Perceptual transparency
Perceptual transparency
In our everyday life, we often experience the view of objects through transparent surfaces.
Physically transparent surfaces allow the transmission of a certain amount of light rays
through them. Sometimes nearly the totality of rays is transmitted across the surface without
significant changes of direction or chromaticity, as in the case of air; sometimes only light at
a certain wavelength is transmitted, as for coloured glass.
Perceptually, the problem of transparency is much more challenging: both the light rays
coming from the transparent surface and those coming from the object behind it do reach the
same retinal location, triggering a single sensorial process. The system somehow maps this
information onto a perceptual representation of two different objects.
Physical transparency was shown to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
perceptual transparency.
Fuchs (1923) showed that when a small portion of a transparent surface is observed, neither the surface colour, nor the fusion colour is perceived, but only the colour resulting from the fusion of that of the transparent surface and that of the background.
Tudor-Hart (1928) showed it is not possible to perceive transparency in a totally homogeneous field. Metzger (1975) showed that patterns of opaque paper can induce the illusion of transparency, in the absence of physical transparency. In order to distinguish perceptual from physical transparency, the former has often been addressed as transparency illusion. transparent surface is observed, neither the surface colour, nor the fusion colour is perceived, but only the colour resulting from the fusion of that of the transparent surface and that of the background. Tudor-Hart (1928) showed it is not possible to perceive transparency in a totally homogeneous field. Metzger (1975) showed that patterns of opaque paper can induce the illusion of transparency, in the absence of physical transparency. In order to distinguish perceptual from physical transparency, the former has often been addressed as transparency illusion.
Paradoxically, however, two models developed within a physical context have long
dominated the research in the field of perceptual transparency: the episcotister model by
Metelli (1970; 1974) and the filter model by Beck et al. (1984).
Metelli’s episcotister model and the luminance conditions for transparency
Though he was not the first author to study the phenomenon of transparency illusion, the Gestalt psychologist Metelli was probably the one who made the major contribution to the problem. Like his forecomers, Metelli faces the problem from a phenomenical more than from a physiological point of view. In other words, he did not investigate which are the physiological algorithms or the brain networks underlying transparency perception, but studied and classified the conditions under which a transparency illusion is generated. In doing so, Metelli marks an approach to the problem that will be followed by many scientists after him. The model is based on the idea that the perceptual colour scission following transparency is the opposite of colour fusion in a rotating episcotister, i.e. a rotating disk that alternates open and solid sectors. Metelli referred to colour fusion in a physical situation in which an episcotister rotates in front of an opaque background of reflectance A; the episcotister has an open sector of size t (a proportion of the total disk) and a solid sector of size (1-t) having reflectance r. The reflectance of the solid sectors and that of background are fused by rotation to produce a virtual reflectance value p: P=t*A +(1-t)*R