Talk:End-to-end encryption
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Inordinate amount of page space devoted to Tetra
This article is literally mostly about Tetra. Is Tetra notable enough to get its own article so that this one can focus on its title and just reference Tetra as an example? Chris Arnesen 14:26, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
- I removed the "Example: Tetra" section because it gave undue weight to one particular example, and it was written like a personal essay. --Dodi 8238 (talk) 13:28, 17 November 2015 (UTC)
Article should describe potential vulnerability to MITM attacks, and means for mitigation
When non-certified/uncertified (is there a difference?) E2EE is used, there is potential for Man-in-the-middle attacks, especially between parties that have not previously exchanged public keys in a more secure manner. Because the article presently does not describe this potential, a reader might wrongly conclude that E2EE is by itself a complete solution to privacy and security, which would be a very dangerous misconception. The article should at least briefly describe the MITM problem, as well as means for mitigation (e.g. web of trust). While I'm very familiar with the problem, I don't have the expertise to adequately describe the possible means of mitigation, and in particular can't explain how (or even whether) those methods are used by the cited examples of E2EE protocols, software and services (e.g., ZRTP, TETRA). --Brouhaha (talk) 18:49, 14 March 2015 (UTC)
Unsure about that info (Lavabit not E2EE?)
I removed a mention according to which Lavabit and Hushmail were not E2EE, which was not supported by the source (I put it back again later). I think to have read somewhere that Lavabit was E2EE before it closed, i.e. knowledge of the server's private key would not allow one to decrypt stored emails; the possible attack medium was by impersonating the server in the key exchange between the sender and the recipient of email, so that one could recover the client's key and read subsequent emails (and possibly the previous ones as well). Said otherwise, the server could be made insecure by changing the protocol, but the mail itself was secure until then.
However, by hunting around the web, I did not find it again. Does someone have a good source for that? The Wired one is the typical example of a layman journalist writing on a technical subject...
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