Talk:Cross-domain solution
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I would question the bias in this article. While I personally agree with some of the statements, things like this:
"a disturbing shift" "A shift of responsibility for certification and accreditation from agencies without conflict of interest to agencies responsible for both security and cost is not helpful at reducing receptiveness to more subjective flexibility."
"Those familiar with high strength technologies (that are sometimes less costly by the way) are more apt to be skeptical about the subversion resistance of less formal CDS."
seem to be written by someone with a personal bias towards one type type of CDS over another.
147.160.136.10 (talk) 13:50, 23 May 2008 (UTC)
Article lacks relevant citations, appears to be original research
This article doesn't cite most of its claims, and adopts a pretty strong point of view against cross-domain. In addition, I'd disagree with some of the factual commentary, e.g.:
"CDS is distinct from the more rigorous approaches because it supports transfer that would otherwise be precluded by established models of computer/network/data security (e.g. Bell-La Padula and Clark-Wilson)."
"CDS development, assessment, and deployment are based on risk management."
Cross-domain solutions can implement the Bell-La Padula model, and are sometimes based on formal methods, not on risk management.
I'll add an "original research" tag. The author of the article, User:JA.Davidson is very knowledgeable in the field, but other points of view would be helpful too. This is an important topic in computer security, so I hope the article can be improved.