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Search/Retrieve via URL

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Search/Retrieve via URL (SRU) is a standard search protocol for Internet search queries, utilizing Contextual Query Language (CQL), a standard query syntax for representing queries.

Samplecode of a complete answer for this SRU Query-URL: http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/XML/sru.php?version=1.1&operation=searchRetrieve&query=author=Shoemaker

<?xml version="1.0"?>

-<sru:searchRetrieveResponse xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xcql="http://www.loc.gov/zing/cql/xcql/" xmlns:diag="http://www.loc.gov/zing/srw/diagnostic/" xmlns:sru="http://www.loc.gov/zing/srw/">

<sru:version>1.1</sru:version>

<sru:numberOfRecords>10</sru:numberOfRecords>


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<sru:recordPacking>XML</sru:recordPacking>


-<sru:recordData>


-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Authors/Titles</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>S. Shoemaker<br /> I Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewußtseins, Frankfurt/M. 1994<br /> Sydney Shoemaker<br /> Einleitung Veronique Zanetti <br /> 1. Shoemaker Selbstbezug und Selbstbewußtsein <br /> Einleitung V.Zanetti/M.Frank <br /> 2.Shoemaker Einheit des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordPacking>XML</sru:recordPacking>


-<sru:recordData>


-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Computer Model</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Rorty VI 184<br /> Machine / Sellars: (according to Rorty): no big difference to people mostly in terms of the complexity of action. (NagelVs, SearleVs).</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>2</sru:recordNumber>

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<sru:recordPacking>XML</sru:recordPacking>


-<sru:recordData>


-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Demonstratives</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Frank I 47f <br /> this / demonstrative: the use rules do not determine by themselves what the reference in every possible use case is - it is determined by the speaker s intention - I / Shoemaker: is no more a demonstrative such as a name or hide marking - ((s) no body is identified).</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>3</sru:recordNumber>

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<sru:recordPacking>XML</sru:recordPacking>


-<sru:recordData>


-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Properties</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Arm III 161<br /> Properties / Shoemaker : thesis what makes a prop be prop is their ability to contribute to the causal powers of the things that have this prop - the connection between a prop and possible effects is a necessary one - that is epistemically justified : they are known only by their effects - BoydVsShoemaker: identity of the prop not only by its effects , but also by their causes - - - Armstrong : all prop are nomically connected with other prop - inactive prop are also prop.<br /> Arm II 85<br /> Properties / Shoemaker : e.g. that my ballpoint pen is no longer 50 miles south of something is no real change of properties, or to be the prop so that Ford is president , is not a real change if Ford is no longer President - III 8 Armstrong / Place / Martin: all per objective prop "in the" Object.<br /> I Stalnaker 92<br /> Properties / Shoemaker / Stalnaker : Thesis: all properties are causal powers - then the causal laws of the properties are essential .</sru:subject>

</sru:dc>

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<sru:recordNumber>4</sru:recordNumber>

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<sru:recordPacking>XML</sru:recordPacking>


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-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>I, Ego, Self</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Frank I 50ff <br /> ShoemakerVsHume: 1st shows no more than that, as I find myself, I can not know - the second premise is false: although there is no index-free description, that does not prove that I would need such - for identification the possibility of errors is necessary - but this is not given in the case of the self - anyway regress in self-identification - Hume did not deny self-consciousness / Shoemaker: no kind of perception! (Rorty ditto) - Pain: no (private) object, a person is not pain, and it is not painful, but one feels pain.</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>5</sru:recordNumber>

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-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Identity</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Frank I, 70f<br /> temporal identity / Shoemaker: with Butler: No criteria - solution: functionalism: only when the I is identified previously -- not a problem because experience is marked by internal perspective.</sru:subject>

</sru:dc>

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<sru:recordNumber>6</sru:recordNumber>

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-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Qualia</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Stalnaker I 220 <br /> Qualia / common sense / Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, but also locally comparable. - Vs Frege-Schlick view - Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is meaningless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent at all something communicable - StalnakerVsShoemaker. per "old-fashioned" Frege-Schlick view.</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>7</sru:recordNumber>

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<sru:title>Self -consciousness</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Frank I 37f <br /> Self consciousness /s.c. / Shoemaker: immune to misidentification - author of the example of exchanged spectra - per Qualia (VsBlock) - self-reference does not imply self-identification - <br /> Frank I 65 <br /> s.c. / Shoemaker: radically different from the consciousness of perception - I cannot learn from from any object, not even learn from the mirror, that I myself am displayed - unless I had known previously.</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>8</sru:recordNumber>

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-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>Subject</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Frank I 20 <br /> Subject / Shoemaker: subject use of "I" is fundamental to object-use.</sru:subject>

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-<sru:dc>

<sru:title>exchanged Spectra</sru:title>

<sru:creator>Shoemaker</sru:creator>

<sru:subject>Stalnaker I 19<br /> Qualia / exchanged spectra / Shoemaker / Stalnaker : tried to reconcile the visibility reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind - StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible.<br /> Stalnaker I 233f<br /> exchanged spectra / Shoemaker Paradox / Stalnaker : four people , partly differently wired / without backup system. - Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time . - Solution / Stalnaker : two different identity criteria. - Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria. - Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity - Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together - I 236 the addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms . - Problem : subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character . - I 237/8 The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia .</sru:subject>

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<sru:recordNumber>10</sru:recordNumber>

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</sru:searchRetrieveResponse>

See also