered from Marvie in the southeast to Champs in the west along the southern perimeter, augmented by engineer and artillery units plugging gaps in the line. The division service area to the west of Bastogne had been raided the first night, causing the loss of almost its entire medical company, and numerous service troops were used as infantry to reinforce the thin lines. CCB of the 10th Armored Division, severely weakened by losses to its Team Desobry, Team Cherry, and Team O'Hara in delaying the Germans, formed a mobile "fire brigade" of 40 light and medium tanks (including survivors of CCR 9th Armored Division and eight replacement tanks found unassigned in Bastogne).

Three artillery battalions, including the all-black 969th Field Artillery Battalion, were commandeered and formed a temporary artillery group. Each had 12 155 mm howitzers, providing the division with heavy firepower in all directions restricted only by its limited ammunition supply. Col. Roberts, commanding CCB, also rounded up 600+ stragglers from the rout of VIII Corps and formed Team SNAFU as a further stopgap force.

As a result of the powerful American defense to the north and east, XLVII Panzer Corps commander Gen. von Luttwitz decided to encircle Bastogne and strike from the south and southwest, beginning the night of December 20–21. German panzer reconnaissance units had initial success, nearly overrunning the American artillery positions southwest of Bastogne before being stopped by a makeshift force. All seven highways leading to Bastogne were cut by German forces by noon of December 21, and by nightfall the conglomeration of airborne and armored infantry forces were recognized by both sides as being surrounded.

The American soldiers were outnumbered and lacking in cold-weather gear, ammunition, food, medical supplies, and leadership (as many officers, including the 101st's commander, Major General Maxwell Taylor, were elsewhere). Due to some of the worst winter weather in years, the surrounded U.S. forces could not be resupplied by air nor was tactical air support available.

However, the two panzer divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps, after using their mobility to isolate Bastogne, continued their mission towards the Meuse on December 22, rather than attacking Bastogne with a single large force. They left just one regiment behind to assist the 26th Volksgrenadier Division in capturing the crossroads. XLVII Panzer Corps probed different points of the southern and western defensive perimeter in echelon, where Bastogne was defended by just a single airborne regiment and support units doubling as infantry. This played into the American advantage of interior lines of communication; the defenders were able to shift artillery fire and move their limited ad hoc armored forces to meet each successive assault.

The 26th VG received one panzergrenadier regiment from the 15th Panzergrenadier Division on Christmas Eve for its main assault the next day. Because it lacked sufficient troops and those of the 26th VG Division were near exhaustion, the XLVII Panzer Corps concentrated its assault on several individual locations on the west side of perimeter in sequence rather than launching one simultaneous attack on all sides. The assault, led by 18 tanks carrying a battalion of infantry, pierced the lines of the 327th's third Battalion (officially, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), and advanced as far as the battalion command post at Hemroulle.

However, the 327th held its original positions and repulsed infantry assaults that followed, capturing 92 Germans. The panzers that had achieved the penetration divided into two columns, one trying to reach Champs from the rear, and were destroyed in detail by two companies of the 1st Battalion 502nd PIR under Lt. Col. Patrick F. Cassidy and four tank destroyers of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Allied control of Bastogne was a major obstacle to the German armored advance, and the morale of Allied forces elsewhere on the Western Front was boosted by news of the stubborn defense of the besieged town.

Breaking of the Encirclement

Elements of General George Patton's Third Army, spearheaded by Lt. Col. Creighton Abrams commanding the 4th Armored Division's 37th Armor Battalion, succeeded in punching through to Bastogne, reaching the lines of the 326th Engineers on the day after the Christmas attack. The 101st's ground communications with the American supply dumps were restored on December 27, and the wounded were evacuated to the rear. Gen. Taylor reached Bastogne with the 4th Armored Division and resumed command.

With the encirclement broken, the men of the 101st expected to be relieved, but were given orders to resume the offensive. The 506th attacked north and recaptured Recogne on January 9, 1945, the Bois Jacques on January 10, and Foy on January 13. The 327th attacked towards Bourcy, northeast of Bastogne, on January 13 and encountered stubborn resistance. The 506th retook Noville on January 15 and Rachamps the next day. The 502nd reinforced the 327th, and the two regiments captured Bourcy on January 17, pushing the Germans back to their point of advance on the day the division had arrived in Bastogne. The next day the division was relieved.

The most famous quote of the battle came from the 101st’s acting commander, Brigadier General McAuliffe. When confronted with a written request from German General Luttwitz for surrender of Bastogne, he replied “NUTS!” (the commander of the 327th GIR interpreted it to the German truce party as “Go to hell!”). After the battle, newspapers referred to the division as the "battered bastards of Bastogne".

• 
  Map of troop movements during the battle of the Bulge. Bastogne is near the middle.
• 
  Letter from General McAuliffe on Christmas Day to the 101st Airborne troops defending Bastogne.
• 101st Airborne troops picking up air-dropped supplies during the siege.
  101st Airborne troops picking up air-dropped supplies during the siege.
• 
  44th Armored Infantry and 6th Armored Division tanks near Bastogne, 31 December, 1944
• 
  General Patton's jeep in Bastogne, 1 January 1945.
• 
  Members of C Company, 9th Engineers, conduct a memorial service for those killed during the siege, January 22, 1945.
• 
  Infantry of relief force near Bastogne, December 1944.

Media portrayals

The 1949 Hollywood film Battleground told the story of the defense of Bastogne by the 101st Airborne Division through a fictional squad of the 327th Glider Infantry. The movie, filmed in black and white, was lauded for its verisimilitude in portraying the infantry unit, flaws included, and the miserable conditions in which the battle was fought.

A 2001 HBO miniseries, Band of Brothers, based on a book of the same name by Stephen Ambrose, dedicated one episode ("Bastogne") to the experiences at Bastogne of Easy Company of the 506th PIR. Like Battleground, this series in color was notable for the authenticity and attention to detail of the men, equipment, and experiences portrayed.

References

• Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992.
• Turow, Scott. Ordinary Heroes. Farrar, Straus and Giroux (October 27, 2005)

Further reading

• Major Gary F. Evans: The 501st Parachute Infantry at Bastogne, Belgium December 1944. 22. Juni 1972, United States Army Center of Military History Historical Manuscripts Collection 8-3.1 BB 2 (army.mil [abgerufen am 9. Juni 2010]). 
• Bastogne, The Story of the First Eight Days In Which the 101st Airborne Division was Closed Within the Ring of German Forces. Reprint 1988 Auflage. United States Army Center of Military History, 1946, CMH Pub 22-2 (army.mil [abgerufen am 9. Juni 2010]). 

Wikisource: THE ARDENNES:
BATTLE OF THE BULGE.
CHAPTER XIX:
THE BATTLE OF BASTOGNE – Quellen und Volltexte

External links

• Summary of the battle
• The Battle of the Bulge - Fortunes of War
• Battle of the Bulge - 4th Armored Division Help End the Siege of Bastogne
• The 101st Airborne Division's Defense of Bastogne
• The Battle of Bastogne on YouTube