Secure two-party computation
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Secure two-party computation (2PC) is sub-problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that has received special attention by researchers because of its close relation to many cryptographic tasks. It is concerned with the question: 'Can two party computation be achieved more efficiently and under weaker security assumptions than general MPC?'
Yao's protocol for two-party computation [1] only provided security against passive adversaries. 2PC protocols that are secure against active adversaries were proposed by Lindell and Pinkas [2].
Another solution for this problem, that explicitly works with committed input was proposed by Jarecki and Shmatikov [3].
Security
The security of a two-party computation protocol is usually defined through a comparison with an idealised scenario that is secure by definition. The idealised scenario involves a trusted party that collects the input of the two parties over secure channels and returns the result if non of the parties chooses to abort. The cryptographic two-party computation protocol is secure, if it behaves no worse than this ideal protocol, but without the additional trust assumptions. This is usually modeled using a simulator.
See also
* An important primitive in 2PC is oblivious transfer.
References
- ^ Andrew Chi-Chih Yao: Protocols for Secure Computations (Extended Abstract) FOCS 1982: 160-164
- ^ Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas: An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries, EUROCRYPT 2007: 52-79 [1]
- ^ S. Jarecki, V. Shmatikov. Efficient Two-Party Secure Computation on Committed Inputs. EUROCRYPT 2007 [2]
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