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Airborne Launch Control System

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The Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) provides a survivable launch capability for the United States Air Force's LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. The ALCS is operated by airborne missileers from Air Force Global Strike Command's (AFGSC) 625th Strategic Operations Squadron (STOS) and United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The weapon system is located onboard the United States Navy's E-6B Mercury, which serves as USSTRATCOM's "Looking Glass" Airborne Command Post (ABNCP). The ALCS crew is integrated into the ABNCP battle staff and is on alert around-the-clock.[1]

Airborne Launch Control System patch

Inception

When the Minuteman ICBM was first placed on alert starting in 1962, the Soviet Union at the time had neither the number of weapons, accuracy, or significant nuclear yield to completely destroy the Minuteman ICBM force during an attack. However, Strategic Air Command planners knew that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets could have such capability. Early on, the Air Force experimented with using trains to make the Minuteman ICBMs mobile, and therefore more survivable. However, the Air Force ultimately decided to scrap the mobile Minuteman ICBM concept and emplace the Minuteman ICBM force in 1000 missile silos along with their 100 associated LCCs. Each facility was spread out several miles apart from each other so that the Soviets could not destroy multiple sites with just one nuclear warhead.[2]

However, starting in the mid-1960s, the Soviets began to catch up with the United States and now had the potential capability to target and successfully attack the Minuteman ICBM force with an increased number of ICBMs that had greater yields and accuracy than were previously available. Studying the problem even more, the Strategic Air Command realized that in order to prevent the United States from launching all 1000 Minuteman ICBMs, the Soviets did not have to target all 1000 Minuteman missile silos. The Soviets only needed to launch a disarming decapitation strike against the 100 Minuteman LCCs in order to prevent the launch of all Minuteman ICBMs since the missiles relied on their LCCs to receive launch commands. Even though the Minuteman ICBMs would have been left unscathed in their missile silos following an LCC decapitation strike, the Minuteman missiles would have been useless without their controlling LCCs. If the Soviets chose to launch a Minuteman LCC decapitation strike, they would have needed far less warheads to launch a successful attack than they would have needed if they had to strike every Minuteman ICBM silo. Theoretically, in order to have greater assurance of successful Minuteman LCC destruction, the Soviets could have targeted two or even three warheads per LCC in order to have greater damage expectancy. Even then, the Soviets would only have had to expend up to 300 warheads to disable the Minuteman ICBM force—far less than the total number of Minuteman ICBM silos. The Soviets could have then used the remaining warheads to strike other targets they chose.[3]

Faced with only a relatively few Minuteman LCC targets, the Soviets could have concluded that the odds of being successful in a Minuteman LCC decapitation strike were higher with less risk than it would have been having to face the almost insurmountable task of successfully attacking and destroying 1000 Minuteman ICBM silos and 100 Minuteman LCCs to ensure the Minuteman ICBM force was disabled. This theory motivated the Strategic Air Command to come up with a survivable means to launch the Minuteman ICBM force, even if all the ground Launch Control Centers were destroyed.[4]

History

Born out of an original concept to have an airborne launch capability from SAC’s Looking Glass aircraft to launch the Emergency Rocket Communication System (ERCS), the Strategic Air Command modified this plan to be able to launch the whole Minuteman ICBM force from the air as well. This is how the concept of ALCS was born. Placed on a modified EC-135 command post aircraft and thoroughly tested, the ALCS demonstrated its capability on 17 April 1967 by launching an ERCS configured Minuteman II out of Vandenberg AFB, CA. The fact that the first test launch using the ALCS was an ERCS missile shows the original roots of ALCS.[5]

After successful demonstration that the ALCS could launch a Minuteman ICBM from the air, ALCS achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 31 May 1967. From that point going forward, ALCS stood alert onboard modified EC-135 aircraft for several decades. Over the years, ALCS operations were adapted in order to ensure the most effective use of this survivable ICBM launch capability. With ALCS now standing alert around-the-clock, the Soviets could no longer believe they could successfully launch a Minuteman LCC decapitation strike. Even if the Soviets attempted to do so, EC-135s equipped with the ALCS could fly overhead and launch the remaining Minuteman ICBMs in retaliation.[6]

Now that ALCS was on alert, this complicated Soviet war planning by forcing the Soviets to not only target the 100 Minuteman LCCs, but also the 1000 Minuteman ICBM silos with more than one warhead in order to guarantee destruction. This would have required upwards of 3000 warheads to complete such an attack. The odds of being successful in such an attack on the Minuteman ICBM force would have been extremely low. What is more, the Soviets would have been faced with attacking the remainder of the United States’ nuclear triad, which would have made the odds even lower. Therefore, it was hoped that the Soviets would have been deterred from launching any attack in the first place. This was the mission of ALCS, along with the rest of the nuclear triad. This mission continues to this day.[7]

Strategic Air Command Era

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, ALCS crews belonged to the 44th Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Ellsworth AFB, SD and 91st SMW at Minot AFB, ND. ALCS equipment was installed on various EC-135 variants to include the EC-135A, EC-135C, EC-135G, and for a short while on the EC-135L.[8]

Starting in the mid-1970s, there were only two SAC squadrons that operated ALCS capable aircraft. This included the 2nd Airborne Command and Control Squadron (ACCS) operating EC-135C aircraft out of Offutt AFB, NE and the 4th ACCS operating EC-135A, EC-135C, and EC-135G aircraft out of Ellsworth AFB, SD. All three variants of these EC-135A/C/G aircraft had ALCS equipment installed onboard.[9]

The 4th ACCS was the workhorse of ALCS operations. Three dedicated Airborne Launch Control Centers (ALCC) were on ground alert around-the-clock providing ALCS coverage for five of the six Minuteman ICBM Wings. These dedicated ALCCs were mostly EC-135A aircraft but could also have been EC-135C or EC-135G aircraft depending on availability. ALCC No. 1 was on ground alert at Ellsworth AFB, SD and during a wartime scenario would have taken off and orbited between the Minuteman Wings at Ellsworth AFB, SD and F.E. Warren AFB, WY providing ALCS assistance if needed. ALCCs No. 2 and No. 3 were routinely on forward deployed ground alert at Minot AFB, ND. During a wartime scenario, ALCC No. 3 would have orbited between the Minuteman ICBM Wings at Minot AFB and Grand Forks AFB, both in North Dakota, providing ALCS assistance if needed. ALCC No. 2 was dedicated to orbiting near the Minuteman ICBM Wing at Malmstrom AFB, MT providing ALCS assistance if needed. The 4th ACCS also maintained an EC-135C or EC-135G on ground alert at Ellsworth AFB, SD as the West Auxiliary Airborne Command Post (WESTAUXCP) as a backup to SAC’s "Looking Glass" Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) as well as a radio relay link between the Looking Glass and ALCCs when airborne. Although equipped with ALCS, the WESTAUXCP did not have a dedicated Minuteman ICBM wing to provide ALCS assistance to.[10]

The 2nd ACCS was another major player in ALCS operations. The primary mission of the 2nd ACCS was to fly the SAC ABNCP "Looking Glass" aircraft in continuous airborne operations. However, due to its proximity in orbiting over the central United States, the airborne Looking Glass provided ALCS coverage for the Minuteman ICBM Wing located at Whiteman AFB, MO. Not only did Whiteman AFB have Minuteman II ICBMs, but it also had ERCS configured Minuteman missiles on alert. The 2nd ACCS also had an additional EC-135C on ground alert at Offutt AFB, NE as the EASTAUXCP, providing backup to the airborne Looking Glass, radio relay capability, and a means for the Commander in Chief of SAC to escape an enemy nuclear attack. Although the EASTAUXCP was ALCS capable, it did not have a dedicated ALCS mission.[11]

For a short time in the early 1980s, one E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) also had ALCS equipment installed onboard during a test proof-of-concept program. Originally, SAC planned for a whole fleet of E-4Bs to replace all of the existing EC-135 Looking Glass aircraft in a program known as the Advanced Airborne Command Post. During the test trial, an E-4B, with a full SAC battlestaff and ALCS crew onboard, periodically flew Looking Glass missions out of Offutt AFB, NE in order to ascertain the feasibility of replacing the EC-135 fleet. In the end however, too many resources were needed and it was deemed too expensive to have the E-4B replace the EC-135. The ALCS equipment was subsequently removed from the E-4B and it continued the NEACP mission while the various EC-135s continued to perform the ABNCP and ALCC missions.[12]

Needless to say, this was the heyday of ALCS operations. Around-the-clock, there were three dedicated ALCCs on ground alert, one ALCS capable Looking Glass SAC ABNCP airborne at all times, and at least two ALCS-capable Auxiliary ABNCPs on ground alert. Airborne missileers, along with all other Cold Warriors kept the peace for several decades.[13]

Post-Cold War Era

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War, several unfortunate events for ALCS unfolded. First, the 4th ACCS was deactivated along with the retirement of most of the EC-135 aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory. Looking Glass continuous airborne operations ceased, the Strategic Air Command was disbanded, and the 2nd ACCS was redesignated as the 7th ACCS. Even though times had changed and many were eager to cash in on the so-called “Peace Dividend” of the post-Cold War era, there were others that argued against these changes. In the end, it was impossible to stop the momentum of world events and all these changes. However, through all the turmoil, airborne missileers operating ALCS remained on alert and continued to remain vigilant, just like they always had. Although ALCS operations were no longer as wide spread as they once were with dedicated ALCCs on alert, ALCS remained on alert with the SAC and the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) EC-135C ABNCPs. The Looking Glass alert posture was now a mix of both airborne and ground alert operations.[14]

Another big change to ALCS operations occurred on 1 October 1998. On this day, the Air Force’s EC-135Cs ceased to perform USSTRATCOM Looking Glass operations and was subsequently retired. The Navy’s E-6B Mercury took over USSTRATCOM’s Looking Glass mission and associated ALCS mission.[15]

Originally, the E-6A was built to perform the TAke Charge And Move Out (TACAMO) mission of relaying Emergency Action Messages to Navy Ballistic Missile Submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. However, when it was decided to retire the remainder of the Air Force’s EC-135C fleet, the E-6A was extensively modified. A battlestaff compartment was added, additional communications equipment was installed, and ALCS equipment was installed. Due to these extensive modifications, this new variant of the Mercury was redesignated from the E-6A to the E-6B. Now, whenever a USSTRATCOM battlestaff and ALCS crew are onboard, the E-6B is known as the USSTRATCOM ABNCP.[16]

Current Era

Today, at least one USSTRATCOM ABNCP is on alert around-the-clock. It is postured with a full USSTRATCOM battlestaff and ALCS crew onboard to perform the Looking Glass mission in the event the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center (GOC) is incapacitated. The aircraft can takeoff quickly to avoid any threat. The ALCS crew onboard still provides a survivable launch capability for the Air Force’s Minuteman III ICBMs located at the three remaining Missile Wings located at Malmstrom AFB, MT; Minot AFB, ND; and F.E. Warren AFB, WY. Just like its original inception, ALCS on alert today provides an adversary with an insurmountable task of trying to destroy the Minuteman ICBM force. Even if the ground Launch Control Centers are destroyed, the USSTRATCOM ABNCP can fly overhead and the airborne missileers onboard can launch the remaining Minuteman III ICBMs.[17]

Operational Information

ALCS Configured Aircraft

The ALCS mission has been held by multiple aircraft during the last 50 years:

ICBMs Remotely Controlled

Units

Units With ALCS Crewmembers Assigned

Units with ALCS Equipped Aircraft

ALCS Personnel

Although the ALCS now resides on a Navy aircraft, the ALCS equipment is owned and operated by Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). The Missile Combat Crew Commander-Airborne (MCCC-A) is always a second or third tour assignment missileer and is from the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron (STOS) located at Offutt AFB, NE. The Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander-Airborne (DMCCC-A) is a joint USSTRATCOM position. Both ALCS crewmembers go through initial and monthly recurring ALCS training provided by the 625th STOS.[45]

ALCS assisted Launches

This list does not contain any launches after the initial Test and Evaluation phase of the system.

See also

References

  1. ^ USSTRATCOM ABNCP Fact Sheet
  2. ^ ALCS Article, page 13
  3. ^ ALCS Article, page 13
  4. ^ ALCS Article, page 13
  5. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  6. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  7. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  8. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  9. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  10. ^ ALCS Article, page 14
  11. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  12. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  13. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  14. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  15. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  16. ^ ALCS Article, page 15
  17. ^ ALCS Article, pages 15-16
  18. ^ 2 ACCS Part 1, page 7
  19. ^ A History of PACCS, ACCS and ALCS, page 1
  20. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  21. ^ A History of PACCS, ACCS and ALCS, page 1
  22. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  23. ^ 4th ACCS
  24. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 116]
  25. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  26. ^ 2 ACCS Part 1
  27. ^ 2 ACCS Part 2
  28. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 116]
  29. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  30. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 118]
  31. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  32. ^ "625th STOS Fact Sheet"
  33. ^ "625th STOS Fact Sheet"
  34. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  35. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  36. ^ 4th ACCS
  37. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 116]
  38. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  39. ^ 2 ACCS Part 1
  40. ^ 2 ACCS Part 2
  41. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 116]
  42. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  43. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 118]
  44. ^ [Hopkins III, Robert S. 1997. Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker: More Than Just a Tanker. Leicester, England: Midland Publishing Limited, p. 196]
  45. ^ ALCS Article, page 16