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In L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21, the Irish Supreme Court confirmed that “decided case”. The decision of judge “what he decided”. The applicant was unsuccessful in their appeal.


Background:

This case involved an appellant who was appealing a decision of the high court. The high court refused to grant an annulment of the petitioners marriage to the respondent. According to the petitioner, the respondent had issues such as psychological maturity and under-development of character. They also claimed that they misrepresented fundamental facts. They separated in 1997. She also claimed that he did not possess the capability to manage financial affairs. His professional dealings along with his financial ones were exaggerated which were contained in his CV according to her. The High Court claimed that this evidence did not prove that the respondent had any particular personality traits that would class him as having a personality disorder.[1]


Holdings of The Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court said the trial judge was entitled to assess certain assertions made by the respondent in respect of exaggerations made in his CV. The evidence came nowhere to establishing that the respondent lacked capacity to contract to a valid marriage. The constitutional protection afforded to marriage entailed that stronger evidence was needed to demonstrate such a lack of capacity. The appeal would be dismissed.[2]

The Constitution imposes a clear obligation on the courts to uphold the marriage contract and it would require far stronger evidence than has been adduced in this case to satisfy me that the respondent lacked the requisite capacity to enter a valid contract of marriage.O'Higgins J. concluded that the respondent's lack of full disclosure about his financial affairs, family and social circumstances, were not grounds upon which one could base a claim for nullity.[3]

It is clear that the trial judge had a very clear and full understanding of the factual situation in this case. He noted that during the marriage the respondent had provided little emotional support to the petitioner and did not appear to have been very good at parenting the child born prior to the break-up of the relationship. He was inconsiderate to the petitioner and sometimes deceitful. The learned trial judge was thus quite prepared to conclude from the evidence that the respondent was very selfish, egotistical, deceitful and dishonest and that he behaved badly.[4]

The relevant legal principles pertaining to a grant of nullity have been comprehensively set out in the judgment of this Court in PF v. GO'M.[5] This was a case where the petitioner and the respondent were married and had one child. The petitioner commenced nullity proceedings on grounds that he had not given full free and informed consent to the refused to grant the nullity sought. The petitioner appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in law in holding that the circumstances of substance which rendered a party's consent full and informed did not include circumstances concerning the disposition or proclivity of the other party. It was held by this Court, in dismissing the appeal, that if a party to a marriage was not fully informed about the conduct or the character of the other party prior to the marriage, this was not of itself sufficient to render the marriage void. Secondly, while adultery was a ground for judicial separation, it had never been a ground for nullity. Thirdly, while consent could not be considered informed where information relating to a party's inherent disposition and mental stability was withheld, this would not be the case where there was a concealed misconduct or other misrepresentation. Fourthly, there was a necessity for certainty in marriage, which was enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore the introduction of a ground of nullity which would bring uncertainty into a wide variety of marriages was not only undesirable as a matter of public policy, but was contrary to the clear intention of Article 41.1.3 of the Constitution.[6]

In delivering judgment on behalf of the Court, McGuinness J conducted a comprehensive review of the relevant legal principles pertaining to nullity. Having traced the origins of the modern law of nullity, she cited a much quoted passage from the judgment of Kenny J. inS . v. S.[7] which emphasised that traditionally two principles were fundamental in suits for nullity. McGuinness J. considered at length the whole question of misrepresentation or fraud arising from the misconduct of one party prior to the marriage. This issue was fully considered in the case of Moss v. Moss.[8] In that case the President, Sir F. H. Jeune had made it clear in the course of his judgment that fraud and misrepresentation had a very small role to play as a ground for a decree of nullity.[9]

The principal authority relied upon by the petitioner in the present case, namely MO'M (otherwise OC) v. BO'C[10], was also dealt with by McGuinness J. in the course of her judgment. That was a case where the High Court had heard evidence relating to the inherent nature, character and behaviour of the respondent during the marriage. It was a case where the respondent, unknown to the petitioner, had been attending a psychiatrist for approximately six years before the marriage.She claimed she did not have adequate knowledge of all the relevant circumstances and that had she been aware of those circumstances she would not have married him as she regarded the fact that the husband had attended a psychiatrist as being indicative of mental instability and probably some form of psychiatric illness. In other words, consent to the marriage was not, she alleged, a free, full and informed consent.[11] Gerard Byrne, psychiatrist, gave evidence as to the psychiatric condition of the respondent and the petitioner. His opinion was that the respondent had, at the time of the marriage, a personality disorder of such an extent as to make it impossible for him to consent to and sustain marriage to the petitioner. He had a fundamental difficulty with trust and allowing himself to be trusted and constructed a persona entirely at variance with reality.[12]

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  1. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  2. ^ Journal of the Bar of Ireland, Volume 16, Issue 5, November 2011
  3. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  4. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  5. ^ (otherwise GF) [2001] 3 IR 1
  6. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  7. ^ [1976- 77] I.L.R.M. 156 at pp. 162 to 163
  8. ^ (otherwise Archer ) [1897] P.263
  9. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  10. ^ [1996] 1 IR 208
  11. ^ L.B. v T.Macc [2009] IESC 21
  12. ^ "Strong evidence is needed to support nullity petition". The Irish Times. Retrieved 2019-12-23.