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Problematic integration theory

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Introduction:

The theory of Problematic Integration (PI) is situated at the intersection of communication and one’s environment. The theory suggests that humans are affected on a myriad of levels according to their interpretations of what is likely, and what is good or bad. The interplay between these complimentary processes represents more than simple co-occurrence. When there is consistency and convergence between clear probabilities and favorable outcomes, integration is routine. However, when these orientations are less clear and consistent, integration is problematic. This can lead to discomfort cognitively, communicatively, affectively, and motivationally.

History:

Austin Babrow first introduced the theory of Problematic Integration in 1992. Babrow brought together a diverse and interdisciplinary literature to serve as building blocks for his new theory. Among the theoretical underpinnings that support PI are: uncertainty reduction theory; the theory of belief in a just world; analysis of decision-making; the theory of and motivation and self-esteem; and Cognitive Dissonance Theory. Due to the complexity of PI, there is ample room for the breadth of Babrow’s theoretical integration.

Concepts:

Babrow identified four distinct manifestations of problematic integration: divergence; ambiguity; ambivalence; and impossibility. The first of these integrative predicaments, divergence, arises when there is a discrepancy between what we believe to be so, and what we want to be so. The second form of PI is ambiguity. Ambiguity arises when the probability of what is prized or despised is ambiguous. Babrow explained, that“in ambiguous situations, neither the outcome, nor the probability of the outcome is known, though the latter has restrictions” (Babrow, 1992, p. 112). The third form of PI is ambivalence. Ambivalence is borne from one of two choice conditions: 1) an individual is forced to choose between two similarly valued alternatives; or 2) an individual is forced to choose between mutually exclusive alternatives. The fourth manifestation of PI is impossibility. The manifestation of this type of PI occurs upon the realization that if something is impossible, than it cannot be. Responses to impossibility can range from a sense of futility, to one of increased motivation to deny the impossibility.


Current Usage:

The complexity of PI and the multiplicity of its manifestations makes it difficult to operationalize, measure, and apply. However, it has been used within the realm of Health Communication studies in order to assess methods of educating, and communicating with, elderly patients that have been diagnosed with chronic conditions.


References:

Babrow, A. S. (1992). Communication and problematic integration: Understanding and diverging probability and value, ambiguity, ambivalence, and impossibility. Communication Theory, 2(2), 95-130.

Berger, C. R. (1986). Uncertain outcome values in predicted relationships: Uncertainty reduction theory then and now. Human Communication Research, 13, 34-38.

Berger, C. R. (1987). Communicating under uncertainty. In M. E. Roloff & G. R. Miller (Eds.), Interpersonal processes: New directions in communication research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in intital interaction and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human Communication Research, 1, 99-112.

Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1987). Decision making under ambiguity. In R. M. Hogarth & M. W. Reder (Eds.), Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology (pp. 41-66). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hines, S.C., Babrow, A.S., Badzek, L., & Moss, A. (2001). From coping with life to coping with death: Problematic integration for the seriously ill elderly. Health Communication, 13(3), 327-342.

Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum.

Raynor, J. O., & McFarlin, D. B. (1986). Motivation and self-esteem. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp. 315-349). New York: Guilford.