Talk:Java Anon Proxy

Germany Start‑class Mid‑importance

	Germany portal This article is within the scope of WikiProject Germany, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Germany on Wikipedia. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.GermanyWikipedia:WikiProject GermanyTemplate:WikiProject GermanyGermany
Start	This article has been rated as Start-class on Wikipedia's content assessment scale.
Mid	This article has been rated as Mid-importance on the project's importance scale.
	This article lacks sufficient references and/or adequate inline citations. Once references have been added, remove the `\|unref=` from this template.

This page needs cleanup. Can someone break it up into sections? --98.199.46.24 00:44, 22 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Potential serious problems

1) Reference #1 ( http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-August/009108.html ) is broken. 2) Reference #3 does not make the claim that there was Internet media confustion as to a backdoor in the client. In fact, it makes the claim that there is indeed a backdoor. The statement about it being media confusion looks like original research, and possible non-neutral point of view. Internet is capitalized, and the word backdoor make bad misuse of scare quotes. 3) Reference #4 links to a simplified abstract of the article it claims to reference. Is the entire paper available somewhere, because that abstract does not say what it claims in this article, namely recompiling software, threat model and making the function more privacy-friendly.

I would certainly like to discuss this before editing.90.128.71.15 (talk) 17:18, 21 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Is anybody listening? 90.136.139.222 (talk) 20:09, 3 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

WP:BB. Often, editors will come out of the woodwork when edits are made to an article even if they didn't contribute to the talk page. Chris Cunningham (not at work) - talk 21:23, 3 June 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Design flaws/features

The comparison with the Tor network is somewhat overlooked in this article (not the aim I know, but it is explicitely mentionned in the Design section, so it should be done right or completely removed).

Tor is a distributed censorship-resistant (and anonymizing) proxy system. JAP is everything *but* censorship-resistant, and offers weaker anonymization. That comes from the fact that the relays must be clearly identified. In the Tor system, every single client is by default also a relay, making the system virtually bullet-proof. With JAP, a well-planned attack (by legal pression, cracking, or otherwise) can relatively easily take control of the whole system. One other important implication is that whith Tor, even if all the downstream nodes are corrupt, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the requests originating from a node and those just *relayed* by this node, bringing the very important "deniability" part which is a requirement for real protection. Appart from this feature-for-feature comparison, Tor offers a number of additional functionalities (most of them grouped under the "hidden services" vocable).

On the other hand, the threat of data interception by the exit node is lower with JAP than with Tor, which can be a huge plus for users who mix anonymous and non-anonymous traffic and are not afraid of censorship or large-scale spying. One other big plus of JAP is that relays must have fast connections, whereas the limited bandwidth of individual Tor client/relays is more likely to create bottlenecks and slow ttraffic down. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.21.113.123 (talk) 05:51, 4 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]