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Pure Inductive Logic
Pure inductive logic (PIL) is the area of mathematics concerned with the theoretical and mathematical foundations of inductive logic [1].
It combines classical predicate logic and probability theory. Probability values are assigned to sentences of a first order relational language to represent degrees of belief that should be held by a rational agent. Conditional probability values represent degrees of belief on the basis of some evidence.
PIL studies prior probability functions on the set of sentences and evaluaes rationality of such prior probability functions
via proposing principles that such functions should satisfy. Each of the principles guarantees that, in some respect, the function assigns probability values to sentences rationally and that also the derived assignments of conditional probability values given some evidence are rational.
History
Inductive logic started to take a clearer shape in the early 20th century in the work of William Ernest Johnson and John Maynard Keynes , and was further developed by Rudolf Carnap. Carnap introduced the distinction between pure and applied inductive logic,[1], and the modern Pure Inductive Logic [2] evolves within the pure, uninterpreted approach envisaged by Carnap.
Framework
Pure Inductive Logic uses first order predicate logic without equality, with the usual connectives
(and, or, not and implies respectively), quantifiers
,
finitely many predicate (relation) symbols
and countably many constant symbols
There are no function symbols. The predicate symbols can be unary, binary or of higher arities. The finite set of predicate symbols may vary whist the rest of the language is fixed. It is a convention to refer to the language as
and write
where the
list the predicate symbols.
The set of all sentences is denoted
. If a sentence is written with constants appearing in it listed then it is assumed that the list includes all those that appear.
is the set of structures for
with universe
and with each constant symbol
interpreted as itself.
A probability function for sentences of
is a function
with domain
and values in the real interval
satisfying Kolmogorov's axioms and Gaifman's condition on quantified sentences which postulates that the constant symbols name all individuals. That is:
- any logically valid sentence
has probability 1:
- if sentences
and
are mutually exclusive then
- for a formula
with one free variable the probability of
is the limit of probabilities of
as
tends to
.
For
and a sentence
with
, the conditional probability function is defined by

Unlike belief functions in many valued logics [2], it is not the case that the probability value of a compound sentence is determined by the probability values of its components. Probability respects the classical semantics: logically equivalent sentences must be given the same probability value. Hence logically equivalent sentences are often identified.
A state description for a finite set of constants is a conjunction of predicates (or their negations) instantiated exclusively by these constants, and such that for any such eligible atomic sentence either it or its negation appear in the conjunction.
Any probability function is uniquely determined by its values on state descriptions. To define a probability functions, it suffices to specify nonnegative values of all state descriptions for
(for all
) so that the values of all state descriptions for
extending a given state description for
sum to the value of the state description they all extend, with the convention that the (only) state description for no constants is a tautology and that has value 1.
If
is a state description for a set of constants including
then it is said that
are indiscernible in
,
, just when upon adding equality to the language (and axioms of equality to the logic), the sentence
would be consistent.
In unary PIL, all the predicates
are unary. Formulae of the form

where
stands for one of
,
, are called atoms. It is assumed that they are listed in some fixed order as
. A state description specifies an atom for each constant involved in it, and it can be written as a conjunction of these atoms instantiated by the corresponding constants. Two constants are indiscernible in the state description if it specifies the same atom for them.
Central question
Assume a rational agent inhabits a structure for the language
but knows nothing about which one it is. What probability function
should he adopt when
is to represent his degree of belief that a sentence
is true in this ambient structure?
Rational Principles
The following principles have been proposed as desirable properties of a rational prior probability function
for
.
The Constant Exchangeability Principle, Ex. The probability of a sentence
does not change when the
in it are replaced by any other
-tuple of (distinct) constants.
The Principle of Predicate Exchangeability, Px.
If
are predicates of the same arity then
for a sentence
,

where
is the result of simultaneously replacing
by
and
by
throughout
.
The Strong Negation Principle, SN.
For a predicate
and sentence
,

where
is the result of simultaneously replacing
by
and
by
throughout
.
The Principle of Regularity, Reg.
If a quantifier-free sentence
is satisfiable then
.
The Principle of Super Regularity (Universal Certainty), SReg.
If a senctence
is satisfiable then
.
The Constant Irrelevance Principle, IP.
If sentences
have no constants in common then
.
The Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP.
If sentences
have no constant nor predicates in common then
.
Language Invariance Principle, Li.
There is a family of probability functions
, one on each
language
, all satisfying Px and Ex, and such that
and
if all predicates of
belong also to
then
and
agree on sentences of
.
The (Strong) Counterpart Principle, CP. If
are sentences such that
is the result of replacing some constant/relation symbols in
by new
constant/relation symbols of the same arity not occurring in
then

(SCP) If moreover
is the result of replacing the same and possibly also other constant/relation symbols in
by new
constant/relation symbols of the same arity not occurring in
then

The Invariance Principle, INV. If
is an isomorphism of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of
supported by some permutation
of
in the sense that for sentences
,
just when 
then
.
The Permutation Invariance Principle, PIP. As INV except that
is additionally required to map (equivalence classes of) state descriptions to the same.
The Spectrum Exchangeability Principle, Sx. The probability
of a state description
depends only on the spectrum of
, that is, on the multiset of sizes of equivalence classes with respect to the equivalence
.
Li with Sx. As the Language Invariance Principle but all the probability functions in the family also satisfy Spectrum Exchangeability.
The Principle of Induction, PI.
Let
be a state description and
a constant not appearing in
. Let
,
be state descriptions extending
to include
. If
is
-equivalent to some and at least as many constants as it is
-equivalent to then
.
Further Rational Principles for Unary PIL
The Principle of Instantial Relevance, PIR. For a sentence
, atom
and constants
not appearing in
,
.
The Generalized Principle of Instantial Relevance, GPIR.
For quantifier-free sentences
with constants
not appearing in
, if
then

Johnson Sufficientness Principle, JSP. For atoms
, the probability :
depends only on
and on the number of times
appears amongst the
.
The Principle of Atom Exchangeability, Ax. If
is a permutation of
and
is a state description expressed as a conjunction of instantiated atoms then
where
obtains from
upon replacing each
by
.
Reichenbach's Axiom, RA. Let
for
be an infinite sequence of
atoms and
an atom. Then as
tends to
, the difference between the conditional probability

and the proportion of occurrences of
amongst the
tends to 0.
Unary Language Invariance Principle, ULi. As Li, but with languages restricted to the unary ones.
ULi with Ax. As ULi but all the probability functions in the family also satisfy Atom Exchangeability.
Recovery Whenever
is a state description then there is another state description
such that
and for any quantifier free
sentence
,

Relationships between Principles
LI implies Ex and Px (by definition).
LI implies CP and SCP.
Li with Sx implies PI.
INV implies PIP and Ex.
PIP+Ex implies Sx.
In the unary case, Ex implies PIR
In the unary case, Ax is equivalent to PIP.
In the unary case, Ax+Ex is equivalent to Sx.
Important Probability Functions
Functions
. For a given structure
for
and
,

Functions
.
For a given state description
,
is defined via specifying its values for state descriptions as follows.
is the probability that when
are randomly picked from
, with replacement and
according to the uniform distribution, then
Functions
. As above but employing a non-standard universe (starting with possibly non-standard state descriptions
and infinitely large
) to obtain the standard
.
The
are the only probability functions that satisfy Ex and IP.
Functions
. For a given infinite sequence
of non-negative reals such that
and
,
is defined via specifying its values for state descriptions as follows.
For a sequence
of natural numbers (possibly 0)
and a state description
,
is consistent with
if whenever
then
.
is the number of state descriptions for
consistent with
.
is the sum over those
with which
is compatible, of

The
are the only probability functions that satisfy Li with Sx and WIP. (The language invariant family witnessing Li with Sx consists of the functions
with fixed
, where
is as
but defined with language
.)
Further, Unary Probability Functions
Functions 
. For a vector
of non-negative real numbers summing to one, 
is defined via specifying its values for state descriptions as follows:



The 
are the only probability functions that satisfy Ex and IP (they are also expressible as
).
Carnap Continuum functions
. For
, the probability function
is uniquely determined by the values

where
the is number of times
occurs amongst the
. Furthermore,
is the probability function that assigns
to every state description for
constants and
is the probability function that assigns
to any state description in which all constants are indiscernible, 0 to any other state description.
The
are the only probability functions that satisfy Ex and JSP.
Functions
.
For
,
is the average of the
functions 
where
has all but one coordinate equal to each other with the odd coordinate differing from them by
, so



where
, (
in </math>i</math>th place) and
.
For
, the
are equal to
for

The
are the only functions that satisfy GPIR, Ex, Ax and Reg.
The
with
are the only functions that satisfy Recovery, Reg and Uli with Ax.
Representation Theorems
A representation theorem for a class of probability functions provides means of expressing every probability function in the class
in terms of generic, relatively simple probability functions from the same class.
Represetation theorem for all probability functions. Every probability function
for
can be represented as

where
is a
-additive measure on the
-algebra of subsets of
generated by the sets
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Representation theorem for Ex (employing non-standard analysis and Loeb Integration Theory). Every probability function
for
satisfying Ex can be represented as

where
is an internal set of state descriptions and
is a
-additive measure on a
-algebra of subsets of
.
Representation theorem for Sx. Every probability function
for
satisfying Sx can be represented as

where
is the set of sequences

of non-negative reals summing to 1 and such that
, and
is a
-additive measure on the Borel subsets of
in the product topology..
de Finetti Representation Theorem (unary). In the unary case (where
is a language containing
unary predicates), the representation theorem for Ex is equivalent to:

Every probability function
for
satisfying Ex can be represented as

where
is the set of vectors
of non-negative real numbers summing to one and
is a
-additive measure on
.
References
- ^ Rudolf Carnap (1980). A Basic System of Inductive Logic, in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume 1, pp 69f.
- ^ Jeff Paris, Alena Vencovská (2015). Pure Inductive Logic, Cambridge University Press.