Nonexistent objects

The "Round square copula" is a common example of the Dual Copula Strategy used in reference to the problem of nonexistent objects as well as their relation to problems in modern Philosophy of language. The issue arose, most notably, between the theories of Alexius Meinong, Betrand Russell - Gilbert Ryle playing a minor part as well in the eventual dismissal of Meinong's object theory (see Meinong's 1904 book, Theory of Objects).

How it works

The example is meant to demonstrate what is at stake when debating nonexistence in the philosophy of language. It is just one of many examples of the Dual Copula Strategy, used to make a distinction between relations of properties and individuals, it entails creating a sentence that isn't supposed to make sense by forcing the term "is" into ambiguous meaning. The Dual Copula Strategy itself is just one of three strategies for avoiding the paradoxes that Meinong's theory is open to. See the "other worlds strategy" and the "nuclear-extranuclear strategy".

According to the [Encyclopedia of Philosophy], by borrowing Edward Zalta's notational method (Fb stands for b exemplifies the property of being F; bF stands for b encodes the property of being F), and using a revised version of Meinongian object theory which makes use of a dual copula distinction (MOT^dc), we can say that the object called "the round square" encodes the property of being round, the property of being square, all properties implied by these, and no others. But it is true that there are also infinitely many properties being exemplified by an object called the round square (and, really, any object) - e.g. the property of not being a computer, and the property of not being a pyramid. Note that this strategy has forced "is" to abondon its predicative use, and now functions abstractly.

When one now analyzes the round square copula using the MOT^dc, one will find that it now avoids the three common paradoxes: (1) it violates the law of contradiction, (2) it claims the property of existence without actually existing, and (3) it produces counterintuitive consequences. Firstly, the MOT^dc shows that the round square does not exemplify the property of being round, but the property of being round and square. Thus, there is no subsequent contradiction. Secondly, it avoids the conflict of existence/non-existence by claiming non-physical existence: by the MOT^dc, it can only be said that the round square simply does not exemplify the property of occupying a region in space. Finally, the MOT^dc avoids counterintuitive consequences (like a 'thing' having the property of nonexistence) by stressing that the round square copula can be said merely to encode the property of being round and square, not actually exemplifying it. Thus, logically, it does not belong to any set or class.

In the end, what the MOT^dc really does is created a kind of object: a nonexistent object that is very different from the objects we might normally think of. Occasionally, references to this notion, while obscure, may be called "Meinongian objects."

Criticism

Making use of the notion of "non-physically existent" objects is highly controversial in philosophy, and created the buzz for many articles and books on the subject during the first half of the 20th century.

See also

• Philosophy of language
• Set theory
• Edward Zalta
• Logical paradoxes
• On Denoting
• Principle of intentionality
• Ontology
• Realism