Common-pool resource
A "common-pool resource" (CPR) is a natural or human made resource system the size or characteristics of which makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Elinor Ostrom observed a number of CPRs throughout the world and noticed that a lot of them are governed by arrangements other than private property or state administration. Her observations are in contradiction with the assumption that CPRs would fail in the long run due to collective action problems leading to the overuse of the common resource (see Tragedy of the commons).
Examples:
- Irrigation systems
- Grazing grounds
- Fishing grounds
- Forests
References:
- Acheson, James, M. (1988) The Lobster Gangs of Maine.
- Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.