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Unrecognized state

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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Wissahickon Creek (talk | contribs) at 15:00, 2 November 2006 (moved Unrecognized state to Unrecognized region). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Unrecognized countries are related to:

  • regions accompanied by a number of ethnic conflicts, civil wars etc often created by "big brother" countries
  • Group capabilities include all resources and abilities of a group in a medium or long-term perspective to assert themselves against other groups. This includes first of all material resources such as arms, but also political cohesion or social capital for that matter. In a setting with almost equal capabilities of the two sides its might be more favourable to sustain or ′freeze′ the conflict than to come to a solution. If the incentive structure would make key players on both sides worse off with a peaceful resolution those players might even collude in preventing the implementation of popular demands for an end of hostilities. External players, such as Russia are a decisive intervening variable in sustaining or changing this incentive structure.
  • civil society - where is it? :)
  • Example: Transnistria Because formally, in the self-proclaimed “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” there are certain signs of the existence of “third sector” structures and groupings, usually perceived as the evidence of emerging or developing civil society in post-totalitarian transition countries. Indeed, about 600 local public organisations got official registration by spring-2005. This statistics, together with the assertions like “here in Transnistria… we have a multiparty political system functioning from the very beginning, private media independent from the state, freely operating oppositional social and political structures…” (Dmitri Soin, head of a department in the “Ministry of State Security of the TMR” and director of the Transnistrian subsidiary of the Russian Institute for National Strategy, 21 April 2005) aim at creating an image of a “modern, democratic, European state” – meaning exactly the region almost unanimously characterised as a “black hole of Europe”. Therefore, if anybody outside the TMR can hardly be deceived by this brightly coloured façade, does it mean that such cohesive and consistent propaganda, lasting for over 13 years, is actually quite harmless and may evoke only smiles and/or mockeries, being not worth of closer attention or serious analysis? The answer would be negative, because in such a way, the state of minds of a significant proportion of local population – which exactly is impossible to assess due to the lack (and impossibility) of any reliable sociological data – is being shaped within this closed society, isolated from the rest of not only Moldova but actually from the real world.
  • As a result of this experiment, the population of Transnistria passed from one totalitarian regime to another – separatist and repressive one – with a traumatic imprint of short but violent bloody conflict in between. And even the emerging opposition to the repressive “regime of Smirnov” (regularly re-elected “president of the PMR”) differs significantly from democratic opposition in post-totalitarian transition countries: it often exhibits not so much aspirations for modern European-style democracy as nostalgia for Soviet times, adhering at the same time to the notion of Transnistrian “statehood”.
  • Internet - Concerning younger generations, another trends could have been expected. Being more active, mobile, and often better educated, having access to Internet and other sources of diversified information, it would be only natural for them not to accept the gloomy realities of everyday life in their unrecognized region, seeking instead some better destiny.
  • Stereotypes - As a result of a regular brainwashing, for many in Transnistria old myths and stereotypes pertaining to the Cold War epoch persist alive and topical. Therefore, it is easy to convince local population that, for instance, “if Russian peacekeepers would leave the area, tomorrow NATO tanks will be here”. And to present these imagined ”threats” in a most convincing way, further “strategies” have been developed and disseminated by Transnistrian media.
  • The main conclusions and recommendations to be drawn from the available up to now information on civil society in unrecognized regions are as follows:
- Currently, it is barely possible to speak about civil society in unrecognized regions in terms of generally used and widely shared perceptions and criteria. It is very difficult even to assess the real situation because of the unwillingness of local authorities and, in many cases, representatives of “Third Sector” to provide any kind of impartial and reliable information. The most visible “NGOs” and other agencies usually represent here the structures not arising from a “grass root level” but artificially established “from above”.
-Their activities are subject to strict control on the part of authorities, with leading role of security bodies, and often follow instructions and command of the latter.
  • “frozen conflicts” ...
  • negative symptoms such as considerable wear and tear and lack of means for modernization, stagnation of the basis – agriculture, decreasing population’ incomes, de-population, especially in rural areas, due to migration, deficit of qualified personnel.
  • secessionist conflicts involving non-recognized de facto states or federated states.