Probabilistic voting model
 | This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these messages)
No issues specified. Please specify issues, or remove this template. |
The probabilistic voting theory, also known as the probabilistic voting model, is a voting theory developed by professors Assar Lindbeck and Jörgen Weibull in the article "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition", published in 1987 in the journal Public Choice, which has gradually replaced the median voter theory, thanks to its ability to find an equilibrium in a multi-dimensional space.
The probabilistic voting model assumes that voters are imperfectly informed about candidates and their platforms. Candidates are also imperfectly informed about the utility preferences of the electorate and the distribution of voters' preferences.
Unlike the median voter theorem, what drives the equilibrium policy is both the numerosity and the density of social groups and not the median position of voters on a preference scale. This difference explains why social groups which have a great homogeneity of preferences are more politically powerful than those whose preferences are dispersed.
Applications
Political economy and public economics are the main fields where the probabilistic voting theory is applied. In particular, it was used to explain public expenditure programmes (Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten & Zilibotti, 2005), public debt dynamics (Song, Storesletten & Zilibotti, 2012), effect of mass media (Strömberg, 2004) social security systems (Profeta, 2002; Gonzalez Eiras & Niepelt, 2008) and taxation (Hettich & Winer, 2005).
References
Assar Lindbeck, and Jörgen W. Weibull (1987). "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." Public Choice, 52(3), 273-297.
Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín, and Dirk Niepelt (2008). "The Future of Social Security." Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 197-218
Hassler, John, Per Krusell, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2005). "The dynamics of government." Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (7), 1331-1358
Hettich, Walter, and Stanley Winer (2005) Democratic Choice and Taxation A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Cambridge University Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Profeta, Paola (2002). "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model" International Tax and Public Finance 9, 331-348.
Strömberg, David "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy." Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 265-284.
Song, Zheng, Kjetil Storeseletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2012). "Rotten parents and disciplined children: A politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt". Econometrica 80 (6), 2785–2803