Talk:Hardware-based full disk encryption
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Bad article
This article is not written in a style suitable for Wikipedia. It looks more like magazine article based on a couple of press releases. There are a lot of terms used but not explained
Examples: FDE, OPAL, Enterprise standards, attack vector, Enterprise SAS, bridge and chipset, Stonewood, Flagstone.
The article should start with an explanation of what the topic is, not from where it's available. Vendor names should be removed, or moved to a less prominent place at the end of the article. There are disadvantages with hardware-based full disk encryption, but they aren't mentioned. Stated facts needs reference.
Questionable facts: "HDD FDE is available ... via the Trusted Computing Group." Perhaps it wasn't the authors's intention that I have to buy such drives via TCG, but it says so.
--HelgeStenstrom (talk) 08:03, 9 September 2010 (UTC)
Merge with Disk encryption hardware
I propose to merge tthis page with Disk encryption hardware, as they are very much related. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.215.90.169 (talk) 11:01, 5 May 2011 (UTC)
FDE is only safe with off or hibernated?
I removed this content because it conflicts with my direct experience and it is not sourced. If someone can find a source then we should reconsider it and I can examine why I do not see this in my system.
FDE is only safe when the computer is off or hibernated. When the computer is stolen while it is turned on or suspended, a restart which boots from a USB stick will reveal the data without need for the password. The problem is that these so called warm reboots will not prompt for the HD password, nor the power-on-password for that matter. This is as a security risk. In contrast, software-based encryption will prompt for the password on a warm reboot.