Logical behaviorism
In the philosophy of mind, logical behaviorism (also known as analytical behaviorism)[1] is the thesis that mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioral concepts.[2]
Logical behaviorism was first stated by the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap.[2] Other philosophers with sympathies for behaviorism included C. G. Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine (1960).[2][3] A more moderate form of analytical behaviorism was put forward by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949).[4][2]
See also
References
- ^ Alex Barber, Robert J Stainton (eds.), Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier, 2010, p. 33.
- ^ a b c d Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Behaviorism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Hempel, C. G. The Logical Analysis of psychology. 1935.
- ^ Neil Tennant, Introducing Philosophy: God, Mind, World, and Logic, Routledge, 2015, p. 299.
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