Probabilistic voting model
The probabilistic voting theory, also known as the probabilistic voting model, is a voting theory developed by Assar Lindbeck and Jörgen Weibull, 1987, which has gradually replaced the median voter theory, thanks to its ability to find an equilibrium in a multi-dimensional space. This theory represents a real break-through in the political economy literature and allowed to solve problems impossible to solve before. In fact, unlike the median voter theorem, what drives the equilibrium policy is both the numerosity and the density of social groups and not the median position of voters on a preference scale. This difference allows to explain why social groups which have a great homogeneity of preferences are more politically powerful than those whose preferences are dispersed.
Applications
The political economy and the public economics are the main fields where the probabilistic voting theory is applied. In particular, it was used to explain public expenditure programmes (Persson & Tabellini, 2000), social security systems (Profeta, 2002) and taxation (Hettich & Winer, 1999 and Canegrati, 2007).
References
- Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition," Public Choice, 52 (1987), 273-297
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press. ISBN 0262661314.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Canegrati, Emanuele, 2007. "A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation," MPRA Paper 6117 [1]
- Canegrati, Emanuele, 2007. "A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Indirect Taxation," MPRA Paper 6116 [2]