Partitioning Communication System
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Partitioning Communication System is an high-assurance computer security architecture based on a information flow separation policy. The PCS extends the four foundational security policies of a MILS (Multiple Independent Levels of Security) separation kernel to the network:
- End-to-end Information Flow
- End-to-end Data Isolation
- End-to-end Periods Processing
- End-to-end Damage Limitation
The PCS leverages the separation kernel to enable application layer entities to enforce, manage, and control application layer security policies in such a manner that the application layer security policies are:
- Non-bypassable,
- Evaluatable,
- Always-invoked, and
- Tamper-proof.
The result is a communications architecture that allows the separation kernel and the PCS to share responsibility of security with the application.
The PCS was invented by Objective Interface Systems.