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Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources

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The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a Zimbabwean community-based natural resource management programme. It is one of the first programs to consider wildlife as renewable natural resources, while addressing the allocation of its ownership to indigenous peoples in and around conservation protected areas.[1]

Beginning

CAMPFIRE began as a program to support community-led development and sustainable use of natural resources.[2] The 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act set the legal basis for CAMPFIRE by allowing communities and private landowners to use wildlife on their land, instead of wildlife being state property.[2] CAMPFIRE is managed through Rural District Councils (RDCs), who distribute contracts and allocate revenue to local wards.[2] Population pressures in Zimbabwe have led to people living in communal lands, much of which is arid and unsuitable for agricultural farming.[3] CAMPFIRE would allow individuals to earn income on these communal lands while simultaneously preserving the environment and wildlife.[3] Prior to this, elephants were often killed by Zimbabweans because they would destroy the peoples livelihood by raiding their land and gardens. CAMPFIRE began with the sale of 100-150 licenses per year for $12,000 to $15,000 (US dollars) for sport hunters to kill elephants. The returns were to be given to local councils to deem how it was used. Poaching was to be suppressed by the people in these hunting areas.[4] This model extended to other wildlife, as well as contracts for safaris and tourism. While some endangered animals were killed, the program aimed at supporting these populations in the long run by managing hunting, decreasing illegal poaching, and strengthening the economic prospects of the community through environmental protection.

United States involvement

The US federal government has invested resources in CAMPFIRE, principally through USAID. CAMPFIRE received $7.6 million initially and $20.5 million in 1994 from USAID.[5] This support created controversy in US politics. CAMPFIRE leadership lobbied in favor of the legalization of the sustainable consumptive use of endangered species as a strategy to increase the value of their remaining populations. This position clashed with the majority preservationist, anti-hunting public sentiment in the US as well as national and international law, in particular CITES.[6] By 2014 the US stopped the importation of elephants into the US, halting much of the hunting carried out in CAMPFIRE communities.[7]

Results

CAMPFIRE earns revenue through safari hunting, the sale of animal products, and tourism contracts, with safari hunting making up 89% of revenues between 1989 and 2001.[2] During 1989–2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities. The scale of benefits varied greatly across districts, wards and households. Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements. The programme has been widely emulated in southern and eastern Africa.

Environmental benefits have been witnessed since CAMPFIRE's inception; elephant numbers have increased, buffalo numbers are either stable or witnessing a slight decrease, and habitat loss has diminished, and in certain regions, even reversed. Between 1980 and 2000, wildlife management as a percent of total land in Zimbabwe increased by 21%.[5]

It has been estimated by the World Wildlife Fund that households participating in CAMPFIRE increased their incomes by 15-25%.[8] Between 1989 and 2006 the project generated US$30 million, of which approximately 52 percent was distributed to local communities to promote rural development projects. For example, the Masoka ward has used its revenue to build a four-block primary school, a two-ward clinic, a grinding mill, and two hand-pumped boreholes.

In order to continue receiving CAMPFIRE payments, some wards have restricted immigration, settlement expansion, and the use of natural resources.[2] In some villages, CAMPFIRE is criticized because its physical restrictions bar villagers from accessing more fertile land.[9] Villagers have expressed that wildlife presents safety concerns for themselves and livestock.[10] In some areas, the communal projects are initiated but are not sustained, while the income from CAMPFIRE revenues is insufficient to substitute agricultural income.[10]

One concern is that the viability of the CAMPFIRE depends upon continued demand for the services being provided by the RDCs. The 2014 ban in importation of elephant parts into the US has led to a significant decline in revenues from hunting parties.[11] CAMPFIRE was affected by political events in Zimbabwe and a significant decline in tourism in the 2000s. It seems to have reemerged subsequently and maintains an active website.[12]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Satchel 1996.
  2. ^ a b c d e Frost, Bond; Bond, Ivan (2008). "The CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe: Payment for Wildlife Services". Ecological Economics. 65, no.4: 776–87 – via Research Gate.
  3. ^ a b Murindagomo, Felix (1990). "Zimbabwe: WINDFALL and CAMPFIRE". Living With Wildlife: Resource Management with Local Participation in Africa: 123–140.
  4. ^ Ceballos, G.; Ehrlich, A. H.; Ehrlich, P. R. (2015). The Annihilation of Nature: Human Extinction of Birds and Mammals. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 170 - 172. ISBN 1421417189 - via open edition.
  5. ^ a b Hasler, Richard. "An Overview of the Social, Ecological and Economic Achievements and Challenges of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme" (PDF). Evaluating Eden Series Discussion Paper No 3: 1–22.
  6. ^ Rowe 1997.
  7. ^ https://firstforwildlife.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/the-campfire-program-in-zimbabwe/
  8. ^ http://www1.american.edu/ted/campfire.htm
  9. ^ Alexander, Jocelyn (2002). "Wildlife and politics: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe". Development and Change. 31: 605–627.
  10. ^ a b Harrison, Elizabeth P. (2015). "Impacts of natural resource management programmes on rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe - the ongoing legacies of CAMPFIRE" (PDF). Pacific Sociological Association Conference: 1–31.
  11. ^ https://firstforwildlife.wordpress.com/2015/08/18/the-campfire-program-in-zimbabwe/
  12. ^ http://campfirezimbabwe.org/

References

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