토론:아나톨리 구트만

문서 작성자가 자료 조작을 하고 있다는 증거

조작1:"자본가, 러시아정교회 신부, 학생, 주부, 어부, 백파계 군인 등등 수십여명의 백파와 일제측으로 도피한 자들 등의 증언을 담고 있다 오늘날 러시아 역사학계에서도 도피하거나 반역혐의로 다수 처형되었음을 인정한다."

조작2:"현재 러시아 역사학계에서는 구트만의 책에 나온 사람들이 니콜라예프스크 일대에서 유대인 자본가, 자본가, 광산과 유전 소유자, 귀족, 백파군 등의 지배층으로 활동했거나 일본 천황에게 볼셰비키 타도를 청원하는 등의 친일파로 활동했음을 인정한다."

조작3:"그 보복으로 포로로 잡고 있던 100여명 이상의 일본계 민간인과 친일파를 참살한 것이라고 인정한다."

조작4:"그러나 인용을 하는 국가중 남한의 친일본 극우 이론가 몇 명을 제외하고는 1920년 2월 29일경 니콜라예프스크 항구를 평화적으로 해방시켰던 트리피츤 부대의 니콜라예프스크에서의 대규모 러시아계 민간인 학살을 인정하는 국가는 확인되지 않는다. "

이런 서술을 하고 있는데 전부 조작인데요.

구체적으로 다음 서술,

조작1:"등등 자본가, 러시아정교회 신부, 학생, 주부, 어부, 백파계 군인 등등 수십여명의 백파와 일제측으로 도피한 자들 등의 증언을 담고 있다 오늘날 러시아 역사학계에서도 도피하거나 반역혐의로 다수 처형되었음을 인정한다."

조작2:"현재 러시아 역사학계에서는 구트만의 책에 나온 사람들이 니콜라예프스크 일대에서 유대인 자본가, 자본가, 광산과 유전 소유자, 귀족, 백파군 등의 지배층으로 활동했거나 일본 천황에게 볼셰비키 타도를 청원하는 등의 친일파로 활동했음을 인정한다."

조작3:"그 보복으로 포로로 잡고 있던 100여명 이상의 일본계 민간인과 친일파를 참살한 것이라고 인정한다."

이런 서술로 러시아인 피해자들을 친일파라고 누명을 씌우고 있는데요.

이거 거짓말인데요.

러시아로 이주한 반란적인 한국인 대부분은 이르쿠츠크나, 상하이에서 혁명적인 파벌을 목표로 삼았다. 그렇게 함에, 사할린 부대의 '상하이파' 게릴라 파벌들은 1919-1920년 니콜라옙스크 항구와 사할린 주의 야생적인 민간인 살육에 능동적으로 참여하고, 아나키스트 트랴피친이 지휘하는 테러군대의 중요한 공격부대였다. [중략] 김과 박은 "무책임한 니콜라옙스크 테러 그룹을 구성해 한국 분리대 소총부대 병사들과 지휘부들에게 공황을 불러일으켰다."

무권력 상태는 마침내 게릴라들의 규율을 부패시켰다, 트랴피친의 절대권에서 민간인을 약탈하고 학살했었던 게릴라들을.

- Тепляков, Алексей Георгиевич. К портрету Нестора Каландаришвили (1876-1922): уголовник-авантюрист, партизан и красный командир. Исторический курьер 1, 2018, 47-48쪽

Основная часть перешедших в Россию мятежных корейцев ориентировалась на Иркутск, остальные – на свою революционную фракцию в Шанхае. При этом сепаратно настроенные «прошанхайские» партизанские вожаки особого Сахалинского партизанскогоотряда были активными участниками дикой резни населения в Сахалинской области иНиколаевске-на-Амуре в 1919–1920 гг., являясь важным ударным отрядом террористической армии анархиста Я. И. Тряпицына. Вполне естественно, что, уйдя под натискомяпонской армии летом 1920 г. с низовьев Амура и расположившись в окрестностях Благовещенска, они привычным образом с помощью оружия решали и вопросы снабжения, иличные конфликты. Еще в конце июля 1920 г. главком НРА Г. Х. Эйхе и его помощник пополитчасти В. Г. Бисярин приказали провести чистку корейско-китайского полка, средибойцов и комсостава которого была отмечена «масса преступлений служебного и политического характера»44. Эффективность подобных мер оказалась невелика. И попытки переподчинить корейцев мирным путем, как свидетельствует переписка советских военных ипартийных властей, оказались безуспешными.

Главком Эйхе в январе 1921 г. выдал мандат члену корейской секции при ДальбюроЦК РКП(б) и представителю Амурского обкома Корейской компартии Ивану ДаниловичуПак-Чан-Ыну для разрешения военных вопросов в корейских партизанских отрядах и поделам созыва в феврале партизанского съезда в Чите или Хабаровске – с правом отстранения командиров отрядов и «ареста лиц, оказывающих препятствие при разрешении им означенных вопросов»45. Тогда же все члены корейской секции Дальбюро, а также командиры особого Сахалинского отряда Иннокентий Ким и Илья Пак «за их недисциплинированность в партийных работах» постановлением Дальне-Восточного секретариата ИККИбыли лишены полномочий, причем Пак и Ким оказались на короткое время под следствием Амурского облотдела Госполитохраны (И. Пак обвинялся как ярый сторонник «авантюриста Тряпицына» и колчаковский контрразведчик, а И. Ким, бывший прапорщик русской армии, ранее, в 1920 г. в Иркутске Особым отделом 5-й армии арестовывался за уклонение от службы в НРА и был освобожден на поруки ).

Чрезвычайная Корейская военная конференция, прошедшая 11 марта 1921 г. в Читепод председательством Цой-Кван-Юна, представителя Кандонского партизанского отрядаКим-Квана и других, постановила отстранить командира особого Сахалинского отрядаИ. Кима и его военкома И. Пака с преданием их военно-полевому суду «за разложениеполка». Им вменялись внесение сепаратизма в Николаевские роты и ссоры командованияполка с рядовыми бойцами, а также доносы; они «не приостановили убийства самосудомВасилия Пака, бывшего командира корейского отряда Николаевского района, совершенное партизанами-николаевцами». Ким и Пак, переходя с отрядом из г. Свободного в сельскую местность, «позволили стрелкам мародерничать и чинить насилия над мирными русскими крестьянами», которые в ответ озлобились, требуя разоружения корейских партизан и вооружения их, крестьян, для отпора корейцам. Также Ким и Пак, «создав группубезответственных террористов из числа николаевцев, наводили панику на солдат и лицкомандного состава Корейского отдельного стрелкового батальона»47

Безвластие окончательно разложило дисциплину партизан, привыкших грабить и убивать мирное население при диктатуре Я. И. Тряпицына. В телеграмме Г. Х. Эйхе23 апреля 1921 г., адресованной Б. З. Шумяцкому, главком НРА сообщал, что Сахалинский отряд из-за недостатка продуктов и «отсутствия соответствующего начальника отряда» восстановил против себя местное население, «что грозит вылиться в открытое столкновение крестьян с корейцами». Отряд планировалось перевести в один из соседних районов. Эйхе просил ускорить выезд Каландаришвили «для урегулирования положения»48.Однако «Дед» смог выехать только через месяц. Между тем, 8 мая 1921 г. комсостав Сахалинского отряда сообщал главкому НРА, что назначенный командующим корейскимичастями О. Хамук неприемлем, поскольку в свое время, будучи комбатом, «порол народоармейцев». Подписавшие обращение начальник отряда Григорьев (бывший офицер, беспартийный), помощник начальника отряда Ким, военком Пак (бывший начальник Николаевского отряда), начштаба Цой (бывший начштаба 2-го летучего отряда), комбат-1 Лим,комбат-2 Анму, комбат-3 Хезаук и ряд командиров рот заявили о неподчиненииО. Хамуку49- Тепляков, Алексей Георгиевич. К портрету Нестора Каландаришвили (1876-1922): уголовник-авантюрист, партизан и красный командир. Исторический курьер 1, 2018, 47-48쪽

소비에트 정권이 공식적으로 인정한 인물 아나키스트 야코프 트랴피친의 게릴라부대가 1920년 1월에 도시에 접근했다. 일본 수비대와 합의가 이루어지고, 부대는 출입이 허용되었다. 그런 레드 게릴라와 지역 주민들 사이의 평화로운 공존은 오래가지 못 했고, 곧 병사들은 화이트 운동에 동조하는 개인들을 샤냥했고, 체포해서 처형했다. 부유한 민간인들의 체포와 처형이 뒤따랐고, 3월까지 분쟁은 일본군을 포함했다. 수비대는 무장해제 최후통첩을 받았고 거절했고, 그리고 이것은 3월 12일에 무력 충돌의 발발로 이어졌다.[중략] 일본 부대는 하바로프스크에서 아무르 하구로 보내졌고 군함은 5월 해안에 근접했다.

상황을 고려해, 트랴피친의 부대는 도서 전체를 제거[waste 직역하면 낭비란 의미로 사람을 보통 죽임으로써 '제거하다'는 의미도 포함]후 퇴각.: 나무구조물이 불에 타고 돌 구조물에 불을 붙였다.

도시의 나머지인구는 부대와 함께 후퇴했지만(그들은 무력에 의해 도시밖으로 끌려갔다.) 반란은 켈비 마을의 도시에서 단거리에서 일어났다. 트랴피친은 체포됐고 유죄판결을 받고, 1920년 7월 9일, 처형, 노동자 인구에 대한 공산주의 정권에 대한 신뢰를 훼손한 범죄를 이유로 말이다.[중략] 오늘날 많은 역사가들은 트라이아피친의 행동이 전례가 없는 근거 없는 잔혹행위라는 설명에 동의한다. "도시 전체를 고의적으로 불태워 헤아릴 수 없는 폐허와 그 전쟁의 역사에 비할 바 없는 영토의 황폐화로 수천 명을 죽였다." (Nelyubova 2012, 291) (Nelyubova 2012, 291)

Grishachev, Sergey V 와 Vladimir G. Datsyshen. Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922. A History of Russo-Japanese Relations. Brill, 2019, 145~146쪽

그는 연해주에서 게릴라전을 계속하고 발전시키기 위해 이 지역의 자원(인간, 식료품)을 활용할 계획을 실행기위해 본부가 니콜라옙스크로 파견한 탐사대 부대 우두머리로 밝혀졌다. 1920년 1월, 니콜라옚크 전선 사령관이라고 선언 후, 그리고 공식적인 인정을 받았다. 사실상 절대권력자로 행동하였다. 니콜라옙스크 항구를 점령 한 후, 시작, 소위, 1920년 3월 12-15 "니콜라옙스크 사건". 게릴라가 유발하여, 일본 분리대의 진출은 그 부대 자체만이 파괴된 게 아니다. 니콜라옙스크의 모든 일본 식민지도, 여성을 포함해서, 아이들, 가족과 함께 영사관, 부상자, 포로들. 결국 일본은 러시아 문제에 대한 주요 무장 개입을 정당화했다.(극동 전역의 일본 행동, 일본의 사할린 북부 점령). 그 사건 전에 일본군은 1920년 2월 4일 중립을 선언했었다. 2월 17일 러시아 영토에서는 군대를 대피시키기 시작했었다.

트랴피친 본부의 명령에 따라 1920년 5월 말일과 6월 1일에 그, 그리고 그 근처에 있는 사람 집단들, 니콜라옙스크 마을이 폭발하고 불태워지고, 해안가 주변에 있는 어업이 불태워지고, 도시의 주민들은 "신뢰성"과 사회적 소속의 자격에 따라 박멸당했다(уничтожены), 생존해 감옥에 갇혀있던 일본인 죄수들도, 트랴피친의 행동에 바대하는 게릴라들도. 인구의 일부가 북방수림(тайгу) 대피한 결과, 5세 미만의 거의 모든 어린이가 사망했다.

그는 1920년 7월 9일 켈비 마을에서 "103인" 법원의 판결로 총살됐다. 그는 정착지 외곽의 공동 무덤에 묻혔다. 트랴피친의 급진주의와 초혁명 모험주의는 볼셰비키와 그들의 특수기관 주도로 게릴라들의 손으로 트랴피친의 독재를 제거하게 한다.- В. В. Кривенький, Е. Г. Малафеева, А. Н. Фуфыгин, "ЯКОВ ТРЯПИЦЫН БЕЗ ЛЕГЕНД: НОВЫЕ ДАННЫЕ О СУДЬБЕ ПАРТИЗАНСКОГО КОМАНДИРА." eruditorum 2018 Выпуск 26 (2018). 128쪽

Оказался во главе экспедиционного отряда, посланного штабом на север к Николаевску с целью обеспечения реализации плана использования ре�сурсов этого региона (людских, продуктовых) для продолжения и дальнейшего развёртывания парти�занской войны в Приамурье [21, с. 71].В январе 1920 г., объявив себя командующим Николаевским фронтом, и получив официальное признание в этом, фактически стал действовать как диктатор [21, с. 85, 87; 10]После захвата Николаевска-на-Амуре, иници�ировал, так называемый, «николаевский инцидент» 12–15 марта 1920 г., когда после, спровоцированно�го партизанами [23, с. 142], выступления японского отряда был уничтожен не только сам этот отряд, но и вся японская колония г. Николаевска, включая женщин, детей, консула с семьёй, раненных, плен�ных. Что, в конечном итоге, дало Японии повод для крупного вооружённого вмешательства в российские дела (выступлению японцев по всему Дальнему Востоку, занятию японцами северного Сахалина) хотя до этого, 4 февраля 1920 года японское коман�дование заявило о нейтралитете, а 17 февраля на�чало эвакуацию своих войск с российской террито�рии.В последних числах мая и первых числах июня 1920 года по распоряжению штаба Тряпицына, его самого, и группы приближённых к нему людей, был взорван и сожжен город Николаевск-на-Амуре [16, с. 124, 126; 4], сожжены окрестные рыбалки по по�бережью [16, с. 124], уничтожены обыватели города по цензу «благонадёжности» и социальной принад�лежности [4; 21, с. 124–126; 16, с. 113–117]; оставши�еся в живых японцы, содержавшиеся в тюрьме в ка�честве пленных, а так же, несогласные с действиями Тряпицына, партизаны. В результате эвакуации части населения в тайгу почти все дети до 5 лет по�гибли [16, с. 160].Расстрелян 9 июля 1920 г. в посёлке Керби по приговору суда «103-х». Похоронен в общей мо�гиле на окраине этого населённого пункта.Сепаратизм, радикализм и ультрареволюцион�ный авантюризм Тряпицына привели к ликвидации тряпицынской диктатуры руками партизан по ини�циативе большевиков и их спецслужб.-В. В. Кривенький, Е. Г. Малафеева, А. Н. Фуфыгин "ЯКОВ ТРЯПИЦЫН БЕЗ ЛЕГЕНД: НОВЫЕ ДАННЫЕ О СУДЬБЕ ПАРТИЗАНСКОГО КОМАНДИРА." eruditorum 2018 Выпуск 26 (2018). 128쪽

The leadership of the young Far Eastern Republic began negotiationswith the Japanese command on the withdrawal of Japanese troops fromVerkhneudinsk and the entire Transbaikal region. One of the most dramaticevents during the period of the civil war and of foreign intervention in thehistory of Russian-Japanese relations was the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident ofspring 1920. The city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was located at some distance fromthe main events; however, as a part of the intervention framework a Japanesegarrison was stationed there in 1918 because of the city’s strategic location onthe estuary of the Amur River opposite the island of Sakhalin. Furthermore,since the end of the 19th century, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was the territory’s center of gold mining. In addition to the small garrison deployed in 1918, Japanesecivilians also inhabited the city, among them the consul and his family.

The guerrilla unit of the anarchist Yakov I. Tryapitsyn, who formally recognized the Soviet regime, approached the city in January 1920. An agreementwas reached with the Japanese garrison, and the unit was allowed entry. Thepeaceful coexistence between Red guerrillas and the local population did notlast, however, and soon the soldiers launched a hunt for individuals sympathetic with the White Movement, who were arrested and executed. Arrests andexecutions of wealthy civilians followed, and by March the conflict embroiledthe Japanese military. The garrison was given a disarmament ultimatum, whichit rejected, and this led to the outbreak of armed conflict on March 12. TheJapanese were sorely outnumbered: Japanese soldiers led by Major IshikawaMasatada, who were sheltering in the barracks, and civilians, including theconsul and his family, were burned alive. Japan viewed the killing of the members of the military garrison, the consul and his family as sufficient grounds todeploy additional troops to the city and to occupy northern Sakhalin (oppositeNikolaevsk-on-Amur) for an indefinite period. Japanese units were sent to theAmur estuary from Khabarovsk and warships neared the shore in May.

Given the circumstances, Tryapitsyn’s unit retreated only after having laidthe entire city to waste: wooden structures were set alight and stone structuresblown up. The remaining population of the city retreated together (they weretaken from the city by force) with the unit but a revolt erupted only a shortdistance from the city in the town of Kerbi. Tryapitsyn was arrested, convicted,and executed on July 9, 1920, for the crime of undermining confidence in thecommunist regime among the working population (Molodyakov 2012, 194).

Soviet and modern Russian historians have conflicting views regardingthe 1920 events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Soviet historians claim that “the socalled Nikolaevsk Incident was intentionally provoked by the Japanese military in March 1920 … This incident was used by the Japanese military as apretext for various provocations for a number of years” (Kutakov 1985, 65).Some contemporary Russian scholars occasionally express a similar opinion:“The Japanese military command chose Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to be a venueof provocation … Japanese militarism deliberately sacrificed its own soldiers”(Dal’niĭ Vostok Rossiĭ 2003, 366–67). There is, however, another historiographicaccount. Already in 1924, the acclaimed journalist Anatoliĭ Gan (the pen nameof Anatoliĭ Ya. Gutman) published a chronicle of the events in his book Ruin ofNikolaevsk-on-Amur: Episodes of the Civil War in the Far East (Gibel Nikolaevskana-Amure: Stranitsy iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke). Gan traveled to Siberia and the Far East at the time of the civil war. He lived in thePrimor’e territory from 1919 to 1920, and therefore was well placed to report onthe brutal events of the spring of 1920 (Gutman 1924). Today, many historiansagree in the description of Tryapitsyn’s actions as unprecedented, baseless cruelty: “the intentional burning of an entire city, killing thousands killed with immeasurable ruins and devastation of the territory that had no parallels in thehistory of that war” (Nelyubova 2012, 291)-Grishachev, Sergey V 와 Vladimir G. Datsyshen. Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922. A History of Russo-Japanese Relations. Brill, 2019, 145~146쪽

실제 러시아인 서술과 다른데 왜 거짓말을 하시나?

다음 서술도 조작입니다.

조작4:"그러나 인용을 하는 국가중 남한의 친일본 극우 이론가 몇 명을 제외하고는 1920년 2월 29일경 니콜라예프스크 항구를 평화적으로 해방시켰던 트리피츤 부대의 니콜라예프스크에서의 대규모 러시아계 민간인 학살을 인정하는 국가는 확인되지 않는다. "

러시아, 미국, 대만 3개국가나 되는데요?

Основная часть перешедших в Россию мятежных корейцев ориентировалась на Иркутск, остальные – на свою революционную фракцию в Шанхае. При этом сепаратно настроенные «прошанхайские» партизанские вожаки особого Сахалинского партизанскогоотряда были активными участниками дикой резни населения в Сахалинской области иНиколаевске-на-Амуре в 1919–1920 гг., являясь важным ударным отрядом террористической армии анархиста Я. И. Тряпицына. Вполне естественно, что, уйдя под натискомяпонской армии летом 1920 г. с низовьев Амура и расположившись в окрестностях Благовещенска, они привычным образом с помощью оружия решали и вопросы снабжения, иличные конфликты. Еще в конце июля 1920 г. главком НРА Г. Х. Эйхе и его помощник пополитчасти В. Г. Бисярин приказали провести чистку корейско-китайского полка, средибойцов и комсостава которого была отмечена «масса преступлений служебного и политического характера»44. Эффективность подобных мер оказалась невелика. И попытки переподчинить корейцев мирным путем, как свидетельствует переписка советских военных ипартийных властей, оказались безуспешными.

Главком Эйхе в январе 1921 г. выдал мандат члену корейской секции при ДальбюроЦК РКП(б) и представителю Амурского обкома Корейской компартии Ивану ДаниловичуПак-Чан-Ыну для разрешения военных вопросов в корейских партизанских отрядах и поделам созыва в феврале партизанского съезда в Чите или Хабаровске – с правом отстранения командиров отрядов и «ареста лиц, оказывающих препятствие при разрешении им означенных вопросов»45. Тогда же все члены корейской секции Дальбюро, а также командиры особого Сахалинского отряда Иннокентий Ким и Илья Пак «за их недисциплинированность в партийных работах» постановлением Дальне-Восточного секретариата ИККИбыли лишены полномочий, причем Пак и Ким оказались на короткое время под следствием Амурского облотдела Госполитохраны (И. Пак обвинялся как ярый сторонник «авантюриста Тряпицына» и колчаковский контрразведчик, а И. Ким, бывший прапорщик русской армии, ранее, в 1920 г. в Иркутске Особым отделом 5-й армии арестовывался за уклонение от службы в НРА и был освобожден на поруки ).

Чрезвычайная Корейская военная конференция, прошедшая 11 марта 1921 г. в Читепод председательством Цой-Кван-Юна, представителя Кандонского партизанского отрядаКим-Квана и других, постановила отстранить командира особого Сахалинского отрядаИ. Кима и его военкома И. Пака с преданием их военно-полевому суду «за разложениеполка». Им вменялись внесение сепаратизма в Николаевские роты и ссоры командованияполка с рядовыми бойцами, а также доносы; они «не приостановили убийства самосудомВасилия Пака, бывшего командира корейского отряда Николаевского района, совершенное партизанами-николаевцами». Ким и Пак, переходя с отрядом из г. Свободного в сельскую местность, «позволили стрелкам мародерничать и чинить насилия над мирными русскими крестьянами», которые в ответ озлобились, требуя разоружения корейских партизан и вооружения их, крестьян, для отпора корейцам. Также Ким и Пак, «создав группубезответственных террористов из числа николаевцев, наводили панику на солдат и лицкомандного состава Корейского отдельного стрелкового батальона»47

Безвластие окончательно разложило дисциплину партизан, привыкших грабить и убивать мирное население при диктатуре Я. И. Тряпицына. В телеграмме Г. Х. Эйхе23 апреля 1921 г., адресованной Б. З. Шумяцкому, главком НРА сообщал, что Сахалинский отряд из-за недостатка продуктов и «отсутствия соответствующего начальника отряда» восстановил против себя местное население, «что грозит вылиться в открытое столкновение крестьян с корейцами». Отряд планировалось перевести в один из соседних районов. Эйхе просил ускорить выезд Каландаришвили «для урегулирования положения»48.Однако «Дед» смог выехать только через месяц. Между тем, 8 мая 1921 г. комсостав Сахалинского отряда сообщал главкому НРА, что назначенный командующим корейскимичастями О. Хамук неприемлем, поскольку в свое время, будучи комбатом, «порол народоармейцев». Подписавшие обращение начальник отряда Григорьев (бывший офицер, беспартийный), помощник начальника отряда Ким, военком Пак (бывший начальник Николаевского отряда), начштаба Цой (бывший начштаба 2-го летучего отряда), комбат-1 Лим,комбат-2 Анму, комбат-3 Хезаук и ряд командиров рот заявили о неподчиненииО. Хамуку49-Тепляков, Алексей Георгиевич (2018). “К портрету Нестора Каландаришвили (1876-1922): уголовник-авантюрист, партизан и красный командир”. 《Исторический курьер 1》: 47-48쪽

The leadership of the young Far Eastern Republic began negotiationswith the Japanese command on the withdrawal of Japanese troops fromVerkhneudinsk and the entire Transbaikal region. One of the most dramaticevents during the period of the civil war and of foreign intervention in thehistory of Russian-Japanese relations was the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident ofspring 1920. The city of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was located at some distance fromthe main events; however, as a part of the intervention framework a Japanesegarrison was stationed there in 1918 because of the city’s strategic location onthe estuary of the Amur River opposite the island of Sakhalin. Furthermore,since the end of the 19th century, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur was the territory’s center of gold mining. In addition to the small garrison deployed in 1918, Japanesecivilians also inhabited the city, among them the consul and his family.

The guerrilla unit of the anarchist Yakov I. Tryapitsyn, who formally recognized the Soviet regime, approached the city in January 1920. An agreementwas reached with the Japanese garrison, and the unit was allowed entry. Thepeaceful coexistence between Red guerrillas and the local population did notlast, however, and soon the soldiers launched a hunt for individuals sympathetic with the White Movement, who were arrested and executed. Arrests andexecutions of wealthy civilians followed, and by March the conflict embroiledthe Japanese military. The garrison was given a disarmament ultimatum, whichit rejected, and this led to the outbreak of armed conflict on March 12. TheJapanese were sorely outnumbered: Japanese soldiers led by Major IshikawaMasatada, who were sheltering in the barracks, and civilians, including theconsul and his family, were burned alive. Japan viewed the killing of the members of the military garrison, the consul and his family as sufficient grounds todeploy additional troops to the city and to occupy northern Sakhalin (oppositeNikolaevsk-on-Amur) for an indefinite period. Japanese units were sent to theAmur estuary from Khabarovsk and warships neared the shore in May.

Given the circumstances, Tryapitsyn’s unit retreated only after having laidthe entire city to waste: wooden structures were set alight and stone structuresblown up. The remaining population of the city retreated together (they weretaken from the city by force) with the unit but a revolt erupted only a shortdistance from the city in the town of Kerbi. Tryapitsyn was arrested, convicted,and executed on July 9, 1920, for the crime of undermining confidence in thecommunist regime among the working population (Molodyakov 2012, 194).

Soviet and modern Russian historians have conflicting views regardingthe 1920 events in Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. Soviet historians claim that “the socalled Nikolaevsk Incident was intentionally provoked by the Japanese military in March 1920 … This incident was used by the Japanese military as apretext for various provocations for a number of years” (Kutakov 1985, 65).Some contemporary Russian scholars occasionally express a similar opinion:“The Japanese military command chose Nikolaevsk-on-Amur to be a venueof provocation … Japanese militarism deliberately sacrificed its own soldiers”(Dal’niĭ Vostok Rossiĭ 2003, 366–67). There is, however, another historiographicaccount. Already in 1924, the acclaimed journalist Anatoliĭ Gan (the pen nameof Anatoliĭ Ya. Gutman) published a chronicle of the events in his book Ruin ofNikolaevsk-on-Amur: Episodes of the Civil War in the Far East (Gibel Nikolaevskana-Amure: Stranitsy iz istorii grazhdanskoĭ voĭny na Dal′nem Vostoke). Gan traveled to Siberia and the Far East at the time of the civil war. He lived in thePrimor’e territory from 1919 to 1920, and therefore was well placed to report onthe brutal events of the spring of 1920 (Gutman 1924). Today, many historiansagree in the description of Tryapitsyn’s actions as unprecedented, baseless cruelty: “the intentional burning of an entire city, killing thousands killed with immeasurable ruins and devastation of the territory that had no parallels in thehistory of that war” (Nelyubova 2012, 291)-Sergey V, Grishachev; Vladimir G, Datsyshen (2019). “Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922”. 《Brill》: 145~146쪽.

빨치산 부대의 퇴각을 결정한 트랴피친은 “반(反)소비에트 분자들”을 처형하며 도시를 파괴하기 시작했다. 약 4천 명의 주민이 학살되었으며, 피신할 수 있었던 일부를 제외한 대다수 주민들은 폐허가 된 도시를 빨치산들과 떠날 수 밖에 없었다.- 러시아연방과학원 러시아역사연구소 이완종 박사-이, 완종 (2014). 《러시아문서 번역집 : 근대한러관계연구. 14, 러시아국립군문서보관소(РГВА)》. 선인. 9쪽.

Compared with Blagoveshchensk and Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk had been an oasis of calm until January 1920 when a large partisan force under Yakov Triapitsyn approached along the Amur “liberating one upstream village after another.* Consul Ishida telegraphed his concern to Tokyo, but ice clogging the Amur and the Tatar Strait precluded either withdrawal or reinforcement. Snowballing to 4,000 armed men as it advanced, Triapitsyn's band annihilated small Russian and Japanese detachments sent out to stop it. It reached the outskirts of Nikolaevsk in late January, cut the telegraph line to Khabarovsk, and put the town under siege. Capturing nearby Fort Chnyrrakh, the partisans bombarded Nikolaevsk with field artillery. Against the advice of the Russian garrison commander, Ishikawa negotiated with Triapitsyn. The upshot was an agreement concluded on 28 February that opened the town to the partisans while allowing the Japanese to keep their arms. The next day Triapitsyn triumphantly entered Nikolae proclaimed Soviet rule, and arrested about 100 Russian officers (the garrison commander committed suicide).

[144쪽~145쪽]Amid boisterous festivities Triapitsyn requisitioned homes, arrested community leaders, and executed the officers already in custody. On 10 March the partisan chief told the Japanese that they too must surrender their arms. With no way to communicate with the outside world (Triapitsun controlled the telegraph), Major Ishikawa and Consul Ishida decided to launch a surprise attack on Triapitsyn's headquarters with all available Japanese military personnel and armed civilians. They struck early in the morning of 12 March, but Triapitsyn survived and counterattacked, killing most of the Japanese population, including Major Ishikawa. Consul Ishida committed suicide with his family. The 136 Japanese survivors, mostly women, children, and wounded, were imprisoned. [*Triapitsyn appears to have been employed in a Petrograd metal works and to have served as a noncommissioned officer in the Imperial Army before coming to the Far East in 1918. By Nov. 1919 he was leading a band of 1,500 Russians, 300 Chinese, 200 Koreans, some Hungarian internationalists, and local aborigines. Nina Lebedeva, sent by the Red Army Military Revolutionary Staff to keep an eye on him, became his chief of staff and lover.]

[145쪽]When Tokyo learned of the fate of its Nikolaevsk garrison, the Japanese commanders in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok were ordered to render the Bolsheviks "incapable” of injuring Japanese lives and interests, a bureaucratic euphemism for taking revenge. On the night of 4-5 April, three days after the last American troop transport had steamed out of the Golden Horn, Japanese units assaulted known and suspected Red organizations in Vladivostok, Nikolsk-Ussuriisk, Spassk, Posyet, and Khabarovsk. Both sides took heavy casualties: 1,000 Japanese and 3,000 “Bolsheviks,” among them Sergei Lazo. Although officially chairman of the Vladivostok Zemstvo Government's Military Council, Lazo was known to be the top Red partisan commander in the Far East and as such ranked high on the Japanese hit list. Lazo gave a false name when picked up on the night of 4-5 April, but his captors knew better and after several days of questioning transported him and two others (one being former secretary of the Vladivostok soviet Vsevolod Sibirtsev) in mail bags to an Ussuri Line station called Muraviev-Amursky, where the three were handed over to a Don Cossack named Bochkarev. When Lazo struggled as he was being taken out of the bag, Bochkarev's men knocked him unconscious and threw him into a locomotive furnace. His two companions followed, having been first shot inside their bags.

[145~146쪽]After the Imperial Army had extracted a measure of revenge, a Foreign Ministry representative apologized for “unauthorized actions” and set up a joint “Russo-Japanese conciliation commission” in Vladivostok. Meanwhile, under Japanese tutelage, a new zemstvo government was installed, presided over by a Menshevik. The Japanese found a cooperative figure in Vasily Boldyrev, a former tsarist officer who had represented the Omsk government in Tokyo, to succeed Lazo as chairman of the military council On 29 April the new government and Tokyo concluded an agreement dubbed by critics a “Far Eastern Brest-Litovsk,” providing for a twenty-mile zone around southern Primorye towns, rail lines, and roads within which only Japanese and Japanese-approved Russian police were permitted to bear arms. [*The Bolsheviks lost an energetic commander but gained a revolutionary martyr. In a 1924 poem, "Vladimir Ilych Lenin,” Vladimir Mayakovsky depicted Lazo being held by Japanese soldiers, one of whom pours molten lead down his throat as another shouts, “Recant!” Lazo gurgles: “Long live communism!” Lazo's murderers were hardly original. Approximately two years earlier, on 13 June 1918, instruments of revolutionary justice in Perm threw Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, his English secretary, and his chauffeur alive into a factory furnace.]

[146쪽]The Japanese sortie of 4-5 April, followed by relief expeditions from Khabarovsk and Otaru (Hokkaido), had fateful results for thousands of hostages in Nikolaevsk. As the relief forces drew near in the last days of May, the partisans put to death their 136 Japanese prisoners, slaughtered approximately 4,000 Russian men, women, and children, and after torching the town, herded a couple of thousand dazed survivors up the Amgun River to Kerbi. 11 When Japanese forces entered Nikolaevsk on 3 June, they found the town in ashes and the river clogged with bloated corpses. Amid journalistically fanned public outrage, Tokyo charged Moscow with responsibility and on 3 July announced that the Imperial Army was occupying northern Sakhalin until the “incident was resolved.

Triapitsyn's homicidal proclivities concerned Moscow only because their visibility jeopardized the success of its buffer strategy. By arousing a powerful neighbor that Lenin and Trotsky wanted to neutralize, Triapitsyn had made himself an unwanted witness whose testimony could prove embarrassing. Accordingly, Triapitsyn, his mistress Nina Lebedeva, and twentythree followers were quickly executed at Kerbi on 11 July after having been found guilty of murdering four Communists. The fate of over 4,000 Nikolaevsk residents was not mentioned in the proceedings. Judicial choreography did not deter Tokyo from raising the ante for withdrawing its forces from Russian territory.-John J., Stephan (1994). 《The Russian Far East: A History》. Stanford University Press. 144~146쪽

[119쪽]Triapitsyn's forces then systematically destroyed as much of the city as they could before the arrival of the Japanese and escaped, fleeing in scattered bands to the taiga. The largest body struck out for Blagoveshchensk, a city on the Amur controlled by the Far Eastern Republic.34 E. Ech, a journalist from Vladivostok, visited Nikolaevsk in the middle of July. He described what he saw: "Everywhere, as far as the eye could reach, there were only ruins of houses; here and there lonely house chimneys, the tall chimney of the blown up electric plant, half-sunken vessels .... Only on the outskirts of the town was smoke coming from the chimneys of houses that had fortunately survived. Of all the buildings within the town itself only the trade school and the prison (a stone building] remained intact.”35 On June 3, 1920, the Japanese relief force landed at Nikolaevsk. Russian survivors of the atrocities slowly returned to the city and and began to rebuild their lives, bringing the episode to a close

[122~124]Triapitsyn embarked on his own course of action, using the rhetoric of Bolshevism to gather soldiers on the way to Nikolaevsk. Many of the recruits undoubtedly believed the ideology he espoused. Triapitsyn himself placed little value in a higher ideology and seemed to use it only to legitimate the actions of his forces. This did not go unnoticed by those under his command. Anton Zakharovich Ovchinnikov, who joined Triapitsyn after the March massacre, recounted the following conversation with a member of his company: “You know, Comrade Ovchinnikov, you could vouch for it that I was sent by Kolchak to the Sakhalin prison for having Bolshevik ideas and that all of us—Comrades Voitinsky, Slepak, Gorschkov, Sergeev-fought and are still fighting for justice for the laboring people. I am a sailor from the Baltic Fleet; I have taken part in the revolution from its first days and have seen all kinds of fighting; but, Comrade Ovchinnikov, if you only knew what goes on here—it's horrible. (He dropped his voice still lower.) Every night whole families are killed, because, as the partisans say, they are burzhui. Comrade Orchinnikov, this is not justice. What is this bloodshed for, and what have the women and children to do with it?43”

Another companion complained that “over here plain working people call us bandits. It is terrible what's going on in town.”:

Justbefore his death, Colonel Witz, commander of a detachment of Whiteforces near Nikolaevsk, had an interview with Triapitsyn. Herecounted part of a conversation he had with the partisan leader in aletter to the Inspector of the lighthouse in de Castry, where he hadmade his final stand before being captured, and asked the inspectorto inform Triapitsyn "that it is time to stop fooling theexhausted Russian people which he leads to ruin.” Revealing hisknowledge of the partisan leader's true motives, Witz remembered aneven earlier meeting in Mariinsk where Triapitsyn declared himself“an anarchist ... against the existing authority and therefore, ...am against the Soviets."45 Presumably, this included theKhabarovsk Soviet which originally ordered him to Nikolaevsk.Triapitsyn used Bolshevism as a vehicle for personal prestige andpower instead of revolution and social change. The victims of hisatrocities during his stay in Nikolaevsk included “not only personsof the ‘Right' groups, but also liberal socialists and even severalBolsheviks.46- Hackemer, Kurt (1998). “The Nikolaevsk massacre and Japanese expansion in Siberia”. 《American Asian Review 16.2》: 119쪽, 122~124쪽.

By 1920 it was obvious to everyone that the Allied operation, aimed at replacing Lenin’sBolshevik government with a White Russian administration more sympathetic to Alliedinterests, had failed. By November 1920, all foreign troops except the Japanese withdrew from Russian territories. The Japanese Army made no plans to evacuate,however, and the so-called Nikolaevsk Incident in the spring of 1920 provided an opportunity to prolong the Japanese Expedition. Japanese forces had occupied Nikolaevsk inthe summer of 1918, largely to protect the considerable Japanese fishery business in theregion, until the town was attacked by guerrillas under Iakov Triapitsyn. In what isknown as the Nikolaevsk Massacre, more than 700 Japanese officers and town residentswere killed, in addition to 8,000 Russian citizens. The Soviets, who captured and executed Triapitsyn in July 1920, claimed he was an anarchist, not a Bolshevik.33 The Japanese Army seized this opportunity to start a propaganda offensive at home. Newspapersreported gruesome stories about the murdered 5,000 Japanese citizens (rather than theactual 700), including women and children. The number of murdered Russian peoplewas omitted. Press conferences of war journalists attracted considerable crowds.Around the country, memorial services were held with members of the imperial family in attendance. The murdered military officers were enshrined at Yasukuni, thenational religious memorial for the war dead. The Nikolaevsk Incident was thetipping point after which Japanese public indifference to the events in Russia yieldedto passionate anti-Bolshevik attitudes.-Linkhoeva, Tatiana. (2018). “The Russian Revolution and the Emergence of Japanese Anticommunism”. 《Revolutionary Russia 31.2》: 268~269.

On the night of the 25th, the Red Army burned down the prison in Nikolayevsk, killing 134 imprisoned Japanese soldiers. On the 26th, they burned the entire town, massacring a total of 834 Japanese and 4,000 Russians, while the Red Army suffered approximately 500 casualties; 100 Chinese expatriates and one British citizen were caught in the crossfire and killed-Li, Chang (2016). “Sino-Japanese negotiations over the Nikolayevsk Incident”. 《Chinese Studies in History 49.4》: 184.

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