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GGH encryption scheme

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The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) cryptosystem is a asymetric cryptosystem based on lattice.

The Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) cryptosystem makes use of the fact that the CVP can be a hard problem. It was published in 1997 and uses a trapdoor one-way function that is relying on the difficulty of lattice reduction. The idea included in this trapdoor function is that, given any basis for a lattice, it is easy to generate a vector which is close to a lattice point, for example taking a lattice point and adding a small error vector. But it is not known how to simply return from this erroneous vector to the original lattice point.

Operation

GGH involves a private key and a public key.

The private key is a basis of a lattice with good properties as short mostly orthogonal vectors and a unimodular matrix .

The public key is of the lattice of the form .

For some chosen M, the message space consists of the vector in the range .

Encryption

Given a message and a public key compute

   

In matrix notation this is . Remember consists of integer values, and is a lattice point, so v is also a lattice point. The ciphertext is then

  

Decryption

To decrypt the cyphertext one computes

  

The Babai rounding technique will be used to remove the term as long as it is small enough. Finally compute

   

to get the messagetext.

Example

Let be a lattice with the basis and its inverse

and

With

and

this gives

Let the message be and the error vector . Then the ciphertext is

.

To decrypt one must compute .

This is rounded to and the message is recovered with .


Security of the Scheme

1999 Nguyen showed at the Crypto conference that the GGH encryption scheme has a flaw in the design of the schemes. He showed that every ciphertext reveals information about the plaintext and that the problem of decryption could be turned in a special closest vector problem much easier to solve than the general CVP.

Bibliography

  • Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Shai Halevi. Public-key cryptosystems

from lattice reduction problems. In CRYPTO ’97: Pro- ceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 112–131, London, UK, 1997. Springer- Verlag.

  • Phong Q. Nguyen. Cryptanalysis of the goldreich-goldwasser-halevi

cryptosystem from crypto ’97. In CRYPTO ’99: Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 288–304, London, UK, 1999. Springer-Verlag.