Institutional analysis and development framework
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The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD framework) was originally developed to help unpicking the complexities of institutions and institutional configurations. The IAD views institutions as set of rules, which determine the proceeding of reoccurring actions.
The IAD framework was particularly successful in analysis of arrangements for sustainably maintaining natural common pool resources (commons). For example, in the case of fishery districts, rules govern individuals' ability to extract fishes, determine the actions in case of violation of the rules, and are developed through higher level rules which describe how to agree on the first set of rules (referred to as operational).
More recently with the advent of digital information resources such as Wikipedia and open source programming efforts both depending on active participation, the IAD framework was adapted to fit these new type of commons.[1] This was particularly driven by Hess (1995) who noted that repositories at her academic institutions resembled commons in respects to the incentives for contributing information and the sharing of network capacity in the cases where information resource is in high demand.[2]
Components in the IAD framework
Ostrom (2005) described the IAD as a "multi-level conceptual map" with which one could zoom in and out of particular hierarchical parts of the regularised interactions in an established social system. It assumes a context to the particular interaction in which the general network of regular actors would be analysed, the particular rules-in-use, and the particular common outcome that they hope to achieve. In the traditional analysis of common pool arrangements, the common outcome would be a particular resource which the actors draw on.[3]
The main unit of analysis assumed in the framework are however particular "action arenas", i.e. (inter)action situations in which the actors involved in this social system interact, given respective operational rules-in-use which guide their possible action outcomes. Before Ostrom passed away in 2010, she further elaborated the possible rules which should be considered in analysing a particular action situation.[3]
| Rule type | Description |
|---|---|
| Position | The number of possible "positions" actors in the action situation can assume (in terms of formal positions these might be better described as job roles, while for informal positions these might rather be social roles of some capacity |
| Boundary | Characteristics participants must have in order to be able to access a particular position |
| Choice | The action capacity ascribed to a particular position |
| Aggregation | Any rules relating to how interactions between participants within the action situation accumulate to final outcomes (voting schemes etc) |
| Information | The types and kinds of information and information channels available to participants in their respective positions |
| Pay-off | The likely rewards or punishments for participating in the action situation |
| Scope | Any criteria or requirements that exist for the final outcomes from the action situation |
References
- ^ Charlotte Hess; Elinor Ostrom. "Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource". Duke University School of Law. p. 22. Retrieved 30 January 2015.
- ^ Charlotte Hess (May 1995). "The Virtual CPR: The Internet as a Local and Global Common Pool Resource" (PDF). Indiana University. pp. 5–6. Retrieved 30 January 2015.
- ^ a b Elinor Ostrom (2009). Understanding Institutional Diversity (PDF). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9781400831739. Retrieved 30 January 2015.