Logical behaviorism
In the philosophy of mind, logical behaviorism (also known as analytical behaviorism)[1] is the thesis that mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioral concepts.[2]
Logical behaviorism was first stated by the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap.[2] Other philosophers with sympathies for behaviorism included C. G. Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine (1960).[2][3] A more moderate form of analytical behaviorism was put forward by the Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949).[4][2]
Overview
Generally speaking, analytic behaviourism is the view that propositions about the mind, or about mental states more generally, are reducible to propositions about behaviour. For example, a dualist would take 'Finbarr is in pain' to refer to a private, non-physical mental state within Finbarr's mind. But a behaviourist would say that 'Finbarr is in pain' simply refers to Finbarr's behaviour, or his disposition to behave in a certain way. So, the behaviourist might argue that if Finbarr was crying, and this was the reason that the mental state of pain was attributed to Finbarr, then 'Finbarr is in pain' reduces to 'Finbarr is crying'. In other words, 'Finbarr is in pain' means the same thing as[5] 'Finbarr is crying' as, for a behaviourist, statements about mental states merely refer to people's behaviour, or their dispositions to show certain behaviour (pain behaviour, in Finbarr's case).
Etymology
Logical behaviorism is called "logical", after the idea adopted by Bertrand Russell, that mathematics can be described in terms of formal logic, using Set Theory, and thus make it "scientific", "provable", "specific", consistent and "truthful". In a similar way, it was thought by the Vienna Circle that the phenomena of human mental states such as feelings, perceptions, imaginations etc. can be described in terms of a tendency to behave in a certain way, which could then be tested and explained scientifically through the methods of Behaviorism, whereby everything consists of stimulus-response pairs, with various types of origins and different types of reinforcement.[6]
See also
References
- ^ Alex Barber, Robert J Stainton (eds.), Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier, 2010, p. 33.
- ^ a b c d Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Behaviorism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Hempel, C. G. The Logical Analysis of psychology. 1935.
- ^ Neil Tennant, Introducing Philosophy: God, Mind, World, and Logic, Routledge, 2015, p. 299.
- ^ "Behaviorism". Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 28/02/24.
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(help) - ^ See Brains and Behavior, Hilary Putnam, 1968 (On the Purdue University website)