Jump to content

User:Seraphim System/draft2

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
< User:Seraphim System
This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Seraphim System (talk | contribs) at 11:50, 25 June 2018 (drafting). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Anti-colonialism

Part of a series on
Islamism
Fundamentals
Ideologies
Concepts
Influences
Movements
Scholastic

Political

Militant

Key texts
Heads of state
Key ideologues
Criticism
Related topics

Islam portal

icon Politics portal
The Fulani jihad states of West Africa, c. 1830

In the years leading to World War I, as Ottoman and Mughal power waned, the teachings of Abd al-Aziz — a Naqshbandi scholar in India — influenced the groups involved in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 against British rule in India.[1][2] Britain's suppression of the uprising was brutal leading to Sayyid Ahmed Khan's late 19th century argument that violent jihad was only required when Muslims were in a strong position. Other influential writers of this period include Syeed Ameer Ali, whose Spirit of Islam (1891) is a well known apologetic text,[3] and Mawdudi, who argued that Muslims were obliged to fight for a political order governed by Islam.[1].

Similar writings were published in other regions, particularly in Egypt where Mahmud Shaltut published a treaty on the Quran's "figting verses", an apologetic account of jihad that presented an account of Muslim expansion as a pursuit of humanitarian ideals—specifically he sought to shift the emphasis from early tensions between Mohammed's followers and the Quarashi to develop a theory of defensive warfare consistent with newly developing principles of international law. On the other hand, Hasan-al Banna, showed thinking more in line with Mawdudi's writings. Al-Banna—who went on to found the Muslim Brotherhood—argued that the purpose of jihad was to establish an Islamic government.[1].

When the Italo-Turkish War broke out in 1912 the Senussis, who had some measure of independence in the Ottoman-ruled Libyan Desert, sided with the Ottomans. During the First World War, in August 1914, most of the area was under French and Italian rule and Sultan Mehmed V declared jihad in October 1914.[4]

Wahhabism

Wahhabism is a sect of Islam that has been influential in the development of modern jihadist ideology. As early as 1830, the Muslim population of Algeria resisted French colonialism, but some of these regions, particularly Arabia and West Africa experienced not only jihad against foreign occupiers, but "purification jihads" as well. This latter form of jihad influenced the development of jihadist ideology through the 20th century which often invoked the theme of a "purer" form of Islam.[5]

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabi Islam, taught that the Sufi and Shi'a branches of Islam were heretical. Some scholars believe Wahhabism is unique and its doctrine of takfir, or the denouncing of other Muslims as infidels, marks a significant divergence from earlier Islamic tradition. In 1746, Ibn Saud declared a jihad against all other Muslims; they destroyed Karbala in 1802, and during the intermittant occupations of Mecca and Medina between 1803 and 1813, they demolished most of the shrines of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, including the monument at the tomb of Zayd ibn al-Khattab.[6] The destruction of the tomb is a symbolic representation of Wahhabi intolerence for any practices they consider to be incompatible with what they call tawhid — or the "oneness" of God — in this case, even the tombs of heroic figures from Islam's early history were a threat to the faithful because they could serve as objects of veneration.[7]

Ibn Taymiyya (b. 1262 - d. 1328) is the medieval Islamic thinker who scholars believe had the most significant influence on 20th century jihadist ideology but not all scholars agree about the extent of his influence on Ibn Abd-Wahhab.[7] In contrast to Taymiyya, Ibn Abd-Wahhab wrote in the Kitab al-Tawhid that jihad was only justified in cases where an enemy was both an aggressor and refused to accept Islam—Taymiyya deviates from classical conceptions of jihad by permitting "offensive jihad", not only against unbelievers, but also against Muslims deemed to be heretical within the dar al-Islam. Scholars disagree about whether Ibn Abd-Wahhab intended to justify the killing persons who deviated from the "correct" beliefs and practices; even the cases where destruction of property was justified, as in the case of tomb destruction, were limited.[7]

Muslim Brotherhood

Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, a secular Kemalist republic was established in Turkey and the Caliphate was formally abolished in 1924. The end of the Caliphate heralded a great debate in Egypt that influenced the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna.[8] For a time, during the early years of the French and British mandates, the goals of the Pan-Arabist and Pan-Islamist movements were aligned: unification of the Arab world, and fighting the forces of colonialism and sectarianism.[9] However, in later years, the Muslim Brotherhood supported pan-Islamism in opposition to Arab nationalism.[8] In 1954, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Egypt's nationalist president Gamal Abdel Nasser, leading to a government crackdown against the organization.[10]

Sayyid Qutb, who was born in Asyut in 1906, joined the Brotherhood in 1951. Qutb is one in a line of thinkers including al-Banna and Mawdudi

In the tract On Jihad, founder al-Banna warned readers against "the widespread belief among many Muslims" that struggles of the heart were more demanding than struggles with a sword, and called on Egyptians to prepare for jihad against the British,[11] (making him the first influential scholar since the 1857 India uprising to call for jihad of the sword).[12] The Brotherood also called for jihad against the new Jewish state of Israel in the 1940s.[13]

Global jihad

Emerging in the second half of the 20th century, Islamic revivalism is a polycentric transnational ideology with two potential centers, one in Saudi Arabia and the other in Egypt.[9] The ideological development of Islamic revival was influenced by fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, subsequent colonial rule, and the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.[10] Some scholars have written that Pan-Arabist national unity was overtaken by sectarianism in the wake of the Arabs' defeat in 1967 Arab-Israeli War, marking the end of post-colonial secular Arabism. The Islamic Revival ideology that emerged from this was a consequence of the failures of secular nationalist regimes.[14]

The fall of Shah Pahlavi in Iran, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and the Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia are among the events that have been formative in the 20th century understanding of "radical Islam".[9] Between the 1970s and mid-1990s jihadist thought was dominated by themes of replacing secular "apostate" rulers with Islamist governments. [15] Radical Islamist groups like Egyptian Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya splintered from the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood.[14] and many Islamist groups appeared, being strongly influenced by the social frustrations following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s.[16]

The summer before the October War (Yom Kippur War) broke out in 1973, Islamic Associations called Gamaat Islamiya summer camps were organized to initiate members into a "pure Islamic life" — these groups eventually came to dominate Islamist discourse in Arab universities.[17] Under the leadership of Shukri Mustafa, the radical group Takfir wal-Hijra popularized the term takfiri meaning "one who excommunicates other Muslims". Shukri pushed an extreme interpretation of Sayyid Qutb's theory of jahiliyyah under which his followers were the only true Muslims. He considered any Muslims outside his organization kafir unbelievers and pronounced takfir on them. Shukri was executed in 1977 after the group kidnapped and executed the Al-Azhar scholar Husayn al-Dhahabi. On month after the trial, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat travelled to Jerusalem to make peace with Israel.[17]

Development of jihadist ideology
Years Leader Primary ideology Secondary ideology
1930s to 1940s Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) Islamization of political and social institutions Jihad as a struggle for national independence
1950s Sayyid Qutb, early ideology Islamic social justice Islamization of laws
1950s Abd al-Qadir Awda (d. 1954)
1950s Qutb, later ideology Post-Nasserism, underground education Hakimiyya vs. jahiliyya
1970s - 1980s Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj and the "Qutbists" Jihad against Sadat, apostate rulers/repressive regimes Establishing an Islamic state
Source: Shamir, Shimon (1995). Egypt from Monarchy to Republic: A Reassessment of Revolution and Change. Westview Press. p. 190. ISBN 978-0-8133-8658-4.

After 1977, the Egyptian Islamist movement was driven underground and coalesced under the leadership of Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, author of Al Farida al Ghaiba (Jihad, the Neglected Duty). Faraj quotes extensively from Ibn Taymiyya to argue that he should replace Sadat. He calls Sadat an "apostate of Islam fed at the tables of imperialism and Zionism" and declares jihad against him. Sadat was assassinated in 1981 not long after assassinated soon after Al Farida al Ghaiba was written.<name=kepel />[18] The text

Some members of the radical movement disagreed over whether the jihadist movement should target Israel or Sadat's regime.

Also influential was Egyptian While Qutb felt that jihad was a proclamation of "liberation for humanity", Faraj stressed that jihad would enable Muslims to rule the world and to reestablish the caliphate.[19] He emphasized the importance of fighting the "near enemy"—Muslim rulers he believed to be apostates, such as the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, whom his group assassinated—rather than the traditional enemy, Israel. Faraj believed that if Muslims followed their duty and waged jihad, ultimately supernatural divine intervention would provide the victory. Faraj included deceiving the enemy, lying to him, attacking by night (even if it leads to accidentally killing innocents), and felling and burning trees of the infidel, as Islamically legitimate methods of fighting.[20][21] Faraj was executed in 1982 for his part in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat.


Ayman Zawahiri, the founder of Egyptian Jihad, argued that the rule of Shari'a can only be restored to the Muslim world through violence.[14]

According to Rudolph Peters and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the new "fundamentalist" movement brought a reinterpretation of Islam and their own writings on jihad. These writings tended to be less interested and involved with legal arguments, what the different of schools of Islamic law had to say, or in solutions for all potential situations. "They emphasize more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, than the detailed elaboration of those rules." They also tended to ignore the distinction between Greater and Lesser jihad because it distracted Muslims "from the development of the combative spirit they believe is required to rid the Islamic world of Western influences".[22][23]

20th century

Sayyid Qutb, Islamist author


Qutb

The highly influential Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sayyid Qutb, preached in his book Milestones that jihad, `is not a temporary phase but a permanent war ... Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto.`[24][25] Like Ibn Taymiyya, Qutb focused on martyrdom and jihad, but he added the theme of the treachery and enmity towards Islam of Christians and especially Jews. If non-Muslims were waging a "war against Islam", jihad against them was not offensive but defensive. He also insisted that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because (he alleged) gave their priests or rabbis "authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God" and "obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship".[26][27]

Azzam

In the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood cleric Abdullah Azzam, argued for a broader interpretation of who it was permissible to kill in jihad, an interpretation that some think may have influenced some of his students, including Osama bin Laden.[28] A charismatic speaker, Azzam traveled to dozens of cities in Europe and North American to encourage support for jihad in Afghanistan. He inspired young Muslims with stories of miraculous deeds during jihad—mujahideen who defeated vast columns of Soviet troops virtually single-handed, who had been run over by tanks but survived, who were shot but unscathed by bullets. Angels were witnessed riding into battle on horseback, and falling bombs were intercepted by birds, which raced ahead of the jets to form a protective canopy over the warriors.[29]

In Afghanistan, Azzam set up a "services office" for foreign fighters and with support from his former student Osama bin Laden and Saudi charities, foreign mujahideed or would-be mujahideen were provided for. Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future fighters.[30] Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad—$600 million a year by 1982.[31] CIA also funded Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat[32] and others via Operation Cyclone. Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of a jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine.[33] The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world.[30] Azzam was assissinated in November 1989.

Having tasted victory in Afghanistan, many of the thousands of fighters returned to their home country such as Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir or to places like Bosnia to continue jihad. Not all the former fighters agreed with Azzam's chioice of targets but former Afghan fighters led or participated in serious insurgencies in Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Somalia in the 1990s and later creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[34]


Martyrdom

Historically, even in early calls for violent jihad, the concept of martyrdom has not included suicide. In 1988, Fathi Shiqaqi the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad said "martyrdom acts" against non-believers was justified in Islam. This is the version of jihad that Al Qaeda relied on when creating its network.Cite error: A <ref> tag is missing the closing </ref> (see the help page).[35][36]

In February 1998, Osama bin Laden put a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" in the Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.[37]

In 2012, Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badie also declared jihad "to save Jerusalem from the usurpers and to [liberate] Palestine from the claws of occupation ... " [38][39]

  1. ^ a b c John Kelsay (2015). "Jihad". Islamic Political Thought: An Introduction. Princeton University Press. JSTOR j.ctt1287ksk.8.
  2. ^ Allen, Charles (2009-03-05). "1. Death of a Commissioner". God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad. Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-7867-3300-2.
  3. ^ Ali, Syed Ameer (1891). The Life and Teachings of Mohammed: Or, The Spirit of Islam. W. H. Allen.
  4. ^ Tucker, Spencer C. (2013-10-29). "Senussi and Sultan of Darfur Rebellions". Encyclopedia of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A New Era of Modern Warfare: A New Era of Modern Warfare. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-61069-280-9.
  5. ^ David Cook (2015). "4. Jihad During the Nineteenth Century: Renewal and Resistance". Understanding Jihad. University of California Press. JSTOR 10.1525/j.ctv1xxt55.9.
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference Cook04 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ a b c DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2007). "1. Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Origins of Wahhabism: The Eighteenth Century Context". Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-322-3.
  8. ^ a b al-Anani, Khalil; ʻAnānī, Khalīl (2016). Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-027973-8.
  9. ^ a b c Sharma, J. P. (1987). "Islamic Revivalism and Egypt (1920-1970)". Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 4: 667–674. JSTOR 44141777.
  10. ^ a b Springer, Devin R. (2009-01-06). "1. Philosophical Foundations". Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Georgetown University Press. ISBN 978-1-58901-578-4.
  11. ^ Al-Banna, Hasan, Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna, (1906–49): A Selection from the "Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna", Translated by Charles Wendell. Berkeley, CA, 1978, pp. 150, 155;
  12. ^ Kadri, Sadakat (2012). Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ... macmillan. p. 158. ISBN 9780099523277. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
  13. ^ Al-Khatib, Ibrahim (2012). The Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine: Letters To Jerusalem. scribedigital.com. Retrieved 7 September 2014. The Muslim Brothers believed a well-planned Jihad to be the only means to liberate Palestine. Its press confirmed that Jihad became an individual obligation upon every Muslim ... [who would] gain one of the two desirable goals (i.e. gaining victory or dying martyrs). The jurists of the Group issued a fatwa during the 1948 War that Muslims had to postpone pilgrimage and offer their money for Jihad (in Palestine) instead.
  14. ^ a b c Abu-Rabi‘, Ibrahim M. (2015-11-30). Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-1-84964-219-4. JSTOR 10.2307/j.ctt18dzs82. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
  15. ^ Yates, Joshua J. (2007). "The Resurgence of Jihad & The Specter of Religious Populism". SAIS Review. 27 (1): 127–144. doi:10.1353/sais.2007.0022. ISSN 1088-3142. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
  16. ^ Van Slooten, Pippi. “Dispelling Myths about Islam and Jihad”, Peace Review, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2005, pp. 289–90.
  17. ^ a b Kepel, Gilles (2006). "4. Islamism in Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan". Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-257-8.
  18. ^ Sohail H. Hashmi (2012). "Enemies Near and Far: The United States and Its Muslim Allies in Radical Islamist Discourse". From Jeremiad to Jihad: Religion, Violence, and America. University of California Press. JSTOR 10.1525/j.ctt1pn5n4.19.
  19. ^ Cook, David, Understanding Jihad by David Cook, University of California Press, 2005 (p. 107)
  20. ^ Farag, al-Farida al-gha'iba, (Amman, n.d.), pp. 28, 26; trans. Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty, (New York, 1986)
  21. ^ Cook, David, Understanding Jihad by David Cook, University of California Press, 2005 pp. 190, 192
  22. ^ DeLong-Bas, Natana J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (First ed.). Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 240–41. ISBN 0-19-516991-3.
  23. ^ Peters, Rudolph (1996). Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton: Marcus Wiener. p. 127.
  24. ^ Qutb, Milestones, 1988, 125-26
  25. ^ DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 2004: 264
  26. ^ Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones (PDF). pp. 82, 60.
  27. ^ Symon, Fiona (16 October 2001). "Analysis: The roots of jihad". BBC. Retrieved 7 September 2014. For Qutb, all non-Muslims were infidels—even the so-called "people of the book", the Christians and Jews—and he predicted an eventual clash of civilisations between Islam and the west.
  28. ^ Cite error: The named reference Gold-99 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  29. ^ "Miracles of jihad in Afghanistan – Abdullah Azzam"| archive.org| Edited by A.B. al-Mehri| AL AKTABAH BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS| Birmingham, England
  30. ^ a b Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. p. 174.
  31. ^ Kepel, Gilles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam by Gilles Kepel, p.143
  32. ^ Katz, Samuel M. "Relentless Pursuit: The DSS and the manhunt for the al-Qaeda terrorists", 2002
  33. ^ Wright, Lawrence, Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, by Lawrence Wright, New York, Knopf, 2006, p. 130
  34. ^ Commins, David (2009). The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. I.B.Tauris. pp. 156–57.
  35. ^ But according to Judith Miller, the MB changed its mind with the intifada. Miller, Judith. God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle East. Simon & Schuster. p. 387. Sheikh Yasin had initially argued in typical Muslim Brotherhood tradition that violent jihad against Israel would be counterproductive until Islamic regimes had been established throughout the Muslim realm. But the outbreak of the Intifada changed his mind: Islamic reconquest would have to start rather than end with jihad in Palestine. So stated the Hamas covenant.
  36. ^ "Hamas Covenant 1988". Yale Law School Avalon Project. Retrieved 7 September 2014. [part of Article 13 of the Covenant] There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.
  37. ^ Lewis, Bernard (November–December 1998). "License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad". Foreign Affairs.
  38. ^ "MB Calls For Jihad To Liberate Palestine (excerpts from sermons by Muhammad Badi')". memri.org/report/en/print6535.htm. memri.org. 23 July 2012. Retrieved 7 September 2014.
  39. ^ http://www.ikhwanonline.com, 5 July 2012.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Seraphim_System/draft2&oldid=847443304"