Talk:Trusted Execution Technology

The article is, in my opinion, rather weak on the details of where TXT differs from existing security solutions. The TPM chip is obviously new and novel, but the article also makes mention of parts of the architecture where I cannot understand why ordinary virtual memory would not suffice, such as:

"The processor : With a private environment for applications, so that the hardware resources (such as memory pools) are locked to the calling applications and cannot be accessed whether for read or write by any other process running on the platform"

This sounds exactly like virtual memory.

"The chipset : Enforces security on the main board by controlling more accurately the memory management policy, enhancements to memory access mechanisms, channel control mechanisms for hardware extensions (user I/O, Graphics, etc.) and secure interface to the TPM"

Except for the secure interface to the TPM, this statement is very vague. How do these "enhancements to memory access mechanisms" differ from current bus access?

"The user Input : Protection states over keyboard, and mouse, allowing users to interact with trusted platform applications, without the risk of being compromised, neither observed by other running software"

Other running software cannot normally observe keyboard or mouse input unless directed to them as is on current operating systems, and even if they can, that sounds like a problem to be solved in software, rather than in hardware to me.

"The Display Interface : This feature enables trusted platform applications to send display data to specific context (a window for example) memory buffer, preventing running software from stealing the being-transmitted information"

Same thing here; even if other programs can access other programs' window contents, that still sounds like a system software problem rather than a hardware problem to me.

It would be great if someone knowledgeable could clarify these issues. Dolda2000 (talk) 14:18, 27 July 2008 (UTC)