Negative hedonistic utilitarianism

Negative hedonistic utilitarianism is a branch of negative utilitarianism that emphasizes reducing suffering and unpleasant experiences, rather than promoting pleasure. Unlike other forms of utilitarianism, it prioritizes minimizing negative well-being (disutility) over maximizing positive well-being (utility).

As a form of suffering-focused ethics, it holds that the primary moral aim is to alleviate suffering, not to enhance happiness. Suffering is defined as any experience that is unpleasant or distressing, and the goal is to ensure that conscious states, if they exist, are free from internal discomfort.

This view specifically targets the reduction of pain or discomfort, rather than the frustration of preferences, asserting that the moral imperative is to minimize such suffering.

Criticism

Critics of negative hedonistic utilitarianism have raised several objections. One notable critique is the "Sadistic Conclusion," which suggests that negative utilitarianism might imply it is better to add unhappy people rather than happy ones in certain situations. However, proponents argue that this conclusion is not necessarily implied by the theory. Negative hedonistic utilitarianism evaluates utility differently—suffering is negative, while a perfect life is neutral or better.

Negative hedonistic utilitarianism is challenged by the view that the distinction between pleasure and pain may result from contingent features of biological neural architecture, specifically the use of separate systems for processing reward and punishment. This perspective calls into question the moral significance traditionally assigned to the pleasure–pain divide, suggesting that minor pleasures and minor pains may not differ greatly in moral weight. Alternative forms of negative utilitarianism emphasize other justifications for prioritizing the reduction of suffering, such as the extreme negative value of intense pain (as in lexical negative utilitarianism) or the asymmetry between the moral importance of preventing unsatisfied preferences and creating new satisfied ones (as in antifrustrationism).

Another philosophical critique draws on the evolutionary debunking argument (EDA). This line of reasoning suggests that beliefs about the badness of suffering, including those central to negative hedonistic utilitarianism, may be explained by evolutionary forces rather than objective moral truths. While some argue this undermines the moral weight of suffering, others defend the view by arguing that evolutionary origins do not necessarily invalidate normative beliefs. In this view, disvalue may still be morally significant even if shaped by evolutionary processes.

Another critique is that negative hedonistic utilitarianism might justify extreme actions, such as human extinction, to eliminate suffering. This has been a subject of ongoing philosophical debate.

Relation to Effective Altruism

Negative hedonistic utilitarianism is recognized as a legitimate ethical stance within the Effective Altruism (EA) movement. EA encompasses a diversity of ethical views, and negative hedonistic utilitarianism is one of the welfarist and widely recognized positions within it. Critics often misrepresent EA by focusing on fringe interpretations or using non-standard terminology, but negative hedonistic utilitarianism remains a valid perspective within the broader consequentialist framework.