First-player and second-player win

Diagram showing optimal strategy for tic-tac-toe. With perfect play, and from any initial move, both players can always force a draw.

In game theory, a two-player deterministic perfect information turn-based game is a first-player-win if with perfect play the first player to move can always force a win. Similarly, a game is second-player-win if with perfect play the second player to move can always force a win. With perfect play, if neither side can force a win, the game is a draw.

Some games with relatively small game trees have been proven to be first or second-player wins. For example, the game of nim with the classic 3–4–5 starting position is a first-player-win game. However, Nim with the 1-3-5-7 starting position is a second-player-win. The classic game of Connect Four has been mathematically proven to be first-player-win.

With perfect play, checkers has been determined to be a draw; that is neither player can force a win.^[1] Another example of a game which leads to a draw with perfect play is tic-tac-toe, and this includes play from any opening move.

Significant theory has been completed in the effort to solve chess. It has been speculated that there may be first-move advantage which can be detected when the game is played imperfectly (such as with all humans and current chess engines). However, with perfect play, it remains unsolved as to whether the game is a first-player win (White), a second player win (Black), or a forced draw.^[2]^[3]

References

^ "Checkers Is Solved". Science. 317: 1518–1522. doi:10.1126/science.1144079. Retrieved 2008-11-24.
^ J.W.H.M. Uiterwijk, H.J. van den Herik. "The Advantage of the Initiative". (August 1999).
^ Shannon, C. (March 1950). "Programming a Computer for Playing Chess". Philosophical Magazine. 7. 41 (314). Archived from the original (pdf) on 2010-03-15. Retrieved 2008-06-27.

v t e Topics of game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Perfect recall Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game Mechanism design
Equilibrium concepts	Bayes correlated equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand equilibrium
Strategies	Appeasement Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Cheap talk De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Pairing strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Auction Bargaining problem Differential game Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers All-pay auction Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Electronic mail game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Bertrand competition Cournot competition Stackelberg competition Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem Pursuit game
Theorems	Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem One-shot deviation principle Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Search optimizations	Alpha–beta pruning Aspiration window Principal variation search max^n algorithm Paranoid algorithm Lazy SMP
Miscellaneous	Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons

This applied mathematics–related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.

See also

References