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Secure two-party computation

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Secure two-party computation (2PC) is sub-problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) that has received special attention by researchers because of its close relation to many cryptographic tasks. It is concerned with the question: 'Can two party computation be achieved more efficiently and under weaker security assumptions than general MPC?'

Yao's protocol for two-party computation [1] only provided security against passive adversaries. 2PC protocols that are secure against active adversaries were proposed by Lindell and Pinkas [2].

Another solution for this problem, that explicitly works with committed input was proposed by Jarecki and Shmatikov [3].

References

  1. ^ Andrew Chi-Chih Yao: Protocols for Secure Computations (Extended Abstract) FOCS 1982: 160-164
  2. ^ Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas: An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries, EUROCRYPT 2007: 52-79 [1]
  3. ^ S. Jarecki, V. Shmatikov. Efficient Two-Party Secure Computation on Committed Inputs. EUROCRYPT 2007 [2]