Talk:Orchestrated objective reduction

This article should be little more than a stub. Penrose's ideas on this topic have no scientific validity. Microtubules can't vibrate in the low Reynolds number environment of the cytoplasm! IlliniWikipedian 17:38, 19 December 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I don't believe I've heard that criticism before. Doesn't that violate Wikipedia's rules against original research? ;-) But actually, I don't think the point is valid. The idea is that viscosity renders rapid motion with respect to the cytoplasm impossible. But objects at finite temperature also vibrate in place! And since a microtubule actually consists of thousands of coupled subunits, there is certainly scope for quite complicated vibrational dynamics to arise... You might be interested in Keskin et al's work on fluctuation dynamics in the tubulin dimer. Mporter 05:51, 24 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, but the text on such a controversial and, let's be frank, not widely accepted subject needs to be written in a much, much more balanced way. Bardon Dornal 13:12, 22 May 2006 (UTC)[reply]

I generally agree, but I think there may be more to it than that. For one, Orch-OR seems to be a not terribly obvious expansion of Penrose's original proposals. Those appear to be limited to GR as a "counteracting" force on quantum evolution, in that GR will force a superposition to collapse (measurement-free, importantly) into a single observable for what appear to be really simple reasons. In a recent talk for the Perimeter Institute, there no mention at all of the microtubulin side of things. Frankly, from this outsider's perspective, I'm not sure why there ever was any work down this direction -- it seems premature at a minimum.

So the problem is that there should really be an article on OR itself. This is notably interesting right now, because they are actually going to test it in a lab shortly. OR makes physical predictions that differ from pure-collapse models over short time scales, time scales that can be "easily" duplicated with modern equipment.

Maury 22:24, 31 July 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Theory vs Fact

I am totally confused, reading this article, between the parts which mean "the theory says this" and the parts which mean "reputable scientific testing has shown this to be true". I suggest that someone who is familiar with orch or separates the two into different sections of the article. I was debating whether to mark it as unverified, but separation would be better. If nobody here has the knowledge + time to do this, it should be marked. Ricky 14:08, 22 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Actually, it's a little more complicated than that, because the whole matter rests on the question of "do the distance scales involved make quantum issues relevant?". In this case, there are a few unproven assumptions, and definite correspondences that the theory could explain, if true. Much like String theory, Orch-OR allows one to derive the observables in a handy way, but explains by way of structures that are extremely difficult or perhaps impossible to observe. So; there are maybe three categories instead of two. There is "conjecture and unprovable speculation," there is "reasonable development, given the assumptions," and there is "these are the actual observables, and how they correspond with what the theory predicts." I'm trying to make better sense of this topic myself, and I expect I'll do some editing here. I want to clean up the whole quantum mind topic range, to make it more accurately describe what those who come to the topic believe in, while better qualifying what is factual, and stressing what we actually know (or don't know).

I expect that will be a lot of work! JonathanD 02:36, 5 October 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The facts in Orch OR are very few, and a lot of biological mismodelling is there - for example the DLB biology, where paper by De Zeew et al., 1995 is quoted as reference but the De Zeew paper says exactly the opposite. More on the Orch OR has been released at PhilSci: Georgiev, Danko (2006) Falsifications of Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR Model of Consciousness and Novel Avenues for Development of Quantum Mind Theory. I hope someone may use the paper uploaded PhilSci and sort out, what is reliable fact in Orch OR, and what is sci fi construction. Danko Georgiev MD 11:00, 20 November 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Penrose's collapse theory vs. The Penrose-Hameroff consciousness theory

It should be emphasised that the theory proceeds in two stages -- a theory about collapse, and a theory about consciousness. It is possible for the first to succeed while the second fails. The collapse theory and the consciousness theory should perhaps be placed into separate articles. The collapse theory (Objective Reduction) could then be linked into the interpretation of quantum mechanics article which currently does not mention spontaneous collapse models.1Z 17:50, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

- I agree with this observation and I like the suggestion --Myscience 21:42, 15 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Testing the theory

The article states: "20 testable predictions of Orch OR were published in 1998. A number of these have been validated, others are being tested. Orch OR is falsifiable".

I assume this refers to OR as a theory of collpase, which is indeed testable. It is difficult to see how it could be tested as a claim about consciousness1Z 17:59, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

In fact 19 of the predictions refer to predictions to do with microtubules, quantum coherence in the brain etc and only one refers to OR. However, Penrose in 2004 and 2006 has mentioned schemes to test OR, and there might actually be one in a few years. Persephone19 20:25, 14 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The Penrose collapse theory

The article states: "Penrose considered superposition as a separation in underlying reality at its most basic level, the Planck scale. Tying quantum superposition to general relativity, he identified superposition as spacetime curvatures in opposite directions, hence a separation in fundamental spacetime geometry. However, according to Penrose, such separations are unstable and will reduce at an objective threshold, hence avoiding multiple universes."

This passage is riddled with errors. I suggest replacing it with a paragraph taken ftom Penrose's own writings.1Z 18:01, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Quantum computation and hypercomputation

The article states: "Quantum computation had been suggested by Paul Benioff, Richard Feynman and David Deutsch in the 1980s. The idea is that classical information, e.g. bit states of either 1 or 0, could also be quantum superpositions of both 1 and 0 (quantum bits, or qubits). Such qubits interact and compute by nonlocal quantum entanglement, eventually being measured/observed and reducing to definite states as the solution. Quantum computations were shown to have enormous capacity if they could be constructed e.g. using qubits of ion states, electron spin, photon polarization, current in Josephson junction, quantum dots etc. During quantum computation, qubits must be isolated from environmental interaction to avoid loss of superposition, i.e. “decoherence”."

This repeats a common misunderstanding. Quantum computation as proposed by David Deutsch,etc, is not known to transcend what can be done with a Turing machine. It is not hypercomputation. What Penrose has is a proposal that the (currently unknown) mechanism of collapse is hypercomputational. Conventional quantum computation is not hypercomputational and does not exploit collapse, but rather superposition. Every aspect of QM except collapse is known to be Turing-emulable. There is no research programme based on collapse, because no-one knows what collapse is, whether it works, or even whether it exists.1Z

Libet and time

The article states: "Experiments in the 1970s by Benjamin Libet suggested that conscious experience of sensory inputs requires up to 500 ms of brain activity, but is referred backward in time to the initial input. Quantum mechanics allows backward time effects as long as causal paradox is not possible (killing your grandmother, preventing your birth is one commonly cited example). Backward referral of unconscious quantum information avoids possible causal paradox, and could explain Libet’s results, real time unified sensory experience and conscious control, rescuing consciousness from the unfortunate role of illusory epiphenomenon."

This is a complete misrepresentation of Benjamin Libet's work. He nowhere invokes literal time travel. His "backwards referral" is no more time travel than manipulating the timestamps of files on a computer.1Z 18:05, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Motivation: The Hard Problem vs. super-Turing mathematicians.

It should be made clearer that the "problem of consciousness" Penrose (rather than Hameroff) is addressing is not the standard one as understood by philosophers, ie the hard problem. Penrose introduces his own version of the problem of consciousness with the controversial argument that human mathematicians can do things that no computer can. (Argument originated by John Lucas). AFAIK, it was Hameroff who suggested that . "Precursors of conscious experience (proto-conscious qualia) are postulated to exist as fundamental, irreducible components of the universe like mass, spin or charge embedded at the Planck scale since the Big Bang." Despite the phraseology, this is an essentially metaphysical claim, and not an uncommon one. It could be bolted on to any other physical theory. Thus, the Penrose-Hameroff theory does not come to a *physical* resolution of the *standard* problem of consciousness. It has a physical proposal to sole the idiosyncratic Lucas-Penrose problem of super-Turing mathematicians, and a metaphysical solution (not original) to the hard problem of consciousness as widely understood. 1Z 18:15, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The thing I find odd about all of this is that Penrose's alternate mechanics indirectly solves the observer problem.

I have never heard of an "observer problem". There is a measurement problem and consciousness causes collapse is one, highly controversial, proposal to solve it. If you think all approaches to the Measurement Problem must involve consciousness or observers, you are mistaken.1Z 20:38, 9 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

As I understand it, he basically posits that small spacial distributions of probability are self-collapsed by gravity. So this being the case, why posit that there is a built-in "universal consciousness quanta"?

His theory of measurement/collapse does not depend on his theory of consciousness. His theory of conciousness is built on his theory of measurement/collapse.1Z 20:38, 9 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

This is clearly due to me not understanding what they are really saying -- but that's my point, this article doesn't really get the the root of it, IMHO. Maury 21:36, 11 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Penrose thinks there is something not governed by algorithms in the brain. The only process in the universe that is not governed by algorithms appears to be the collapse of the wave function. As normally described this is random and not apparently very helpful for mathematical understanding, hence the proposition of a version of collapse which is non-random but also non-computable. Is this metaphysical? I am not sure in what sense the word is being used here. However, Penrose and Hammeroff assert plausible tests both for objective reduction of the wave function and for quantum coherence and other features in the brain. Persephone19 20:38, 14 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

I'd like to re-ask my question. If one removes all mentions of brains and consciousness, does Penrose's wavefunction collapse physics still work? IE, do you need a brain, or just gravity? The recent talk I saw seemed to suggest the later, but I came in half way. Maury 19:23, 23 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The OR collapse is first given as a resolution of the wave function collapse problem. This is best described in Penrose's second book, 'Shadows of the Mind' and particularly in Chapter 6, especially 6.10 and 6.11, pp335-9. This chapter follows on a long discussion of the problems in quantum theory. The part about the brain comes later. If Penrose's scheme is right, OR collapses would have been happening billions of years before the first brains evolved. Persephone19 18:40, 24 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Ok, that's the feeling I got from the talk. But in retrospect I realize I asked the question incorrectly: forget brains, that's not what I meant, I meant "some sort of mechanical-like OR collapsing gizmo". IE, does Penrose's OR require anything other than gravity at all? (BTW, I'm ordering the book as I type this...) Maury 20:58, 24 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

As I understand it, the superpositions are reduced by gravity alone. The only qualification is that in the later version of the theory in 'Shadows of the Mind', the reduction does not automatically cut in at the Planck Length. Instead the system becomes unstable from this point on, and liable to reduction, on the principle that the greater the difference between the superpositions the shorter the expected time to reduction. The process is compared to the decay of an unstable uranium nucleus.Persephone19 17:32, 25 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Right, ok, so I think the talk I saw was basically what you have described here. And it's particularly interesting too, because it has clearly testable predictions that are currently under experiment (or will be shortly). I think this is the first direct test of a quantum formalism in a while now.

But of course I can't help coming back to my first, potentially rhetorical, question: why would Penrose be drawn off into this highly speculative topic? I'm all for musings, but by creating an early connection between his QM formalism and consciousness, I personally feel the former was "tainted" by the generally poor reception of the later.

Back to reality: this thread suggests that there should be a single complete article on OR alone. I'm going to get a copy of Shadows ASAP, but I also have his latest "big book" at home which I'm sure covers much of this as well. Maury 19:36, 26 January 2007 (UTC)[reply]

1Z, please respond at the bottom of the thread, it's hard to follow your posts otherwise. Anyway we're all quite aware of the different approaches to the measurement problem, which should have been clear from the following discussion. The issue that we're trying to understand is why he would go on to develop a theory of consciousness based on it, something that is so completely different that there doesn't appear to be any connection. Oh, I'm perfectly aware that they attempted to link the two, but given the fragile basis for the claim it seems odd anyone even bothered. As one reviewer put it, the basic line of reasoning is "quantum is weird, consciousness is weird too, they must be related!". And you definitely seem to re-enforce my opinion that OR should be split out. Maury 22:59, 9 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]

I think it's just that Penrose had approached things from the other angle. At the end of the 1980s, he decided for whatever reason to address the problem of consciousness. He formed the (highly contentious) view that the Godel Theorem meant that there was something non-computable in human mathematical understanding. Only after this did he go looking for its physical basis. He homed in on the collapse because this was not governed by algorithms. But the collapse is random and pretty useless for mathematical understanding. Hence the suggestion that the new type of collapse, OR, might be non-computable. However, OR's non-computability is not just a convenient hypothesis, there is a at least a small amount of supporting argument for why OR might be non-computable. In fact, there are really three questions. (1) Does OR exist? (2) Is it non-computable? (3)Does it have any connection with what goes on in the brain?

One thing I would add is that whatever you may think of Penrose arguments, the review you quote is an absolute travesty. Penrose's line of argument is something like what I've tried to outline above, and he never argued anything as idiotic as that the two things had to be connected simply because they were mysterious or weird. Persephone19 14:47, 10 February 2007 (UTC)[reply]