Psychophysical parallelism
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Psychophysical parallelism (or parallelism) is the philosophical theory that mental and bodily events occur together, without any causal interaction between them. As such, it affirms the correlation of mental and bodily events, but denies any causal relationship.[1] On this view, mental and bodily phenomena are independent but inseparable, like two sides of a coin. The theory is a third possible alternative of relation between mind and body, between interaction (e.g., dualism) and one-sided action (e.g., materialism, epiphenomenalism).[2]
Malebranche
A prominent version of parallelism is called occasionalism. Defended by Nicolas Malebranche, occasionalism agrees that the mind and body are separated but does not agree with Descartes’s explanation of how the two interact. For Malebranche, God intercedes if there was a need for the mind and body to interact. For example, if the body is injured, God is aware of the injury and makes the mind, or the person (subject of experience), feel pain.[3] Likewise, if a person wants to move their hand, i.e. to grasp an object with their fingers, that want is made aware to God and then God makes the person’s hand move. In reality, the mind and body are not actually in contact with each other, it just seems that way because God is intervening. Occasionalism can be viewed as parallelism with divine intervention so to speak, because if God did not mediate between the mind and body, there would be no interaction between the two.
Spinoza
According to Baruch Spinoza, as explicated in his Ethics, the two attributes of God of which we have cognizance, namely thought and extension, are not causally related. Rather, they are two different ways of comprehending one and the same reality. Thus, the human body has a corresponding idea, which is the human mind or soul. Whatever happens in the body always occurs in tandem with contents of the mind. Since everything that exists is a modus of God, Spinoza's concept represents a monist account of parallelism, contrary to Leibniz's pluralist version.
Leibniz
German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz concluded that the world was made up of an infinite number of life units called monads (from the Greek monas, meaning “single”). Similar to living atoms, monads are all active and functioning. As there is naturally a hierarchy in nature, monads vary in degrees of intelligence.[4] Some are more specialized and are more capable of having clearer and more distinctive thoughts opposed to monads that are simpler in structure. Next to God, humans possess the monads that are able to exhibit the highest level of comprehensive thinking. However, humans possess many types of monads, varying from very simple to very complex forms, which explains why the ideas we experience at times differ in clarity.[5] Monads according to Leibniz can never be influenced by anything outside of themselves. Therefore, the only way that they can change is by internal development, or more specifically, by actualizing their potential. He believed monads never influence each other; it just seems like they do. Whenever we perceive a monad to be the cause of something, other monads are created in such a way as to seem like they are affecting the other. According to Leibniz, the entire universe was created by God to be in a preestablished harmony, so nothing in the universe actually influences anything else.[6] Looking at psychophysical parallelism in that way, you could imagine the mind and body as two identical clocks. The clocks will always be in agreement because of the preexisting harmony between them, but will never interact. And like the two clocks, no interaction or causation among the monads that make up the mind and body is necessary because they are already synchronized.
See also
References
- ^ Walker, Leslie Joseph (1911). . In Herbermann, Charles (ed.). Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 20 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 762.
- ^ Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Print. p. 185.
- ^ Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Print. p. 187.
- ^ Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Print. p. 187.
- ^ Hergenhahn, B. R. An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Australia: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Print. p. 188.