Defense Message System

The Defense Message System or Defense Messaging System (DMS) is a deployment of secure electronic mail and directory services in the United States Department of Defense. DMS is usually operated in conjunction with DMDS (Defense Message Dissemination System), a profiling system that takes a message and forwards it, based on message criteria, to parties that are required to take action on a message. This combination has met success with the upper echelons of command, since parties do not have to wait for messaging center operators to route the messages to the proper channels for action.

DMS was intended to replace the AUTODIN network, and is based on implementations of the OSI X.400 mail, X.500 directory and X.509 public key certificates, with several extensions to meet the specific needs of military messaging. DMS has been coordinated by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and testing began in 1995. DMS is currently in the process of being phased out by MMHS and CMS 1.0. These new programs replace the end user Fortezza cards with Domain Fortezza, a technology developed by Microsoft.

Amongst other vendors, Microsoft and IBM sell versions of their electronic mail software (Outlook/Exchange and Lotus Notes) that have been tested for compliance with DMS requirements.

Due to the bandwidth and computer equipment requirements for DMS, DMS has not seen a wide application in the field. However, the Army is currently experimenting with a version of DMS that utilizes Outlook Web Access instead of a dedicated Outlook Solution.

Security of DMS

Compared to AUTODIN, security of DMS might be considered more fragile: In fact commercial software programs such as Exchange and Outlook are much more secure and resistant to attack. The wide commercial use of real COTS software (millions of users)means that literally thousands of hackers spend millions of hours trying to break the system. Occasionally they do and immediately (Microsoft is very, very fast at this)the supplier removes the vulnerability. So perversly the because COTS software is attacked often it becomes harder and harder to break.

The real risks are within software that is deployed in low numbers and attacked rarely. Such software is an easy target for the determined individual. There is a constant battle being waged between software manufacturers and those who seek to bring them down. It is a fallacy that obscurity bring security. The closure of Autodin has improved security of Defence Messaging immeasurably and we should beware of deploying proprietary systems again in future.

Limitations of DMS

The DMS system was created to replace the AUTODIN messaging system; however, the DMS system lacks one critical feature that AUTODIN provided, ruthless pre-emption. In DMS, if Alice introduces a message and there already 10,000 messages being processed, her message must wait its turn to be sent. This is all well and good, unless her message happens to be a call for help as in the case of "I am in the US Embassy in Iran and we are being overrun...Please send help!" This lack of pre-emption does not meet all DoD and Government user needs. There is a least one group within the military who are unable to translate all of their messaging needs to DMS because their operations absolutely require pre-emption.

See also

• GlobalSecurity.org - Defense Message System
• Joint Interoperability Test Command (DISA) - Defense Message System
• Automatic Digital Network
• Automated Message Handling System
• Defense Switched Network
• GOSIP

The preemption ability for messaging that is being mentioned in this article for AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network) is called precedence. Precedence is basically adding a certain message importance. To understand this capability official messages must be correctly formatted and introduced into AUTODIN. Some basic guidlines to format a correct AUTODIN official message is to properly send it from your geographical location (i.e Commands, Divisions, Agencies etc..) to other geographical location or AIG's (Addressee Indicator Groups) [Basically like email distribution lists] that are defined in certain publications. The message originator will add the appropriate level of classification for his message (unclassified, secret, top secret). A precedence value is added from the originator of the message (routine, priority, immediate, Flash). Once the message is introduced in AUTODIN a routine message takes the longest to process from originator to destination and flash the quickest because of it preempts all other message traffic cued between AUTODIN switches. However, Flash messages are limited by the amount of characters within the body of the message and within AUTODIN. Generally a one paragraph or one page message. the intention of the message such as the example of "EMBASSY IN IRAN BEING TAKEN OVER BY HOSTILES. MUST SANITIZE OR DESTROY DATA AND EXIT COUNTRY ASAP. PLEASE SEND SECURITY AND AIRCRAFT FOR EVACUATION" prempts all other non-important messages. AUTODIN has this built-in capability for premption and very early versions of DMS did not address precedence values initially. DMS had used what is standard for SMTP email such as importance levels of (low, normal, high). Later versions of DMS addressed this important issue by adding DMS extensions to the DMS outlook client so it could work with AUTODIN and recognize standard precedence values. Because AUTODIN is supposed to be phased out and replaced, DMS needed to have certain functionality that AUTODIN provided for services and agencies to transition correctly to DMS. While native DMS to DMS messages don't preempt they can preempt if introduced and translated from DMS to AUTODIN. Thus DMS does not have preemptive capabilities. However, the need for premption is dependent on the service or agency. DMS systems can use software products such as DMDS to notify and disseminate flash message traffic and may be particularly important for a number of commands.